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FIRST PRINCIPLES 



FIRST PRINCIPLES 



BY 

HERBERT SPENCER 

AUTHOR OF 

"THE DATA OF ETHICS," " EDUCATION," "THE PRINCIPLES OF 
PSYCHOLOGY," ETC. 



NEW YORK 

LOVELL, CORYELL & COMPANY 
43, 45 and 47 East 10th Street 

19 f- ? 



6 






Of 
V1CTOP. S. CLARK 
SEPT. 3, 1**6 
TH€ LIBRARY Of COHGRESS 



s 






5§ 

I PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION. 



To the first edition of this work there should have been 
prefixed a definite indication of its origin; and the misap- 
prehensions that have arisen in the absence of such indica- 
tion ought before now to have shown me the need of 
supplying it. 

Though reference was made in a note on the first page 
of the original preface, to certain Essays entitled " Prog- 
ress: its Law and Cause," and "Transcendental Physiol- 
ogy," as containing generalizations which were to be elab- 
orated m the " System of Philosophy" there set forth in 
programme, yet the dates of these Essays were not given; 
nor was there any indication of their cardinal importance 
as containing, in a brief form, the general Theory of Evo- 
lution. No clear evidence to the contrary standing in the 
way, there has been very generally uttered and accepted 
the belief that this work, and the works following it, orig- 
inated after, and resulted from, the special doctrine con- 
tained in Mr. Darwin's " Origin of Species." 

The Essay on "Progress: its Law and Cause," coexten- 
sive in the theory it contains with Chapters XV., XVI., 
XVII. , and XX. in Part II. of this work, was first pub- 
lished in the Westminster Review for April, 1857; and the 
essay in which is briefly set forth the general truth elab- 
orated in Chapter XIX. originally appeared under "the 
title of " The Ultimate Laws of Physiology," in the Na- 
tional Review for October, 1857. Further I may point out 
that in the first edition of " The Principles of Psychol- 
ogy," published in July, 1855, mental phenomena ^are in- 
terpreted entirely from the. evolution point of view; and 
the words used in the titles of sundry chapters imply the 
presence, at that date, of ideas more widely applied in the 
Essays just named. As the first edition of " The Origin of 
Species" did not make its appearance till October, 1859, it 



Ti PREFACE TO THE AMERICAN EDITION 

is manifest that the theory set forth in this work and its 
successors had an origin independent of, and prior to, that 
which is commonly assumed to have initiated it. 

The distinctness of origin might, indeed, have been in- 
ferred from the work itself, which deals with Evolution at 
large — Inorganic, Organic, and Super- —in terms 

of Matter and Motion; and touches but briefly on those 
particular processes so luminously exhibited by Mr. Dar- 
win. In § 150 only (p. 44?). when illustrating the 1 
" The Multiplication of Efl 

have I had occasion to refer to thedoctri rth in the 

" Origin of Species :*' pointing out that the genera] 
I had previously assigned for the produ 
varieties of organisms would not Buffice 
the facts without that special canst d by Mr. Dar- 

win. The absence of this 

leave a serious gap in the general argument; but the re- 
mainder of the work would - it now 

I do not make this explanation in the belief that the 
vailing misapprehension will thereby so, 
I am conscious that, once having 
liefs of th i^ kind long persist — all d 
ing. Nevertheless, 1 yield to the s d that, 

I state the facta as they stand, I Bhall continue t«> counte- 
nance the misapprehension, and cannot 

With the exception of unimportant chi t the 

notes, and some typographi t this 

edition is identical with that of the last. I i 
ever, added an Appendix dealing with certain criti 
that have been passed upon the general formula of 
lution, and upon the philosophical doctrine which pre- 
cedes it. 

May 1880. 



PREFACE To Till- AMERICAN EDITH 

The present volume is the \\ 
unfold the principles of a new philosophy. It is 
into two parts: the aim of the first being rmine the 

true sphere of all rational invest] and of t: 

to elucidate those fundamental and universal principle! 



PREFACE TO THE AMERICAN EDITION. vii 

which science has established within that sphere, and 
which are to constitute the basis of the system. The 
scheme of truth developed in these First Principles is com- 
plete in itself, and has its independent value : but it is de- 
signed by the author to serve for guidance and verification 
in the construction of the succeeding and larger portions 
of his philosophic plan. 

Having presented in his introductory volume so much 
of the general principles of Physics as is essential to the 
development of his method, Mr. Spencer enters upon the 
subject of Organic Nature. The second work of the series 
is to be the Principles of Biology — a systematic statement 
of the facts and laws which constitute the Science of Life. 
It is not to be an encyclopedic and exhaustive treatise 
upon this vast subject, but such a compendious presentation 
of its data and general principles as shall interpret the 
method of nature, afford a clear understanding of the ques- 
tion involved, and prepare for further inquiries. This 
work is now published in quarterly numbers, of from 80 
to 96 pages. Four of these parts have already appeared, 
and some idea of the course and character of the discus- 
sion may be formed by observing the titles to the chap- 
ters, which are as follows: 

Part First: I. Organic Matter; II. The Actions of 
Forces on Organic Matter; III. The Reactions of Or- 
ganic Matter on Forces; IV. Proximate Definition of 
Life; V. The Correspondence between Life and its Cir- 
cumstances; VI. The Degree of Life varies with the De- 
gree of Correspondence; VII. Scope of Biology. Part 
Second: I. Growth; II. Development; Function; IV. 
Waste and Repair; V. Adaptation ; VI. Individuality 
VII. Genesis; VIII. Heredity; IX. Variation; X. Gen- 
esis, Heredity, and Variation; XL Classification; XII. 
Distribution. 

The Principles of Biology will be followed by the Prin- 
ciples of Psychology; that is, Mr. Spencer will pass from 
the consideration of Life to the study of Mind This sub- 
ject will be regarded in the light of the great truths of 
Biology previously established; the connections of life and 
mind will be traced ; the evolution of the intellectual fac- 
ulties in their due succession, and in correspondence with 
the conditions of the environment, will be unfolded, and 
the whole subject of mind will be treated, not by the nar- 



viii PREFACE TO THE AMERICAN EDITluW. 

row metaphysical methods, but in its broadest aspect, as 
a phase of nature's order which can only be comprehended 
in the light of her universal plan. 

The fourth work of the series is Sociology, or the sci- 
ence of human relations. As a multitude is but an ; 
blage of units, and as the characteristics of a multitude 
result from the properties of its units, so social phenomena 
are consequences of the natures of individual m< 
ogy and Psychology are the two great i. the knowl- 

edge of human nature; and hence from ^.»encer 

naturally passes to the subject of Social 8 The 

growth of society, the conditions of its intellectual and 
moral progress, the development of its various activities 
and organizations, will be here i I, and a statement 

made of those principles which arc BBBential t<» t: 
ful regulation of social affairs. 

Lastly, m Part Fifth, Mr. Spencer pi 
the principles of Morality. The truths furnished by 
ogy, Psychology, and Sociology will !■• jht to 

bear, to determine correct rales of humaj prin- 

ciples of private and public j m a true 

theory of right li\ 

The reader will obtain a more just idea of the i 
and proportions of Mr. Spencer's phi 
consulting his prospectus at t! ame. It 

will be seen to embrace a but in the 

present work, and in his profound ai 
the " Principles of Pb 
also throughout his numer 

discover that he has already traversed almost the entire 
field, while to elaborate the whole b I 

organized philosophical scheme is a work weO 
his held and comprehend ins. With a metaph 

acuteness equalled only by his imm< i «.f the ri 

of physical science— alike remark; I 

analysis constructive ability, and power «»f lucid and I 
hie statement, Mr. Spencer has ray be r the 

task he has undertaken, and can hardly fail 
his system the laru \uYn- 

cies of the age. 

As the present volume is a working-out "f anil 
principles to be subsequently applied, it is proba 
more abstract character than will be tin nt workl 



PREFACE TO THE AMERICAN EDITION. ix 

of the series. The discussions strike down to the prof ound- 
est basis of human thought, and involve the deepest ques- 
tions upon which the intellect of man has entered. Those 
unaccustomed to close metaphysical reasoning may there- 
fore find parts of the argument not easy to follow, al- 
though it is here presented with a distinctness and a vigor 
to be found perhaps in no other author. Still, the chief 
portions of the book may be read by all with ease and 
pleasure, while no one can fail to be repaid for the persis- 
tent effort that may be required to master the entire ar- 
gument. All who have sufficient earnestness of nature to 
take interest in those transcendent questions which are now 
occupying the most advanced minds of the age will find 
them here considered with unsurpassed clearness, origi- 
nality, and power. 

The invigorating influence of philosophical studies upon 
the mind, and their consequent educational value, have 
been long recognized. In this point of view the system 
here presented has high claims upon the young men of our 
country, — embodying as it does the latest and largest results 
of positive science; organizing its facts and principles 
upon a natural method, which places them most perfectly 
in command of memory ; and converging all its lines of 
inquiry to the end of a high practical beneficence — the un- 
folding of those laws of nature and human nature which de- 
termine personal welfare and the social polity. Earnest and 
reverent in temper, cautious in statement, severely logical 
and yet presenting his views in a transparent and attrac- 
tive style which combines the precision of science with 
many of the graces of light composition, it is believed 
that the thorough study of Spencer's philosophical scheme 
would combine, in an unrivalled degree, those prime requi- 
sites of the highest education, a knowledge of the truths 
which it is most important for man to know, and that sal- 
utary discipline of the mental faculties which results from 
their systematic acquisition. 

We say the young men of oar country, for, if we are not 
mistaken, it is here that Mr. Spencer is to find his larg- 
est and fittest audience. There is something in the bold 
handling of his questions, in his earnest and fearless appeal 
to first principles, and in the practical availability of his 
conclusions, which is eminently suited to the genius of our 
people. It has been so in a marked sense with his work on 



x PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 

Education, and there is no reason why it .should not be so 
in an equal degree with his other writings. They betray a 
profound sympathy with the best spirit of our institutions, 
and that noble aspiration for the welfare and improvement 
of society which can hardly fail to commend them to the 
more liberal and enlightened portions of the American 
public. 



PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 

WHEN the First Edition of this work 
supposed that the general theory set forth in i - 
Part was presented in something like a finished form; but 
subsequent thought led me to further developmei 
much importance, and disclosed the fact that t 
nent parts of the theory had been wrongly put 
Even in the absence of a more special reason, I ha 
cided that, on the completion of the " Principl< 
ogy," it would be proper t i for a few montl 

series 1 am issuing, that I might make the required re- 
organization. And when the time had arri re had 
arisen a more Bpecial reason, which forbade h 
Translations into the French and Russian . 
about to be made — had, i 

had I deferred the reorganize k would have 

been reproduced with all its original 
This will i»e a sufficient expla i have 

complained of the delay in the - the "Pri 

Psychology." 

The First Part remains almo iched: tv 

alterations only, on pp, 

prevent misconceptioi I II.. I. holly 

transformed. Its first el;:. 

omitted, with a view to the inclusion of it in one of the 
later volumes of the Beri( s. 
pear. Most of the rest are transposed, i 
And there are nine new chaptt - e further 

developments, and serving .bine tl. 

chapters into a changed whole. Tl 
which the new cha 3 • marked by aali 
idea of the transformation: 



PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 



First Edition. 



Second Edition. 



Laws in General. 

The Law of Evolution. 

The Law of Evolution (con- 
tinued) . 

The Causes of Evolution. 

Space, Time, Matter, Motion, 
and Force. 

The Indestructibility of Matter. 

The Continuity of Motion. 

The Persistence of Force. 



Philosophy Defined. 
The Data of Philosophy. 



The Correlation and Equiva- 
lence of Forces. 
The Direction of Motion. 
The Rhythm of Motion. 



The Conditions essential 
Evolution. 



to 



Space, Time, Matter, Motion, 
and Force. 

The Indestructibility of Matter. 

The Continuity of Motion. 

The Persistence of Force. 

The Persistence of Relations 

. among Forces. 

The Transformation and Equiv- 
alence of Forces. 

The Direction of Motion. 

The Rhythm of Motion. 

Recapitulation, Criticism, and 
Recommencement. 

Evolution and Dissolution 

Simple and Compound Evolu- 
tion. 

The Law of Evolu-] 
tion. Re-ar- 

The Law of Evolu- J ranged 
tion (contiaued). ( withad- 

The Law of Evolu- I ditions. 
tion (continued). J 

The Law of Evolution (con- 
cluded) . 

The Interpretation of Evolu- 
tion. 

The Instability of the Homo- 
geneous. 

The Multiplication of Effects. 

Segregation. 

Equilibration. 
Dissolution. 

Summary and Conclusion (Re- 
written) . 

Of course throughout this reorganized Second Part 
the numbers of the sections have been changed, and hence 
those who possess the "Principles of Biology," in which 
many references are made to passages in " First Princi- 
ples/' would be inconvenienced by the want of correspond- 
ence between the numbers of the sections in the original 
edition and in the new edition, were they without any 
means of identifying the sections as now numbered. The 



The Instability of the Homo- 
geneous. 

The Multiplication of Effects. 

Differentiation and Integra- 
tion. 

Equilibration. 

Summarv and Conclusion. 



xii 



PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION 



annexed list, showing which section answers to which in 
the two editions, will meet the requirement : 



First Second First Second First Second First SecoDd First Second 
Edit. Edit. Edit. Edit. Edit. Edit. Edit Edit. Edit. Edit. 



?43 §119 

44 117 

45 118 

46 120 

47 121 

48 122 

49 123 

50 124 

51 125 

52 126 

53 128 

54 129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 



55 



§56^ 



61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 



107 

108 

109 

110 

111 

112 

113 

114 

115 

46 

47 

48 

49 

50 

52 

53 

54 

55 

56 

57 



rat 
it. 


Second 
Edit. 


;72 


§58 


73 


59 


74 


GO 


75 


61 


76 


62 


77 


66 


78 


67 


79 


68 


80 


69 


81 


70 


82 


71 


83 


72 


B4 


;:; 


85 


74 


86 


75 


87 


76 


88 


;; 




> 


90 


79 


!•! 


'80 



£92 §81 
93 B2 



94 
95 

97 
98 
99 



83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 



109 149 

110 150 

111 151 

112 152 

113 153 

114 L54 

115 155 

116 156 

117 157 

118 L58 

119 159 
120 



§121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 

134 
135 

i.;; 

144 
145 



§161 
162 

163 
164 
165 
166 

iro 

171 
172 
173 
174 
175 
176 
| 177 

193 
194 



The original stereotype plates have been used wherever 
it was possible: and hence the exact c idence be- 

tween the two editions in many places, even where adja- 
cent pages are altered.* 

London. November 1867 



*This refers lo the Luiidou editions ouly. —Editor. 



CONTENTS. 



PART I.— THE UNKNOWABLE. 

CHAPTER PAGE 

I.— Religion and Science, 1 

II.— Ultimate Religious Ideas, 20 

III. —Ultimate Scientific Ideas, 39 

IV, —The Relativity of All Knowledge, . . .56 
V. —The Reconciliation, 82 



PART II.— THE KNOWABLE. 



105 
112 
131 
143 
150 
158 



I.— Philosophy Defined, .... 

II. — The Data of Philosophy, 

III.— Space, Time, Matter, Motion, and Force 

IV. — The Indestructibility of Matter, 

V.— The Continuity of Motion, . 

VI.— The Persistence of Force, 

VII.— The Persistence of Relations Among Forces, . 164 

VIII.— The Transformation and Equivalence of Forces, 166 

IX.— The Direction of Motion, 189 

X.— The Rhythm of Motion, 212 

XI.— Recapitulation, Criticism, and Recommencement, 231 

XII.— Evolution and Dissolution, 235 

XIII.— Simple and Compound Evolution, . . . 242 
XIV. —The Law of Evolution, 259 



xiv 


CONTEXTS. 




CHAPTER 




PAGE 


XV. 


—The Law of Evolution Continued, 


. 277 


XVI.- 


—The Law of Evolution Continued, 


. 305 


XVII. 


—The Law of Evolution Concluded, 


. 320 


XVIII.- 


—The Interpretation of Evolution, 


. 334 


XIX. 


—The Instability of the Homogeneous, 


. 337 


XX.- 


—The Multiplication of Effects, . 


. 362 


XXI.- 


—Segregation, 


. 386 


XXII. - 


—Equilibration, , 


. 407 


XXIII. 


—Dissolution, 


. 436 


XXIV- 


—Summary and Conclusion, 


. 453 




Appendix, 


. 4'A 



FIRST PRINCIPLES 



PART I: 
THE U^OOWABLE. 



CHAPTEE I. 

RELIGION AND SCIENCE. 



§ 1. We too often forget that not only is there " a soul of 
goodness in things evil," but very generally also a soul of 
truth in things erroneous. While many admit the abstract 
probability that a falsity has usually a nucleus of reality, 
few bear this abstract probability in mind, when passing 
judgment on the opinions of others. A belief that is 
finally proved to be grossly at variance with fact is cast 
aside with indignation or contempt; and in the heat of 
antagonism scarcely any one inquires what there was in 
this belief which commended it to men's minds. Yet 
there must have been something. And there is reason to 
suspect that this something was its correspondence with 
certain of their experiences : an extremely limited or vague 
correspondence perhaps ; but still, a correspondence. Even 
the absurdest report may in nearly every instance be traced 
to an actual occurence; and had there been no such actual 
occurrence, this preposterous misrepresentation of it 
would never have existed. Though the distorted or mag- 
nified image transmitted to us through the refracting 
medium of rumor, is utterly unlike the reality; yet in 
the absence of the reality there would have been no dis- 
torted or magnified image. And thus it is with human 
beliefs in general. Entirely wrong as they may appear, 



2 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

the implication is that they germinated out of actual ex- 
periences — originally contained, and perhaps still contain, 
some small amount of verity. 

More especially may we safely assume this, in the case cf 
beliefs that have long existed and are widely diffused ; and 
most of all so in the case of beliefs that are perennial and 
nearly or quite universal. The presumption that any cur- 
rent opinion is not wholly false gains in strength accord- 
ing to the number of its adherents. Admitting, as we 
must, that life is impossible unless through a certain agree- 
ment between internal convictions and external circum- 
stances; admitting therefore that the probabilities are 
always in favor of the truth, or at least the partial truth, 
of a conviction; we must admit that the convictions enter- 
tained by many minds in common are the most likely to 
have some foundation. The elimination of individual 
errors of thought, must give to the resulting judgment a 
certain additional value. It may indeed be urged that many 
widely spread beliefs are received on authority; that those 
entertaining them make no attempts at verification; and 
hence it may be inferred that the multitude of adherents 
adds but little to the probability of a belief. But this is 
not true. For a belief which gains extensive reception 
without critical examination, is thereby proved to have a 
general congrnity with the various other beliefs of those 
who receive it ; and in bo far as these various other beliefs 
are based upon personal observation and judgment, they 
give an indirect warrant to cue with which they harmonize. 
It may be that this warrant is of small value: but still it 
is of some value. 

Could we reach definite views on this matter, they would 
be extremely useful to us. It is important that we should, 
it' possible, form something like a general theory of cur- 
rent opinion.-; so that we may neither over-estimate nor 
under-estimate their worth. Arriving at correct judgments 
on disputed questions, much depends on the attitu 
mind we preserve while listening to, <>r takir. .. the 

controversy; and for the preservation of a right attitude, 
it is needful that we should learn how true, and yet how 
untrue, are average human beliefs. On the one hand, we 
must keep free from that bias in favor of r ideas 

which expresses itself in such dogmas as " What every one 
says must be true," or" The voice of the people is the voice 



FIRST PRINCIPLES 8 

of God." On the other hand, the fact disclosed by a sur- 
vey of the past, that majorities have usually been wrong, 
must not blind us to the complementary fact, that majori- 
ties have usually not been entirely wrong. And the avoid- 
ance of these extremes being a prerequisite to catholic 
thinking, we shall do well to provide ourselves with a safe- 
guard against them, by making a valuation of opinions in 
the abstract. To this end we must contemplate the kind 
of relation that ordinarily subsists between opinions and 
facts. Let us do so with one of those beliefs which under 
various forms has prevailed among all nations in all times. 

§ 2. The earliest traditions represent rulers as gods or 
demigods. By their subjects, primitive kings were re- 
garded as superhuman in origin, and superhuman in power. 
They possessed divine titles; received obeisances like those 
made before the altars of deities; and were in some cases 
actually worshipped. If there needs proof that the divine 
and half-divine characters originally ascribed to monarchs 
were ascribed literally, we have it in the fact that there are 
still existing savage races, among whom it is held that the 
chiefs and their kindred are of celestial origin, or, as else- 
where, that only the chiefs have souls. And of course 
along with beliefs of this kind, there existed a belief in the 
unlimited power of the ruler over his subjects — an absolute 
possession of them, extending even to the taking of their 
lives at will; as even still in Fiji, where a victim stands un- 
bound to be killed at the word of his chief ; himself declar- 
ing, " whatever the king says must be done." 

In times and among races somewhat less barbarous, we 
find these beliefs a little modified. The monarch, instead 
of being literally thought god or demigod, is conceived to be 
a man having divine authority, with perhaps more or less 
of divine nature. He retains, however, as in the East to the 
present day, titles expressing his heavenly descent or re- 
lationship ; and is still saluted in forms and words as 
humble as those addressed to the Deity. While the lives 
and properties of his people, if not practically so completely 
at his mercy, are still in theory supposed to be his. 

Later in the progress of civilization, as during the 
middle ages in Europe, the current opinions respecting the 
relationship of rulers and ruled are further changed. For 
the theory of divine origin, there is substituted that of 



4 FIRST PPJXCIPLES. 

divine right. No longer god or demigod, or even god-de- 
scended, the king is now regarded as simply God's vice- 
gerent. The obeisances made to him are not so extreme in 
their humility; and his sacred titles lose much of their 
meaning. Moreover, his authority ceases to be unlimited. 
Subjects deny his right to dispose at will of their lives and 
properties; and yield allegiance only in the shape of obe- 
dience to his commands. 

With advancing political opinion has come still greater 
restriction of imperial power. Belief in the supernatural 
character of the ruler, long ago repudiated by ourselves 
for example, has left behind it nothing more than the 
popular tendency to ascribe unusual as, wisdom, and 

beauty to the monarch. Loyalty, which originally meant 
implicit submission to the king's will, now means a merely 
nominal profession of subordination, and the fulfilment of 
certain forms of respect. Our political practice, and our 
political theory, alike utterly rej _;;tives 

which once passed unquestioned. By depoe .and 

putting others in their places, we have not only denied the 
divine rights of certain men to rule; but we have denied 
that they have any rights beyond tl inating in the 

assent of the nation. Though our forms ii and our 

state-documents still assert the subj «ti< >ti of the citizens 
to the ruler, our actual beliefs and our daily proceedings 
implicitly assert the contrary. We obey no Laws 
of our own making. We have entirely divested the 
monarch of legislative power; and should immediately 
rebel against his or her exercifi P, even in 

matters of the smallest concern. In brief, the i 
doctrine is all but extinct ami 

Nor has the rejection of primitive political beliefs 
suited only in transferring the authority of an au- 
to a representative body. The views entertained r- - 
ing governments in general, of whatever form, are now 
widely different from fchoe entertained. Whether 

popular or despotic, governments were in ancient times 
supposed to have unlimited authority over their sub 
Individuals existed for the benefit of the S t the 

State for the benefit of individuals. In our days, how 
not only has the national will been in many 
stituted tor the will of the king: but the exercise of this 
national will has been restricted to a much smaller sphere. 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 5 

In England, for instance, though there has been established 
no definite theory setting bounds to governmental author- 
ity, yet, in practice, sundry bounds have been set to it 
which are tacitly recognized by all. There is no organic 
law formally declaring that the legislature may not freely 
dispose of the citizens' lives, as early kings did when they 
sacrificed hecatombs of victims; but were it possible for 
our legislature to attempt such a thing, its own destruction 
would be the consequence, rather than the destruction 
of citizens. How entirely we have established the personal 
liberties of the subject against the invasions of State power, 
would be quickly demonstrated, were it proposed by Act of 
Parliament forcibly to take possession of the nation, or of 
any class, and turn its services to public ends; as the ser- 
vices of the people were turned by primitive rulers. And 
should any statesman suggest a re-distribution of property 
such as was sometimes made in ancient democratic com- 
munities, he would be met by a thousand-tongued denial 
of imperial power over individual possessions. Not only 
in our day have these fundamental claims of the citizen 
been thus made good against the State, but sundry minor 
claims likewise. Ages ago, laws regulating dress and mode 
of living fell into disuse; and any attempt to revive them 
would prove the current opinion to be, that such matters 
lie beyond the sphere of legal control. For some centuries 
we have been asserting in practice, and have now estab- 
lished in theory, the right of every man to choose his own 
religious beliefs, instead of receiving such beliefs on State 
authority. Within the last few generations we have inau- 
gurated complete liberty of speech, in spite of all legislative 
attempts to suppress or limit it. And still more recently 
we have claimed and finally obtained, under a few excep- 
tional restrictions, freedom to trade with whomsoever we 
please. Thus our political beliefs are widely different from 
ancient ones, not only as to the proper depositary of power 
to be exercised over a nation,- but also as to the extent of 
that power. 

Not even here has the change ended. Besides the 
average opinions which we have just described as current 
among ourselves, there exists a less widely di'ffused opinion 
going still further in the same direction. There are to be 
found men who contend that the sphere of government 
should be narrowed even more than it is in England. The 



6 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

modern doctrine that the State exists for the benefit of 
citizens, which has now in a great measure supplanted the 
ancient doctrine that the citizens exist for the benefit of the 
State, they would push to its logical results. They hold 
that the freedom of the individual, limited only by the 
like freedom of other individuals, is sacred; and that the 
legislature cannot equitably put further restrictions upon 
it, either by forbidding any actions which the law of equal 
freedom permits, or taking away any property save that 
required to pay the cost of enforcing this law itself. They 
assert that the sole function of the State is the protection 
of persons against each other, and against a foreign foe. 
They urge that as, throughout civilization, the man i test 
tendency has been continually to extend the libei i 
the subject, and restrict the functions of the State, there is 
reason to believe that the ultimate political condition 
must be one in which personal freedom is tl. -: pos- 

sible and governmental power the lea* that, 

namely, in which the freedom of each has no limit but the 
like freedom of all ; while the sole governmental duty is 
the maintenance of this limit. 

Here, then, in different times and places we find concern- 
ing the origin, authority, and functions of government a 
great variety of opinions — opinions of which the leading 
genera above indicated subdivide into countless 
What now must be said about the truth or falsity <•; 
opinions'/ Save among a few barbarous tribes the notion 
that a monarch is a god or deni garded thror. s 

the world as an absurdity ah: the bom 

human credulity. In but few plac there survive a 

vague notion that the ruler matural attri- 

butes. Most civilized communities which still admit the 
divine right of governments have lonjg since repudi 
the divine right of kin_- I - where the belief that there 
is anything sacred in legislative regulations is dying out; 
laws are coming to be consi.I conventional only. 

While the extreme school holds that governments have 
neither intrinsic authority, nor can have authority g 
to them by convention, but can possess authoril 
the administrators of those moral principl - 
from the conditions essential to social life. Of 
various beliefs, with their inumerable modifications, must 
we then say that some one alone is wholly right and al* 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 7 

the rest wholly wrong ; or must we say that each of them 
contains truth more or less completely disguised by errors? 
The latter alternative is the one which analysis will force 
upon us. Kidiculous as they may severally appear to those 
not educated under them, every one of these doctrines has 
for its vital element the recognition of an unquestionable 
fact. Directly or by implication, each of them insists on 
a certain subordination of individual actions to social re- 
quirements. There are wide differences as to the power to 
which this subordination is due; there are wide differences 
as to the motive for this subordination; there are wide 
differences as to its extent; but that there must be some 
subordination all are agreed. From the oldest and rudest 
idea of allegiance, down to the most advanced political 
theory of our own day, there is on this point complete 
unanimity. Though,- between the savage who conceives 
his life and property to be at the absolute disposal of his 
chief, and the anarchist who denies the right of any gov- 
ernment, autocratic or democratic, to trench upon his in- 
dividual freedom, there seems at first sight an entire and 
irreconcilable antagonism; yet ultimate analysis.discloses 
in them this fundamental community of opinion; that 
there are limits which individual actions may not trans- 
gress — limits which the one regards as originating in the 
king's will, and which the other regards as deducible from 
the equal claims of fellow-citizens. 

It may perhaps at first sight seem that we here reach a 
very unimportant conclusion : namely, that a certain tacit 
assumption is equally implied in all these conflicting politi- 
cal creeds — an assumption which is indeed of self-evident 
validity. The question, however, is not the value or 
novelty of the particular truth in this case arrived at. My 
aim has been to exhibit the more general truth, which we 
are apt to overlook, that between the most opposite beliefs 
there is usually something in common — something taken 
for granted by each ; and that this something, if not to be 
set down as an unquestionable verity, may yet be considered 
to have the highest degree of probability. A postulate 
which, like the one above instanced, is not consciously 
asserted but unconsciously involved; and which is un- 
consciously involved not by one man or body of men, but 
by numerous bodies of men who diverge in countless ways 
and degrees in the rest of their beliefs — has a warrant far 



8 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

transcending any that can be usually shown. And when, 
as in this case, the postulate is abstract — is not based on 
some one concrete experience common to all mankind, but 
implies an induction from a great variety of experiences, 
we may say that it ranks next in certainty to the postulates 
of exact science. 

Do we not thus arrive at a generalization which may 
habitually guide us when seeking for the soul of truth in 
things erroneous? While the foregoing illustration brings 
clearly home the fact, that in opinions seeming to be ab- 
solutely and supremely wrong something right is yet to be 
found, it also indicates the method we should pursue in 
seeking the something right. This method is to compare 
all opinions of the same genus; to set aside as more or less 
discrediting one another those various special and concrete 
elements in which such opinions di. -air roe; to observe what 
remains after the discordant constituents have been 
eliminated; and to find for this remaining constituent that 
abstract expression which holds true throughout its diver- 
gent modifications. 

§ 3. A candid acceptance of this general principle, and 
an adoption of the course it indicates, will greatly aid us 
in dealing with those chronic antagonisms by which men 
are divided. Applying it not only to current ideas with 
which we are personally unconcerned, bat also to our own 
ideas and those of our opponents, we shall be led to form 
far more correct judgment We shall I i 
pert that the convictions we entertain are not wholly right, 
and that the adverse convictions are not wholly v. 
On the one hand, we shall not, in common with the 
mass of the unthinking, let our beliefs lie determined by 
the mere accident of birth in a particular age on a particu- 
lar part of the Earth's surface; and, on the other hand, 
we shall be saved from that error of entire and contemptu- 
ous negation which is fallen into by most who take up an 
attitude of independent criticism. 

Of all antagonisms of belief, the oldest, the widest, the 
most profound, and the most important, is that between 
Religion and Science. It commenced when the recognition 
of the simplest uniformities in surrounding thi 
limit to the once universal superstition. It shows itself 
everywhere throughout the domain of human knowledge, 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. , 9 

affecting men's interpretations alike of the simplest 
mechanical accidents and of the most complicated events 
in the histories of nations. It has its roots deep down in 
the diverse habits of thought of different orders of minds. 
And the conflicting conceptions of nature and life which 
these diverse habits of thought severally generate influence 
for good or ill the tone of feeling and the daily conduct. 

An unceasing battle of opinion like this, which has been 
carried on throughout all ages under the banners of Re- 
ligion and Science, has of course generated an animosity 
fatal to a just estimate of either party by the other. On 
a larger scale, and more intensely than any other contro- 
versy, has it illustrated that perennially significant fable 
concerning the knights who fought about the color of a 
shield of which neither looked at more than one face. Each 
combatant, seeing clearly his own aspect of the question, 
has charged his opponent with stupidity or dishonesty in 
not seeing the same aspect of it ; while each has wanted the 
candor to go over to his opponent's side and find out how 
it was that he saw everything so differently. 

Happily the times display an increasing catholicity of 
feeling, which we shall do well in carrying as far as our 
natures permit. In proportion as we love truth more and 
victory less, we shall become anxious to know what it is 
which leads our opponents to think as they do. We shall 
begin to suspect that the pertinacity of belief exhibited 
by them must result from a perception of something we 
have not perceived. And we shall aim to supplement the 
portion of truth we have found with the portion found by 
them. Making a more rational estimate of human author- 
ity, we shall avoid alike the extremes of undue submission 
and undue rebellion — shall not regard some men's judg- 
ments as wholly good and others as wholly bad; but shall 
rather lean to the more defensible position that none are 
completely right and none are completely wrong. 

Preserving, as far as may be, this impartial attitude, let 
us then contemplate the two sides of this great contro- 
versy. Keeping guard against the bias of education and 
shutting out the whisperings of sectarian feeling, let us 
consider what are the a priori probabilities in favor of 
each party. 

§ 4. When duly realized, the general principle above il- 



10 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

lustrated must lead us to anticipate that the diverse forms 
of religious belief which have existed, and which still exist, 
have all a basis in some ultimate fact. Judging by analogy 
the implication is, not that any one of them is altogether 
right ; but that in each there is something right more or 
less disguised by other things wrong. It may be that the 
soul of truth contained in erroneous creeds is very unlike 
most, if not all, of its several embodiments; and indeed if, 
as we have good reason to expect, it is much more abstract 
than any of them, its unlikeness necessarily follows. But 
however different from its concrete expressions, some essen- 
tial verity must be looked for. To suppose that these 
multiform conceptions should be one and all absolutely 
groundless, discredits too profoundly that average human 
intelligence from which all our individual intelligences are 
inherited. 

This most general reason we shall find enforced by other 
more special ones. To the presumption that a number of 
diverse beliefs of the same class havi nmon founda- 

tion in fact, must in this case be added a further presump- 
tion derived from the omnipresence of the beliefs. Re- 
ligious ideas of one kind" or other are almost univ 
Admitting that in many places there are tribes who have 
no theory of creation, no word for a deity, no propitiatory 
acts, no idea of another life: admitting that only when a 
certain phase of intelligence is reached do the most rudi- 
mentary of such theories make their appearance — the im- 
plication is practically the same. Grant that among all 
races who have passed a certain stage of intellectual de- 
velopment there are found vague notions concerning the 
origin and hidden nature of surrounding things, and there 
arises the inference that such notions are necessary prod- 
ucts Of progressing intelligence. Their endless variety 
serves but to strengthen this conclusion: showing 
does a more or less independent genesis — showing how. in 
different places and times, like conditions have led to 
similar trains of thought, ending in analogous results. 
That these countless different, and yet allied, phenomena 
presented by all religions are accidental or factii 
untenable supposition. A candid examination of the evi- 
dence quite negatives the doctrine maintained by some, 
that creeds are priestly inventions. Even as a mere ques- 
tion of probabilities it cannot rationally be concluded that 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 11 

in every society, past and present, savage and civilized, 
certain members of the community have combined to de- 
lude the rest in ways so analogous. To any who may 
allege that some primitive fiction was devised by some 
primitive priesthood, before yet mankind had diverged 
from a common centre, a reply is furnished by philology ; 
for philology proves the dispersion of mankind to have 
commenced before there existed a language sufficiently or- 
ganized to express religious ideas. Moreover, were it 
otherwise tenable, the hypothesis of artificial origin fails 
to account for the facts. It does not explain why, under 
all changes of form, certain elements of religious belief 
remain constant. It does not show us how it happens that 
while adverse criticism has from age to age gone on de- 
stroying particular theological dogmas, it has not destroyed 
the fundamental conception underlying these dogmas. It 
leaves us without any solution of the striking circumstance 
that when, from the absurdities and corruptions accumu- 
lated around them, national creeds have fallen into general 
discredit, ending in indifferentism or positive denial, there 
has always by and by arisen a re-assertion of them ; if not 
the same in form, still the same in essence. Thus the 
universality of religious ideas, their independent evolution 
among different primitive races, and their great vitality, 
unite in showing that their source must be deep-seated 
instead of superficial. In other words, we are obliged to 
admit that, if not supernaturally derived as the majority 
contend, they must be derived out of human experiences, 
slowly accumulated and organized. 

Should it be asserted that religious ideas are products of 
the religious sentiment, which, to satisfy itself, prompts 
imaginations that it afterward projects into the external 
world, and by and by mistakes for realities; the problem 
is not solved, but only removed further back. Whether 
the wish is father to the thought, or whether sentiment 
and idea have a common genesis, there equally arises the 
question — Whence comes the sentiment? That it is a con- 
stituent in man's nature is implied by the hypothesis ; and 
cannot indeed be denied by those who prefer other hypo- 
theses. And if the religious sentiment, displayed habi- 
tually by the majority of mankind, and occasionally aroused 
even in those .seemingly devoid of it, must be classed 
among human emotions, we cannot rationally ignore it. 



12 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

AVe are bound to ask its origin and its function. Here is 
an attribute which, to say the least, has had an enormous 
influence — which has played a conspicuous part cnroughout 
the entire past as far back as history records, and is at 
present the life of numerous institutions, the stimulus to 
perpetual controversies, and the prompter of countless 
daily actions. Any Theory of Things which takes no 
account of this attribute, must, then, be extremely defect- 
ive. If with no other view, still as a question in philo- 
sophy, we are called on to say what this attribute means; 
and we cannot decline the task without confessing our 
philosophy to be incompetent. 

Two suppositions only are open to us : the one that the 
feeling which responds to religions ideas resulted, along 
with all other human faculties, from an ; special 

creation; the other that it, in common with thereat, arose 
by a process of evolution. If we ado] it the first of these 
alternatives, universally accepted by our ancestors and by 
the immense majority of our contemporaries, the matter 
is at once settled: man is directly endowed with the re- 
ligious feeling by a creator: and to that creator it de- 
signedly responds. If we adopt the second alternative, then 
we are met by the questions — What are the eircum>t 
to which the genesis of the religions feeling is due? and — 
What is its office? We are hound to entertain tl 
tions; and we are bound to rind answers to them. 
sidering all faculties, as we must on this supposition, to 
result from accumulated modifications caused by the in- 
tercourse of the organism with its environment, we are 
obliged to admit that there exist in the environment 
tain phenomena or conditions which have determined the 
growth of the feeling in question; and so are obliged toad- 
mit that it is as normal as any other faculty. Add to 
which that as, on the hypothesis of a development of lower 
forms into higher, the end toward which the } 
changes directly or indirectly tend must he adaptation to 
the requirements of existence: we are aL= i to infer 

that this feeling is in some way conducive to human wel- 
fare. Thus both alternatives contain the same ultimate 
implication. We must conclude that the religi- a 
ment is either directly created, or is created by th< 
action of natural causes; and whichever of these Cc 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 13 

sions we adopt requires us to treat the religious senti- 
ment with respect. 

One other consideration should not be overlooked — a 
consideration which students of Science more especially 
need to have pointed out. OccupiecL as such are with es- 
tablished truths, and accustomed to regard things not 
already known as things to be hereafter discovered, they 
are liable to forget that information, however extensive it 
may become, can never satisfy inquiry. Positive knowl- 
edge does not, and never can, fill the whole region of pos- 
sible thought. At the uttermost reach of discovery there 
arises, and must ever arise, the question — What lies be- 
yond? As it is impossible to think of a limit to space so 
as to exclude the idea of space lying outside that limit ; so 
we cannot conceive of any explanation profound enough 
to exclude the question — What is the explanation of that 
explanation? Regarding Science as a gradually increasing 
sphere* we may say that every addition to its surface does 
but bring it into wider contact with surrounding nescience. 
There must ever remain, therefore, two antithetical modes 
of mental action. Throughout all future time, as now, 
the human mind may occupy itself, not only with ascer- 
tained phenomena and their relations, but also with that 
unascertained something which phenomena and their rela- 
tions imply. Hence if knowledge cannot monopolize 
consciousness — if it must always continue possible for the 
mind to dwell upon that which transcends knowledge; 
then there can never cease to be a place for something of 
the nature of Eeligion ; since Religion under all its forms 
is distinguished from everything else in this, that its sub- 
ject-matter is that which passes the sphere of experience. 

Thus, however untenable may be any or ail the existing 
religious creeds, however gross the absurdities associated 
with them, however irrational the arguments set forth in 
their defence, we must not ignore the verity which in all 
likelihood lies hidden within them. The general proba- 
bility that widely spread beliefs are not absolutely baseless 
is in this case enforced by a further probability due to the 
omnipresence of the beliefs. In the existence of a religious 
sentiment, whatever be its origin, we have a second evi- 
dence of great significance. And as in that nescience 
which must ever remain the antithesis to science, there is 



14 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

a sphere for the exercise of this sentiment, we find a third 
general fact of like implication. AVe may be sure, there- 
fore, that religions, though even none of them be actually 
true, are yet all adumbrations of a truth. 

§ 5. As, to the religious, it will seem absurd to set forth 
any justification for Religion; so, to the scientific, will it 
seem absurd to defend Science. Yet to do the last is cer- 
tainly as needful as to do the first. If there exists a class 
who, in contempt of its follies and disgust at its corrup- 
tions, have contracted toward Religion a repugnance which 
makes them overlook the fundamental verity contained in 
it — so, too, is there a class offended to such a degee by the 
destructive criticisms men of science make on the religious 
tenets they regard as essential, that they have acquired a 
strong prejudice against Science in general. They are not 
prepared witli any avowed realms for their dislike. They 
have simply a remembrance of the rude shakes which 
Science has given to many of their cherished convictions, 
and a suspicion that it may perhaps eventually uproot all 
they regard as sacred; and hence it produces in them a 
certain inarticulate dread. 

What is Science*? To see the absurdity of the prejudice 
against it, we need only remark that Science is simply a 
higher development of common knowledge; and that if 
Science is repudiated, all knowledge must be repudiated 
along with it. The extreniot bigot will not suspect any 
harm in the observation that the sun rises earlier and sets 
later in the Bummer than in the winter; but will rather 
consider such an observation as a useful aid in fulfilling 
the duties of life. Well, Astronomy is an organized body 
of similar observations, made with greater nicety, extended 
to a larger number of objects, and BO analyzed as to dis- 
close the real arrangements of the heavens, and t«> 
our false conceptions of them. That iron will nu 
water, that wood will burn, that long kept viands k 
putrid, the most timid sectarian will teach without alarm, 
as things useful to be known. Hut these are chemical 
truths: Chemistry is a systematized collection of such facts, 
ascertained with precision, and so classified and generalized 
as to enable us to say with certainty, concerning each simple 
or compound substance, what change will occur in it under 
given conditions. And thus is it with all tlu 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 15 

They severally germinate out of the experiences of daily 
life ; insensibly as they grow they draw in remoter, more 
numerous, and more complex experiences; and among 
these, they ascertain laws of dependence like those which 
make up our knowledge of the most familiar objects. No- 
where is it possible to draw a line and say — here Science 
begins. And as it is the function of common observation 
to serve for the guidance of conduct; so, too, is the guid- 
ance of conduct the office of the most recondite and ab- 
stract inquiries of Science. Through the countless indus- 
trial processes and the various modes of locomotion which 
it lias given us, Physics regulates more completely our 
social life than does his acquaintance with the properties 
of surrounding bodies regulate the life of the savage. 
Anatomy and Physiology, through their effects on the 
practice of medicine and hygiene, modify our actions al- 
most as much as does our acquaintance with the evils and 
benefits which common environing agencies may produce 
on our bodies. All Science is prevision ; and all prevision 
ultimately aids us in greater or less degree to achieve the 
good and avoid the bad. As certainly as the perception 
of an object lying in our path warns us against stumbling 
over it ; so certainly do those more complicated and subtle 
perceptions which constitute Science warn us against 
tumbling over intervening obstacles in the pursuit of our 
distant ends. Thus being one in origin and function, the 
simplest form of cognition and the most complex must be 
dealt with alike. We are bound in consistency to receive 
the widest knowledge which our faculties can reach, or to 
reject along with it that narrow knowledge possessed by 
all. There is no logical alternative between accepting our 
intelligence in its entirety, or repudiating even that lowest 
intelligence which we possess in common with brutes. 

To ask the question which more immediately concerns 
our argument — whether Science is substantially true? — is 
much like asking whether the sun gives light. And it is 
because they are conscious how undeniably valid are most 
of its propositions, that the theological party regard 
Science with so much secret alarm. They know that dur- 
ing the two thousand years of its growth, some of its larger 
divisions — mathematics, physics, astronomy — have been 
subject to the rigorous criticism of successive generations; 
and have notwithstanding become ever more firmly estab- 



16 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

lished. They know that, unlike many of their own doc- 
trines, which were once universally received but have age 
by age been more frequently called in question, the doc- 
trines of Science, at first confined to a few scattered in- 
quirers, have been slowly growing into general acceptance, 
and are now in great part admitted as beyond dispute. 
They know that men of science throughout the world sub- 
ject each other's results to the most searching examina- 
tion; and that error is mercilessly exposed and rejected as 
soon as discovered. And, finally, they know that still 
more conclusive testimony is to be found in the daily ver- 
ification of scientific predictions, and in the never-ceasing 
triumphs of those arts which Science guides. 

To regard with alienation that which lias such high cre- 
dentials is a folly. Though in the tone which many of the 
scientific adopt toward them the defenders of Religion 
may iind some excuse for their alienation; yet the < 
is a very insufficient one. On the side of \ 
their own side, they must admit that shortcomings in the 
advocates do not tell essentially against that which 
vocated. Science must be judged by itself; andsoju 
only the most perverted intellect can fail to Bee that it is 
worthy of all reverence. Be there or he there lmt an- 
other revelation, we have 4 veritable revelation in v 
a continuous disclosure, through the intelligence with 
which we are endowed, of the established order of the 
Universe. This disclosure it is the duty of ev< 
verify as far as in him lies; and, having verified, to n 
with all humility. 

£ ii. On both sides of this great controversy, then, truth 
must exist. An unbiased consideration of its general as- 
pects forces us to conclude that Religion, everywhere 
ent as a weft running through the warp of human hisl 
expresses some eternal fact; wihle it is almost a t: 
to Bay of Science that it is an organized mass of facts, 
ever growing, and ever being more completely purified 
from errors. And if both have bases in the realil 
things, then between them there must be a fundamental 
harmony. It is an incredible hypothesis that the: 
two orders of truth, is absolute and everlastin tionu 

Only on some Maniohean theory, which among ours 
no one dares openly avow, however much his beliefs n. 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 17 

tainted by it, is such a supposition even conceivable. That 
Eeligion is divine and Science diabolical, is a proposition 
which, though implied in many a clerical declamation, not 
the most vehement- fanatic can bring himself distinctly to 
assert. And whoever does not assert this must admit that 
under their seeming antagonism lies hidden an entire 
agreement. 

Each side, therefore, has to recognize the claims of the 
other as standing for truths that are not to be ignored. 
He who contemplates the Universe from the religious 
point of view must learn to see that this which we call 
Science is one constituent of the great whole; and as such 
ought to be regarded with a sentiment like that which the 
remainder excitjs. While he who contemplates the uni- 
verse from the scientific point of view must learn to see 
that this which we call Eeligion is similarly a constituent 
of the great whole; and being such, must be treated as a 
subject of science with no more prejudice than any other 
reality. It behoves each party to strive to understand the 
other, with the conviction that the other has something 
worthy to be understood; and with the conviction that 
when mutually recognized this something will be the basis 
of a complete reconciliation. 

How to find this something — how to reconcile them, 
thus becomes the problem which we should perseveringly 
try to solve. Not to reconcile them in any makeshift way 
— not to find one of those compromises we hear from time 
to time proposed, which their proposers must secretly feel 
are artificial and temporary; but to arrive at the terms of 
a real and permanent peace between them. The thing we 
have to seek out, is that ultimate truth which both will 
avow with absolute sincerity — with not the remotest men- 
tal reservation. There shall be no concession — no yielding 
on either side of something that will by and by be reas- 
serted; but the common ground on which they meet shall 
be one which each will maintain for itself. We have to 
discover some fundamental verity which Religion will as- 
sert, with all possible emphasis, in the absence of Science; 
and which Science, with all possible emphasis, will assert 
in the absence of Eeligion — some fundamental verity in 
the defence of which each will find the other its ally. 

Or, changing the point of view, our aim must be to co- 
ordinate the seemingly opposed convictions which Eeligion 
2 



18 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

and Science embody. From the coalescence of antagonist 
ideas, each containing its portion of truth, there always 
arises a higher development. As in Geology when the 
igneous and aqueous hypothesis were united, a r-^pid ad- 
vance took place; as in Biology we are beginning to pro- 
gress through the fusion of the doctrine of types with the 
doctrine of adaptations; as in Psychology the arrested 
growth recommences now that the disciples of Kant and 
those of Locke have both their views recognized in the the- 
ory that organized experiences produce forms of thought; 
as in Sociology, now that it is beginning to assume a | 
tive character, we find a recognition of both the party of 
progress and the party of order, as each holding a truth 
which forms a needful complement to that held by the 
other; so must it be on a grander scale with Religion and 
Science. Here too we must look for a conception which 
combines the conclusions of both; and here too we n 
expect important results from their combination. To 
understand how Science and Religion expi sides 

of the same fact — the one its near or visible Bide, and the 
other its remote or invisible side — this it is which wen 
attempt; and to achieve this must profoundly modify our 
general Theory of Things. 

Already in the foregoing pages the method of seeking 
such a reconciliation has been vaguely foreshadowed. I 
fore proceeding further, however, it will lie well t<» r 
the question of method more definitely. To find that truth 
in which Religion and Science coalesce, we must know in 
what direction to look for it, and what kind of truth it is 
likely to be. 

§ 7. We have found a priori reason for believing that in all 
religions, even the rudest, there lies hidden a fundamental 
verity. We have inferred that this fundamental verit 
that element common to all religions, which reman 
their discordant peculiarities have been mutually cancelled. 
And we have further inferred that this element is aim 
certain to be more abstract than any current religious d - 
trine. Now it is manifest that only in some highly ab- 
stract proposition can Religion and Science find a common 
ground. Neither such dogmas as those of the trinitarian 
and unitarian, nor any such idea as that of propitiati 
common though it may be to all religions, can 'he 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 19 

desired basis of agreement ; for Science cannot recognize 
beliefs like these : they lie beyond its sphere. Hence we 
see not only that, judging by analogy, the essential truth 
contained in Religion is that most abstract element pervad- 
ing all its forms; but also that this most abstract element 
is the only one in which Religion is likely to agree with 
Science. 

Similarly if we begin at the other end, and inquire what 
scientific truth can unite Science and Religion. It is at 
once manifest that Religion can take no cognizance of 
special scientific doctrines, any more than Science can take 
cognizance of special religious doctrines. The truth 
which Science asserts and Religion indorses cannot be one 
furnished by mathematics ; nor can it be a physical truth ; 
nor can it be a truth in chemistry; it cannot be a truth 
belonging to any particular science. No generalization of 
the phenomena of space, of time, of matter, or of force, 
can become a Religious conception. Such a conception, if 
it anywhere exists in Science, must be more general than 
any of these — must be one underlying all of them. If 
there be a fact which Science recognizes in common with 
Religion, it must be that fact from which the several 
branches of Science diverge, as from their common root. 

Assuming, then, that since these two great realities are 
constituents, of the same mind, and respond to different 
aspects of the same Universe, there must be a fundamental 
harmony between them, we see good reason to conclude 
that the most abstract truth contained in Religion and the 
most abstract truth contained in Science must be the one 
in which the two coalesce. The largest fact to be found 
within our mental range must be the one of which we are 
in search. Uniting these positive and negative poles of 
human thought, it must be the ultimate fact in our intel- 
ligence. 

§ 8. Before proceeding in the search for this common 
datum let me bespeak a little patience. The next three 
chapters, setting out from different points and converging 
to the same conclusion, will be comparatively unattractive. 
Students of philosophy will find in them much that is 
more or less familiar; and to most of those who are unac- 
quainted with the literature of modern metaphysics, they 
may prove somewhat difficult to follow. 



20 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

Our argument, however, cannot dispense with these 
chapters; and the greatness of the question at issue justi- 
fies even a heavier tax on the reader's attention. The 
matter is one which concerns each and all of us more than 
any other matter whatever. Though it affects us little in 
a direct way, the view we arrive at must indirectly affect 
us in all our relations — must determine our conception of 
the Universe, of Life, of Human Nature — must influence 
our ideas cf right and wrong, and so modify our conduct. 
To reach that point of view from which the seeming dis- 
cordance of Religion and Science disappears, and the two 
merge into one, must cause a revolution of thought fruit- 
ful in beneficial consequences, and most surely be worth an 
effort. 

Here ending preliminaries, let us now address ourselves 
to this all-important inquiry. 



CHAPTER II. 

ULTIMATE RELIGIOUS IDEAS. 

§ 9. TViiex, on the sea-shore, we note how the hulls of 
distant vessels are hidden below the horizon, and h 
still remoter vessels, only the uppermost sails are vis 
we realize with tolerable clearness the slight curvature of 

that portion of the sea's surface which lies before u. 
But when we seek in imagination to follow out this curved 
surface as it actually exists, slowly bending round until all 
its meridians meet in a point eight thousand miles below 
our feet, we find ourselves utterly baffled. "We cannot con- 
ceive in its real form and magnitude even that small 
ment of our globe which extends a hundred miles on • 
side of us: much less the globe as a whole. The pie 
rocl on which we stand can be mentally represented 
son: -thing like completeness: we find ours le to 

think of its top, its sides, and it.- under surf:. same 

time; or so marly at the same time that - mall 

present in consciousness together; and so we can form what 
we call a conception of the rock. But to do the like with 
the Earth we tind impossible. If even to imagine the an- 
tipodes as at that distant place in space which it actually 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 21 

occupies, is beyond our power; much more beyond our 
power must it be at the same time to imagine all other 
remote points on the Earth's surface as in their actual 
places. Yet we habitually speak as though we had an idea 
of the Earth — as though we could think of it the same way 
that we think of minor objects. 

What conception, then, do we form of it? the reader 
may ask. That its name calls up in us some state of con- 
sciousness is unquestionable; and if this state of conscious- 
ness is not a conception, properly so called, what is it? 
The answer seems to be this : — We have learned by indirect 
methods that the Earth is a sphere; we have formed 
models approximately representing its shape and the dis- 
tribution of its parts; generally when the Earth is referred 
to, we either think of an indefinitely extended mass be- 
neath our feet, or else, leaving out the actual Earth, we 
think of a body like a terrestrial globe ; but when we seek 
to imagine the Earth as it really is, we join these two ideas 
as well as we can — such perception as our eyes gives us of 
the Earth's surface we couple with the conception of a 
sphere. And thus we form of the Earth, not a conception 
properly so called, but only a symbolic conception.* 

A large proportion of our conceptions, including all 
those of much generality, are of this order. Great mag- 
nitudes, great durations, great numbers, are none of them 
actually conceived, but are all of them conceived more or 
less symbolically ; and so, too, are all those classes of ob- 
jects of which we predicate some common fact. When 
mention is made of any individual man, a tolerably com- 
plete idea of him is formed. If the family he belongs to 
be spoken of, probably but a part of it will be represented 
in thought; under the necessity of attending to that which 
is said about the family, we realize in imagination only its 
most important or familiar members, and pass over the 
rest with a nascent consciousness which we know could, if 
requisite, be made complete. Should something be re- 
marked of the class, say farmers, to which this family be- 
longs, we neither enumerate in thought all the individuals 
contained in the class, nor believe that we could do so if 
required ; but we are content with taking some few samples 
of it, and remembering that these could be indefinitely 

* Those who may have before met with this term, will perceive that it is 
here used in a different sense. 



22 FIRST PRIXCIPLES. 

multiplied. Supposing the subject of which something is 
predicated be Englishmen, the answering state of conscious- 
ness is a still more inadequate representative of the reality. 
Yet more remote is the likeness of the thought to the 
thing, if reference be made to Europeans or to human 
beings. And when we come to propositions concerning the 
mammalia, or concerning the whole of the vertebrata, or 
concerning animals in general, or concerning all organic 
beings, the unlikeness of our conceptions to the objects 
named reaches its extreme. Throughout which series of 
instances we see, that as the number of objects grouped 
together in thought increases, the concept, formed of a 
few typical samples joined with the notion of multiplicity, 
becomes more and more a mere symbol: not only because 
it gradually ceases to represent the size of the group, but 
also because, as the group grows more heterogeneous, the 
typical samples thought of are less like the average objects 
which the group contains. 

This formation of symbolic conceptions, which inevitably 
arises as we pass from small and concrete objects to large 
and to discrete ones, is mostly a very useful, and indeed 
necessary, process. When, instead of tilings whose attri- 
butes can be tolerably well united in a single state of 
seiousness, we have to deal with things whose attribute 
too vast or numerous to be so united, we must either drop 
in thought part of their attributes, or else net think of 
them at all — either form a more or less symbolic conception, 
or no conception. We must predicate nothing of ol 
too great or too multitudinous to be mentally represented; 
or we must make our predications by the help of extremely 
inadequate representations, of such objects — mere symbols 
of them. 

But while by this process alone we are enabled to form 
general propositions, and so to reach general conclusions, 
we are by this process perpetually led into danger, and very 
often into error. We habitually mistake our symboli. 
ceptions for real ones: ami so are betrayed into countless 
false inferences. Net only is it that in proportion as the 
concept we form of any thing or class of things, misrepre- 
sents the reality, we are apt to be wrong in any assertion 
we make respecting the reality; but it is that we are led 
to suppose we have truly conceived a great variety of things 
which we have conceived only in this fictitious way: and 



FIEST PRINCIPLES. 23 

further to confound with these certain things which cannot 
be conceived in any way. How almost unavoidably we 
fall into this error it will be needful here to observe. 

From objects readily represen table in their totality, to 
those of which we cannot form even an approximate repre- 
sentation, there is an insensible transition. Between a 
pebble and the entire Earth a series of magnitudes might 
be introduced, each of which differed from the adjacent 
ones so slightly that it would be impossible to say at what 
point in the series our conceptions of them became inade- 
quate. Similarly, there is a gradual progression from those 
groups of a few individuals which we can think of as 
groups with tolerable completeness, to those larger and 
larger groups of which we can form nothing like true ideas. 
Whence it is manifest that we pass from actual conceptions 
to symbolic ones by infinitesimal steps. Note next that we 
are led to deal with our symbolic concejotions as though 
they were actual ones, not only because we cannot clearly 
separate the two, but also because, in the great majority 
of cases, the first serve our purposes nearly or quite as well 
as the last— are simply the abbreviated signs we substitute 
for those more elaborate signs which are our equivalents 
for real objects. Those very imperfect representations of 
ordinary things which we habitually make in thinking 
we know can be developed into adequate ones if needful. 
Those concepts of larger magnitudes and more extensive 
classes which we cannot make adequate, we still find can 
be verified by some indirect process of measurement or 
enumeration. And even in the case of such an utterly in- 
conceivable object as the Solar System, we yet, through 
the fulfilment of predictions founded on our symbolic con- 
ception of it, gain the conviction that this symbolic con- 
ception stands for an actual existence, and, in a sense, truly 
expresses certain of its constituent relations. Thus our 
symbolic conceptions being in the majority of cases capable 
of development into complete ones, and in most other cases 
serving as steps to conclusions which are proved valid by 
their correspondence with observation, we acquire a con- 
firmed habit of dealing with them, as true conceptions — as 
real representations of actualities. Learning by long ex- 
perience that they can, if needful, be verified, we are led 
habitually to accept them without verification. And thus 
we open the door to some which profess to stand for known 



24 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

things, but which really stand for things that cannot be 
known in any way. 

To sum up, we must say of conceptions in general, that 
they are complete only when the attributes of the object 
conceived are of such number and kind that they can be 
represented in consciousness so nearly at the same time as 
to seem all present together; that as the objects conceived 
become larger and more complex, some of the attributes 
first thought of fade from consciousness before the rest 
have been represented, aDd the conception thus becomes 
imperfect; that when the size, complexity, or discreteness 
of the object conceived becomes very great, only a small 
portion of its attributes can be thought of at once, and the 
conception formed of it thus becomes so inadequate as to 
be a mere symbol; that neverth b symbolic concep- 

tions, which are indispensable in general thinking, are le- 
gitimate, provided that by some cumulative or indirect 
process of thought, or by the fulfilment of predictions 
based on them we can fissure ourselves that they stand for 
actualities; but that when our symbolic conceptions are 
such that no cumulative or indirect pr : thought 

can enable us to ascertain that there are corresponding 
actualities, nor any predictions be made whose fulfilment 
can prove this, then they are altogether vicious and illu- 
sive, and in no way distinguishable from pure iictions. 

§10. And now to consider the bearings of this general 
truth on our immediate topic — Ultimata 

To the primitive man sometimes happen things which 
are out of the ordinary course — disea: ? es, storms, earth- 
quakes, echos, eclipses. From dreams arises the id- 
a wandering double; whence follows the belief that the 
double, departing permanently at death, is thei 
(•hosts thus become assignable causes for strange occur- 
rences. The greater ghosts are presently sir have 
extended spheres of action. As men grow intelligent the 
conceptions of these minor invisible agencii into 
the conception of a universal invisible agency; ami there 
result hypotheses concerning the origin, not of special in- 
cidents only, but of things in general. 

A critical examination, however, will prove notonh 
no current hypothesis is tenable, but also that no tenable 
hypothesis can be framed. 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 25 

§ 11. Respecting the origin of the Universe three verbally- 
intelligible suppositions may be made. We may assert that 
it is self-existent; or that it is self- created ; or that it is 
created by an external agency. Which of these supposi- 
tions is most credible it is not needful here to inquire. 
The deeper question, into which this finally merges is, 
whether any one of them is even conceivable in the true 
sense of the word. Let us successively test them. 

When we speak of a man as self-supporting, of an ap- 
paratus as self-acting, or of a tree as self-developed, our ex- 
pressions, however inexact, stand for things that can be 
realized in thought with tolerable completeness. Our 
conception of the self-development of a tree is doubtless 
symbolic. But though we cannot really represent in con- 
sciousness the entire series of complex changes through 
which the tree passes, yet we can thus represent the leading 
features of the series; and general experience teaches us 
that by long continued observation we could gain the power 
to realize in thought a series of changes more fully repre- 
senting the actual series; that is, we know that our symbolic 
conception of self-development can be explained into some- 
thing like a real conception ; and that it expresses, however 
inaccurately, an actual process in nature. But when we 
speak of self-existence, and, helped by the above analogies, 
form some vague symbolic conception of it, we delude our- 
selves in supposing that this symbolic conception is of the 
same order as the others. On joining the word self to the 
word existence, the force of association makes us believe 
we have a thought like that suggested by the compound 
word self-acting. An endeavor to expand this symbolic 
conception, however, will undeceive us. In the first place, 
it is clear that by self-existence we especially mean an 
existence independent of any other — not produced by any 
other: the assertion of self-existence is simply an indirect 
denial of creation. In thus excluding the idea of any 
antecedent cause, we necessarily exclude the idea of a be- 
ginning; for to admit the idea of a beginning — to admit 
that there was a time when the existence had not com- 
menced — is to admit that its commencement was determined 
by something, or was caused; which is a contradiction. 
Self-existence, therefore, necessarily means existence with- 
out a beginning; and to form a conception of self-existence 
is to form a conception of existence without a beginning. 



26 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

Now by no mental effort can we do this. To conceive 
existence through infinite past-time, implies the conception 
of infinite past-time, which is an impossibility. To this 
let us add that, even were self-existence conceivable, it 
would not in any sense be an explanation of the Universe. 
Xo one will say that the existence of an object at the 
present moment is made easier to understand by the dis- 
covery that it existed an hour ago, or a day ago, or a year 
ago; and if its existence now is not made in the least de- 
gree more comprehensible by its existence during some 
previous finite period of time, then no accumulation of 
such finite periods, even could we extend them to an infi- 
nite period, would make it more comprehensible. Thus 
the Atheistic theory is not only absolutely unthinkable, 
but, even if it were thinkable, would not 
The assertion that the Universe i- -snot 

really carry ns a step beyond the cognition of its 
existence; and so I with a w lentof the 

mystery. 

The hypothesis of self-creation, which practically 
amounts to what is called Pantheism, i- similarly incapable 
of being represented in thoug t. I ertain phenomena, 
as the precipitation of invisible vapor into cloud, aid us 
in forming a symbolic conception i Ived Uni- 

; and there are not wanting indi q the he; 

and on the earth, which help us to render t iption 

tolerably definite. But while the 
through which the Universe has pasBed in reachii 
present form may perhaps be comprehended as in a sense 
self-determined; yet the impossibility of expandim; 
symbolic conception of - 
remains as complete as ever. Really to con< 
tion is to conceive potential existence passing into ;. 
existence by some inherent necessity; which wecann 
We cannot form any idea of a potential existence of the 
universe, as distinguished from its actual exifi .If 

represented in thought at ail, potential existence mue 
represented as something, that is as an actual 
suppose that it can be represented as nothing, involve - 
absurdities — that nothing is more than a negation, and can 
be positively represented in thought; and that one noth- 
ing is distinguished from all other no: its power 
to develop into something. Nor is this all. We ha 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 27 

state of consciousness answering to the words — an inherent 
necessity by which potential existence became actual exist- 
ence. To render them into thought, existence, having for 
an indefinite period remained in one form, must be con- 
ceived as passing, without any external or additional im- 
pulse, into another form ; and this involves the idea of a 
change without a cause — a thing of which no idea is pos- 
sible. Thus the terms of this hypothesis do not stand for 
real thoughts ; but merely suggest the vaguest symbols, in- 
capable of any interpretation. Moreover, even were it true 
that potential existence is conceivable as a different thing 
from actual existence, and that the transition from the one 
to the other can be mentally realized as a self-determined 
change, we should still be no forwarder; the problem 
would simply be removed a step back. For whence the 
potential existence? This would just as much require ac- 
counting for as actual existence ; and just the same difficul- 
ties would meet us. Kespecting the origin of such a latent 
power, no other suppositions could be made than those 
above named — self -existence, self-creation, creation by ex- 
ternal agency. The self-existence of a potential universe 
is no more conceivable than we have found the self-existence 
of the actual universe to be. The self -creation of such a 
potential universe would involve over again the difficulties 
here stated — would imply behind this potential universe a 
more remote potentiality; and so on in an infinite series, 
leaving us at last no forwarder than at first. While to as- 
sign as the source of this potential universe an external 
agency, would be to introduce the notion of a potential 
universe for no purpose whatever. 

There remains to be examined the commonly received or 
theistic hypothesis — creation by external agency. Alike in 
the rudest creeds and in the cosmogony long current among 
ourselves, it is assumed that the genesis of the Heavens and 
the Earth is effected somewhat after the manner in which 
a workman shapes a piece of furniture. And this assump- 
tion is made not by theologians only, but by the immense 
majority of philosophers, past and present. Equally in .the 
writings of Plato, and in those of not a few living men of 
science, we find it taken for granted that there is an 
analogy between the process of creation and the process of 
manufacture. Now in the first place, not only is this con- 
ception one that cannot by any cumulative process of 



28 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

thought, or the fulfilment of predictions "based on it. be 
shown to answer to anything actual ; and not only is it that, 
in the absence of all evidence respecting the process of 
creation, we have no proof of correspondence even between 
this limited conception and some limited portion of the 
fact; but it is that the conception is not even consistent 
with itself — cannot be realized in thought, when all its 
assupmtions are granted. Though it is true that the pro- 
ceedings of a human artificer may vaguely symbolize to us 
a method after which the Universe might be shaped, yet 
they do not help us to comprehend the real mystery; 
namely, the origin of the material of which the Universe 
consists. The artisan does not make the iron, wood, or 
stone he uses; but merely fashions and combines them. 
If we suppose suns, and planets, and satellites, and all they 
contain, to have been similarly formed by a "Great Ar- 
tificer," we suppose merely that certain pre-existing ele- 
ments were thus put into their present arrangement. But 
whence the pre-existing elements? The comparison helps 
us not in the least to understand that; and unless it helps 
us to understand that, it is worthless. The production of 
matter out of nothing is the real mystery, which neither 
this simile not any other enables us to conceive; and a 
simile which does not enable us to couceive this may just 
as well be dispensed with. Still more manifest does the 
insufficiency of this theory ition become, when we 

turn from material object* to that which contains them — 
when instead of matter we contemplate - Did there 

exist nothing but an immeasurable void, explanation would 
be needed as much as now. There would still arise the 
question — how came it so? If the theory of creat'. ">n by 
external agency were an adequate one, it would supply an 
answer; and its answer would be — space was made in the 
same manner that matter was made. Bat the im] 
of conceiving this i> so manifest, that no one da 
assert it. For if space was created, it must have 
previously non-existent. The non-existence of spaoi 
not, however, by any mental effort be imagined. It is 
one of the most familiar truths that the idea of spa 
surrounding us on all sides, is not for a moment to b g I 
rid of — not only are we compelled to think of spa 
now everywhere present, but we are unable to conceive its 
absence either in the past or the future. And if the non- 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 29 

existence of space is absolutely inconceivable, then, neces- 
sarily, its creation is absolutely inconceivable. Lastly, even 
supposing that the genesis of the Universe could really be 
represented in thought as the result of an external agency, 
the mystery would be as great as ever ; for there would still 
arise the question — how came there to be an external 
agency? To account for this only the same three hypo- 
theses are possible — self-existence, self-creation, and 
creation by external agency. Of these the last is useless: 
it commits us to an infinite series of such agencies, and 
even then lveaes us where we were. By the second we are 
practically involved in the same predicament; since, as 
already shown, self-creation implies an infinite series of 
potential existences. We are obliged, therefore, to fall back 
upon the first, which is the one commonly accepted and 
commonly supposed to be satisfactory. Those who cannot 
conceive a self-existent universe, and who therefore assume 
a creator as the source of the universe, take for granted 
that they can conceive a self -existent creator. The mystery 
which they recognize in this great fact surrounding them 
on every side, they transfer to an alleged source of this 
great fact; and then suppose that they have solved the 
mystery. But they delude themselves. As was proved at 
the outset of the argument, self-existence is rigorously in- 
conceivable ; and this holds true whatever be the nature of 
the object of which it is predicated. Whoever agrees that 
the atheistic hypothesis is untenable because it involves 
the impossible idea of self-existence, must perforce admit 
that the theistic hypothesis is untenable if it contains the 
same impossible idea. 

Thus these three different suppositions respecting the 
origin of things, verbally intelligible though they are, and 
severally seeming to their respective adherents quite 
rational, turn out, when critically examined, to be literally 
unthinkable. It is not a question of probability, or credi- 
bility, but of conceivability. Experiment proves that the 
elements of these hypotheses cannot even be put together 
in consciousness; and we can entertain them only as we 
entertain such pseud-ideas as a square fluid and a moral 
substance — only by abstaining from the endeavor to ren- 
der them into actual thoughts. Or, reverting to our orig- 
inal mode of statement, we may say that they severally 
involve symbolic conceptions of the illegitimate and illu- 



30 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

sive kind. Differing so widely as they seem to do, the 
atheistic, the pantheistic, and the theistic hypotheses con- 
tain the same ultimate element. It is impossible to avoid 
making the assumption of self-existence somewhere; and 
whether that assumption be made nakedly, or under com- 
plicated disguises, it is equally vicious, equally unthink- 
able. Be it a fragment of matter, or some fancied poten- 
tial form of matter, or some more remote and still less 
imaginable cause, oar conception of its self-existence can 
be formed only by joining with it the notion of unlimited 
duration through past time. And as unlimited duration 
is inconceivable, all those formal ideas into which it enters 
are inconceivable; and indeed, if such an expression is 
allowable, are the more inconceivable in proportion as the 
other elements of the ideas are indefinite. So that in fact, 
impossible as it is to think of the actual unive: - 
existing, we do but multiply impossibilities of thought by 
every attempt we make to explain its existence. 

§ 12. If from the origin of the Universe we turn to its 
nature, the like insurmountable difficulties rise up before 
us on all sides — or, rather, the same difficulties under new 
aspects. We find ourselves on the one band obliged to 
make certain assumptions: and yet on the other hand we 
find these assumptions cannot be represented in thought. 

When we inquire what is the meaning of the various 
effects produced upon our Benses — when we ask bow there 
come to be in our consciousness impressions of sour 
colors, of tastes, and of those various attributes which we 
ascribe to bodies — we are compelled to regard them as the 
effects of some cause. We may stop short in the belief that 
this cause is what we call matter. Or we may conclude, 
as some do, that matter is only a certain mode of manifes- 
tation of spirit; which is therefore the tn; - . Or, 
regarding matter and spirit as proximate agencies, we may 
attribute all the changes wrought in our consciousu 
immediate divine power. But be the cause we assign what 
it may, we are obliged to suppoe suae. And we are 
not only obliged to suppose some cause, hut also a first 
cause. The matter, or spirit, or whatever we assume to be 
the agent producing on us these various impressions, must 
either be the first cause of them or not. If it is the first 
cause, the conclusion is reached. If it i» no", the first 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 31 

cause, then by implication there must be a cause behind 
it ; which thus becomes the real cause of the effect. Mani- 
festly, however complicated the assumptions, the same con- 
clusion must inevitably be reached. We cannot think at 
all about the impressions which the external world produces 
on us, without thinking of them as caused ; and we cannot 
carry out an inquiry concerning their causation, without 
inevitably committing ourselves to the hypothesis of a First 
Cause. 

But now if we go a step further, and ask what is the 
nature of this First Cause, we are driven by an inexorable 
logic to certain further conclusions. Is the First Cause 
finite or infinite? If we say finite we involve ourselves in a 
dilemma. To think of the First Cause as finite, is to think 
of it as limited. To think of it as limited, necessarily 
implies a conception of something beyond its limits ; it is 
absolutely impossible to conceive a thing as bounded with- 
out conceiving a region surrounding its boundaries. What 
now must we say of this region? If the First Cause is 
limited, and there consequently lies something outside of 
it, this something must have no First Cause — must be 
uncaused. But if we admit that there can be something 
uncaused, there is no reason to assume a cause for any- 
thing. If beyond that finite region over which the First 
Cause extends, there lies a region, which we are compelled 
to regard as infinite, over which it does not extend — if we 
admit that there is an infinite uncaused surrounding the 
finite caused — we tacitly abandon the hypothesis of causa- 
tion altogether. Thus it is impossible to consider the 
First Cause as finite. And if it cannot be finite it must 
be infinite. 

Another inference concerning the First Cause is equally 
unavoidable. It must be independent. If it is dependent 
it cannot be the first Cause; for that must be the First 
Cause on which it depends. It is not enough to say that 
it is partially independent ; since this implies some neces- 
sity which determines its partial dependence, and this 
necessity, be it what it may, must be a higher cause, or the 
true First Cause, which is a contradiction. But to think 
of the First Cause as totally independent, is to think of it 
as that which exists in the absence of all other existence; 
seeing that if the presence of any other existence is neces- 
sary, it must be partially dependent on that other existence, 



32 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

and so cannot be the First Cause. Not only, however, must 
the First Cause be a form of being which has no necessary 
relation to any other form of being, but it can have no 
necessary relation within itself. There can be nothing in 
it which determines change, and yet nothing which pre- 
vents change. For if it contains something which imposes 
such necessities or restraints, this something must be a 
cause higher than the First Cause, which is absurd. Thus 
the First Cause must be in every sense perfect, complete, 
total; including within itself all power, and transcending 
all law. Or, to use the established word, it must be abso- 
lute. 

Here then respecting the nature of the Universe, we seem 
committed to certain unavoidable conclusions. The objects 
and actions surrounding us, not less than the phenomena 
of our own consciousness, compel us t-> ask a cause; in our 
search for a cause, we discover no resting-place until we 
arrive at the hypothesis of a First Cause; and wo have no 
alternative but to regard this Firri [finite and 

Absolute. These are inferences forced aponns by 
ments from which there appears n it i< hardly 

needful, however, to Bhow those who have followed tl. 
how illusive arc t onings and their results. But 

that it would tax the reader's patii no purpo 

might easily be proved that the materials of which the 
argument is built, equally with the oonclue 
them, are merely Bymjtolic conceptions of the illegitimate 
order. Instead, however, i 
above, it will be desirable to pursue another meth< 
ing the fallacy of these concli 
mutual contradicl 

Eere 1 cannot ^ better than avail myself of the demon- 
stration which Mr. Mansel, carrying out in detail th 
crine of Sir William Hamilton, has given in his " Limits of 
Religious Thoughts." And I gladly <h> this, ly be- 

cause his mode of presentation cannot be imp: 
also because, writing as he does in defence of the current 
Theology, his reasonings will be the m 
the majority of read( 

£ 13. Having given preliminary definitions of 
Cause, of the Infinite, and of the Absolute, Mr. U 

savs : 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 33 

: But these three conceptions, the Cause, the Absolute, 
the Infinite, all equally indispensable, do they not imply 
contradiction to each other, when viewed in conjunction, 
as attributes of one and the same Being? A Cause cannot, 
as such, be absolute; the Absolute cannot, as such, be a 
cause. The cause, as such, exists only in relation of its 
effect : the cause is a cause of the effect ; the effect is an 
effect of the cause. On the other hand, the conception of 
the Absolute implies a possible existence out of all relation. 
We attempt to escape from this apparent contradiction, by 
introducing the idea of succession in time. The Absolute 
exists first by itself, and afterwards becomes a Cause. But 
here we are checked by the third conception, that of the 
Infinite. How can the Infinite become that which it was 
not from the first? If Causation is a possible mode of 
existence, that which exists without causing is not infinite; 
that which becomes a cause has passed beyond its former 
limits. . . . 

" Supposing the Absolute to become a cause, it will fol- 
low that it operates by means of free will and conscious- 
ness. For a necessary cause cannot be conceived as abso- 
lute and infinite, if necessitated by something beyond 
itself, it is thereby limited by a superior power; and if 
necessitated by itself, it has in its own nature a necessary 
relation to its effect. The act of causation must therefore 
be voluntary; and volition is only possible in a conscious 
being. But consciousness again is only conceivable as a 
relation. There must be a conscious subject, and an object 
of which he is conscious. The subject is a subject to the 
object; the object is an object to the subject; and neither 
can exist by itself as the Absolute. This difficulty, again, 
may be for the moment evaded, by distinguishing between 
the Absolute as related to another and the Absolute as re- 
lated to itself. The Absolute, it may be said, may possibly 
be conscious, provided it is only conscious of itself. But 
this alternative is, in ultimate analysis, no less self- 
destructive than the other. For the object of conscious- 
ness, whether a mode of the subject's existence or not, is 
either created in and by the act of consciousness, or has an 
existence independent of it. In the former case, the 
object depends upon the subject, and the subject alone is 
the true Absolute. In the latter case, the subject depends 
upon the object, and the object alone is the true Absolute. 
8 



34 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

Or if we attempt a third hypothesis, and maintain that 
each exists independently of the other, we have no Absolute 
at all, but only a pair of relatives; for coexistence, whether 
in consciousness or not, is itself a relation. 

" The corollary from this reasoning is obvious. Xot 
only is the Absolute, as conceived, incapable of a necessary 
relation to anything else; but it is also incapable of con- 
taining, by the constitution of its own nature, an essential 
relation within itself; as a whole, for instance, composed 
of parts, or as a substance consisting of attributes, or as 
a conscious subject in antithesis to an object. For if there 
is in the Absolute any principle of unity, distinct from the 
mere accumulation of parts or attributes, this principle 
alone is the true Absolute. If, on the other hand, t.. 
no such principle, then there is no Absolute at all, but only 
a plurality of relatives. The almost unani 
philosophy, in pronouncing that the Absolute is both one and 
simple, must be accepted as the 
as reason has any voice in the matter. But this 
unity, as indifferent and containing no al 
neither be distinguished from the multiplicity 
beings by any characters - be idei 

with them in their multiplicity. Tims we are 
an inextricable dilemma. The Absolute cannot 
ceived a< conscious, neither can it be concei 
scions: it cannot be conceived as complex, neither can it 
be conceived as simple: it cannot be conceived by differ- 
ence, neither can it be conceived by the of differ- 
ence: it cannot be identified with the universe, neither 
can it be distinguished from it. The One and the Many, 
regarded as the beginning of exist* thus alike in- 
comprehensible. 

"The fundamental conception of Rational 
being thus self • destructive, we may naturally expect to find 
the same antagonism manifested in their special applica- 
tions. . . . Bow, for example, can Infinite Power 1 • 
to do all things, and yet Infinite Goodness be unable I 
evil? How can Infinite Justice exact the utmost penalty 
for every sin, and yet Infinite Mercy pardon the sinner? 
How can Infinite Wisdom know all that is to come, and yet 
Infinite Freedom be at liberty to do or to forbear? How 
is the existence of Evil compatible with that of an infin- 
itely perfect Being; for, if he wills it, he i» not infinitely 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 35 

good ; and if he wills it not, his will is thwarted and his 
sphere of. action limited? . . . 

" Let us, however, suppose for an instant that these 
difficulties are surmounted, and the existence of the Abso- 
lute securely established on the testimony of reason. Still 
we have not succeeded in reconciling this idea with that of 
a Cause : we have done nothing toward explaining how the 
Absolute can give rise to the relative, the Infinite to the 
finite. If the condition of causal activity is a higher state 
than that of quiescence, the Absolute, whether acting vol- 
untarily or involuntarily, has passed from a condition of 
comparative imperfection to one of comparative perfection ; 
and therefore was not originally perfect. If the state of 
activity is an inferior state to that of quiescence, the Abso- 
lute, in becoming a cause, has lost its original perfection. 
There remains only the supposition that the two states are 
equal, and the act of creation one of complete indifference. 
But this supposition annihilates the unity of the absolute, 
or it annihilates itself. If the act of creation is real, an 
yet indifferent, we must admit the possibility of two con- 
ceptions of the Absolute, the one as productive, the other 
as non-productive. If the act is not real, the supposition 
itself vanishes. . . . 

" Again, how can the relative be conceived as coming into 
being? If it is a distinct reality from the Absolute, it must 
be conceived as passing from non-existence into existence. 
But to conceive an object as non-existent, is again a self- 
contradiction ; for that which is conceived exists, as an 
object of thought, in and by that conception. We may 
abstain from thinking of an object at all; but, if we think 
of it, we cannot but think of it as existing. It is possible 
at one time not to think of an object at all, and at another 
to think of it as already in being; but to think of it in the 
act of becoming, in the progress from not being into 
being, is to think that which, in the very thought, an- 
nihilates itself. . . . 

" To sum up briefly this portion of my argument. The 
conception of the Absolute and Infinite, from whatever 
side we view it, appears encompassed with contradictions. 
There is a contradiction in supposing such an object to 
exist, whether alone or in conjunction with others; and 
there is a contradiction in supposing it not to exist. There 
is a contradiction in conceiving it as one ; and there is a 



30 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

contradiction in conceiving it as many. There is a con- 
tradiction in conceiving it as personal; and there is a con- 
tradiction in conceiving it as imjoersonal. It cannot, 
without contradiction, be represented as active; nor, with- 
out equal contradiction, be represented as inactive. It 
cannot be conceived as the sum of all existence, nor yet 
can it be conceived as a part only of that sum." 

§ 1-i. And now what is the bearing of these results on 
the question before us? Our examination of Ultimate 
Religious Ideas has been carried on with the view of mak- 
ing manifest some fundamental verity contained in them. 
Thus far, however, we have arrived at negative conclusions 
only. Criticising the essential conceptions involved in the 
different orders of beliefs, we find no one of them to be 
Logically defensible. Passing over the consideration of 
credibility, and confining ourselves to tl Qceivabil- 

ity, we see that Atheism, Pantheism, and Theism, when 
rigorously analyzed, severally provi absolutely un- 

thinkable. Instead of di a fundamental verity 

existing in each, our investigation - ems rather to have shown 
that there is no fundamental verity contained in any. T<» 
carry away this conclusion, fa . would be a fatal 

error; as we shall shortly - 

Leaving out the accompanying moral code, wl 
all cases a supplementary growth, a relig 
Unable as a theory of original causation. By the I 
savages the genesis of things la not inquired about: anom- 
alous appearances alone raise the question of agency. But 
he it in the primitive Ghost-theory which assumes a human 
personality behind each unusual phenomenon; be it in 
Polytheism, in which these personalities arc partiall; 
eralized; be it in Monotheism, in which they an- wholly 
generalized; or be it in Pantheism, in which the 
eralized personality becomes th the phenomena — we 

equally find an hypothesis which is supposed to render the 
Universe comprehensible. Nay. c\cn that which is 
monly regarded as the negation of all Religion — even 
tive Atheism, comes within the definition; for it, ( 
asserting the self-existence of Space, Matter, and M 
which it regards as adequate causes of every appearance, 
propounds an a priori theory from which it holds the facts 
to be deducible. Now every theory tacitly asserts two 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 37 

things: firstly, that there is something to be explained; 
secondly, that snch and such is the explanation. Hence, 
however widely different speculators may disagree in the 
solutions, they give of the same problem, yet by implication 
they agree that there is a problem to be solved. Here then 
is an element which all creeds have in common. Eeligions 
diametrically opposed in their overt dogmas are yet per- 
fectly at one in the tacit conviction that the existence of 
the world, with all it contains and all which surrounds it, is 
a mystery ever pressing for interpretation. On this point, 
if on no other, there is entire unanimity. 

Thus we come within sight of that which we seek. In 
the last chapter, reasons w r ere given for inferring that 
human beliefs in general, and especially the perennial 
ones, contain, under whatever disguises of error, some soul 
of truth ; and here we have arrived at a truth underlying 
even the grossest superstitions, We saw further that this 
soul of truth was most likely to be some constituent com- 
mon to conflicting opinions of the same order ; and here w r e 
have a constituent which may be claimed alike by all re- 
ligions. It was pointed out that this soul of truth would 
almost certainly be more abstract than any of the beliefs 
involving it; and the truth we have arrived at is one ex- 
ceeding in abstractness the most abstract religious doc- 
trines. In every respect, therefore, our conclusion answers 
to the requirements. It has all the characteristics which 
we inferred must belong to that fundamental verity ex- 
pressed by religions in general. 

That this is the vital element in all religions is further 
proved by the fact that it is the element which not only 
survives every change, but grows more distinct the more 
highly the religion is developed. Aboriginal creeds, 
though pervaded by the idea of personal agencies which are 
usually unseen, yet conceive these agencies under perfectly 
concrete and ordinary forms — class them with the visible 
agencies of men and animals; and so hide a vague percep- 
tion of mystery in disguises as unmysterious as possible. 
The Polytheistic conceptions in their advanced phases 
represent the presiding personalities in greatly idealized 
shapes, existing in a remote region, working in subtle 
ways, and communicating with men by omens or through 
inspired persons; that is, the ultimate causes of things 
are regarded as less familiar and comprehensible. The 



38 FIRST PBIXCIPLES. 

growth of a Monotheistic faith, accompanied as it is by a 
denial of those beliefs in which the divine nature 
similiated to the human in all its lower propensities, shows 
us a further step in the same direction; and however im- 
perfectly this higher faith is at first realized, we yet see in 
altars "to the unknown and unknowable ind in the 

worship of a God that cannot by any searching be found 
out, that there is a clearer recognition of the inserutable- 
ness of creation. Further developments of theology, end- 
ing in such assertions as that "a God understood would be 
I at all," and " to think that God i-, as we can think 
him 1 3 blasphemy." exhibit this 

more distinctly; and it pervades all the cultivated theology 
of the present day. 'rims, while otb 
religious creeds one by one drop away, this remains 
grows even more manifest; and 
tin! constituent. 

• does the evidence end hi omni- 

_ which } ..--■ - m 
mosi abstract belief which is common to all 
which becomes the mere distinct in pro] - they 

develop, ami which remains after their discordant 
ments have been mutually cancelle I 

which the most nns riticism 

tionable — or rather ma 

fear from the most inexorable logic; but en the contrary 
is a belief which the m 

>undly true than any relig 
religion, setting out though it does with th< I 
of a mystery, forthwith pr< 

this mystery; ami that it is not a mystery p 

human comprehension. But an examination oi 
tions they severally propou uniformly 

invalid. The analysis of every possible hypothec - 
not simply that no 1.; thesis hut that no 

hypothesis is even thinkable. And thus the mystery which 
■all religious recognise turn- out to he a far more trans- 
cendent mystery than any of them BUS] I — D I a relative, 
but an absolute mystery. 

Here, then, is an ultima: is truth of the h : _ 

possible certainty — a truth in which n 
are at one with each other, and with a philoe 
tagonistie to their special d< I this truth, 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 39 

respecting which there is a latent agreement among all 
mankind from the fetish-worshipper to the most stoical 
critic of human creeds, must be the one we seek. If Re- 
ligion and Science are to be reconciled, the basis of recon- 
ciliation must be this deepest, widest, and most certain of 
all facts — that the Power which the Universe manifests to 
us is utterly inscrutable. 



CHAPTER III. 

ULTIMATE SCIENTIFIC IDEAS. 

§ 15. What are Space and Time? Two hypotheses are 
current respecting them; the one that they are objective, 
and the other that they are subjective — the one that they 
are external to, and independent of, ourselves, the other 
that they are internal, and appertain to our own conscious- 
ness. Let us see what becomes of these hypotheses under 
analysis. 

To say that Space and Time exist objectively, is to say 
that they are entities. The assertion that they are non- 
entities is self-destructive : non-entities are non-existences ; 
and to allege that non-existences exist objectively, is a 
contradiction in terms. Moreover, to deny that Space and 
Time are things, and so by implication to call them noth- 
ings, involves the absurdity that there are two kinds of 
nothing. Neither can they be regarded as attributes of 
some entity ; seeing, not only that it is impossible really to 
conceive any entity of which they are attributes; but see- 
ing further that we cannot think of them as disappearing, 
even if everything else disappeared; whereas attributes 
necessarily disappear along with the entities they belong- 
to. Thus as Space and Time cannot be either non-entities, 
nor the attributes of entities, we have no choice but con- 
sider them as entities. But while, on the hypothesis of 
their objectivity, Space and Time must be classed as things, 
we find, on experiment, that to represent them in thought 
as things is impossible. To be conceived at all, a thing must 
be conceived as having attributes. We can distinguish some- 
thing from nothing, only by the power which the some- 
thing has to act on our consciousness; the several affections 



40 FIRST PRIXCIPLES. 

it produces on our consciousness (or else the hypothetical 
causes of them), we attribute to it, and call its attributes; 
and the absence of these attributes is the absence of the 
terms in which the something is conceived, and involves 
the absence of a conception. What now are the attributes 
of Space? The only one which it is possible for a moment 
to think of as belonging to it, is that of extension; and to 
credit it w T ith this imjriies a confusion of thought. For 
extension and Space are convertible terms: by extension, 
as we ascribe it to surrounding objects, we mean occupancy 
of Space; and thus to say that Space is extended is, to say 
that Space occupies Space. How we are similarly unable 
to assign any attribute to Time, scarcely needs pointing 
out. Nor are Time and Space unthinkable as entities only 
from the absence of attributes ; there is another peculiarity, 
familiar to readers of metaphysics, which equally excludes 
them from the category. All entities which we actually 
know as such, are Limited; and even if W< -'Our- 

selves either to know or to be able to conceive seme nil- 
limited entity, we of necessity in bo classing it positively 
separate it from the classof limited entities. But of v 
and Time we cannot assert either limitation or the a 
of limitation. We find ourselves totally unable to form 
any mental image of unbounded Space: and yet totally 
unable to imagine bounds beyond which there is i 
Similarly at the other extreme: it is in think 

of a limit to the divisibilr 

Bible to think of its infinite divisibility. And. without 
Btating them, it will be seen that we labor under like 
impptencies in respect to Time. Tims - I conceive 

Space ami Time as entities, and are equally disabled from 
conceiving them as either the attributes of enti 
non-entities. We are compelled to think of the; 
ing; and yet cannot bring them within those conditions 
under which existences are represented in thought. 

Shall we then take refuge in the Kantian doctrine? 
Shall we say that Space and Time are forms of the intel- 
lect — " a priori laws or conditions of the conscious mind"? 
To do this is to escape from great difficulties by rushing 
into greater. The proposition with which philo- 

sophy sets out, verbally intelligible though it is. cam 
any effort be rendered into thought — cannot be inter]': 
into an idea proper 1 )' so called, but stands merely for a 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 41 

pseud-idea. In the first place, to assert that Space and 
Time, as we are conscious of them, are subjective condi- 
tions, is by implication to assert that they are not objective 
realities: if the Space and Time present to our minds be- 
long to the ego, then of necessity they do not belong to the 
non-ego. Now it is absolutely impossible to think this. 
The very fact on which Kant bases his hypothesis — namely, 
that our consciousness of Space and Time cannot be sup- 
pressed — testifies as much; for that consciousness of Space 
and Time which we cannot rid ourselves of, is the con- 
sciousness of them existing objectively. It is useless to 
reply that such an inability must inevitably result if they 
are subjective forms. The question here is — What does 
consciousness directly testify? And the direct testimony 
of consciousness is, that Time and Space are not within 
but without the mind ; and so absolutely independent of 
it that they cannot be conceived to become non-existent 
even were the mind to become non-existent. Besides being 
positively unthinkable in what it tacitly denies, the theory 
of Kant is equally unthinkable in what it openly affirms. 
It is not simply that we cannot combine the thought of 
Space with the thought of our own personality, and con- 
template the one as a property of the other — though our 
inability to do this would prove the inconceivableness of 
the hypothesis — but it is that the hypothesis carries in 
itself the proof of its own inconceivableness. For if Space 
and Time are forms of thought, they can never be thought 
of; since it is impossible for anything to be at once the 
form of thought and the matter of thought. That Space 
and Time are objects of consciousness, Kant emphatic- 
ally asserts by saying that it is impossible to suppress 
the consciousness of them. How then, if they are objects 
of consciousness, can they at the same time be conditions of 
consciousness? If Space and Time are the conditions un- 
der which we think, then when we think of Space and 
Time themselves, our thoughts must be unconditioned; 
and if there can thus be unconditioned thoughts, what be- 
comes of the theory? 

It results therefore that Space and Time are wholly in- 
comprehensible. The immediate knowledge which we seem 
to have of them proves, when examined, to be total ignor- 
ance. While our belief in their objective reality is insur- 
mountable, we are unable to give any rational account of 



42 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

it. And to posit the alternative belief (possible to state 
but impossible to realize) is merely to multiply irrationali- 
ties. 

§ 16. Were it not for the necessities of the argument, 
it would be inexcusable to occupy the reader's attention 
with the threadbare, and yet unended, controversy re- 
specting the divisibility of matter. Matter is either in- 
finitely divisible or it is not: no third possibility can be 
named. Which of the alternatives shall we accept? If 
we say that Matter is infinitely divisible, we commit our- 
selves to a supposition not realizable in thought. "We can 
bisect and re-bisect a body, and continually repeating the 
act until we reduce its parts to a size no longer physically 
divisible, may then mentally continue the process without 
limit. To do this, however, ie not really to conceive the 
infinite divisibility of matter, but to form a symbolic 
ception incapable of expansion into a reft] i not 

admitting of other verification. Really to conceive the 
infinite divisibility of matter is mentally to follow out the 
divisions to infinity: and to do this would require infinite 
time. On the other hand, to assert that matter U 
infinitely divisible is to assert that it is reducible to parts 
which no conceivable power can divide: and this i 
supposition can no more be represented in thought than 
the other. For each Of SOCh ultimate parts, did they 
exist, must have an under and an upper Burface, a right 
and a left side, like any larger fragment. Now it is im- 
possible to imagine its Bides so near that no plane of & 
can be conceived between them : and. however great 
assumed force of cohesion, it is impossible to shut out the 
idea of a greater force capable of overcoming it. So that 
of human intelligence the one hypo tl 
aide than the other: and yet the i 

other must agree with the facl to human intelli- 

gence unavoidable. 

Again, leaving this insolvable question, let D8 
whether substance has, in reality, anything like tl: 
tended solidity which it presents to our cona - The 

portion of space occupied by a piece of metal seems to 
eves and fingers perfectly filled : we perceive a horn 
resisting mass, without any breach of continuity. Shall 
we then say that Matter is as actually solid as it ap. 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 43 

Shall we say that whether it consists of an infinitely 
divisible element or of ultimate units incapable of further 
division, its parts are everywhere in actual contact? To 
assert as much entangles us in insuperable difficulties. 
Were Matter thus absolutely solid, it would be, what it is 
not — absolutely incompressible; since compressibility, im- 
plying the nearer approach of constituent parts, is not 
thinkable unless there is unoccupied space between the 
parts. Nor is this all. It is an established mechanical 
truth, that if a body, moving at a given velocity, strikes 
an equal body at rest in such wise that the two move on 
together, their joint velocity will be but half that of the 
striking body. Now it is a law of which the negation is 
inconceivable, that in passing from any one degree of mag- 
nitude to any other, all intermediate degrees must be 
passed through. Or, in the case before us, a body moving 
at velocity 4 cannot, by collision, be reduced to velocity 
2, without passing through all velocities between 4 and 2. 
But were Matter truly solid — were its units absolutely in- 
compressible and in absolute contact — this " law of con- 
tinuity," as it is called, would be broken in every case of 
collision. For when, of two such units, one moving at 
velocity 4 strikes another at rest, the striking unit must 
have its velocity 4 instantaneously reduced to velocity 2 ; 
must pass from velocity 4 to velocity 2 without any lapse 
of time, and without passing through intermediate veloci- 
ties; must be moving with velocities 4 and 2 at the same 
instant, which is impossible. 

The supposition that Matter is absolutely solid being 
untenable, there presents itself the Newtonian supposition, 
that it consists of solid atoms not in contact but acting 
on each other by attractive and repulsive forces, varying 
the distances. To assume this, however, merely shifts the 
difficulty: the problem is simply transferred from the 
aggregated masses of matter to these hypothetical atoms. 
For granting that Matter, as we perceive it, is made up of 
such dense extended units surrounded by atmospheres of 
force, the question still arises — What is the constitution of 
these units? We have no alternative but to regard each 
of them as a small piece of matter. Looked at through a 
mental microscope, each becomes a mass of substance such 
as we have just been contemplating. Exactly the same 
inquiries may be made respecting the parts of which each 



44 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

atom consists; while exactly the same difficulties stand in 
the way of every answer. And manifestly, even were the 
Irypothetical atom assumed to consist of still minuter ones, 
the difficulty would re-appear at the next step; nor could 
it be got rid of even by an infinite series of such assump- 
tions. 

Boscovich's conception yet remains to us. Seeing that 
Matter could not, as Leibnitz suggested, be composed of 
unext ended monads (since the juxtaposition of an infinity 
of points having no extension could not produce that exten- 
sion which matter possesses), and perceiving objections to 
the view entertained by Newton, Boscovich proposed an 
intermediate theory, uniting, as he considered, the advan- 
tages of both and avoiding their difficulties. His theory is, 
that the constituents of Matter are centres of force — points 
without dimensions, which attract and repel each other in 
such wise as to be kept at specific distances apart. And he 
argues, mathematically, that the forces 1 by such 

centres might so vary with the distances that under given 
conditions the centres would remain in stable equilibrium 
with definite interspaces; and yet. under other conditions, 
would maintain larger or smaller interspaces. This specu- 
lation, however, ingeniously as it is elaborated, and eluding 
though it does various difficulties, posits a proposition 
which cannot by any effort be represented in thought: it 
escapes all the inconceivabilities above indicated, by merg- 
ing them in the one inconceivability with which 
out. A centre of force absolutely without extension is un- 
thinkable: answering to these words we can form nothing 
more than a symbolic conception of the illegitimate order. 
The idea of resistance cannot be separated in thought 
from the idea of an extended body which otters resistance. 
To suppose that central forces can reside in points not in- 
finitesimally small but occupying no space whatever — points 
having position only, with nothing to mark t" 
points in no respect distinguishable from the surrounding 
points that are not centres of force: to suppose this, is 
utterly beyond human power. 

Here it may possibly be said, that though all hypo: 
respecting the constitution of Matter commit us to incon- 
ceivable conclusions when logically developed, yet we have 
reason to think that one of them corresponds with the 
fact. Though the conception of Matter as consisting of 






FIRST PRINCIPLES. 45 

dense indivisible units is symbolic and incapable of being 
completely thought out, it may yet be supposed to find in- 
direct verification in the truths of chemistry. These, it is 
argued, necessitate the belief that Matter consists of 
particles of specific weights, and therefore of specific sizes. 
The general law of definite proportions seems impossible on 
any other condition than the existence of ultimate atoms; 
and though the combining weights of the respective ele- 
ments are termed by chemists their " equivalents," for the 
purpose of avoiding a questionable assumption, we are 
unable to think of the combination of such definite weights, 
without supposing it to take place between definite numbers 
of definite particles. And thus it would appear that the 
Newtonian view is at any rate preferable to that of Bosco- 
vich. A disciple of Boscovich, however, may reply that 
his master's theory is involved in that of Newton, and 
cannot indeed be escaped. "What," he may ask, "is it 
that hold together the parts of these ultimate atoms?" " A 
cohesive force," his opponent must answer. " And what," 
he may continue, " is it that holds together the parts of 
any fragments into which, by sufficient force, an ultimate 
atom might be broken?" Again the answer must be — a 
cohesive force. "And what," he may still ask, "if the 
ultimate atom were, as we can imagine it to be, reduced 
to parts as small in proportion to it as it is in proportion 
to a tangible mass of matter — what must give each part 
the ability to sustain itself, and to occupy space?" Still 
there is no answer but — a cohesive force. Carry the proc- 
ess in thought as far as we may, until the extension of the 
parts is less than can be imagined, we still cannot escape 
the admission of forces by which the extension is upheld ; 
and we can find no limit until we arrive at the conception 
of centres of force without any extension. 

Matter then, in its ultimate nature, is as absolutely in- 
comprehensible as Space and Time. Frame what suppo- 
sitions we may, we find on tracing out their implications 
that they leave us nothing but a choice between opposite 
absurdities. 

§ 17. A body impelled by the hand is clearly perceived 
to move, and to move in a definite direction : there seems 
at first sight no possibility of doubting that its motion is 
real, or that it is toward a given point. Yet it is easy to 



46 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

slicrw that we not only may be, but usually are, quite wrong 
in both these judgments. Here, for instance, is a ship 
which, for simplicity's sake, we will suppose to be anchored 
at the equator with her head to the West. When the cap- 
tain walks from stem to stern, in what direction does he 
move? East is the obvious answer — an answer which for 
the moment may pass without criticism. But now the 
anchor is heaved, and the vessel sails to the West with a 
velocity equal to that at which the captain walks. In what 
direction does he now move when he goes from stem to 
stern? You cannot say East, for the vessel is carrying 
him as fast toward the West as he walks to the East ; and 
you cannot say West for the converse reason. In respect 
to surrounding space he is stationary; though to all on 
board the ship he seems to be moving. But now are we 
quite sure of this conclusion? — Is he really stationary? 
When we take into account the Earth's motion round its 
axis, we find that instead <»f being stationary he is travel- 
ling at the rate of 1000 miles per hour to tl. - > that 
neither the perception of one who looks at him, nor the 
inference of one who allows for the ship 1 Q, is any- 
thing like the truth. Nor indeed, on further considera- 
tion, shall we find this revised conclusion t«> he much 
better. Km- we have forgotten to allow for tie- Earth's 
motion in its orbit. This beil j miles per 
hour, it follows that, assuming toe time to be mid-day, he is 
moving, not at the rate 

but at the rate of 67,000 miles per hour to thi Nay, 

not even now have we discovered I i the 

true direction of his movement. With the Earth's 
res3 in its orbit, we have to join that of the wl 
System toward the constellation Hercules; and when we 
do this, we perceive that lie is ; neither 

West, but in a line inclined to the plane of the Ecliptic, 
and at a Velocity greater or to the ti: 

the year) than that above named. To which lei 
that were the dynamic arrangement- sidereal .- 

fully known to us, we should probably discover the direc- 
tion and rate of his actual movement to diller consider* 
ably even from these. Hpw illus our idefl 

Motion, is thus made sufficiently manifest. That which 
seems moving proves to be stationary; that which B 
stationary proves to be moving; while that which we 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 47 

elude to be going rapidly in one direction turns out to be 
going much more rapidly in the opposite direction. And 
so we are taught that what we are conscious of is not the 
real motion of any object, either in its rate or direction; 
but merely its motion as measured from an assigned posi- 
tion — either the position we ourselves occupy or some 
other. Yet in this very process of concluding that the 
motions we perceive are not the real motions, we tacitly 
assume that there are real motions. In revising our suc- 
cessive judgments concerning a body's course or velocity, 
we take for granted that there is an actual course and an 
actual velocity — we take for granted that there are fixed 
points in space with respect to which all motions are abso- 
lute; and we find it impossible to rid ourselves of this idea. 
Nevertheless, absolute motion cannot even be imagined, 
much less known. Motion as taking place apart from those 
limitations of space which we habitually associate with it, 
is totally unthinkable. For motion is change of place; 
but in unlimited space change of place is inconceivable, 
because place itself is inconceivable. Place can be con- 
ceived only by reference to other places ; and in the absence of 
objects dispersed through space, a place could be conceived 
only in relation to the limits of space ; whence it follows 
that in unlimited space place cannot be conceived — all 
places must be equidistant from boundaries that do not 
exist. Thus while we are obliged to think that there is an 
absolute motion, we find absolute motion incomprehensible. 
Another insuperable difficulty presents itself when we 
contemplate the transfer of Motion. Habit blinds us to 
the marvellousness of this phenomenon. Familiar with the 
fact from childhood, we see nothing remarkable in the 
ability of a moving thing to generate movement in a thing 
that is stationary. It is, however, impossible to under- 
stand it. In what respect does a body after impact differ 
from itself before impact? What is this added to it which 
does not sensibly affect any of its properties and yet enables it 
to traverse space? Here is an object at rest and here is the 
same object moving. In the one state it has no tendency 
to change its place ; but in the other it is obliged at each 
instant to assume a new position. What is it which will 
for ever go on producing this effect without being ex- 
hausted? and how does it dwell in the object? The mo- 
tion you say has been communicated. But how? What 



48 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

has been communicated? The striking body has not trans- 
ferred a thing to the body struck ; and it is equally out of 
the question to say that it has transferred an attribute. 
What then has it transferred? 

Once more there is the old puzzle concerning the con- 
nection between Motion and Eest. We daily witness the 
gradual retardation and final stoppage of things projected 
from the hand or otherwise impelled; and we equally often 
witness the change from Rest to Motion produced by the 
application of force. But truly to represent these transi- 
tions in thought, we find impossible. For a breach of the 
law of continuity seems necessarily involved; and yet no 
breach of it is conceivable. A body travelling at a given 
velocity cannot be brought to a state of rest, or no velocity, 
without passing through all intermediate velocities. A 
first sight nothing seems easier than to imagine it doing 
this. It is quite possible to think of its motion as dimin- 
ishing insensibly until it becomes infinitesimal; and many 
will think equally possible to pass in thought from in- 
finitesimal motion to no motion. But this is an error. 
Mentally follow out the decreasing velocity as long as you 
please, and there still remains some velocity. Halve and 
again halve the rate of movement for ever, yet movement 
still exists, and the smallest movement is separated by an 
impassable gap from no movement. As something, how- 
ever minute, is infinitely great in comparison with noth- 
ing, so is even" the leaf eivable motion infinite as 
compared with rest. The converse perplexities atten- 
dant on the transition from Refit to Motion need not he 
specified. These, equally with the foregoing, show us that 
though we are obliged to think of such changes as actually 
occurring, their occurrence cannot he realized. 

Thus neither when considered in connection with S 
nor when considered in connection with Matter, nor when 
considered in connection with Rest, do we find that Motion 
is truly cognizable. All efforts to understand its essential 
nature do but bring us to alternative impossibiliti 
thought. 

§ IS. On lifting a chair the force exerted we regard as 
equal to that antagonistic force called the weight of the 
chair, ami we cannot think of these as equal without 
thinking of them as like in kind; since equality is con- 






FIRST PRINCIPLES. 49 

ceivable only between things that are connatural. The 
axiom that action and reaction are equal and in opposite 
directions, commonly exemplified by this very instance of 
muscular effort versus weight, cannot be mentally realized 
on any other condition. Yet, contrariwise, it is incredible 
that the force as existing in the chair really resembles the 
force as present to our minds. It searcely needs to point 
out that the weight of the chair produces in us various 
feelings according as we support it by a single finger or 
the whole hand, or the leg; and hence to argue that as it 
cannot be like all these sensations there is no reason to 
believe it like any. It suffices to remark that since the 
force as known to us is an affection of consciousness we 
cannot conceive the force existing in the chair under the 
same form without endowing the chair with consciousness. 
So that it is absurd to think of Force as in itself like our 
sensation of it, and yet necessary so to think of it if we 
realize it in consciousness at all. 

How, again, can we understand the connection between 
Force and Matter? Matter is known to us only through its 
manifestations of Force. Our ultimate test of Matter is the 
ability to resist. Abstract its resistance and there remains 
nothing but empty extension. Yet, on the other hand, 
resistance is equally unthinkable apart from Matter — 
apart from something extended. Not only, as pointed 
out some pages back, are centres of force devoid of exten- 
sion unimaginable ; but, as an inevitable corollary, we can- 
not imagine either extended or unextended centres of force 
to attract and repel other such centres at a distance, with- 
out the intermediation of some kind of matter. We have 
here to remark what could not without anticipation be 
remarked when treating of Matter, that the hypothesis of 
Newton, equally with that of Boscovich, is open to the 
charge that it supposes one thing to act upon another 
through a space which is absolutely empty — a supposition 
which cannot be represented in thought. This charge is 
indeed met by the introduction of a hypothetical fluid ex- 
isting between the atoms or centres. Bnt the problem is 
not thus solved ; it is simply shifted, and reappears when 
the constitution of this fluid is inquired into. How im- 
possible it is to elude the difficulty presented by the trans- 
fer of Force through space, is best seen in the case of as- 
tronomical forces. The Sun a£ts upon us in such way as to 



50 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

produce the sensations of light and heat; and we have as- 
certained that between the cause as existing in the Sun and 
the effect as experienced on the Earth a lapse of about 
eight minutes occurs; whence unavoidably result in us the 
conceptions of both a force and a motion. So that for 
the assumption of a luminiferous ether there is the de- 
fence not only that the exercise of force through 95,000,- 
000 of miles of absolute vacuum is inconceivable, but also 
that it is impossible to conceive motion in the absence of 
something moved. Similarly in the case of gravitation. 
Newton described himself as unable to think that the at- 
traction of one body for another at a distance could I 
erted in the absence of an intervening medium. But now 
let us ask how much the forwarder we are if an intervening 
medium be assumed. This ether, whose undulations ac- 
cording to the received hypothesis constitute heat and light, 
and which is the vehicle of gravitation — how it is c< 
tuted? We must regarded it in the way that physicists do 
regard it, as composed of atoms which attract and repel 
each other — infinitesimal it may be in comparison with 
those of ordinary matter, but still atoms. And remember- 
ing that this ether is imponderable we are obliged to con- 
clude that the ratio between the interspaces of these atoms 
and the atoms themselves is incommensnrably greater than 
the like ratio in ponderable matter, else the densities could 
not be incommensurable. Instead then of a direct action 
by the Sun upon the Earth without anything intervening, 
we have to conceive the Sun's action propagated th. 
a medium whose molecules are probably as small relatively 
to their interspaces as are the Sun and Earth compared with 
the space between them. We have to conceive these in- 
finitesimal molecules acting on each other through 
lately vacant spaces, which are immense in comparison 
with their own dimensions. How is this conception easier 
than the other? We still have mentally to represent a 
body as acting where it is not, and in the absence of any- 
thing by which its action maybe transferred: and what 
matters it whether this takes place on a large or a small 
scale? We see, therefore, that the exercise of Force is al- 
together unintelligible. We cannot imagine it except 
through the instrumentality of something havi 
sion; and yet when we have assumed this somethi: 
find the perplexity is not got rid of but only postponed. 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 51 

We are obliged to conclude that matter, whether ponderable 
or imponderable, and whether aggregated or in its hypo- 
thetical units, acts upon matter through absolutely vacant 
space ; and yet this conclusion is positively unthinkable. 

Yet another difficulty of conception, converse in nature, 
but equally insurmountable, must be added. If, on the 
one hand, we cannot in thought see matter acting upon 
matter through a vast interval of space which is absolutely 
void — on the other hand, that the gravitation of one par- 
ticle of matter toward another and toward all others should 
be absolutely the same whether the intervening space is 
filled with matter or not is incomprehensible. I lift from 
the ground, and continue to hold, a pound weight. Now, 
into the vacancy between it and the ground is introduced 
a mass of matter of any kind whatever, in any state what- 
ever — hot or cold, liquid or solid, transparent or opaque, 
light or dense ; and the gravitation of the weight is en- 
tirely unaffected. The whole Earth, as well as each indi- 
vidual of the infinity of particles composing the Earth, acts 
on the pound in absolutely the same way, whatever inter- 
venes, or if nothing intervenes. Through eight thousand 
miles of the Earth's substance each molecule at the anti- 
podes affects each molecule of the weight I hold, in utter 
indifference to the fulness or emptiness of the space be- 
tween them. So that each portion of matter in its deal- 
ings with remote portions treats all intervening portions 
as though they did not exist ; and yet at the same time it 
recognizes their existence with scrupulous exactness in its 
direct dealings with them. We have to regard gravitation 
as a force to which everything in the Universe is at once 
perfectly opaque in respect of itself and perfectly trans- 
parent in respect of other things. 

While, then, it is impossible to form any idea of Force 
in itself, it is equally impossible to comprehend its mode 
of exercise. 

§ 19. Turning now from the outer to the inner world, 
let us contemplate not the agencies to which we ascribe 
our subjective modifications, but the subjective modifica- 
tions themselves. These constitute a series. Difficult as 
we find it distinctly to separate and individualize them, it 
is nevertheless beyond question that our states of con- 
sciousness occur in succession. 



52 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

Is this chain of states of consciousness infinite or finite? 
"We cannot say infinite; not only because we have indi- 
rectly reached the conclusion that there was a period when 
it commenced, but also because all infinity is inconceiv- 
able — an infinite series included. We cannot say finite, 
for we have no knowledge of either of its ends. Go back 
in memory as far as Ave may, we are wholly unable to iden- 
tify our first states of consciou The perspective of 
our thoughts vanishes in a dim obscurity where we can 
make out nothing. Similarly at the other extreme. We 
have no immediate knowledge of a termination to the 
series at a future time, and we cannot really lay hold of 
that temporary termination of the Beriee reached at the 
present moment. For the state of consciousness 
nized by us as our Last is not truly our last. That any 
mental affection may be contemplated i the series 
it must be remembered — represented in thought, not /'/•'- 
sented. The truly last state of conscious bat which 
is passing in the very act of <<>]iteniplatinL r a state just 
past — that in which we are thinking of the one Vie;' 
the Last. So that the proximate end of the chain eludes 
us, as well as the remote end. 

44 But," it may be said, "though we cannot dire<-tly 
consciousness to he finite duration, neither of its 

limits can be actually reached, yet we can very well '■"//- 
rrirc it to be so." No; not even this is true. In the first 
place we cannot conceive the terminations of thai 
sciousness which alone we really know — our own — any 
more than we can perceive its terminatii r in truth 

the two acts are here one. In either i . termina- 

tions must he, as above said, DOt presented in thought, hut 
represented; and they must be represented : 
occurring. Now. to represent the termination of conscious* 
nees as occurring in ourseh 
contemplating the cessation of the 
and this impli< 3 a suppofi 
sciousness after its last state, which 1- In the 

second place, if we regard the matter ly — if we 

study the phenomena as g in others, or in the 

abstract, we are equally foiled. - aplies 

perpetual change and the perpetual establishment of rela- 
tions between its successive phases. 'To be known at all 
any mental affection must be known as such or such — as 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 53 

like these foregoing ones or unlike those. If it is not 
thought of in connection with others — not distinguished or 
identified by comparison with others, it is not recognized — 
is not a state of consciousness at all. A last state of con- 
sciousness, then, like any other, can exist only through a 
perception of its relations to previous states. But such 
perception of its relations must constitute a state later than 
the last, which is a contradiction. Or, to put the diffi- 
culty in another form, if ceaseless change of state is the 
condition on which alone consciousness exists, then when 
the supposed last state has been reached by the completion 
of the preceding change, change has ceased; therefore 
consciousness has ceased ; therefore the supposed last state 
is not a state of consciousness at all ; therefore there can 
be no last state of consciousness. In short, the perplexity 
is like that presented by the relations of Motion and Rest. 
As we found it was impossible really to concede Rest be- 
coming Motion or Motion becoming Rest, so here we find it 
is impossible really to conceive either the beginning or 
the ending of those changes which constitute consciousness. 
Hence, while we are unable either to believe or to con- 
ceive that the duration of consciousness is infinite, we are 
equally unable either to know it as finite or to conceive it 
as finite. 

§ 20. Nor do we meet with any greater success when 
instead of the extent of consciousness Ave consider its sub- 
stance. The question, What is this that thinks? admits 
of no better solution than the question to which w T e have 
just found none but inconceivable answers. 

The existence of each individual as known to himself 
has been always held by mankind at large the most incon- 
trovertible of truths. To say " I am as sure of it as I am 
sure that I exist" is, in common speech, the most emphatic 
expression of certainty. And this fact of personal exist- 
ence, testified to by the universal consciousness of men, 
has been made the basis of sundry philosophies; whence 
may be drawn the inference that it is held by thinkers, as 
well as by the vulgar, to be beyond all facts unquestion- 
able. 

Belief in the reality of self is indeed a belief which no 
hypothesis enables us to escape. What shall we say of 
these successive impressions and ideas which constitute 



54 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

consciousness? Shall we say that they are the affections 
of something called mind, which, as being the subject of 
them, is the real ego ? If we say this we manifestly imply 
that the ego is an entity. Shall we assert that these im- 
pressions and ideas are not the mere superficial changes 
wrought on some thinking substance, but are themselves 
the very body of this substance — are severally the modified 
forms which it from moment to moment assumes? This 
hypothesis, equally with the foregoing, implies that the 
individual exists as a permanent and distinct being; since 
modifications necessarily involve something modified. 
Shall we then betake ourselves to the sceptic's position, 
and argue that we know nothing more than our impres- 
sions and ideas themselves — that .these are to us the only 
existences, and that the personality said to underlie them 
is a mere fiction? We do not even thus escape; since this 
proposition, verbally intelligible but really unthinkable, 
itself makes the assumption which it pn repudiate. 

For how can consciousness be wholly resolved into impres- 
sions and ideas when an impression of necessity implies 
something impressed? Or, again, how can the Bceptic 
who has decomposed his consciousness into impres 
and ideas explain the fact that he considers them as Lis 
impressions and ideas? Or, once more, if, as he must, he 
admits that he has an impression of his personal existence, 
what warrant can he show for rejecting this impression as 
unreal while he accepts all his other impn a real? 

Unless he can give satisfactory answers to these queries, 
which he cannot, he must abandon his conclusions, and 
must admit the reality of the individual mind. 

Hut now, unavoidable as is this belief, established though 
it is. not only by the assent of mankind at large, ind 
by divers philosophers, but by the suicide of the sceptical 
argument, it is yet a belief admitting of no justification by 
reason ; nay, indeed, it is a belief which reason when p: 
for a distinct answer rejects. Ore of the most recent writers 
who has touched upon this question. Mr. Mansel, does 
indeed contend that in the consciousness of self we have 
a piece of real knowledge. The validity of immediate 
intuition he holds in this case unquestionable, remarking 
that " Let system-makers say what they will, the unsophis- 
ticated sense of mankind refuses to acknowledge that mind 
is but a bundle of states of conscious matter is 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 55 

(possibly) a bundle of sensible qualities." On which posi- 
tion the obvious comment is that it does not seem alto- 
gether a consistent one for a Kantist, who pays but small 
respect to " the unsophisticated sense of mankind" when 
it testifies to the objectivity of space. Passing over this, 
however, it may readily be shown that a cognition of self, 
properly so called, is absolutely negatived by the laws of 
thought. The fundamental condition to all consciousness 
emphatically insisted upon by Mr. Mansel, in common with 
Sir William Hamilton and others, is the antithesis of subject 
and object. And on this " primitive dualism of conscious- 
ness," "from which the explanations of philosophy must 
take their start," Mr. Mansel founds his refutation of the 
German absolutists. But now, what is the corollary from 
this doctrine, as bearing on the consciousness of self? The 
mental act in which self is known implies, like every other 
mental act, a perceiving subject and a perceived object. 
If, then, the object perceived is self, what is the subject 
that perceives? or, if it is the true self which thinks, what 
other self can it be that is thought of? Clearly, a true 
cognition of self implies a state in which the knowing and 
the known are one — in which subject and object are iden- 
tified; and this Mr. Mansel rightly holds to be the annihi- 
lation of both. 

So that the personality of which each is conscious, and of 
which the existence is to each a fact beyond all others the 
most certain, is yet a thing which cannot truly be known 
at all. Knowledge of it is forbidden by the very nature 
of thought. 

§ 21. Ultimate Scientific Ideas, then, are all representa- 
tive of realities that cannot be comprehended. After no 
matter how great a progress in the colligation of facts and 
the establishment of generalizations ever wider and wider; 
after the merging of limited and derivative truths in 
truths that are larger and deeper has been carried no 
matter how far, the fundamental truth remains as much 
beyond reach as ever. The explanation of that which is 
explicable does but bring out into greater clearness the 
inexplicableness of that which remains behind. Alike in 
the external and the internal worlds, the man of science 
sees himself in the midst of perpetual changes, of which 
he can discover neither the beginning nor the end. If, 



56 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

tracing back the evolution of things, he allows himself to 
entertain the hypothesis that the Universe once existed in 
a diffused form, he finds it utterly impossible to conceive 
how this came to be so; and equally, if he speculates on 
the future he can assign no limit to the grand succession 
of phenomena ever unfolding themselves before him. hi 
like manner, if he looks inward he perceives that both 
ends of the thread of consciousness are beyond his grasp — 
nay, even beyond his power to think of having existed or 
as existing in time to come. When; again, he turns from 
the succession of phenomena, external or internal, to their 
intrinsic nature, he is just as much at fault. Supposing 
him in every case able to resolve the appearances, properties, 
and movements of things into manifestations qj Font- in 
►Space and Time, he still finds that Force. Spare, and Time 
pass all understanding. Similarly, though the anal; 
mental actions may finally bring him down to sensations, 
as the original materials out of which all thought is woven, 
yet he is little forwarder; for he can gi\ ant either 

of sensations themselves or of that something which is 
conscious of sensations. Objective and subjective things 
he thus ascertains to he alike inscrutable in their substance 
and genesis, in all directions his investigations eventu- 
ally bring him face to face with an insoluble enigma: and 
he ever more clearly -perceives it t'> he an insoluble enigma. 
He learns at once the greatness and the littleness of the 
human intellect — its power in dealing with all that comes 
within the range of experience, its impotence in dealing 
with all that transcends experience. He realizes with a 
special vividness the utter incomprehensiblenesB of the 
simplest fact, considered in itself. He, more than any 
other, truly know* that in its ultimate essence nothing 
be known. 



CHAPTEB IV. 

THE RELATIVITY OF ALL KNOWLEDGE. 

§ 22, The same conclusion is thus arrived at, from 
whichever point we set out. If, respecting the origin and 
nature of things, we make some assumption, we find that 
through an inexorable logic it inevitably commits us to 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 57 

alternative impossibilities of thought; and this holds true 
of every assumption that can be imagined. If, contrari- 
wise, we make no assumption, but set out from the sensible 
properties of surrounding objects, and, ascertaining their 
special laws of dependence, go on to merge these in laws more 
and more general, until we bring them all under some 
most general laws; we still find ourselves as far as ever from 
knowing what it is which manifests these properties to us: 
clearly as we seem to know it, our apparent knowledge 
proves on examination to be utterly irreconcilable with 
itself. Ultimate religious ideas and ultimate scientific 
ideas alike turn out to be merely symbols of the actual, 
not cognitions of it. 

The conviction so reached, that human intelligence is 
incapable of absolute knowledge, is one that has been 
slowly gaining ground as civilization has advanced. Each 
new ontological theory, from time to time propounded in 
lieu of previous ones shown to be untenable, has been fol- 
lowed by a new criticism leading to a new r scepticism. All 
possible conceptions have been one by one tried and found 
wanting; and so the entire field of speculation has been 
gradually exhausted without positive result, the only result 
arrived at being the negative one above stated — that the 
reality existing behind all appearances is, and must ever 
be, unknown. To this conclusion almost every thinker of 
note has subscribed. "With the exception," says Sir 
William Hamilton, " of a few late Absolutist theorizers in 
Germany, this is perhaps the truth of all others most har- 
moniously re-echoed by every philosopher of every school." 
And among these he names Protagoras, Aristotle, St. 
Augustin, Boethius, Averroes, Albertus Magnus, Gerson, 
Leo Hebraeus, Melancthon, Scaliger, Francis Piccolomini, 
Giordano Bruno, Campanella, Bacon, Spinoza, Newton, 
Kant. 

It yet remains to point out how this belief may be estab- 
lished rationally, as well as empirically. Not only is it 
that, as in the earlier thinkers above named, a vague per- 
ception of the inscrutableness of things in themselves 
results from discovering the illusiveness of sense-impres- 
sions, and not only is it that, as shown in the foregoing 
chapters, definite experiments evolve alternative impossi- 
bilities of thought out of every ultimate conception we 
can frame, but it is that the relativity of our knowledge 



58 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

is demonstrable analytically. The induction drawn from 
general and special experiences may be confirmed by a 
deduction from the nature of our intelligence. Two ways 
of reaching such a deduction exist. Proof that our cogni- 
tions are not, and never can be, absolute is obtainable by 
analyzing either the product of thought or the process of 
thought. Let us analyze each. 

§ 23. If, when walking through the fields some day in 
September you hear a rustle a few yards in advance, and, 
on observing the ditch-side where it occurs, see the herbage 
agitated, you will probably turn toward the spot to learn 
by what this sound and motion are produced. As you 
approach there flutters into the ditch a partridge, on see- 
ing which your curiosity is Batisfied — you have what you 
call an explanation of the appearances. The explanation, 
mark, amounts to this, that whereas throughout life you 
have had countless experiences of disturbance among small 
stationary bodies, accompanying the movement of other 
bodies among them, and have generalized the relation 
between such disturbances and such movements, you con- 
sider this particular disturbance explained on finding it to 
present an instance of the like relation. Bu] 
catch the partridge, and, wishing to ascertain why it did 
not escape, examine it and find at one spot a slight trace 
of blood upon its feathers. You now understaA 
say, what lias disabled the partridge. It has been wounded 
by a sportsman — adds another case to the man] 
ready seen by you, of birds being killed or injured by the 
shot discharged at them from fowling-pieces. And in 
assimilating this ease to other sueh cases consists your 
understanding of it. But now, on consideration, a diffi- 
culty suggests itself. Only a single shot has struck the 
partridge, and that not in a vital place. The win. 
uninjured, as are also those muscles which move them; 
and the creature proves by its struggles that it has abun- 
dant strength. Why, then you inquire of yourself, 
it not fly? Occasion favoring, you put the question to an 
anatomist, who furnish.es you with a solution. He points 
out that this solitary shot has passed close to the pll 
which the nerve supplying the wing-muscles of one side 
diverges from the spine, and that a slight injury to this 
nerve, extending even to the rupture of a few fibres, may. 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 59 

by preventing a perfect co-ordination in the action of the 
two wings, destroy the power of flight. You are no longer 
puzzled. But what has happened? What has changed 
your state from one of perplexity to one of comprehension f 
Simply the disclosure of a class of previously known cases, 
along with which you can include this case. The con- 
nection between lesions of the nervous system and paralysis 
of limbs has been already many times brought under your 
notice, and you here find a relation of cause end effect that 
is essentially similar. 

Let us suppose you are led on to make further inquiries 
concerning organic actions, which, conspicuous and re- 
markable as they are, you had not before cared to 
understand. How is respiration effected? — you ask — why 
does air periodically rush into the lungs? The answer is 
that in the higher vertebrata, as in ourselves, influx of air 
is caused by an enlargement of the thoracic cavity, due 
partly to depression of the diaphragm, partly to elevation 
of the ribs. But how does elevation of the ribs enlarge 
the cavity? In reply the anatomist shows you that the 
plane of each pair of ribs makes an acute angle with the 
spine, that this angle widens when the movable ends of 
the ribs are raised ; and he makes you realize the consequent 
dilatation of the cavity, by pointing out how the area of a 
parallelogram increases as its angles approach to right 
angles. You understand this special fact when you see it 
to be an instance of a general geometrical fact. There 
still arises, however, the question, Why does the air rush 
into this enlarged cavity? To which comes the answer 
that when the thoracic cavity is enlarged the contained 
air, partially relieved from pressure, expands, and so loses 
some of its resisting power — that hence it opposes to the 
pressure of the external air a less pressure, and that as air, 
like every other fluid, presses equally in all directions, 
motion must result along any line in which the resistance 
is less than elsewhere; whence follows an inward current. 
And this interpretation you recognize as one, when a few 
facts of like kind, exhibited more plainly in a visible fluid 
such as water, are cited in illustration. Again, when it 
was pointed out that the limbs are compound levers acting 
in essentially the same way as levers of iron or wood, you 
might consider yourself as having obtained a partial ra- 
tionale of animal movements. The contraction of a muscle, 



60 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

seeming before utterly unaccountable, would seem less 
unaccountable were you shown how, by a galvanic current, 
a series of soft iron magnets could be made to shorten itself 
through the attraction of each magnet for its neighbors — 
an alleged analogy which especially answers the purpose of 
our argument; since, whether real or fancied, it equally 
illustrates the mental illumination that results on finding 
a class of cases within which a particular case may possibly 
be included. And it may be further noted how, in the 
instance here named, an additional feeling of comprehen- 
sion arises on remembering that the influence conveyed 
through the nerves to the muscles is, though not positively 
electric, yet a form of force nearly allied to the electric. 
Similarly, when you learn thai animal heat arises from 
chemical combination, and bo is evolved as heat is evolved 
in other chemical combinations — when you learn that the 
absorption of nutrient fluids through the f the 

intestines is an instance of osmotic action — when you learn 
that the changes undergone by food during digestion are 
like changes artificially producible in the laboratory, 
regard yourself as knowing something about the natn 
these phenomena. 

Observe now what we have been doing. Turning to the 
general question, let as note v,!idv »ive inter- 

pretations have carried us. W< with quite special 

and concrete facta, In explaining and afterward 

explaining the more general facts of which they are in- 
stances, we have got down to certain h ; _ era! facts, 
to a geometrical principle or property of space, to a simple 
law of mechanical action, to a law of fluid equilibrium — 
to truths in physics, in chemistry, in thermology, in elec- 
tricity. The particular phenomena with which \ 
have been merged in larger and larger groups of phenom- 
ena, and as they have been so merged we have arrived at 
solutions that we consider profound in proportion as this 
process has been carried far. Still deeper explanatioi 
simply further steps in the same direction. Whei 
instance, it is asked why the law of action of the lever is 
what it is, or why fluid equilibrium and fluid motion 
exhibit the relations which they do, the answer furnished 
by mathematicians consists in the disclosure of the prin- 
ciple of virtual velocities — a principle holding true alike 
in fluids and solids, a principle under which the others 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 61 

are comprehended. And similarly, the insight obtained 
into the phenomena of chemical combination, heat, elec- 
tricity, etc., implies that a rationale of them, when found, 
will be the exposition of some highly general fact respect- 
ing the constitution of matter, of which chemical, elec- 
trical, and thermal facts are merely different manifestations. 
Is this process limited or unlimited? Can we go on 
forever explaining classes of facts by including them in 
larger classes, or must we eventually come to a largest 
class? The supposition that the process is unlimited, 
were any one absurd enough to espouse it, would still 
imply that an ultimate explanation could not be reached; 
since infinite time would be required to reach it. While 
the unavoidable conclusion that it is limited (proved not 
only by the finite sphere of observation open to us, but 
also by the diminution in the number of generalizations 
that necessarily accompanies increase of their breadth) 
equally implies that the ultimate fact cannot be under- 
stood. For if the successively deeper interpretations of 
nature which constitute advancing knowledge are merely 
successive inclusions of special truths in general truths, 
and of general truths in truths still more general, it obvi- 
ously follows that the most general truth, not admitting 
of inclusion in any other, does not admit of interpretation. 
Manifestly, as the most general cognition at which we. 
arrive cannot be reduced to a more general one it cannot, 
be understood. Of necessity, therefore, explanation must 
eventually bring us down to the inexplicable. The deep- 
est truth which we can get at must be unaccountable. 
Comprehension must become something other than com- 
prehension before the ultimate fact can be comprehended. 

§ 24. The inference which we thus find forced upon us 
when we analyze the product of thought as exhibited ob- 
jectively in scientific generalizations is equally forced upon 
us by an analysis of the process of thought as exhibited 
subjectively in consciousness. The demonstration of the 
necessarily relative character ol our knowledge, as deduced 
from the nature of intelligence, has been brought to its 
most definite shape by Sir William Hamilton. I cannot 
here do better than extract from his essay on the " Philos- 
ophy of the Unconditioned" the passage containing the 
substance of his doctrine. 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 



" The mind can conceive," he argues, " and consequently 
can know, only the limited, and the conditionally limited. 
The unconditionally unlimited, or the Infinite, the uncon- 
ditionally limited, or the Absolute, cannot positively be 
construed to the mind. They can be conceived only by a 
thinking away from, or abstraction of, those very condi- 
tions under which thought itself is realized; consequently, 
the notion of the Unconditioned is only negative — negative 
of the conceivable itself. For example, on the one hand 
we can positively conceive neither an absolute whole — that 
is, a whole so great that we cannot also conceive it as a 
relative part of a still greater whole — nor an absolute part 
— that is, a part so small that we cannot also conceive it 
as a relative whole divisible into smaller parts. On the 
other hand we cannot positively represent, or realize, or 
construe to the mind (as here understanding and una 
tion coincide), an infinite whole; i'<»r this could only be 
done by the infinite synthesis in thought of finite wholes, 
which would itself require an infinite time for its accom- 
plishment. Nor, for the same reason, can we fellow out 
in thought an infinite divisibility of parts. The result is 
the same, whether we apply the process to limitation in 
spare, in time, or in degree. The unconditioned negation, 
and the unconditioned affirmation of limitation — in 
words, the infinite and absolute, ]>r>< : . are thus 

equally inconceivable t»> us. 

"As the conditionally limited (which we may briefly 
call the conditioned) is thus the only possible obi- 
knowledge and <>f positive thought — thought necessarily 
supposes conditions. To think ia and condi- 

tional limitation is the fundamental law of the possibility 
of thought. For, as the greyhound cannot outstrip his 
shadow, nor (by a more appropriate simile) the eagli 
soar the atmosphere in which he floats, and by which alone 
he may be supported, so the mind cannot transcend that 
sphere of limitation within and through which exclusively 
the possibility of thought k? realized. Thought is only of 
the conditioned, because, as we have said, to think is sim- 
ply to condition. The absolute is conceived merely by a 
negation of eoueeivability, and all that we know is only 
known as 

'won from the void and formless infinite.' 






FIRST PRINCIPLES. 63 

How, indeed, it could ever be doubted that thought is only 
of the conditioned may well be deemed a matter of the 
profoundest admiration. Thought cannot transcend con- 
sciousness; consciousness is only possible under the antith- 
esis of a subject and object of thought, known only in 
correlation, and mutually limiting each other; while inde- 
pendently of this all that we know either of subject or 
object, either of mind or matter, is only a knowledge in 
each of the particular, of the plural, of the different, of 
the modified, of the phenomenal. We admit that the 
consequence of this doctrine is — that philosophy, if viewed 
as more than a science of the conditioned, is impossible. 
Departing from the particular, we admit that we can 
never, in our highest generalizations, rise above the finite 
— that our knowledge, whether of mind or matter, can be 
nothing more than a knowledge of the relative manifesta- 
tions of an existence, which in itself it is our highest 
wisdom to recognize as beyond the reach of philosophy — 
in the language of St. Austin, 'cognoscendo ig?wrari, et 
ignorando cognosci. ' 

11 The conditioned is the mean between two extremes — 
two inconditionates, exclusive of each other, neither of 
which can be conceived as possible, but of which, on the 
principles of contradiction and excluded middle, one must 
be admitted as necessary. On this opinion, therefore, 
reason is shown to be weak, but not deceitful. The mind 
is not represented as conceiving two propositions subver- 
sive of each other, as equally possible, but only as unable 
to understand as possible either of two extremes — one of 
which, however, on the ground of their mutual repug- 
nance it is compelled to recognize as true. We are thus 
taught the salutary lesson that the capacity of thought is 
not to be constituted into the measure of existence, and 
are warned from recognizing the domain of our knowledge 
as necessarily co-extensive with the horizon of our faith. 
And by a wonderful revelation, we are thus, in the very 
consciousness of our inability to conceive aught above the 
relative and finite, inspired with a belief in the existence 
of something unconditioned beyond the sphere of all com- 
prehensible reality." 

Clear and conclusive as this statement of the case appears 
when carefully studied, it is expressed in so abstract a 
manner as to be not very intelligible to the general reader. 



64 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

A more popular presentation of it, with illustrative appli- 
cations, as given by Mr. Blansel in his " Limits of Religious 
Thought," will make it more fully understood. The fol- 
lowing extracts, which I take the liberty of making from 
his pages, will suffice: 

" The very conception of consciousness, in whatever 
mode it may be manifested, necessarily implies distinction 
between one object and another. To be conscious we 
must be conscious of something, and that something can 
only be known as that which it is by being distinguished 
from that which it is not. But distinction is necessarily 
limitation, for if one object is to be distinguished from 
another it must poe ne form of existence which the 

other has not, or it must not p me form which the 

other has. But it is obvious that the Infinite cannot be dis- 
tinguished, as such, from the Finite by the absence of any 
quality which the Kini; 

a limitation. Nor yet can it be distinguished by the pres- 
ence of an attribute which the Finite has not; ( 
finite part can be a constituent of an infinite whole, this 
differentia] characteristic must itself be infinite, and must 
at the same time have nothing Lo common with the finite. 
AW' are thus thrown hack upon cur former impossibility, 
for this second infinite will be distinguished from the 
finite by the absence of qualities which the latter 
A consciousness of the Intinit- . b, thus necessarily 

involves a self-contradiction; for it implies there 
tion, by limitation and difference, of that which can only 
be given as unlimited and indifferent. . . . 

"This contradiction, which is utterly inexplicable on 
the supposition that the Infinite is a positive obj< 
human thought, is at once ted for when it is re- 

garded as the mere negation of thought. If all thou_ 
limitation — if whatever we cue by the very 

conception, regarded as finite — the infinite, from a human 
point of view, is merely a name for tin - B of those 
conditions under which thought is possible. T - 
a Conception of the Infinite is. therefore, at once to affirm 
those conditions and to deny them. The contradi 
which we discover in such a conception is only that which 
we have ourselves placed there by tacitly assuming 
oonceivability of the inconceivable. The conditio 
scionsness is distinction, and condition of distinction is 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 65 

limitation. We can have no consciousness of being in 
general which is not some being in particular. A thing, 
in consciousness, is one thing out of many. In assuming 
the possibility of an infinite object of consciousness I 
assume, therefore, that it is at the same time limited and 
unlimited — actually something, without which it could 
nofc-be an object of consciousness, and actually nothing, 
without which it could not be infinite. . . . 

" A second characteristic of Consciousness is that it is 
only possible in the form of a relation. There must be a 
Subject, or person conscious, and an Object, or thing of 
which he is conscious. There can be no consciousness 
without the union of these two factors, and in that union 
each exists only as it is related to the other. The subject 
is a subject only in so far as it is conscious of an object ; 
the object is an object only in so far as it is apprehended 
by a subject; and the destruction of either is the destruc- 
tion of consciousness itself. It is thus manifest that a 
consciousness of the Absolute is equally self-contradictory 
with that of the Infinite. To be conscious of the Absolute, 
as such, we must know that an object which is given in 
relation to our consciousness is identical with one which 
exists in its own nature, out of all relation to consciousness. 
But to know this identity we must be able to compare the 
two together, and such a comparison is itself a contradic- 
tion. We are in fact required to compare that of which 
we are conscious with that of which we are not conscious, 
the comparison itself being an act of consciousness, and 
only possible through the consciousness of both its objects. 
It is thus manifest that even if we could be conscious of 
the absolute we could not possibly know that it is the 
absolute; and, as we can be conscious of an object, as such, 
only by knowing it to be what it is, this is equivalent to an 
admission that we cannot be conscious of the absolute at 
all. As an object of consciousness everything is necessarily 
relative, and what a thing may be out of consciousness no 
mode of consciousness can tell us. 

- This contradiction, again, admits of the same explana- 
tion as the former. Our whole notion of existence is 
necessarily relative, for it is existence as conceived by us. 
But Existence, as we conceive it, is but a name for the 
several Ways in which objects are presented to our con- 
sciousness — a general term, embracing a variety of rela- 
5 



66 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

tions. The Absolute, on the other hand, is a term expressing 
no object of thought, but only a denial of the relation by 
which thought is constituted. To assume absolute exist- 
ence as an object of thought is thus to suppose a relation 
existing when the related terms exist no longer. An 
object of thought exists, as such, in and through its rela- 
tion to a thinker; while the absolute, as such, is indepen- 
dent of all relation. The Conception of the Absolute thus 
implies at the same time the presence and absence of the 
relation by which thought is constituted, and our various 
endeavors to represent it are only so many modified forms 
of the contradiction involved in our original assumption. 
Here, too, the contradiction is one which we ourselves 
have made. It does not imply that the Absolute cannot 
exist, but it implies most certainly that we cannot conceive 
it as existing." 

Here let me point out how the same general inference 
may be evolved from another fundamental condition of 
thought, omitted by Sir W. Hamilton, and not supplied 
by Mr. Mansel — a condition which, under its ol 
aspect, we have already contemplated in the last section. 
Every complete act of consciousness, besides distinction 
and relation, also implies likeness. Before it can h 
an idea, or constitute a piece of knowledge, a mental 
must not only be known as separate in kind from certain 
foregoing states to which it is known as related by si 
sion; but it must further be known as of the same kind 
with certain other foregoing states. That organization of 
changes which constitutes thinking involves continuous 
integration as well as continuous differentiation. Were 
each new affection of the mind perceived simply 
affection in some way contrasted with the preced; 
were there but a chain of impressions, each of which as it 
arose was merely distinguished from its pre I 
sciousness would be an utter chaos. To produce that 
orderly consciousness which we call intelligence there re- 
quires the assimilation of each impression to others, that 
occurred earlier in the series. Both the successive mental 
states ami the successive relations which they bear t< 
other, must be classified, and classification in\ 
only a parting of the unlike, but also a bonding together 
of the like. In brief, a true cognition is possible only 
through an accompanying recognition. Should it be ob- 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 67 

jected that if so there cannot be a first cognition, and 
hence there can be no cognition, the reply is that cognition 
proper arises gradually — that during the first stage of in- 
cipient intelligence, before the feelings produced by inter- 
course with the outer world have been put in order, there 
are no cognitions, strictly so-called, and that, as every 
infant shows us, these slowly emerge out of the confusion 
of unfolding consciousness as fast as the experiences are 
arranged into groups — as fast as the most frequently 
repeated sensations and their relations to each other become 
familiar enough to admit of their recognition as such or 
such whenever they recur. Should it be further objected 
that if cognition pre-supposes recognition there can be no 
cognition, even by an adult, of an object never before seen, 
there is still the sufficient answer that in so far as it is not 
assimilated to previously seen objects it is not known, and 
that it is known in so far as it is assimilated to them. Of 
this paradox the interpretation is that an object is classi- 
fiable in various ways, with various degrees of complete- 
ness. An animal hitherto imknoivn (mark the word), 
though not referable to any established species or genus, 
is yet recognized as belonging to one of the larger divisions 
— mammals, birds, reptiles, or fishes — or should it be so 
anomalous that its alliance with any of these is not deter- 
minable, it may yet be classed as vertebrate or invertebrate ; 
or, if it be one of those organisms of which it is doubtful 
whether the animal or vegetable characteristics predom- 
inate, it is still known as a living body. Even should it 
be questioned whether it is organic, it remains beyond 
question that it is a material object, and it is cognized by 
being recognized as such. Whence it is manifest that a 
thing is perfectly known only when it is in all respects 
like certain things previously observed — that in proportion 
to the number of respects in which it is unlike them is 
the extent to which it is unknown; and hence, when it 
has absolutely no attribute in common with anything else, 
it must be absolutely beyond the bounds of knowledge. 

Observe the corollary which here concerns us. A cog- 
nition of the Eeal as distinguished from the Phenomenal 
must, if it exists, conform to this law of cognition in gen- 
eral. The First Cause, the Infinite, the Absolute, to be 
known at all, must be classed. To be positively thought 
of, it must be thought of as such or such — as of this or that 



68 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

kind. Can it be like in kind to anything of which we 
have sensible experience? Obviously not. Between the 
creating and the created there must be a distinction tran- 
scending any of the distinctions existing between different 
divisions of the created. That which is uncaused cannot 
be assimilated to that which is caused, the two being in 
the very naming antithetically opposed. The Infinite can- 
not be grouped along with something that is finite: since 
in being so grouped it must be regarded as not-infinite. 
It is impossible to put the Absolute in the same cal 
with anything relative, so long as the Absolute is defined 
as that of which no necessary relation can be predi 
Is it then that the Actual, though unthinkable by el 
cation with the Apparent, i- thinkable by classification 
with itself? This supposition is equally absurd with the 
other. It implies the plurality of the First Cause, the 
Infinite, the Absolute; and this implication U Belf-oon- 
tradictory. There cannot be more than one Y\ 

* that the existence of more than one would involve 
the existence of something necessitating than cue, 

which something would be t! First Cause. How 

self-destruetive i- the assumption of two or more Infinites 
is manifest <»n remembering that Buch Infinites, by limit- 
M-h other, would ijlarly, an 

Absolute which existed not alone, but along with i 
Absolutes, woi ite but a relative. 

The Unconditioned, t : e neither with any 

form of the conditioned nor with any other Unconditioned, 
cannot be I ail. And to admit that it cam 

known as of such or such kind is to admit that it is 
unknowable. 

Thus, from the very nature of thought, the relath i 
our knowledge is inferable in three several ways 
find by analyzing it, and as we Bee it objectivel) 
in every proposition, a thought involve 3 
eiia\ likeness. Whatever does not present each of I 

>t admit of cognition. And hence we may say that 
the Unconditioned, as presenting them, i? trebly 

unthinkable. 

§ 25. From yet another point of view we may dif 
the same great truth. If instead of examining our intel- 
lectual powers directly as exhibited in tb thought, 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 69 

or indirectly as exhibited in thought when expressed by 
words, we look at the connection between the mind and 
the world, a like conclusion is forced upon us. In the 
very definition of Life, when reduced to its most abstract 
shape, this ultimate implication becomes visible. 

All vital actions, considered not separately but in their 
ensemble, have for their final purpose the balancing of cer- 
tain outer processes by certain inner processes. There are 
unceasing external forces tending to bring the matter of 
which organic bodies consist into that state of stable equi- 
librium displayed by inorganic bodies; there are internal 
forces by which this tendency is constantly antagonized ; 
and the perpetual changes which constitute Life may be 
regarded as incidental to the maintenance of the antago- 
nism. To preserve the erect posture, for instance, we see 
that certain weights have to be neutralized by certain 
strains. Each limb or other organ gravitating to the 
Earth and pulling down the parts to which it is attached 
has to be preserved in position by the tension of sundry 
muscles; or, in other words, the group of forces which 
would, if allowed, bring the body to the ground has to be 
counterbalanced by another group of forces. Again, to 
keep up the temperature at a particular point the external 
process of radiation and absorption of heat by the sur- 
rounding medium must be met by a corresponding internal 
process of chemical combination, whereby more heat may 
be evolved; to which add that if from atmospheric changes 
the loss becomes greater or less the production must become 
greater or less. And similarly throughout the organic 
actions in general. 

When we contemplate the lower kinds of life we see 
that the correspondences thus maintained are direct and 
simple, as in a plant, the vitality of which mainly consists in 
osmotic and chemical actions responding to the co-exist- 
ence of light, heat, water, and carbonic acid around it. 
But in animals, and especially in the higher orders of 
them, the correspondences become extremely complex. 
Materials for growth and repair not being, like those 
which plants require, everywhere present, but being widely 
dispersed and under special forms, have to be found, to be 
secured, and to be reduced to a fit state for assimilation. 
Hence the need for locomotion, hence the need for the 
senses, hence the need for prehensile and destructive appli- 



70 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

ances, hence the need for an elaborate digestive apparatus. 
Observe, however, that these successive complications are 
essentially nothing but aids to the maintenance of the 
organic balance in its integrity, in opposition to those 
physical, chemical, and other agencies which tend to over- 
turn it. And observe, moreover, that while these succes- 
sive complications subserve this fundamental adaptation 
of inner to outer actions, they are themselves nothing else 
but further adaptations of inner to outer actions. For 
what are those movements by which a predatory creature 
pursues its prey, or by which its prey seeks to escape, but 
certain changes in the organism fitted to meet certain 
changes in its environment? What is that compound 
operation which constitutes the perception of a piece of 
food but a particular correlation of nervous modifications, 
answering to a particular correlation of physical proper- 
ties? What is that process by which food when swallowed 
is reduced to a fit form for assimilation hut a set of me- 
chanical and chemical a'-! ions responding to the mechanical 
and chemical actions which distinguish the food? AVhence 
it becomes manifest that while Life in its simplest form is 
the correspondence of certain inner physico-chemical ac- 
tions with certain outer physico-chemical acti 
advance to a higher form of Life consists in a better pres- 
ervation of this primary correspondence by the establish- 
ment of other correspondences. 

Divesting this conception of all superfluities and reduc- 
ing it to its most abstract shape, we see that Life is defina- 
ble as the continuous adjustment of internal relations to 
external relations. And when we so define it we difi 
that the physical and the psychical life are equally 
prehended by the definition. We perceive that this which 
we call Intelligence shows itself when the external relations 
to which the internal ones are adjusted begin to he nu- 
merous, complex, and remote in time or space — that 
every advance in Intelligence essentially consists in the 
establishment of more varied, more complete, and more 
involved adjustments; and that even the highest achieve- 
ments of science are resolvable into mental relatioi 
co-cxistenee and sequence, so co-ordinated as exactly to 
tally with certain relations of co-existence and sequence 
that occur externally. A caterpillar wandering at random 
and at length finding its way on to a plant having a certain 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 71 

odor, begins to eat — lias inside of it an organic relation 
between a particular impression and a particular set of 
actions, answering to the relation outside of it, between 
scent and nutriment. The sparrow, guided by the more 
complex correlation of impressions which the color, form, 
and movements of the caterpillar gave it, and guided also 
by other correlations, which measure the positions and 
distance of the caterpillar, adjusts certain correlated mus- 
cular movements in such way as to seize the caterpillar. 
Through a much greater distance in space is the hawk, 
hovering above, affected by the relations of shape and 
motion which the sparrow presents; and the much more 
complicated and prolonged series of related nervous and 
muscular changes gone through in correspondence with 
the sparrow's changing relations of position finally succeed 
when they are precisely adjusted to these changing rela- 
tions. In the fowler experience has established a relation 
between the appearance and flight of a hawk and the de- 
struction of other birds, including game. There is also in 
him an established relation between those visual impressions 
answering to a certain distance in space and the range of 
his gun; and he has learned, too, by frequent observation, 
what relations of position the sights must bear to a point 
somewhat in advance of the flying bird before he can fire 
with success. Similarly, if we go back to the manufacture 
of the gun. By relations of co-existence between color, 
density, and place in the earth a particular mineral is 
known as one which yields iron ; and the obtainment of 
iron from it results when certain correlated acts of ours 
are adjusted to certain correlated affinities displayed by 
ironstone, coal, and lime at a high temperature. If we 
dsecend yet a step further, and ask a chemist to explain 
the explosion of gunpowder, or apply to a mathematician 
for a theory of projectiles, we still find that special or 
general relations of co-existence and sequence between 
properties, motions, spaoes, etc., are all they can teach us. 
And lastly, let it be noted that what we call truth, guiding 
us to successful action and the consequent maintenance of 
life, is simply the accurate correspondence of subjective 
to objective relations; while error, leading to failure and 
therefore toward death, is the absence of such accurate 
correspondence. 

If, then, Life in all its manifestations, inclusive of intel- 



72 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

ligence in its highest forms, consists in the continuous 
adjustment of internal relations to external relations, the 
necessarily relative character of our knowledge becomes 
obvious. The simplest cognition being the establishment 
of some connection between subjective states, answering to 
some connection between objective agencies, and each 
successively more complex cognition being the establish- 
ment of some more involved connection of such states, 
answering to some more involved connection of such i _ 
cies, it is clear that the process, no matter how far it be 
carried, can never bring within the reach of intelligence 
either the states themselves or the agencies themselves. 
Ascertaining which things occur along with which, and 
what things follow what, supposing it to be pursued ex- 
haustively, must still leave as with co-existences and 
sequences only. If every act of knowing is the formation 
of a relation in consciousness parallel to a relation in the 
environment, then the relativity of knowledge is self- 
evident — becomes, indeed, a truism. Thinking being 
relationing, no thought can ever ea tore than 

relations. 

And here let us n<»t omit to mark how that to which 
our intelligence is confined is that with which alon< 
intelligence is concerned. The knowledge within our 
reach is the only knowledge that can be oi service I 
This maintenance el a correspondence between internal 
actions and external actions, which both constitute - 
life at each moment and is the means whereby life L£ 
tinned through subsequent moments, merely requires that 
the agencies acting upon us shall be known in their co- 
existences and sequences, and not that they shall be known 
in themselves. If ./• and y are two uniformly com 
properties in some outer objeet, while a ami l> are the 
effects they produce in our conscious id if while the 

property a; produces in us the indifferent mental - 
the property y produces in us the painful mental state b 
(answering to a physical injury); then, all that is requisite 
for our guidance is, that .>• being the uniform accompani- 
ment of y externally, a shall be the uniform accompaniment 
O* /' internally: so that when, by the presence of 
produced in conscious] r rather the idea of I. e 

follow it, ami excite the motions by which the effect of u 
may be escaped. The sole need is that a and and the 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 73 

relation between them, shall always answer to x and y and 
the relation between them. It matters nothing to us if a 
and b are like x and y or not. Could they be exactly 
identical with them we should not be one whit the better 
oil, and their total dissimilarity is no disadvantage to us. 

Deep down, then, in the very nature of Life the relativ- 
ity of our knowledge is discernible. The analysis of vital 
actions in general leads not only to the conclusion that 
things in themselves cannot be known to us, but also to 
the conclusion that knowledge of them, were it possible, 
would be useless. 

§ 26. There still remains the final question, What must 
we say concerning that which transcends knowledge? Are 
we to rest wholly in the consciousness of phenomena? Is 
the result of inquiry to exclude utterly from our minds 
everything but the relative? or must we also believe in 
something beyond the relative? 

The answer of pare logic is held to be, that by the limits 
of our intelligence we are rigorously confined within the 
relative, and that anything transcending the relative can 
be thought of only as a pure negation or as a non-existence. 
" The absolute is conceived merely by a negation of con- 
ceivability," writes Sir William Hamilton. " The Absolute 
and the Infinite" says Mr. Mansel, "are thus, like the 
Inconceivable and the Imperceptible, names indicating not 
an object of thought or of consciousness at all, but the 
mere absence of the conditions under which consciousness 
is possible." From each of which extracts may be deduced 
the conclusion that since reason cannot warrant us in 
affirming the positive existence of what is cognizable only 
as a negation, we cannot rationally affirm the positive exist- 
ence of anything beyond phenomena. 

Unavoidable as this conclusion seems, it involves, I 
think, a grave error. If the premiss be granted the infer- 
ence must doubtless be admitted; but the premiss, in the 
form presented by Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel, 
is not strictly true. Though in the foregoing pages the 
arguments used by these writers to show that the Absolute 
is unknowable have been approvingly quoted, and though 
these arguments have been enforced by others equally 
thoroughgoing, yet there remains to be stated a qualifica- 
tion which saves us from that scepticism otherwise neces- 



74 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

sitated. It is not to be denied that so long as we confine 
ourselves to the purely logical aspect of the question the 
propositions quoted above must be accepted in their en- 
tirety; but when we contemplate its more general, or 
psychological, aspect we find that these propositions are 
imperfect statements of the truth — omitting, or rather 
excluding, as they do, an all-important fact. To 
specifically: Besides that definite consciousness of which 
logic formulates the laws there is also an indefinite con- 
sciousness which cannot be formulated. Besides complete 
thoughts, and besides the thoughts which though incom- 
plete admit of completion, there are thoughts which it is 
impossible to complete, and yet which are still real, in the 
sense tiiat they are normal affections of the intellect. 

Observe in the first place that every one of the arguments 
by which the relativity of our knowledge is demonstrated 
distinctly postulates the positive existence of something 
beyond the relative. To say that *e cannot know the 
absolute is, by implication, t<» affirm that there is an 
lute. In the very denial of onr power to learn what the 
absolute i-. there lies hidden the assumption thai it is: and 
the making of this assumption pr«>\es that the absolute 
has been present to the mind, not as a nothing, but as a some- 
thing. Similarly with every step in I Boning by 
which this doctrine is upheld. The Noumenon, every- 
where named as the antithesis of the Phenomenon, is 
throughout necessarily thought of as an actuality. It is 
rigorously impossible to conceive that our know 
knowledge of appearances only, without at time 
conceiving a reality of which they are appean 
appearance without reality is unthinkable. Strike out 
from the argument the terms unconditioned, infinite. - - 
lute, with their equivalents, ami in place of them write 
u negation of conceivability, or " absence of the conditions 
under which consciousness is possible," and you find that 
the argument becomes nonsense. Truly to realize in 
thought any one of the propositions of which the argument 
consists, the unconditioned must be repr 
ami not negative. How, then, can it be a legitimate 
elusion from the argument that our consciousness of it is 
negative? An argument, the very construction of which 
assigns to a certain term a certain meaning, but which 
ends in showing that this term has no siuh meaning, is 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 75 

simply an elaborate suicide. Clearly, then, the very dem- 
onstration that a definite consciousness of the absolute is 
impossible to us unavoidably presupposes an indefinite con- 
sciousness of it. 

Perhaps the best way of showing that by the necessary 
conditions of thought we are obliged to form a positive 
though vague consciousness of this which transcends dis- 
tinct consciousness, is to analyze our conception of the 
antithesis between relative and absolute. It is a doctrine 
called in question by none that such antinomies of thought 
as whole and part, equal and unequal, singular and plural 
are necessarily conceived as correlatives. The conception 
of a part is impossible without the conception of a whole. 
There can be no idea of equality without one of inequality. 
And it is admitted that in the same manner the relative is 
itself conceivable as such only by opposition to the irrela- 
tive or absolute. Sir William Hamilton, however, in his 
trenchant (and in most parts unanswerable) criticism on 
Cousin, contends, in conformity with his position above 
stated, that one of these correlatives is nothing whatever 
beyond the negation of the other. "Correlatives," he 
says, " certainly suggest -each other, but correlatives may 
or may not be equally real and positive. In thought con- 
tradictions necessarily imply each other, for the knowledge 
of contradictories is one. But the reality of one contra- 
dictory, so far from guaranteeing the reality of the other, 
is nothing else than its negation. Thus every positive 
notion (the concept of a thing by what it is) suggests a 
negative notion (the concept of a thing by what it is not) ; 
and the highest positive notion, the notion of the conceiv- 
able, is not without its corresponding negative in the 
notion of the inconceivable. But though these mutually 
suggest each other, the positive alone is real ; the negative 
is only an abstraction of the other, and in" the highest 
generality even an abstraction of thought itself." Now 
the assertion that of such contradictories " the negative is 
only an abstraction of the other" — " is nothing else than its 
negation" — is not true. In such correlatives as equal and 
unequal it is obvious enough that the negative concept 
contains something besides the negation of the positive 
one, for the things of which equality is denied are not 
abolished from consciousness by the denial. And the fact 
overlooked by Sir William Hamilton is that the like holds 



76 FIRST PRIXCIPLES. 

even with those correlatives of which the negative is in- 
conceivable, in the strict sense of the word. Take for 
example the Limited and the Unlimited. Our notion of 
the Limited is composed firstly of a consciousness of some 
kind of being, and secondly of a consciousness of the lim- 
its under which it is known. In the antithetical notion 
of the L T nlimited the consciousness of limits is abolished, 
but not the consciousness of some kind of being. It is 
quite true that in the absence of conceived limits thi- 
sciousnes3 ceases to be a concept, properly so called, but it 
is none the less true that it remains as a mode of con- 
sciousness. If in such cases the negative contradi 
were, as alleged, u nothing else" than the negation of the 
other, and therefore a mere nonentity, then it would 
clearly follow that negative contradictories could be 
interchangeably. The Unlimited might be thought of as 
antithetical to the Divisible, ami the Indivisible as anti- 
thetical to the Limited; while the I they cannot be 
so used proves that in i 3 the Unlimited and the 
Indivisible are qualitatively distinct and therefore positive 
or real; sinee distinction cannot I reen not] 
The error (very naturally fallen into by philosophers intent 
on demonstrating the Limits and Gondii 

;uiing that conscious] 38 ..tains 
nothing but limits and conditions, to the entire I B 
that which is limited and conditioned It is 
that there is something which alike forms the raw material 
of definite thought and remains after the detiniteness which 
thinking gave to it has been destroyed. Now all tl. 
plies by change of terms to the last and highest of 
antinomies — that between the Relative and the Non-relative. 
We are conscious of the Relative as existence under condi- 
tions and limits. It is impossible that these conditions 
limits can be thought of apart from something to which 
they give the form. The abstraction of these conditions 
and limits is, by the hypothesis, the abstractly d 
consequently there must be a residuary cone 
of something which filled up their outlines, and this i 
nite something constitutes our conscious 
relative or Absolute. Impossible though it is : 
this consciousness any qualitative or quantitative «. 
Sion whatever, it is not the less certain that it remains 
with us as a positive and indestructible element of thought. 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 77 

Still more manifest will this truth become when it is ob- 
served that our conception of the Eelative itself disappears 
if our conception of the Absolute is a pure negation. It is 
admitted, or rather it is contended, by the writers I have 
quoted above, that contradictories can be known only in 
relation to each other; that Equality, for instance, is un- 
thinkable apart from its correlative Inequality, and that 
thus the Eelative can itself be conceived only by opposition 
to the Non-relative. It is also admitted, or rather con- 
tended, that the consciousness of a relation implies a con- 
sciousness of both the related members. If we are required 
to conceive the relation between the Eelative and Non- 
relative without being conscious of both, " we are in fact" 
(to quote the words of Mr. Mansel differently applied) 
" required to compare that of which we are conscious with 
that of which we are not conscious; the comparison itself 
being an act of consciousness, and only possible through, 
the consciousness of both its objects." What then becomes 
of the assertion that " the Absolute is conceived merely by 
a negation of conceivability," or as "the mere absence of 
the conditions under which consciousness is possible?" If 
the Non-relative or Absolute is present in thought only as a 
mere negation, then the relation between it and the Eela- 
tive becomes unthinkable, because one of the terms of the 
relation is absent from consciousness. And if this relation 
is unthinkable, then is the Eelative itself unthinkable for 
want of its antithesis ; whence results the disappearance of 
all thought whatever. 

Let me here point out that both Sir William Hamilton 
and Mr. Mansel do, in other places, distinctly imply that 
our consciousness of the Absolute, indefinite though it is, 
is positive and not negative. The very passage already 
quoted from Sir William Hamilton, in which he asserts 
that " the absolute is conceived merely by a negation of 
conceivability," itself ends with the remark that "by a 
wonderful revelation, we are thus, in the very conscious- 
ness of our inability to conceive aught above the relative 
and finite, inspired with a belief in the existence of some- 
thing unconditioned beyond the sphere of all comprehen- 
sible reality." The last of these assertions practically ad- 
mits that which the other denies. By the laws of thought, 
as Sir William Hamilton has interpreted them, he finds 
himself forced to the conclusion that our consciousness of 



?s 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 



the Absolute is a pure negation. He nevertheless finds 
that there does exist in consciousness an irresistible con- 
viction of the real " existence of something unconditioned." 
And he gets over the inconsistency by speaking of thi3 
conviction as "a wonderful revelation," "a belief" with 
which we are " inspired," thus apparently hinting that it 
is supernaturally at variance with the laws of thought. 
Mr. Mansel is betrayed into a like inconsistency. When 
he says that "we are compelled by the constitution of our 
minds to believe in the existence of an Absolute and Infi- 
nite Being — a belief which appears forced upon us as the 
complement of onr conscio lative and the 

finite," he clearly Bays by implication that this conscioua- 

3 positive and not negative. He tacitly admits 
we are obliged to regard the Absolute as something 
than a negation — that our consciousness of it is n<>t " the 
mere absence of the conditions nnder which 

is possible." 

The supreme importance of this question must be my 

apology for taxing the reader's attention a little further, 
in the hope Of clearing up the remaining difficulties. 
The necessarily positive character of onr conscious] 
the Unconditioned, which, as we have seen, to] 

an ultimate law of thought, will lie better und( 
contemplating the process of thought. 

Out 1 of the arguments used to prove the relativity of onr 
knowledge is that we cannot conceive Spare or Tii 
either limited or unlimited. It is pointed out that when 
we imagine a limit there simultaneously arise- the 
ness of a spare or time existing beyond the limit This 
remoter space or time, though not contemplate 
nite, is yet contemplated as real. Though « 
of it a conception proper, since not brii 

within bounds, there is yet in our minds the una] 
material of a conception. Similarly with our 
o\' Cause. We are no more able to form a circumscribe . 
of Cause than of Space or 'rime, ami we are 
obliged to think of the Cause which I Is the lin 

our thought as posit i ..h indefinite. n the 

same manner that on conceiving any bourn" there 

arises a nascenl unds, 

so when we think of any definite cause tli 
consciousness of a cause behind it; and in the t 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 79 

in the other, this nascent consciousness is in substance like 
that which suggests it, though without form. The mo- 
mentum of thought inevitably carries us beyond condi- 
tioned existence to unconditioned existence, and this ever 
persists in us as the body of a thought to which we can 
give no shape. Hence our firm belief in objective reality 
— a belief which metaphysical criticisms cannot for a 
moment shake. When we are taught that a piece of mat- 
ter regarded by us as existing externally cannot be really 
known, but that we can know only certain impressions 
produced on us, we are yet, by the relativity of our thought, 
compelled to think of these in relation to a positive cause 
— the notion of a real existence which generated these 
impressions becomes nascent. If it be proved to us that 
every notion of a real existence which we can frame is 
utterly inconsistent with itself — that matter, however con- 
ceived by us, cannot be matter as it actually is, our 
conception, though transfigured, is not destroyed. There 
remains the sense of reality, dissociated as far as possible 
from those special forms under which it was before repre- 
sented in thought. Though Philosophy condemns succes- 
sively each attempted conception of the Absolute — though 
it proves to us that the Absolute is not this, nor that, nor 
that — though in obedience to it we negative, one after 
another, each idea as it arises, yet as we cannot expel the 
entire contents of consciousness there ever remains behind 
an element which passes into new shapes. The continual 
negation of each particular form and limit simply results 
in the more or less complete abstraction of all forms and 
limits, and so ends in an indefinite consciousness of the 
unformed and unlimited. 

And here we come face to face with the ultimate diffi- 
culty: How can there possibly be constituted a conscious- 
ness of the unformed and unlimited, when, by its very 
nature, consciousness is possible only under forms and 
limits? If every consciousness of existence is a conscious- 
nsss of existence as conditioned, then how, after the nega- 
tion of conditions, can there be any residuum? Though 
not directly withdrawn by the withdrawal of its conditions, 
must not the raw material of consciousness be withdrawn 
by implication? Must it not vanish when the conditions 
of its existence vanish? That there must be a solution of 
this difficulty is manifest ; since even those who would put 



80 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

it do, as already shown, admit that we have some such 
consciousness; and the solution appears to be that above 
shadowed forth. Such consciousness is not, and cannot 
be, constituted by any single mental act, but is the pro- 
duct of many mental acts. In each concept there is an 
element which persists. It is alike impossible for this 
element to be absent from consciousness and fur it to be 
present in consciousness alone. Either alternative involves 
unconsciousness — the one from the want of the substance, 
the other from the want of the form. But the persistence 
of this element under successive conditions necessii 
sense of it as distinguished from the conditions and inde- 
pendent of them. The sense of a something that is coidi- 
tioned in every thought cannot be got rid of, because the 
something cannot be got rid of. How then must the .<ense 
cf this something be constituted? Evidently by eon bill- 
ing successive concepts deprived of their limits and condi- 
tions. We form this indefinite thought as we form many 
of our definite thoughts, by tl 3cence of i 

thoughts. Let me illustrate this. A large complex objeet, 
having attributes too numerous to be represented at once, 
is yet tolerably well conceived by the union of several rep- 
resentations, each standing for part of its attributes. 
thinking of a piano there 6 /.nation its 

ual appearance, to which are instantly added (though by 
separate mental acts) the idea- of its remote side and of 
its solid substance. A complete conception, however, in- 
volves the strings, the hammers, the damp; . -dais; 
while successively adding these to the conception, the attri- 
butes first thought of lapse more or [ess completely out of 
consciousness, Nevertheless, the whole group constitutes 
a representation of the piano. Now as in tl. form 
a definite concept of a special existence, by imposing limits 
and conditions in successive acts; so, in the con'. - - . 
by taking away the limits and conditions in sneo - 
we form an indefinite notion of general existence. By 
fusing a series of >tates of consciousness, in each of which, 
as it arises, the limitations and conditions are abolis 
there is produced a consciousness - mething uncondi- 
tioned. To speak more rigorously: this consciousness - 
not the abstract of any one group of thoughts. id< 
conceptions; but it is the abstract of uU thoughts, ideas, 
or conceptions. That which is common to them all, and 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 81 

cannot be got rid of, is what we predicate by the word 
existence. Dissociated as this becomes from each of its 
modes by the perpetual change of those modes, it remains 
as an indefinite consciousness of something constant under 
all modes — of being apart from its appearances. The dis- 
tinction we feel between special and general existence, is 
the distinction between that which is changeable in us, 
and that which is unchangeable. The contrast between 
the Absolute and the Eelative in our minds, is really the 
contrast between that mental element which exists abso- 
lutely, and those which exist relatively. 

By its very nature, therefore, this ultimate mental ele- 
ment is at once necessarily indefinite and necessarily inde- 
structible. Our consciousness of the unconditioned being -^ 
literally the unconditioned consciousness, or raw material ^> 
of thought to which in thinking we give definite forms, it <£* 
follows that an ever-present sense of real existence is the » 
very basis of our intelligence. As we can in successive 
mental acts get rid of all particular conditions and replace 
them by others, but cannot get rid of that undifferentiated 
substance of consciousness which is conditioned anew in 
every thought ; there ever remains with us a sense of that 
which exists persistently and independently of conditions. 
At the same time that by the laws of thought we are rigor- 
ously prevented from forming a conception of absolute 
existence, we are by the laws of thought equally prevented 
from ridding ourselves of the consciousness of absolute 
existence, this consciousness being, as we here see, the 
obverse of our self-consciousness. And since the only pos- 
sible measure of relative validity among our beliefs, is the 
degree of their persistence in opposition to the efforts made 
to change them, it follows that this which persists at all 
times, under all circumstances, and cannot cease until con- 
sciousness ceases, has the highest validity of any. 

To sum up this somewhat too elaborate argument: We 
have seen how in the very assertion that all our knowledge, 
properly so called, is Eelative, there is involved the asser- 
tion that there exists a Non-relative. We have seen how, 
in each step of the argument by which this doctrine is 
established, the same assumption is made. We have seen 
how, for the very necessity of thinking in relations, it 
follows that the Relative is itself inconceivable, except as 
related to a real Non-relative. We have seen that unless 



82 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

a real Non-relative or Absolute be postulated, the Relative 
itself becomes absolute ; and so brings the argument to a 
contradiction. And .on contemplating the process of 
thought, we have equally seen how impossible it is to get 
rid of the consciousness of an actuality lying behind ap- 
pearances; and how, from this impossibility, results our 
indestructible belief in that actuality. 



CHAPTER V. 

THE RECONCILIATION. 

§ 27. Thus do all lines of argument converge to the 
same conclusion. The inference reached a priori, in the 
last chapter, confirms the inferences which, in tin 
preceding chapters, were reached a posteriori. Those 
imbecilities of the understanding that disclose themselves 
when we try to answer the highest questions of objective 
science, subjective science proves to be necessitated by the 
laws of that understanding. We not only learn by the 
frustration of all our efforts, that the reality underlying 
appearances is totally and forever inconceivable by us, hut 
we also learn why, from the very nature of our intelligence, 
it must be so. Finally we discover that this conclusion, 
which, in its unqualified form, seems opposed to the in- 
stinctive convictions of mankind, falls into harmony with 
them when the missing qualification is supplied. Though 
the Absolute cannot in any manner or d< \ known, in 

the strict sense of knowing, yet we find that its positive 
existence is a necessary datum of consciousness; that so 
long as consciousness continues, we cannot for an instant 
rid it of this datum; and that thus the belief which this 
datum constitutes has a higher warrant than any other 
whatever. 

Here then is that basis of agreement we set out to 
seek. TTiis conclusion which objective science illustrates, 
and subjective science shows to be unavoidable — this 
conclusion which, while it in the main expresses the 
doctrine of the English school of philosophy, recognizes 
also a soul of truth in the doctrine of the antagonist 
German school — this conclusion which brings the results 
of speculation into harmony with those of common - 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 83 

is also the conclusion which reconciles Religion with Sci- 
ence. Common Sense asserts the existence of a reality; 
Objective Science proves that this reality cannot be what 
we think it ; Subjective Science shows why we cannot think 
of it as it is, and yet are compelled to think of it as exist- 
ing; and in this assertion of a Reality utterly inscrutable 
in nature, Religion finds an assertion essentially coinciding 
with her own. We are obliged to regard every phenom- 
enon as a manifestation of some Power by which we are 
acted upon; though Omnipresence is unthinkable, yet, as 
experience discloses no bounds to the diffusion of phenom- 
ena, we are unable to think of limits to the presence of 
this Power; while the criticisms of Science teach us that 
this Power is incomprehensible. And this consciousness of 
an Incomprehensible Power, called Omnipresent from ina- 
bility to assign its limits, is just that consciousness on 
which Religion dwells. 

To understand fully how real is the reconciliation thus 
reached, it will be needful to look at the receptive atti- 
tudes that Religion and Science have all along maintained 
toward this conclusion. We must observe how, all along, 
the imperfections of each have been undergoing correc- 
tion by the other; and how the final outcome of their 
mutual criticisms can be nothing else than an entire 
agreement on this deepest and widest of all truths. 

§ 28. In Religion let us recognize the high merit that 
Jrom the beginning it has dimly discerned the ultimate 
verity, and has never ceased to insist upon it. In its earliest 
and crudest forms it manifested, however vaguely and in- 
consistently, an intuition forming the germ of this highest 
belief in which all philosophies finally unite. The con- 
sciousness of a mystery is traceable in the rudest fetishism. 
Each higher religious creed, rejecting those definite and 
simple interpretations of Nature previously given, has be- 
come more religious by doing this. As the quite concrete 
and conceivable agencies alleged as the causes of things 
have been replaced by agencies less concrete and conceiv- 
able, the element of mystery has of necessity become more 
predominant. Through all its successive phases the dis- 
appearance of those positive dogmas by which the mystery 
was made unmysterious, has formed the essential change 
delineated in religious history. And so Religion has ever 



84 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

been approximating toward that complete recognition of 
this mystery which is its goal. 

For its essentially valid belief, Religion has constantly 
done battle. Gross as were the disguises under which it 
first espoused this belief, and cherishing this belief though 
it still is, under disfiguring vestments, it has never ceased 
to maintain and defend it. It has everywhere established 
and propagated one or other modification of the doctrine 
that all things are manifestations of a Power that tran- 
scends our knowledge. Though from age to age, Science 
has continually defeated it wherever they have come in 
collision, and has obliged it to relinquish one or more of 
its positions, it has still held the remaining ones with un- 
diminished tenacity. No exposure of the logical inconsis- 
tency of its conclusions — no proof that each of its particular 
dogmas was absurd, has been able to weaken its allegiance 
to that ultimate verity for which it stands. After criti- 
cism has abolished all its arguments and reduced it to 
silence, there has still remained with it the indestructible 
consciousness of a truth which, however faulty the mode 
in which it had been expressed, was yet a truth beyond 
cavil. To this conviction its adherence has been sub- 
stantially sincere. And for the guardianship and dif- 
fusion of it Humanity has ever been, and must ever be, its 
debtor. 

But while, from the beginning, Religion has had the all- 
essential office of presenting men from being wholly 
absorbed in the relative or immediate, and of awakening 
them to a consciousness of something beyond it, this office 
has been but very imperfectly discharged. Religion has 
ever been more or less irreligious; and it continues to be 
partially irreligious even now. In the first place, as im- 
plied above, it has all along professed to have some knowl- 
edge of that which transcends knowledge; and 1. 
contradicted its own teachings. While with one breath it 
has asserted that the Cause of all things passes understand- 
ing, it has, with the next breath, asserted that the Cause 
of all things possesses such or such attributes — can be in 
so far understood. In the second place, while in great 
part sincere in its fealty to the great truth it hes had to 
uphold, it has often been insincere, and consequently irre- 
ligious, in maintaining the untenable doctrines by which 
it has obscured this great truth. Each assertion respect- 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 85 

ing the nature, acts, or motives of that Power which the 
Universe manifests to us, has been repeatedly called in 
question, and proved to be inconsistent with itself, or with 
accompanying assertions. Yet each of them has been age 
after age insisted on, in spite of a secret consciousness that 
it would not bear examination. Just as though unaware 
that its central position was impregnable, Eeligion has 
obstinately held every outpost long after it was obviously 
indefensible. And this naturally introduces us to the 
third and most serious form of irreligion which Eeligion 
has displayed ; namely, an imperfect belief in that which 
it especially professes to believe. How truly its central 
position is impregnable, Religion has never adequately real- 
ized. In the devoutest faith as we habitually see it, there 
lies hidden an innermost core of scepticism ; and it is this 
scepticism which causes that dread of inquiry displayed 
by Religion when face to face with Science. Obliged to 
abandon one by one the superstitions it once tenaciously 
held, and daily finding its cherished beliefs more and more 
shaken, Religion shows a secret fear that all things may 
some day be explained ; and thus itself betrays a lurking 
doubt whether that Incomprehensible Cause of which it is 
conscious is really incomprehensible. 

Of Religion, then, we must always remember, that amid 
its many errors and corruptions it has asserted and diffused. 
a supreme verity. From the first, the recognition of this 
supreme verity, in however imperfect a manner, has been 
its vital element ; and its various defects, once extreme but 
gradually diminishing, have been so many failures to rec- 
ognize in full that which it recognized in part. The truly 
religious element of Religion has always been good; that 
which has proved untenable in doctrine and vicious in 
practice has been its irreligious element ; and from this it 
has been ever undergoing purification. 

§ 29. And now observe that, all along, the agent which 
has effected the purification has been Science. AVe habit- 
ually overlook the fact that this has been one of its func- 
tions. Religion ignores its immense debt to Science; and 
Science is scarcely at all conscious how much Religion owes 
it. Yet it is demonstrable that every step by which Relig- 
ion has progressed from its first low conception to the 
comparatively high one it has now reached, Science has 



86 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

helped it, or rather forced it, to take ; and that even now, 
Science is urging further steps in the same direction. 

Using the word Science in its true sense, as comprehend- 
ing all positive and definite knowledge of the order existing 
among surrounding phenomena, it becomes manifest that 
from the outset the discovery of an established order has 
modified that conception of disorder, or undetermined 
order, which underlies every superstition. As fast as ex- 
perience proves that certain familiar changes always happen 
in the same sequence, there begins to fade from the mind 
the conception of a special personality to whose variable 
will they were before ascribed. And when, step by step, 
accumulating observations do the like with the less familiar 
changes, a similar modification of belief takes place with 
respect to them. 

AVhile this process seems to those who effect, and those 
who undergo it, an anti-religious one, it is really the re- 
verse. Instead of the specific comprehensible agency before 
assigned, there is substituted a less specific and less com- 
prehensible agency; and though this, standing in opposi- 
tion to the previous one, cannot at first call forth the same 
feeling, jet, as being less comprehensible, it must eventu- 
ally call forth this feeling more fully. Take an instance. 
Of old the Sun was regarded as the chariot of a god, drawn 
by horses. How far the idea thus grossly expressed, was 
idealized, we need not inquire. It suffices to remark that 
this accounting for the apparent motion of the Sud by an 
agency like certain visible terrestrial agencies, reduced a 
daily wonder to the level of the commonest intellect. 
When, many centuries after, Kepler discovered that the 
planets moved round the Sun in ellipses and described 
equal areas in equal times, he concluded that in each 
planet there must exist a spirit to guide its movements. 
Here we see that with the progress of Science, there had 
disappeared the idea of a gross mechanical traction, such 
as was first assigned in the case of the Sun; but that while 
for this there was substituted an indefinite and less easily 
conceivable force, it was still thought needful to assume a 
special personal agent as a cause of the regular irregularity 
of motion. When, finally, it was proved that these plan- 
etary revolutions, with all their variations and disturbances, 
conformed to one universal law — when the presiding spirits 
which Kepler conceived were set aside, and the force of 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 87 

gravitation put in their place — the change was really the 
abolition of an imaginable agency, and the substitution of 
an unimaginable one. For though the laiv of gravitation 
is within our mental grasp, it is impossible to realize in 
thought the force of gravitation. Newton himself con- 
fessed the force of gravitation to be incomprehensible 
without the intermediation of an ether; and, as we have 
already seen (§ 18), the assumption of an ether does not 
in the least help us. Thus it is with Science in general. 
Its progress in grouping particular relations of phenomena 
under laws, and these special laws under laws more and 
more general, is of necessity a progress to causes that are 
more and more abstract. And causes more and more ab- 
stract are of necessity causes less and less conceivable; since 
the formation of an abstract conception involves the drop- 
ping of certain concrete elements of thought. Hence the 
most abstract conception, to which Science is ever slowly 
approaching, is one that merges into the inconceivable or 
unthinkable, by the dropping of all concreted elements 
of thought. And so is justified the assertion, that the 
beliefs which Science has forced upon Eeligion have been 
intrinsically more religious than those which they sup- 
planted. 

Science however, like Religion, has but very incompletely 
fulfilled its office. As Religion has fallen short of its func- 
tion in so far as it has been irreligious, so has Science fallen 
short of its function in so far as it has been unscientific. 
Let us note the several parallelisms. In its earlier stages, 
Science, while it began to teach the constant relations of 
phenomena, and so discredited the belief in separate per- 
sonalities as the causes of them, itself substituted the be- 
lief in causal agencies which, if not personal, were yet 
concrete. When certain facts were said to show " Nature's 
abhorrence of a vacuum," when the properties of gold were 
explained as due to some entity called " aureity," and when 
the phenomena of life were attributed to "a vital princi- 
ple," there was set up a mode of interpreting the facts, 
which, while antagonistic to the religious mode, because 
assigning other agencies, was also unscientific, because it 
professed to know that about which nothing was known. 
Having abandoned these metaphysical agencies — having 
seen that they were not independent existences, but merely 
special combinations of general causes, Science has more 



88 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

recently ascribed extensive groups of phenomena to elec- 
tricity, chemical affinity, and other like general powers. 
But in speaking of these as ultimate and independent 
entities, Science has preserved substantially the same atti- 
tude as before. Accounting thus for all phenomena, those 
of Life and Thought included, it has not only maintained 
its seeming antagonism to lieligion, by alleging agencies 
of a radically unlike kind; but, in so far us it has tacitly 
assumed a knowledge of these agencies, it has continued 
unscientific. At the present time, however, the 
vanced men of science are abandoning these later concep- 
tions, as their predecessors abandoned the earlier ones. 
Magnetism, heat, light; etc., which were a while since spoken 
of as so many distinct imponderables, physicists are now 
beginning to regard as different modes of manifestation of 
someone universal force; and in so doing are ceasing to 
think of this force as comprehensible. Jn each phase of 
its progress, Science lias rim- Btopped short with superficial 
solutions — has unscientifically neglected t<> ask what wan 
the nature of the agents it BO familiarly invoked. T 
in each succeeding phase it has gone a little deeper, and 
merged its supposed agents in more general and al e 
ones, it has still, as before, rested content with I 
they were ascertained realities. And this, which 1. 
along been the unscientific character^ - S ience, has 

all along been a part cause of its conflict with Religion. 

§ 'Ml We see then that, from the first, the faults of both 
Religion and Science have been the faults of imperfect devel- 
opment. Originally a mere rudiment, each has 
growing into a more complete form; the vice of each has 
in all times been its incompleteness; the nents 

between them have throughout been nothing more than 
the consequences of their incompleteness; and as they 
reach their final forms, they conn- into entire harmony. 

The progress of intelligence has throughout been dual. 
Though it has not seemed bo to those who made it. every 
step in advance has been a step toward both the natural 
and the supernatural. The better interpretation of 
phenomenon has been, on the erne hand, the reject 
a cause that was relatively conceivable in its nature but 
unknown in the order of its actions, and, on the other 
hand, the adoption of a cause that was known in the order 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 89 

of its actions but relatively inconceivable in its nature. 
The first advance out of universal fetishism manifestly 
involved the conception of agencies less assimilable to the 
familiar agencies of men and animals, and therefore less 
understood ; while at the same time, such newly conceived 
agencies, in so far as they were distinguished by their uni- 
form effects, were better understood than those they 
replaced. All subsequent advances display the same 
double result. Every deeper and more general power 
arrived at as a cause of phenomena has been at once less 
comprehensible than the special ones it superseded, in the 
sense of being less definitely representable in thought; 
while it has been more comprehensible in the sense that 
its actions have been more completely predicable. The 
progress has thus been as much toward the establishment 
of a positively unknown as toward the establishment of a 
positively known. Though as knowledge approaches its 
culmination, every unaccountable and seemingly supernat- 
ural fact is brought into the category of facts that are 
accountable or natural ; yet, at the same time, all account- 
able or natural facts are proved to be in their ultimate 
genesis unaccountable and supernatural. And so there 
arise two antithetical states of mind, answering to the 
opposite sides of that existence about which we think. 
While our consciousness of Nature under the one aspect 
constitutes Science, our consciousness of it under the other 
aspect constitutes Religion. 

Otherwise contemplating the facts, we may say that 
Eeligion and Science have been undergoing a slow differen- 
tiation; and that their ceaseless conflicts have been due to 
the imperfect separation of their spheres and functions. 
Religion has, from the first, struggled to unite more or less 
science with its nescience; Science has, from the first, 
kept hold of more or less nescience as though it were a 
part of science. Each has been obliged gradually to re- 
linquish that territory which it wrongly claimed, while it 
has gained from the other that to which it had a right; 
and the antagonism between them has been an inevitable 
accompaniment of this process. A more specific statement 
will make this clear. Religion, though at the outset it 
asserted a mystery, also made numerous definite assertions 
respecting this mystery — professed to know its nature in 
the minutest detail, and in so far as it claimed positive 



90 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

knowledge, it trespassed upon the province of Science. 
From the times of early mythologies, when such intimate 
acquaintance with the mystery was alleged, down to our own 
days, when but a few abstract and vague propositions are 
maintained, Religion has been compelled by Science to give 
up one after another of its dogmas — those assumed cog- 
nitions which it could not substantiate. In the mean time, 
Science substituted for the personalities to which Religion 
ascribed phenomena, certain metaphysical entities; and in 
doing this it trespassed on the province of Religion; since 
it classed among the things which it comprehended certain 
forms of the incomprehensible. Partly by the criticisms 
of lieligion, which has occasionally called in question its 
assumptions, and partly as a consequence of spontaneous 
growth, Science has been obliged to abandon these attempts 
to include within the boundaries of knowledge that which 
cannot be known; and has so yielded up to Religion that 
which of right belonged to it. So long as this pro< 
differentiation is incomplete, more or less of antagonism 
must continue. Gradually as the limits of possible 
tion are established, the causes of conflict will diminish. 
And a permanent peace will be readied when S 
comes fully convinced that its explanations are proximate 
and relative; while Religion becomes fully convinced that 
the mystery it contemplates is ultimate and absolute. 

Religion and Science are therefon I relatives. 

As already hinted, they stand respectively for those two 
antithetical modes of consciousness which cannot exist 
asunder. A known cannot be thought of apart from an 
unknown; nor can an unknown be thought of apart from 
a known. And by consequence neither can become more 
distinct without giving greater distinctness to the other. 
To carry further a metaphor before used — they are the 
positive and negative poles oi thought; of which neither 
can gain in intensity without increasing the intensity of 
the other. 

§ 31. Thus the consciousness of an Inscrutable Tower 
manifested to us through all phenomena has been growing 
ever clearer; and must eventually be freed from its im- 
perfections. The certainty that on the one hand such a 
Rower exists, while on the other hand its nature transcends 
intuition and is beyond imagination, is the certainty to- 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 91 

ward which intelligence has from the first been progressing. 
To this conclusion Science inevitably arrives as it reaches 
its confines ; while to this conclusion Religion is irresistibly 
driven by criticism. And satisfying as it does the demands 
of the most rigorous logic at the same time that it gives 
the religious sentiment the widest possible sphere of action, 
it is the conclusion we are bound to accept without reserve 
or qualification. 

Some do indeed allege that though the Ultimate Cause 
of things cannot really be thought of by ns as having 
specified attributes, it is yet incumbent upon us to assert 
these attributes. Though the forms of our consciousness 
are such that the Absolute cannot in any manner or degree 
be brought within them, we are nevertheless told that we 
must represent the Absolute to ourselves under these forms. 
As writes Mr. Mansel, in the work from which I have 
already quoted largely: "It is our duty, then, to think of 
God as personal ; and it is our duty to believe that He is 
infinite." 

That this is not the conclusion here adopted, needs 
hardly be said. If there be any meaning in the foregoing 
arguments, duty requires us neither to affirm nor deny 
personality. Our duty is to submit ourselves with all hu- 
mility to the established limits of our intelligence; and 
not perversely to rebel against them. Let those who can, 
believe that there is eternal war set between our intellectual 
faculties and our moral obligations. I for one, admit no 
such radical vice in the constitution of things. 

This which to most will seem an essentially irreligious 
position, is an essentially religious one — nay is the religious 
one, to which, as already shown, all others are but approx- 
imations. In the estimate it implies of the Ultimate Cause, 
it does not fall short of the alternative position but exceeds 
it. Those who espouse this alternative position make the 
erroneous assumption that the choice is between personality 
and something lower than personality; whereas the choice 
is rather between personality and something higher. Is 
it not just possible that there is a mode of being as much 
transcending Intelligence and Will, as these transcend me- 
chanical motion? It is true that we are totally unable to 
conceive any such higher mode of being. But this is not 
a reason for questioning its existence; it is rather the 
reverse. Have we not seen how utterly incompetent our 



92 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

minds are to form even an approach to a conception of 
that which underlies all phenomena? Is it not proved 
that this incompetency is the incompetency of the Condi- 
tioned to grasp the Unconditioned? Does it not follow 
that the Ultimate Cause cannot in any respect be conceived 
by us because it is in every respect greater than can be 
conceived? And may we not therefore rightly refrain 
from assigning to it any attributes whatever, on the ground 
that such attributes, derived as they must be from our 
own natures, are not elevations but degradations? Indeed 
it seems somewhat strange that men should suppose the 
highest worship to lie in assimilating the object of their 
worship to themselves. Not in asserting a transcendant 
difference, but in asserting a certain likeness, consists the 
element of their creed which they think essential. It is 
true that from the time when the rudest Bavages imagined 
the causes of all things to he creatures <>f flesh and blood 
like themselves, down to our own time, the degree of as- 
sumed likeness has been diminishing. Hut though a 
bodily form and substance similar to that of man has 
long Bince ceased, among cultivated ra< • a literally 

conceived attribute of the Ultimate Cans. — though the 
grosser human desires have been also rejected as unlit ele- 
ments of the conception — though there is Borne hesitation 
in ascribing even the higher human feel: greatly 

idealized shape-; yet \\ is stiU thought not only proper, 
but imperative, to ascribe the most abstract qualil 
our nature. To think of the Creative Power as in all re- 
spects anthropomorphous, is now considered impio 
men who yet hold themselves bound to think of th< 
ative Power as in some respects anthropomorphous; and 
who do not see that the o\w proceeding is but an ei 
cent form of the other. And then, most marvellous of all, 
this course is persisted in even by those who contend that 
we are wholly unable to frame any conception whate 
the Creative Power. After it has been shown that I 
supposition respecting the genesis of the Universe commits 
us to alternative impossibilities of thought — after it has 
been shown that each attempt to conceive real existence 
ends in any intellectual suicide — after it has been shown 
why, by the very constitution of our minds, eter- 

nally debarred from thinking of the Absolute: it is 
asserted that we ought to think of the Absolute thus and 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 93 

thus. In all imaginable ways we find thrust upon us the 
truth, that we *are not permitted to know — nay, are not 
even permitted to conceive — that Eeality which is behind 
the veil of Appearance ; and yet it is said to be our duty to 
believe (and in so far to conceive) that this Reality exists 
in a certain defined manner. Shall we call this reverence? 
or shall we call it the reverse? 

Volumes might be written upon the impiety of the pious. 
Through the printed and spoken thoughts of religious 
teachers may almost everywhere be traced a professed 
familiarity with the ultimate mystery of things, which, to 
say the least of it, seems anything but congruous with the 
accompanying expressions of humility. And surprisingly 
enough, those tenets which most clearly display this famil- 
iarity are those insisted upon as forming the vital elements 
of religious belief.. The attitude thus assumed can be 
fitly represented only by further developing a simile long 
current in theological controversies — the simile of the 
watch. If for a moment we made the grotesque supposi- 
tion that the tickings and other movements of a watch 
constituted a kind of consciousness; and that a watch pos- 
sessed of such a consciousness insisted on regarding the 
watchmaker's actions as determined like its own by springs 
and escapements; we should simply complete a parallel of 
which religious teachers think much. And were we to 
suppose that a watch not only formulated the cause of its 
existence in these mechanical terms but held that watches 
were bound out of reverence so to formulate this cause, 
and even vituperated, as atheistic watches, any that did 
not venture so to formulate it; we should merely illustrate 
the presumption of theologians by carrying their own argu- 
ment a step further. A few extracts will bring home to 
the reader the justice of this comparison. We are told, 
for example, by one of high repute among religious think- 
ers, that the Universe is " the manifestation and abode of 
a Free Mind, like our own; embodying His personal 
thought in its adjustments, realizing His own ideal in its 
phenomena, just as we express our inner faculty and char- 
acter through the natural language of an external life. 
In this view, we interpret Nature by Humanity; we find 
the key to her aspects in such purposes and affections as 
our own consciousness enables us to conceive; we look 
everywhere for physical signals of an ever-living Will ; and 



94 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

decipher the universe as the autobiography of an Infinite 
Spirit, repeating itself in miniature within our Finite 
Spirit." The same writer goes still further. He not only 
thus parallels the assimilation of the watchmaker to the 
watch — he not only thinks the created can u decipher" 
"the autobiography" of the Creating; but he asserts that 
the necessary limits of the one are necessary limits of the 
other. The primary qualities of bodies, he says, " belong 
eternally to the material datum objective to God" and 
control his acts; while the secondary ones are "products 
of pure Inventive Reason and Determining Will" — consti- 
tute " the realm of Divine originality." . . . " While on 
this Secondary field His Mind and ours are thus contrasted, 
they meet in resemblance again upon the Primary; for the 
evolutions of deductive Reason there is but one track pos- 
sible to all intelligences; no merum arbitrium can inter- 
change the false and true, or make more than one geometry, 
one scheme of pure Physics, for all worlds ; and the Omnipo- 
tent Architect Himself, in realizing the Ooemical concep- 
tion, in shaping the orbits out of immensity and determin- 
ing seasons out of eternity, could but follow the laws 
of curvature, measure and proportion. That is to say, 
the Ultimate Cause is like a human mechanic, not only as 
'shaping' the 'material datum objective to 1 Him, but also 
as being obliged to conform to the necessary properties of 
that datum." Nor is this all. Therefollowst count 

of "the Divine. psychology,'* to the extent i g that 

we learn " the character of God — the order of affections in 
Him" from "the distribution of authority in the hie- 
rarchy of our impulses." In other words, it is alleged that 
the Ultimate Cause has desires that are to be 
higher and lower like our own.* Every oru ard of 

the king who wished he had been present at the en 
of the world, that he might have given good advice. He 
was humble, however, compared with those who pn 
understand not only the relation of the Creating to the 
created, but also how the Creating is constituted. And 
yet this transcendent audacity, which claims to penetrate 
the secrets of the Power manifested to us through all exist- 
ence — nay even to stand behind that Power and note the 
■ conditions to its action — this it is which passes current as 

* These extracts are from an article entitled " Nature and God," published 
in the National Review for October. Ifi 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 95 

piety! May we not without hesitation affirm that a sin- 
cere recognition of the truth that our own and all other 
existence is a mystery absolutely and forever beyond our 
comprehension, contains more of true religion than all the 
dogmatic theology ever written? 

Meanwhile let us recognize whatever of permanent good 
there is in these persistent attempts to frame conceptions 
of that which cannot be conceived. From the beginning 
it has been only through the successive failures of such 
conceptions to satisfy the mind, that higher and higher 
ones have been gradually reached ; and doubtless, the con- 
ceptions now current are indispensable as transitional 
modes of thought. Even more than this may be willingly 
conceded. It is possible, nay probable, that under their 
most abstract forms, ideas of this order will always con- 
tinue to occupy the background of our consciousness. 
Very likely there will ever remain a need to give shape 
to that indefinite sense of an Ultimate Existence, which 
forms the basis of our intelligence. We shall always be 
under the necessity of contemplating it as some mode of 
being, that is, of representing it to ourselves in some 
form of thought, however vague. And we shall not err 
in doing this so long as we treat every notion we thus 
frame as merely a symbol, utterly without resemblance to 
that for which it stands. Perhaps the constant formation 
of such symbols and constant rejection of them as inade- 
quate may be hereafter, as it has hitherto been, a means of 
discipline. Perpetually to construct ideas requiring the 
utmost stretch of our faculties, and perpetually to find that 
such ideas must be abandoned as futile imaginations, may 
realize to us, more fully than any other course, the great- 
ness of that which we vainly strive to grasp. Such efforts 
and failures may serve to maintain in our minds a due 
sense of the incommensurable difference between the Con- 
ditioned and the Unconditioned. By continually seeking 
to know and being continually thrown back with a deep- 
ened conviction of the impossibility of knowing, we may 
keep alive the consciousness that it is alike our highest 
wisdom and our highest duty to regard that through which 
all things exist as The Unknowable. 

§ 32. An immense majority will refuse, with more or 
less of indignation, a belief seeming to them so shadowy 



96 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

and indefinite. Having always embodied the Ultimate 
Cause so far as was needful to its mental realization, they 
must necessarily resent the substitution of an Ultimate 
Cause which cannot be mentally realized at all. " You 
offer us," they say, " an unthinkable abstraction in place 
of a Being toward whom we may entertain definite feelings. 
Though we are told that the Absolute is real, yet since we 
are not allowed to conceive it, it might as well be a pure 
negation. Instead of a Power which we can regard as 
having some sympathy with us, you would have us con- 
template a Power to which no emotion whatever can be 
ascribed. And so we are to be deprived of the very sub- 
stance of our faith." 

This kind of protest of necessity accompanies every 
change from a lower creed to a higher. The belief in a 
community of nature between himself and the object of 
his worship has always been to man a satisfactory one, and 
he has always accepted with reluctance fchoe »ively 

less concrete conceptions which have been forced upon him. 
Doubtless, in all times and places, it has consoled the 
barbarian to think of his deities actly like himself 

in nature that they could be bribed by offerings of food; 
and the assurance that deities could not be so propitiated 
must have been repugnant, because it deprived him of 
an easy method of gaining supernatural protection. To 
the Greeks it was manifestly a Bonrce of comfort that on 
occasions <>f difficulty they could obtain, through oracles, 
the advice of their ffodfl — nay, might even get the pi 
aid of their gods in battle; and it was probably a very 
genuine anger which they visited upon philosophers who 
called in question thi - ideas of their myth* 

A religion which teaches the Hindoo that it is imp 
to purchase eternal happiness by placing himself under the 
wheel of Juggernaut, can scarcely fail to seem a cruel one 
to him; since it deprives him of the pleasurable conscious- 
ness that he can at will exchange miseries for joys, N r 
is it less clear that to our Catholic ancestors the 
that crimes could be compounded for by the build:: 
churches, that their own punishments and those of their 
relatives could be abridged by the saying of masses, and 
that divine aid or forgiveness might be gained through the 
Intercession of saints, were highly solacing ones: and that 
Protestantism, in substituting the conception of God so com- 



FIEST PRINCIPLES. 97 

paratively unlike ourselves as not to be influenced by such 
methods, must have appeared to them hard and cold. 
Naturally, therefore, we must expect a further step in the 
same direction to meet with a similar resistance from out- 
raged sentiments. No mental revolution can be accom- 
plished without more or less of laceration. Be it a change 
of habit or a change of conviction, it must, if the habit or 
conviction be strong, do violence to some of the feelings; 
and these must of course oppose it. For long-experienced, 
and therefore definite, sources of satisfaction, have to be 
substituted sources of satisfaction that have not been experi- 
enced, and are therefore indefinite. That which is rela- 
tively well known and real has to be given up for that 
which is relatively unknown and ideal. And of course 
such an exchange cannot be made without a conflict involv- 
ing pain. Especially then must there arise a strong 
antagonism to any alteration in so deep and vital a concep- 
tion as that with which we are here dealing. Underlying 
as this conception does all others, a modification of it 
threatens to reduce the superstructure to ruins. Or, to 
change the metaphor, being the root with which are con- 
nected our ideas of goodness, rectitude, or duty, it appears 
impossible that it should be transformed without causing 
these to wither away and die. The whole higher part of 
the nature almost of necessity takes up arms against a 
change which, by destroying the established associations 
of thought, seems to eradicate morality. 

This is by no means all that has to be said for such 
protests. There is a much deeper meaning in them. They 
do not simply express the natural repugnance to a revolu- 
tion of belief here made specially intense by the vital im- 
portance of the belief to be revolutionized, but they also 
express an instinctive adhesion to a belief that is in one 
sense the best — the best for those who thus cling to it, 
though not abstractedly the best. For here let me remark 
that what were above spoken of as the imperfections of 
Eeligion, at first great, but gradually diminishing, have 
been imperfections only as measured by an absolute 
standard, and not as measured by a relative one. Speak- 
ing generally, the religion current in each age and among 
each people has been as near an approximation to the 
truth as it was then and there possible for men to receive. 
The more or less concrete forms in which it has embodied 
7 



98 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

the truth have simply been the means of making thinkable 
what would otherwise have been unthinkable, and so have 
for the time being served to increase its impressiveneas. If 
we consider the conditions of the case we shall find this 
to be an unavoidable conclusion. During each stage of 
evolution men must think in such terms of thought as 
they possess. While all the conspicuous changes of which 
they can observe the origins have men and animals as an- 
tecedents, they are unable to think of antecedents in 
general under any other shapes, and hence creative agen- 
cies are of necessity conceived by them in these shapes. 
If during this phase these concrete conceptions were taken 
from them, and the attempt made to give them compara- 
tively abstract conceptions, the result would be to leave 
their minds with none at all; sinee the substituted ones 
could not be mentally represented. Similarly with every 
successive stage of religious belief down to the Last 
Though, as accumulating ezperien ly modify the 

earliesl ideas..!' casual personalities, there grow np more 
general and vague ideas of them, yet I nnot be at 

once replaced by others .-till moi s -1 and \ 
Further experiem i Bnpply the needful further ab- 

stractions before the menial void left by the d< 
of such inferior ideas can be filled by i . 
order. And at the p me the refusal t 

a relatively concrete notion for a relatively 
implies the inability to frame the relatively 
ami so proves that the change would be premature and 
injurious. Siill more clearly shall we see the injurioiis- 
ness of any such premature change on observing that the 
effects of a. belief upon conduct must be diminished in 
proportion as the vividness with which it is realized be- 
comes less. Evils and benefits akin to those which the 
savage has personally felt or learned from these who have 
felt them, are the only evils and benefits he can understand, 
and these must be looked for as coming in ways like 
of which he has had experience. His deities must be im- 
agined to have like motives and passions and mel 
the beings around him; for motives ami passions and 
methods of a higher character being unknown to him. and 
in great measure unthinkable by him. cannot be so real- 
ized in thought as to influence his deeds. During 
phase of civilization the actions of the [ 



FIEST PRINCIPLES. 99 

well as the resulting rewards and punishments, being con- 
ceivable only in such forms as experience furnishes, to 
supplant them by higher ones before wider experiences 
have made higher ones conceivable is to set up vague and 
uninfluential motives for definite and influential ones. 
Even now, for the great mass of men, unable through lack 
of culture to trace out with due clearness those good and 
bad consequences which conduct brings round through the 
established order of the Unknowable, it is needful that 
there should be vividly depicted future torments and fu- 
ture joys, pains and pleasures of a definite kind, produced 
in a manner direct and simple enough to be clearly imag- 
ined. Nay, still more must be conceded. Few, if any, 
are as yet fitted wholly to dispense with such conceptions 
as are current. The highest abstractions take so great 
mental power to realize with any vividness, and are so 
inoperative upon conduct unless tne}^ are vividly realized, 
that their regulative effects must for a long period to come 
be appreciable on but a small minority. To see clearly 
how a right or wrong act generates consequences, internal 
and external, that go on branching out more widely as 
years progress, requires a rare power of analysis. To 
mentally represent even a single series of these conse- 
quences, as it stretches out into the remote future, re- 
quires an equally rare power of imagination. And to 
estimate these consequences in their totality, ever multi- 
plying in number while diminishing in intensity, requires a 
grasp of thought possessed by none. Yet it is only by such 
analysis, such imagination, and such grasp that conduct 
can be rightly guided in the absence of all other control: 
only so can ultimate rewards and penalties be made to 
outweigh proximate pains and pleasures. Indeed, were it 
not that throughout the progress of the race men's exper- 
iences of the effects of conduct have been slowly gener- 
alized into principles — were it not that these principles 
have been from generation to generation insisted on by 
parents, upheld by public opinion, sanctified by religion, 
and enforced by threats of eternal damnation for disobe- 
dience — were it not that under these potent influences 
habits have been modified and the feelings proper to them 
made innate — were it not, in short, that we have been 
rendered in a considerable degree organically moral, it is 
certain that disastrous results would ensue from the re- 



100 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

moval of those strong and distinct motives which the 
current belief supplies. Even as it is, those who relin- 
quish the faith in which they have been brought up for 
this most abstract faith in which Science and Religion unite 
may not uncommonly fail to act up to their convictions. 
Left to their organic morality, enforced only by general 
reasonings imperfectly wrought out and difficult to keep 
before the mind, their defects of nature will often come 
out more strongly than they would have done under their 
previous creed. The substituted creed can become 
adequately operative only when it becomes, like the 
present one, an element in early education, and has the 
support of a strong social sanation. Nor will men be quite 
ready for it until, through the continuance of a discipline 
which has already partially moulded them to the C 
tions of social existence, they are completely moulded to 
those conditions. 

We must therefore recognize the resistance to a change 
of theological opinion as in great measure salutary. It is 
not simply that strong and deep-rooted feelings are i 
sarily excited t<> antagonism — it is not simply that the 
highest moral sentiments join in the condemnation of a 
change which seems to undermine their authority: but it 
is thai a real adaptation exists between an established be- 
lief and the natures of those who defend it, ami that the 
tenacity of the defence measures the completeness of the 
adaptation. Forms of religion. 1 ik \ eminent, 

must he tit for those who live under them: and in the one 
case as in the other, that form which is fittest is tha 
which there is an instinctive preference. As certai] 
a barbarous race needs a harsh terrestrial rule and habitu- 
ally shows attachment to a despotism capable of the neces- 
sary rigor, so certainly does Bach a race i Lief in a 
celestial rule that is similarly harsh, and habitually e 
attachment to such a belief. And just in the same way 
that the sudden substitution of free institutions for tyran- 
nical ones is sure to be followed by a reaction, bo, if a 
full of dreadful ideal penalties is all at once replaced by 
one presenting ideal penalties that are comparatively gentle, 
there will inevitably be a return to some modification of 
the old belief. The parallelism holds yet further. Dur- 
ing those early stages in which there is an extreme incon- 
gruity between the relatively best and the absolute!} 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 101 

both political and religious changes, when at rare intervals 
they occur, are necessarily violent, and necessarily entail 
violent retrogressions. But as the incongruity between 
that which is and that which should be diminishes the 
changes become more moderate and are succeeded by more 
moderate retrogressions, until, as these movements and 
counter-movements decrease in amount and increase in 
frequency, they merge into an almost continous growth. 
That adhesion to old institutions and beliefs which in 
primitive societies opposes an iron barrier to any advance, 
and which, after the barrier has been at length burst 
through, brings back the institutions and beliefs from 
that too-forward position to which the momentum of 
change had carried them, and so helps to re-adapt social 
conditions to the popular character — this adhesion to old 
institutions and beliefs eventually becomes the constant 
check by which the constant advance is prevented from 
being too rapid. This holds true of religious creeds and 
forms, as of civil ones. And so Ave learn that theological 
conservatism, like political conservatism, has an all-impor- 
tant function. 

§ 33. That spirit of toleration which is so marked a 
characteristic of modern times, and is daily growing more 
conspicuous, has thus a far deeper meaning than is sup- 
posed. What we commonly regard simply as a due respect 
for the right of private judgment is really a necessary 
condition to the balancing of the progressive and conser- 
vative tendencies — is a means of maintaining the adapta- 
tion between men's beliefs and their natures. It is there- 
fore a spirit to be fostered ; and it is a spirit which the 
catholic thinker, who perceives the functions of these 
various conflicting creeds, should above all other men dis- 
play. Doubtless whoever feels the greatness of the error 
to which his fellows cling and the greatness of the truth 
which they reject, will find it hard to show a due patience. 
It is hard for him to listen calmly to the futile arguments 
used in support of irrational doctrines and to the misrep- 
resentation of antagonist doctrines. It is hard for him to 
bear the manifestation of that pride of ignorance which 
so far exceeds the pride of science. Naturally enough, 
such a one will be indignant when charged with irreligion 
because he declines to accept the carpenter-theory of crea- 



102 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

tion as the most worthy one. He may think it needless 
as it is difficult to conceal his repugnance to a creed 
which tacitly ascribes to The Unknowable a love of adula- 
tion such as would be despised in a human being. Con- 
vinced as he is that all punishment, as we see it wrought 
out in the order of nature, is but a disguised beneficence, 
there will perhaps escape from him an angry condemnation 
of the belief that punishment is a divine vengeance, and 
that divine vengeance is eternal. He may be tempi 
show his contempt when he is told that actions inst:_ 
by an unselfish sympathy or by i pure love of rectitude 
are intrinsically sinful, and that conduct is truly good 
only when it is due to a faith whose openly pr< 
motive is other-Worldliness; but I restrain 

feelings. Though he may be unafa his during the 

excitement of controversy, or when otherwise brought 
to face with current superstitu tust yet qualify his 

antagonism in calmer moments; bo that his mature judg- 
ment and resulting conduct maj be without bias. 

To this end let him ever bear in mind three cardinal 
facts — two of them already dwelt upon, and one still to be 
pointed out. The first is that with which m 
namely, the existence of a fundamental verity under all 
forms of religion, however degraded. In each of them 
there is a soul of truth. Through tl 

traditions and rites which contain it, it bh — 

dimly or clearly, as the case may be. This it i- which 
gives vitality even t«> the rude* which 

survives every modification, and thif must 

net forget when condemning tl. under which it is 

presented. The second of these cardinal : forth 

at Length in the foregoing Beotion, is that while I 
Crete elements in which each i ul of 

truth are bad as measured by an a standard, they 

are good as measured by a relative standard, 
from higher perceptions they hide the abstract verity with- 
in them, yet to lower perceptions they rend erity 
more appreciable than it would otherwise be. They 
to make real and influential over men that which would 
else be unreal and unintluential. Or we may call them 
the protective envelopes, without which the contained 
truth would die. The remaining cardinal fact is that 
these various belief s are parts of the constituted order of 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 103 

things, and not accidental but necessary parts. Seeing 
how one or other of them is everywhere present, is of 
perennial growth, and when cut down redevelops in a 
form but slightly modified, we cannot avoid the inference 
that they are needful accompaniments of human life, 
severally fitted to the societies in which they are indigenous. 
From the highest point of view we must recognize them 
as elements in that great evolution of which the beginning 
and end are beyond our knowledge or conception — as 
modes of manifestation of The Unknowable, and as having 
this for their warrant. 

Our toleration therefore should be the widest possible. 
Or, rather, we should aim at something beyond toleration, 
as commonly understood. In dealing with alien beliefs 
our endeavor must be not simply to refrain from injustice 
of word or deed, but also to do justice by an open recog- 
nition of positive worth. We must qualify our disagree- 
ment with as much as may be of sympathy. 

§ 34. These admissions will perhaps be held to imply 
that the current theology should be passively accepted, or, 
at any rate, should not be actively opposed. "Why," it 
may be asked, " if all creeds have an average fitness to 
their times and places, should we not rest content with 
that to which we are born? If the established belief con- 
tains an essential truth — if the forms under which it 
presents this truth, though intrinsically bad, are extrinsi- 
cally good — if the abolition of these forms would be at 
present detrimental to the great majority — nay, if there 
are scarcely any to whom the ultimate and most abstract 
belief can furnish an adequate rule of life, surely it is 
wrong, for the present at least, to propagate this ultimate 
and most abstract belief." 

The reply is, that though existing religious ideas and 
institutions have an average adaptation to the characters 
of the people who live under them, yet, as these characters 
are ever changing, the adaptation is ever becoming imper- 
fect ; and the ideas and institutions need remodelling with 
a frequency proportionate to the rapidity of the change. 
Hence, while it is requisite that free play should be given 
to conservative thought and action, progressive thought 
and action must also have free play. Without the agency 



104 FIRST PRIXCIPLES. t 

of both, there cannot be those continual re-adaptations 
which orderly progress demands. 

Whoever hesitates to utter that which he thinks the 
highest truth, lest it should be too much in advance of the 
time, may reassure himself by looking at his acts from an 
impersonal point of view. Let him duly realize the fact 
that opinion is the agency through which character adapts 
external arrangements to itself — that his opinion rightly 
forms part of this agency — is a unit of force, constituting 
with other such units the general power which works out 
social changes, and lie will perceive that he may properly 
give full utterance to his innermost conviction, leaving it 
to produce what effect it may. It is not for nothing that 
he has in him these sympathies with some principles and 
repugnance to others, lie, with all his capacities and 
aspirations and beliefs, is not an accident, but a product of 
the time. He must remember that while he is a descend- 
ant of the past he is a parent of the future, and that his 
thoughts are as children born to him, which he may not 
carelessly let die. He, like every other man, may properly 
consider himself as one of the myriad agencies through 
whom works the Unknown Cause; and when the Unknown 
Cause produces in him a certain belief, he is thereby au- 
thorized to profess and act out that belief. For, to render 
in their highest tense the words of the poet : 

Nature is made better bv no mean. 



But nature makes that mean : over that art 
Which you say a<Ms to nature, is an art 
That nature makes. 

Not as adventitious, therefore, will the wise man regard 
the faith which is in him. The highest truth he sees he 
will fearlessly utter, knowing that, let what may come of 
it, he is thus playing his right part in the world — know- 
ing that if he can effect the change he aims at — well; if 
not — well also; though not so well. 




PART II. 
THE KJTOWABLE, 

CHAPTER I. 

PHILOSOPHY DEFINED. 

§ 35. After concluding that we cannot know the ulti- 
mate nature of that which is manifested to us, there arise 
the questions, What is it that we know? in what sense do 
we know it? And in what consists our highest knowledge 
of it? Having repudiated as impossible the Philosophy 
which professes to formulate Being as distinguished from 
Appearance, it becomes needful to say what Philosophy 
truly is — not simply to specify its limits, but to specify its 
character within those limits. Given a certain sphere as 
the sphere to which human intelligence is restricted, and 
there remains to define the peculiar product of human 
intelligence which may still be called Philosophy. 

In doing this we may advantageously avail ourselves of 
the method followed at the outset, of separating from con- 
ceptions that are partially or mainly erroneous the element 
of truth they contain. As in the chapter on " Religion 
and Science" it was inferred that religious beliefs, wrong 
as they might individually be in their particular forms, 
nevertheless probably each contained an essential verity, 
and that this was most likely common to them all — so in 
this place it is to be inferred that past and present beliefs 
respecting the nature of Philosophy are none of them 
wholly false, and that that in which they are true is that 
in which they agree. We have here, then, to do what was 
done there — " to compare all opinions of the same genus; to 
set aside as more or less discrediting one another those 
various special and concrete elements in which such opin- 
ions disagree; to observe what remains after the discordant 
constituents have been eliminated, and to find for this re- 

105 



106 FIBST PRINCIPLES. 

maining constituent that abstract expression which holds 
true throughout its divergent modifications." 

§ 36. Earlier speculations being passed over, we see that 
among the Greeks, before there had arisen any notion of 
Philosophy in general, apart from particular forms of 
Philosophy, the particular forms of it from which the 
general notion was to arise were hypotheses respecting some 
universal principle that constituted the essence of all con- 
crete kinds of being. To the question, " What is that 
invariable existence of which these are variable giai 
there were sundry answers — Water, Air, Fire. A class of 
hypotheses of this all-embracing character having been 
propounded, it became possible for Pythagoras to conceive 
of Philosophy in the abstract as knowledge the must remote 
from practical ends, and to define it as "knowled. 
immaterial and eternal things" — " the cause of the material 
existence of things" being, in his view. Number. There- 
after we tind continued a pursuit of Philosoph; 
ultimate interpretation of the Universe, assumed I 
possible whether actually reached in any case or not. A:, i 
in the course of this pursuit various such ultimate inter- 
pretations were given, as that " One is the beginning of all 
things," that " the One is (i<>d." that " the One is Finite," 
that the One is Infinite," that " Intelligent rent- 

ing principle of things, " and so on. From all which it is 
plain that the knowledge supposed to constitute Philoso- 
phy differed from other knowledge in its transcendent, 
exhaustive character. In the subsequent course of specu- 
lation, after the sceptics had shaken men's faith in their 
powers of reaching such transcendent knowledge, there 
grew up a much restricted conception of Philosophy. Un- 
der Socrates, and still more under the Stoics, Philosophy 
became little else than the doctrine of right living. Its 
subject-matter was practically cut down to the proper 
ruling of conduct, public and private. Xot, indeed, that 
the proper ruling of conduct, as conceived by sun . 
the later Greek thinkers to constitute subject-matter of 
Philosophy, answered to what was popularly unden 
by the proper ruling of conduct. The injunctions of Zeno 
were not of the same class as those which guided nu-u 
from early times downward, in their daily observances, 
sacrifices, customs — all having more or less of religious 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 107 

sanction ; but they were principles of action enunciated 
without reference to times, or persons, or special cases. 
What, then, was the constant element in these unlike ideas 
of Philosophy held by the ancients? Clearly, the character 
in which this last idea agrees with the first is, that within 
its sphere of inquiry Philosophy seeks for wide and deep 
truths as distinguished from the multitudinous detailed 
truths which the surfaces of things and actions present. 

By comparing the conceptions of Philosophy that have 
been current in modern times, we get a like result. The 
disciples of Schelling, Fichte, and their kindred, join the 
Hegelian in ridiculing the so-called Philosophy which has 
usurped the title in England. Not without reason, they 
laugh on reading of "Philosophical instruments," and 
would deny that any one of the papers in the Philosophical 
Transactions has the least claim to come under such a title. 
Retaliating on their critics, the English may, and most of 
them do, reject as absurd the imagined Philosophy of the 
German schools. As consciousness cannot be transcended, 
they hold that whether consciousness does or does not 
vouch for the existence of something beyond itself, it at 
any rate cannot comprehend that something; and that 
hence, in so far as any Philosophy professes to be an Ontol- 
ogy, it is false. These two views cancel one another over 
large parts of their areas. The English criticism on the 
Germans cuts off from Philosophy all that is regarded as 
absolute knowledge. The German criticism on the Eng- 
lish tacitly implies that if Philosophy is limited to the 
relative, it is at any rate not concerned with those aspects 
of the relative which are embodied in mathematical form- 
ulae, in accounts of physical researches, in chemical anal- 
yses, or in descriptions of species and reports of physio- 
logical experiments. Now what has the too-wide German 
conception in common with the conception general among 
English men of science, which, narrow and crude as it is, 
is not so narrow and crude as their misuse of the word 
philosophical indicates? The two have this in common, 
that neither Germans nor English apply the word to un- 
systematized knowledge — to knowledge quite uncoordinated 
with other knowledge. Even the most limited specialist 
would not describe as philosophical an essay which, deal- 
ing wholly with details, manifested no perception of the 
bearings of those details on wider truths. 



108 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

The vague idea thus raised of that in which the various 
conceptions of Philosophy agree may be rendered more 
definite by comparing what has been known in England as 
Natural Philosophy with that development of it called 
Positive Philosophy. Though, as M. Comte admits, the 
two consist of knowledge essentially the same in kind, yet 
by having put this kind of knowledge into a more coherent 
form he has given it more of that character to which the 
term philosophical is applied. Without expressing any 
opinion respecting the truth of his coordination, it must 
be conceded that by the fact of its coordination the body 
of knowledge organized by him lias a better claim to the 
title Philosophy than lias the comparatively unorganized 
body of knowledge named Natural Philosophy. 

If subdivisions of Philosophy, or more special forms of it, 
be contrasted with one another, or with the whole, the same 
implication comes out. Moral Philosophy and Political 
Philosophy agree with Philosophy at large in the compre- 
hensiveness of their reasonings and conclusions. T! 
under the head of Moral Philosophy we treat of human 
actions as right or wrong we do not include special direc- 
tions for behavior in the nursery, at table, or on the ex- 
change; and though Political Philosophy has for its topic 
the conduct of men in their public relations, it da - 
concern itself with modes of Toting or details of adminis- 
tration. Both of these sections of Philosophy contemplate 
particular instances, only as illustrating truths of wide 
application. 

£ 37. Thus every one of these conceptions implies the 
belief in a possible way of knowing things more completely 
than they are known through simple experiences mechan- 
ically accumulated in memory or heaped ap in cyclopaedias. 
Though in the extent of the Bphere which they bavi 
posed Philosophy to till, men have differed and ^till differ 
very widely, yet there is a real if unavowed ag 
among them in signifying by this title a knowledge which 
transcends ordinary knowledge. That which remains as 
the common element in these conceptions of Philosophy, 
after the elimination of their discordant elements, is — 
knowledge of the highest degrex \ . W 

this tacitly asserted by the simultaneous inclusion of I 
Nature, and .Man within its scope; or still more distinctly 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 109 

by the division of Philosophy as a whole into Theological, 
Physical, Ethical, etc. For that which characterizes the 
genus of which these are species must be something more 
general than that which distinguishes any one species. 

What must be the specific shape here given to this con- 
ception? The range of intelligence we find to be limited 
to the relative. Though persistently conscious of a Power 
manifested to us, we have abandoned as futile the attempt 
to learn anything respecting the nature of that Power, 
and so have shut out Philosophy from much of the domain 
supposed to belong to it. The domain left is that occu- 
pied by Science. Science concerns itself with the co-exist- 
ences and sequences among phenomena, grouping these 
at first into generalizations of a simple or low order, and 
rising gradually to higher and more extended generaliza- 
tions. But if so, where remains any subject-matter for 
Philosophy? 

The reply is, Philosophy may still properly be the title 
retained for knowledge of the highest generality. Science 
means merely the family of the Sciences — stands for noth- 
ing more than the sum of knowledge formed of their con- 
tributions, and ignores the knowledge constituted by the 
fusion of all these contributions into a whole. As usage 
has defined it, Science consists of truths existing more or 
less separated, and does not recognize these truths as en- 
tirely integrated. An illustration will make the difference 
clear. 

If we ascribe the flow of a river to the same force which 
causes the fall of a stone, we make a statement, true as far 
as it goes, that belongs to a certain division of Science. 
If, in further explanation of a movement produced by 
gravitation in a direction almost horizontal, we cite the 
law that fluids subject to mechanical forces exert reactive 
forces which are equal in all directions, we formulate a 
wider fact, containing the scientific interpretation of 
many other phenomena, as those presented by the fountain, 
the hydraulic press, the steam-engine, the air-pump. And 
when this proposition, extending only to the dynamics of 
fluids, is merged in a proposition of general dynamics, 
comprehending the laws of movement of solids as well as 
of fluids, there is reached a yet higher truth, but still a 
truth that comes wholly within the realm of Science. 
Again, looking around at Birds and Mammals, suppose 



110 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

we say that air-breathing animals are hot-blooded; and 
that then, remembering how Reptiles, which also breathe 
air, are not much warmer than their media, we say, more 
truly, that animals (bulks being equal) have temperatures 
proportionate to the quantities of air they breathe; and 
that then, calling to mind certain large fish which main- 
tain a heat considerably above that of the water they swim 
in, we further correct the generalization by saying that 
the temperature varies as the rate of oxygenation of the 
blood; and that then, modifying the statement to meet 
other criticisms, we finally assert the relation to be be- 
tween the amount of heat and the amount of molecular 
change — supposing we do all this, we state scientific truths 
that are successively wider and more complete, but truths 
which to the last remain purely scientific. Once mo 
guided by mercantile experiences, we reach the conclusion 
that prices rise when the demand exceeds the supply; and 
that commodities flow from places where they are abundant 
to places where they are Bcarce; and that the industr 
different Localities are determined in their kinds mainly by 
the facilities which the localities afford for them: and if, 
studying these generalizations of political economy, we 
trace them all to the truth that each man seekssatisfa 
for his desires in ways costing the smallest eff< 
social phenomena being resultants of individual a 
guided — we are still dealing with the pre; - of Science 

only. 

And now how is Philosophy constituted? It is consti- 
tuted by carrying a stage further the process indi 
So long as these truths are known only apart and regi I 

as independent, even the most general of them cannot 
without laxity o\' speech he called philosophical. Bui 
when, having been severally reduced to a simple mechani- 
cal axiom, a principle of molecular physics, and a law <.f 
social action, they are contemplated together laries 

of some ultimate truth, then we rise to the kind of k' 
edge that constitutes Philosophy proper. 

The truths of Philosophy thus hear the same relation to 
the highest scientific truths that each of thes> 
lower scientific truths. As each widest generalizat; 
Science comprehends and consolidates the narrof 
alizations of its own division, so the general] 
philosophy comprehend and consolidate the widest general- 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. Ill 

izations of Science. It is therefore a knowledge trie ex- 
treme opposite in kind to that which experience first 
accumulates. It is the final product of that process which 
begins with a mere colligation of crude observations, goes 
on establishing propositions that are broader and more 
separated from particular cases, and ends in universal 
propositions. Or to bring the definition to its simplest 
and clearest form. — Knowledge of the lowest kind is un- 
unified knowledge; Science is partially unified knowledge; 
Philosophy is completely unified knowledge. 

§ 38. Such, at least, is the meaning we must here give to 
the word Philosophy, if we employ it at all. In so defin- 
ing it, we accept that which is common to the various con- 
ceptions of it current among both ancients and moderns — 
rejecting those elements in which these conceptions dis- 
agree or exceed the possible range of intelligence. In 
short, we are simply giving precision to that application 
of the word which is gradually establishing itself. 

Two forms of Philosophy, as thus understood, may be 
distinguished and dealt with separately. On the one hand 
the things contemplated may be the universal truths: all 
particular truths referred to being used simply for proof 
or elucidation of these universal truths. On the other 
hand, setting out with the universal truths as granted, the 
things contemplated may be the particular truths as in- 
terpreted by them. In both cases we deal with the uni- 
versal truths; but in the one case they are passive and in 
the other case active — in the one case they form the prod- 
ucts of exploration and in the other case the instruments 
of exploration. These divisions we may appropriately 
call General Philosophy and Special Philosophy respec- 
tively. 

The remainder of this volume will be devoted to General 
Philosophy. Special Philosophy, divided into parts deter- 
mined by the natures of the phenomena treated, will be 
the subject-matter of subsequent volumes. 



CHAPTER II. 

THE DATA OF PHILOSOPHY. 

§ 39. Every thought involves a whole system of thoughts ; 
and ceases to exist if severed from its various correlatives. 
As we cannot isolate a single organ of a living body, and 
deal with it as though it had a life independent of the 
rest; so, from the organized structure of our cognitions, 
we cannot cut out one and proceed as though it had sur- 
vived the separation. The development of formless pro- 
toplasm into an embryo is a specialization of parts, the 
distinctness of which increases only as East as their com- 
bination increases — each becomes a distinguishable 
only on condition that it is bound up with others, which 
have simultaneously become distinguishable organs; and, 
similarly, from the unformed material of conscious] 
developed intelligence can arise only by a process which, in 
making thoughts defined, also make- them mutually de- 
pendent — establishes among them certain vital connec- 
tions the dost ruction of which causes instant death of the 
thoughts. Overlooking this all-important truth, however, 
speculators have habitually set out with some profec 
simple datum or data; have supposed themselves to assume 
nothing beyond this datum or these data; and have there- 
upon proceeded to prow or disprove propositions which 
were, by implication, already unconsciously asserted along 
with that which was consciously asserted. 

This reasoning in a circle has resulted from the misuse 
of words: not that misuse commonly enlarged upon — uot 
the misapplication or change of meaning whence so much 
error arises; but a more radical and less obvious 1: 
Only that thought which is directly indicated by each 
word lias been contemplated; while numerous thoughts 
indirectly indicated have been left out of consideration. 
Because a spoken or written word can be detached from all 
others, it has been inadvertently assumed that the thing 
signified by a word can be detached from the things 
nitied by all other words. Though more deeply hidden, 
the mistake is of the same order as that made by the 
Greeks, who were continually led astray by the belief in 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 113 

some community of nature between the symbol and that 
which it symbolized. For though here community of nature 
is not assumed to the same extent as of old, it is assumed 
to this extent, that because the symbol is separable from all 
other symbols, and can be contemplated as having an in- 
dependent existence, so the thought symbolized may be thus 
separated and thus contemplated. How profoundly this 
error vitiates the conclusions of one who makes it, we shall 
quickly see on taking a case. The sceptical metaphysician, 
wishing his reasonings to be as rigorous as possible, says 
to himself, " I will take for granted only this one thing." 
What now are the tacit assumptions inseparable from his 
avowed assumption? The resolve itself indirectly asserts 
that there is some other thing, or are some other things, 
which he might assume; for it is impossible to think of 
unity without thinking of a correlative duality or multi- 
plicity. In the very act, therefore, of restricting himself, 
he takes in much that is professedly left out. Again, be- 
fore proceeding he must give a definition of that which 
he assumes. Is nothing unexpressed involved in the 
thought of a thing as defined? There is the thought of 
something excluded by the definition — there is, as before, 
the thought of other existence. But there is much more. 
Defining a thing, or setting a limit to it, implies the 
thought of a limit; and limit cannot be thought of apart 
from some notion of quantity — extensive, protensive, or 
intensive. Further, definition is impossible unless there 
enters into it the thought of diiference; and difference, 
besides being unthinkable without having two things that 
differ, implies the existence of other differences than the 
one recognized ; since otherwise there can be no general 
conception of difference. Nor is this all. As before 
pointed out (§ 24) all thought involves the consciousness of 
likeness: the one thing avowedly postulated cannot be 
known absolutely as one thing, but can be known only as 
of such or such kind — only as classed with other things in 
virtue of some common attribute. Thus along with the 
single avowed datum, we have surreptitiously brought in 
a number of unavowed data — existence other than that 
alleged, quantity, number, limit, difference, likeness, class, 
attribute. Saying nothing of the many more which an 
exhaustive analysis would disclose, we have in these 
unacknowledged postulates the outlines of a general 
8 



114 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

theory; and that theory can be neither proved nor dis- 
proved by the metaphysician's argument. Insist that his 
symbol shall be interpreted at every step into its full 
meaning, with all the complementary thoughts implied 
by that meaning, and you find already taken for granted 
in the premises that which in the conclusion ie 
or denied. 

In what way, then, must Philosophy set out? The 
developed intelligence is framed upon certain organized 
and consolidated conceptions of which it cannot divest it- 
self; and which it can no more stir without using than 
the body can stir without help of its limbs. In what way, 
then, is it possible for intelligence, striving after Philos- 
ophy, to give any account of these conceptions, and to 
show either their validity' or their invalidity'/ There is 
but one way. Those of them which are vital, or cannot 
be severed from the rest without mental dissolution, must 
be assumed as true provisionally. The fundamental intui- 
tions that are essential to the process of thinking, must 
be temporarily accepted as unquestionable, leaving the as- 
sumption of their nnquestionableness to be justified by the 
results. 

§40. Bow is it to be justified by the results? As any 
other assumption is justified — by ascertaining that all the 

conclusions deducible from it correspond with the facts 
as directly observed — by showing the agreement be1 
tlu 1 experiences it leads us to anticipate, and the actual 
experiences. There is no modeof establishing the validity 

of any belief, except that of show: :ire eongruity 

with all other beliefs. If we suppose that a mass which 
has a certain color and lustre is the sul 31 _ 

how do we proceed to prove the hypothesis that it is e 
AVe represent to ourselves certain other impi \ which 

gold produces on us. and then observe whether, under the 
appropriate conditions, this particular mass produ - 
us such impressions. We remember, as we say. thai 
has a high specific gravity: and if , on poising this sub- 
stance on the linger, we find that its weight is great con- 
sidering its bulk, we take the correspon n the 
represented impression and the presented impi - 
further evidence that the substance is gold. In response 
to a demand lor more proof, we compare certain other 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 115 

ideal and real effects. Knowing that gold, unlike most 
metals, is insoluble in nitric acid, we imagine to ourselves 
a drop of nitric acid placed on the surface of this yellow, 
glittering, heavy substance, without causing corrosion; 
and when, after so placing a drop of nitric acid, no effer- 
vescence or other change follows, we hold this agreement 
between the anticipation and the experience to be an ad- 
ditional reason for thinking that the substance is gold. 
And if, similarly, the great malleability possessed by gold 
we find to be paralleled by the great malleability of this 
substance; if, like gold, it fuses at about 2,000 deg. ; 
crystallizes in octahedrons; is dissolved by selenic acid; 
and, under all conditions, does what gold does under such 
conditions, the conviction that it is gold reaches what we 
regard as the highest certainty — we know it to be gold in 
the fullest sense of knowing. For, as we here see, our whole 
knowledge of gold consists in nothing more than the con- 
sciousness of a definite set of impressions, standing in 
definite relations, disclosed under definite conditions; and, 
if, in a present experience, the impressions, relations, and 
conditions perfectly correspond with those in past experi- 
ences, the cognition has all the validity of which it is 
capable. So that, generalizing the statement, hypothe- 
ses, down even to those simple ones which we make from 
moment to moment in our acts of recognition, are verified 
when entire congruity is found to exist between the states 
of consciousness constituting them, and certain other 
states of consciousness given in perception, or reflection, 
or both; and no other knowledge is possible for us than 
that which consists of the consciousness of such congru- 
ities and their correlative incongruities. 

Hence Philosophy, compelled to make those fundamental 
assumptions without which thought is impossible, has to 
justify them by showing their congruity with all other 
dicta of consciousness. Debarred as we are from every- 
thing beyond the relative, truth, raised to its highest 
form, can be for us nothing more than perfect agreement, 
throughout the whole range of our experience, between 
those representations of things which we distinguish as 
ideal and those presentations of things which we distin- 
guish as real. If, by discovering a proposition to be un- 
true, we mean nothing more than discovering a difference 
between a thing expected and a thing perceived; then a 



116 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

body of conclusions in which no such difference anywhere 
occurs, must be what we mean by an entirely true body of 
conclusions. 

And here, indeed, it becomes also obvious that, setting 
out with these fundamental intuitions provisionally as- 
sumed to be true — that is, provisionally assumed to be 
congruous with all other dicta of consciousness — the proc- 
ess of proving or disproving the congruity becomes the 
business of Philosophy; and the complete establishment of 
the congruity becomes the same thing as the complete uni- 
fication of knowledge in which Philosophy reaches its goal. 

§ 41. What is this datum, or rather what are these 

data, which Philosophy cannot do without'/ Clearly one 
primordial datum is involved in the foregoing statement. 
Already by implication we have assumed, and must for 
ever continue to assume, that congruities and incongru- 
ities exist, and are cognizable by us. We cannot avoid 
accepting as true the verdict of consciousness that 
manifestations are like one another and some are unlike 
one another. Unless consciousness be a competent judge 
of the likeness and unlikeness of its states, there can never 
be established that congruity throughout the whole of our 
cognitions which constitutes Philosophy; nor can there 
ever be established that incongruity by which only any 
hypothesis, philosophical or other, can be shown erroneous. 
The impossibility of moving toward either conviction 
or scepticism without postulating thus much, we shall see 
even more vividly on observing how every step in n 
ing postulates thus much, over and over again. T 
that all things of a certain class are characterized by a 
certain attribute, is to say that all things known as like 
in those various attributes connoted by their common 
name, are also Ufa in having the particular attribute 
specified. Tosay that some object of immediate attention 
belongs to this class, is to say that it is Ufa all the others 
in the various attributes connoted by their common name. 
To say that this object possesses the particular attribute 
specified, is to say that it is like the others in this re- 
spect also. While, contrariwise, the assertion that the 
attribute thus inferred to be possessed by it is not pos- 
sessed, implies the assertion that in place of one of the 
alleged likeness there exists an unlikeness. Neither 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 117 

affirmation nor denial, therefore, of any deliverance of 
reason, or any element of such deliverance, is possible 
without accepting the dictum of consciousness that cer- 
tain of its states are like or unlike. Whence, besides 
seeing that the unified knowledge constituting a com- 
pleted Philosophy, is a knowledge composed of parts that 
are universally congruous; and besides seeing that it is 
the business of Philosophy to establish their universal 
congruity, we also see that every act of the process by 
which this universal congruity is to be established, down 
even to the components of every inference and every ob- 
servation, consists in the establishment of congruity. 

Consequently, the assumption that a congruity or an 
incongruity exists when consciousness testifies to it, is an 
inevitable assumption. It is useless to say, as Sir W. 
Hamilton does, that " consciousness is to be presumed 
trustworthy until proved mendacious." It cannot be 
proved mendacious in this, its primordial act; since, as 
we see, proof involves a repeated acceptance of this 
primordial act. Nay more, the very thing supposed to be 
proved cannot be expressed without recognizing this pri- 
mordial act as valid ; since, unless we accept the verdict 
of consciousness that they differ, mendacity and trust- 
worthiness become identical. Process and product of 
reasoning both disappear in the absence of this assump- 
tion. 

It may, indeed, be often shown that what, after careless 
comparison, were supposed to be like states of conscious- 
ness are really unlike ; or that what were carelessly sup- 
posed to be unlike are really like. But how is this shown? 
Simply by a more careful comparison, mediately or im- 
mediately made. And what does acceptance of the revised 
conclusion imply? Simply that a deliberate verdict of 
consciousness is preferable to a rash one; or, to speak 
more definitely — that a consciousness of likeness or differ- 
ence which survives critical examination must be accepted 
in place of one that does not survive — the very survival be- 
ing itself the acceptance. 

And here we get to the bottom of the matter. The 
permanence of a consciousness of likeness or difference 
is our ultimate warrant for asserting the existence of like- 
ness or difference; and, in fact, we mean by the existence 
of likeness or difference, nothing more than the perma- 



118 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

nent consciousness of it. To say that a given congruity 
or incongruity exists, is simply our way of saying that we 
invariably have a consciousness of it along with a con- 
sciousness of the compared things. We know nothing 
more of existence than a continued manifestation. 

§ 42. But Philosophy requires for its datum some sub- 
stantive proposition. To recognize as unquestionable a 
certain fundamental process of thought, is not enough; 
we must recognize as unquestionable some fundamental 
product of thought, readied by this process. If Philoso- 
phy is completely unified knowledge — if the unification 
of knowledge is to be effected only by showing that 
ultimate proposition includes and consolidates all the re- 
sults of experience; then, dearly, this ultimate prop- 
osition which has to be proved congruous with all others, 
must express a piece of knowledge, and not the validity 
of an act of knowing. Baying assumed the trustworthi- 
ness of consciousness, we have also to assume as trust- 
worthy sonic deliverance of consciousness. 

What must this be? Must it not be one affirming the 
widest and most profound distinction which things pro- 
Bent? Must it not be a statement of congruities and 
incongruities more general than any other'/ An ultimate 
principle that is to unify all experience must be co-exten- 
sive with all experience — cannot be concerned with ex- 
perience of one order or several orders, but mm 
concerned with universal experience. That which Phi- 
losophy takes as its datum, must be an assertion of 
likeness and difference to which all other likenesses and 
differences are secondary. If knowing is elassifyii 
grouping the like and separating the unlike; and if the 
unification of knowledge proceeds by arranging the smaller 
classes of like experience within the larger, and 
within the still larger; then, the proposition by which 
knowledge is unified must be one specifying the antithesis 
between two ultimate classes of experiences, in whi 
others merge. 

Let us now consider what these classes arc. In dra 
the distinction between them, we cannot avoid 
words that have indirect implications wider than their di- 
rect meanings — we cannot avoid arousing thoughts 
imply the very distinction which it is the object of the 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 119 

analysis to establish. Keeping this fact in mind, we can 
do no more than ignore the connotations of the words, 
and attend only to the things they avowedly denote. 

§ 43. Setting out from the conclusions lately reached, 
that all things known to us are manifestations of the Un- 
knowable ; and suppressing, so far as we may, every hy- 
pothesis respecting the something which underlies one or 
other order of these manifestations ; we find that the mani- 
festations, considered simply as such, are divisible into 
two great classes, called by some impressions and ideas. 
The implications of these words are apt to vitiate the 
reasonings of those who use the words; and though it may 
be possible to use them only with reference to the differ- 
ential characteristics they are meant to indicate, it is best 
to avoid the risk of making unacknowledged assumptions. 
The term sensation, too, commonly used as the equivalent 
of impression, implies certain psychological theories — 
tacitly, if not openly, postulates a sensitive organism and 
something acting upon it ; and can scarcely be employed 
without bringing these postulates into the thoughts and 
embodying them in the inferences. Similarly, the phrase 
state of consciousness, as signifying either an impression or 
an idea, is objectionable. As we cannot think of a state 
without thinking of something of which it is a state, and 
which is capable of different states, there is involved a 
foregone conclusion — an undeveloped system of meta- 
physics. Here, accepting the inevitable implication that 
the manifestations imply something manifested, our aim 
must be to avoid any further implications. Though we 
cannot exclude further implications from our thoughts, 
and cannot carry on our argument without tacit recog- 
nitions of them, we can at any rate refuse to recognize 
them in the terms with which we set out. We may do 
this most effectually by classing the manifestations as vivid 
and faint respectively. Let us consider what are the several 
distinctions that exist between these. 

And first a few words on this most conspicuous distinc- 
tion which these antithetical names imply. Manifestations 
that occur under the conditions called those of perception 
(and the conditions so called we must here, as much as 
possible, separate from all hypotheses, and regard simply 
as themselves a certain group of manifestations) are ordi- 



120 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

narily far more distinct than those which occur under the 
conditions known as those of reflection, or memory, or 
imagination, or ideation. These vivid manifestations do, 
indeed, sometimes differ but little from the faint ones. 
When nearly dark we may be unable to decide whether a 
certain manifestation belongs to the vivid order or the 
faint order — whether, as we say, we really see something 
or fancy we see it. In like manner, between a very feeble 
sound and the imagination of a sound, it is occasionally 
difficult to discriminate. But these exceptional cases are 
extremely rare in comparison with the enormous m 
cases in which, from instant to instant, the vivid mani- 
festations distinguish themselves unmistakably from the 
faint. Conversely, it also now and then happens (though 
under conditions which we significantly distinguish as 
abnormal) that manifestations of the faint order become 
so strong as to be mistaken for those <>f the vivid order. 
Ideal sights and sounds are in the insane so much inten- 
sified as to be classed with real sights and sounds — ideal 
and real being here supposed to imply no other contrast 
than that which we are considering. The- I illu- 

sion, as we call them, bear, however, so small a ratio to the 
great mass of cases, that we may safely neglect them, and 
say that the relative faintness of these manifestati< 
the second order is so marked, that we are never in doubt 
as to their distinctness from those of the first order. < ! I 
if we recognize the exceptional occurrence of donbt, the 
recognition serves but to introduce the significant fact that 
we have other means of determining to which order a par- 
ticular manifestation belongs, when the test of compara- 
tive vividness fails us. 

Manifestations of the vivid order precede, in our ex- 
perience, those of the faint order; or, in the terms quoted 
above, the idea is an imperfect and feeble repetition <-f 
the original impression. To put the facts in hist- 
sequence — there is first a presented manifestation of the 
vivid order, and then, afterward, there may come a rep- 
resented manifestation that is like it except in being 
much less distinct. Besides the universal experience that 
after having those vivid manifestations which we call par- 
ticular places, and persons ami things, we can have those 
faint manifestations which we call recollections of the 
places, persons, and things, but cannot have these 



v 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 121 



iously ; and besides the universal experience that before 
tasting certain substances and smelling certain perfumes 
we are without the faint manifestations known as ideas of 
their tastes and smells ; we have also the fact that where 
certain orders of the vivid manifestations are shut out (as 
the visible from the blind and the audible from the deaf), 
the corresponding faint manifestations never come into 
existence. It is true that in some cases the faint mani- 
festations precede the vivid. What we call a conception 
of a machine may presently be 'followed by a vivid mani- 
festation matching it — a so-called actual machine. But 
in the first place this occurrence of the vivid manifestation 
after the faint has no analogy with the occurrence of the 
faint after the vivid — its sequence is not spontaneous like 
that of the idea after the impression. And in the second 
place, though a faint manifestation of this kind may occur 
before the vivid one answering to it, yet its component 
parts may not. Without the foregoing vivid manifesta- 
tions of wheels and bars and cranks, the inventor could 
have no faint manifestation of his new machine. Thus, 
the occurrence of the faint manifestations is made possible 
by the previous occurrence of the vivid. They are dis- 
tinguished from one another as independent and dependent. 

These two orders of manifestations form concurrent 
series; or rather let us call them, not series, which implies 
linear arrangements, but heterogeneous streams or pro- 
cessions. These run side by side ; each now broadening 
and now narrowing, each now threatening to obliterate 
its neighbor, and now in turn threatened with obliter- 
ation, but neither ever quite excluding the other from 
their common channel. Let us watch the mutual actions 
of the two currents. During what we call our states of 
activity, the vivid manifestations predominate. W T e 
simultaneously receive many and varied presentations — a 
crowd of visual impressions, sounds more or less numerous, 
resistances, states, odors, etc. ; some groups of them 
changing, and others temporarily fixed, but altering as we 
move; and when we compare in its breadth and massive- 
ness this heterogeneous combination of vivid manifestations 
with the concurrent combination of faint manifestations, 
these last sink into relative insignificance. They never 
wholly disappear, however. Always along with the vivid 
manifestations, even in the greatest obtrusiveness, anal- 



122 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

ysis discloses a thread of thoughts and interpretations con- 
stituted of the faint manifestations. Or if it be contended 
that the occurrence of a deafening explosion or an intense 
pain may for a moment exclude every idea, it must yet be 
admitted that such breach of continuity can never be im- 
mediately known as occurring; since the act of knowing 
is impossible in the absence of ideas. On the other hand, 
after certain vivid manifestations which we call the acts of 
closing the eyes and adjusting ourselves so as to enfeeble the 
vivid manifestations of pressure, sound, etc., the mani- 
festations of the faint order become relatively predomi- 
nant. The ever-varying heterogeneous current of them, 
no longer obscured by the vivid current, grows more dis- 
tinct, and seems almost to exclude the vivid current. Bat 
while what we call consciousness continues, the current of 
vivid manifestations, however small the dimensions to 
which it is reduced, still continues: pressure and touch do 
not wholly disappear. It is only on Lapsing into the un- 
consciousness termed Bleep, that manifestations of the 
vivid order cease to be distinguishable as snch, and those 
of the- faint order come to be mistaken for them. And 
even of this we remain unaware till the recurrence of man- 
ifestations of the vivid order on awaking; we can never 
infer that manifestations of the vivid order have been 
absent, until they are again present; and can therefore 
never directly know them to be absent. Thus, of the two 
concurrent compound series of manifestations, each pre- 
serves its continuity. As they flow side by side. 
trenches on the other, but there never comes a moment 
at which it can he said that the one has, then and there, 
broken through the other. 

Besides this longitudinal cohesion there is a lateral co- 
hesion, both of the vivid to the vivid and of the faint to 
the faint. The components of the vivid series are bound 
together by ties of co-existence as well as by ties of s. 
sion; and the components of the faint series are similarly 
bound together. Between the degrees of union in the 
two cases there are. however, marked and very signilieant 
differences. Let us observe them. Over an area occupy- 
ing part of the so-called field of view, lights and shades 
and colors and outlines constitute a group to which, as the 
signs of an object, we give a certain name; and while they 
continue present, these united vivid manifestations re- 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 123 

main inseparable. So, too, is it with co-existing groups 
of manifestations ; each persists as a special combination ; 
and most of them preserve unchanging relations with those 
around. Such of them as do not — such of them as are 
capable of what we call independent movements, neverthe- 
less show us a constant connection between certain of the 
manifestations they include, along with a variable connec- 
tion of others. Aud though after certain vivid manifes- 
tations known as a change in the conditions of perception, 
there is a change in the proportions among the vivid man- 
ifestations constituting any group, their cohesion contin- 
ues — we do not succeed in detaching one or more of them 
from the rest. Turning to the faint manifestations, we 
see that while there are lateral cohesions among them, 
these are much less extensive, and in most cases are by no 
means so rigorous. After closing my eyes, I can repre- 
sent an object now standing in a certain place, as standing 
in some other place, or as absent. While I look at a blue 
vase, I cannot separate the vivid manifestation of blue- 
ness from the vivid manifestation of a particular shape ; 
but, in the absence of these vivid manifestations, I can 
separate the faint manifestation of the shape from the 
faint manifestation of blueness, and replace the last by 
a faint manifestation of redness. It is so throughout; the 
faint manifestations cling together to a certain extent, 
but nevertheless most of them may be re-arranged with 
facility. Indeed, none of the individual faint manifes- 
tations cohere in the same indissoluble way as do the 
individual vivid manifestations. Though along with a 
faint manifestation of pressure there is always some faint 
manifestation of extension, yet no particular faint mani- 
festation of extension is bound up with a particular faint 
manifestation of pressure. So that whereas in the vivid 
order the individual manifestations cohere indissolubly, 
usually in large groups, in the faint order the individual 
manifestations noue of them cohere indissolubly, and are 
most of them loosely aggregated ; the only indissoluble 
cohesions among them being between certain of their 
generic forms. 

While the components of each cohere with one another, 
they do not cohere at all strongly with those of the other 
current. Or, more correctly, we may say that the vivid 
current habitually flows on quite undisturbed by the faint 



134 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

current ; and that the faint current, though often largely 
determined by the vivid, and always to some extent carried 
with it, may yet maintain a substantial independence, 
letting the vivid current slide by. We will glance at the 
interactions of the two. The successive faint manifes- 
tations constituting thought fail to modify in the slightest 
degree the vivid manifestations that present themselves. 
Omitting a quite peculiar class of exceptions, hereafter 
to be dealt with, the vivid manifestations, fixed and 
changing, are not directly affected by the faint. Those 
which I distinguish as components of a landscape, as 
surgings of the sea, as whistlings of the wind, as move- 
ments of vehicles and people, are absolutely uninfluenced 
by the accompanying faint manifestations which I distin- 
guish as my ideas. On the other hand, the current of 
faint manifestations is always somewhat perturbed by the 
vivid. Frequently it consists mainly of faint manifes- 
tations which cling to the vivid ones, and are carried with 
them as they pass — memories and suggestions as we call 
them, which, joined with the vivid manifestations produc- 
ing them, form almost the whole body of the manifes- 
tations. At other times, when, as we say, absorbed in 
thought, the disturbance of the faint current is but super- 
ficial. The vivid manifestations drag after them 
few faint manifestations only as constitute recognit* 
them; to each impression adhere certain ideas which 
make up the interpretation of it as such or such. But 
there meanwhile flows on a main stream of faint mani- 
festations wholly unrelated to the vivid manifestations — 
What we call a re very, perhaps, or it may be a pro© - 
reasoning. And occasionally, during the state known as 
absence of mind, this current of faint manifestath 
far predominates that the vivid current scarcely affects it 
at all. Hence, these concurrent series of manifestations, 
each coherent with itself longitudinally and laterally, 
have but partial coherence with one another. The vivid 
scries is quite unmoved by its passing neighbor; and 
though the faint scries is always to some extent moved by 
the adjacent vivid series, and is often carried bodily along 
with the vivid series, it may nevertheless become in great 
measure separate. 

Yet another all-important differential characteristic has 
to be specified. The conditions under which these re- 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 125 

spective orders of manifestations occur, are different; and 
the conditions of occurrence of each order belong to itself. 
Whenever the immediate antecedents of vivid manifes- 
tations are traceable, they prove to be other vivid manifes- 
tations; and though we cannot say that the antecedents of 
the faint manifestations always lie wholly among them- 
selves, yet the essential ones lie wholly among themselves. 
These statements will need a good deal of explanation. 
Obviously, changes among any of the vivid manifestations 
we are contemplating — the motions and sounds and alter- 
ations of appearance, in what we call surrounding objects 
— are either changes that follow certain vivid manifes- 
tations, or changes of which the antecedents are unapparent. 
Some of the vivid manifestations, however, occur only 
under certain conditions that seem to be of another order. 
Those which we know as colors and visible forms pre- 
suppose open eyes. But what is the opening of the eyes, 
translated into the terms we are here' using? Literally 
it is an Occurrence of certain vivid manifestations. The 
preliminary idea of opening the eyes does, indeed, consist 
of faint manifestations, but the act of opening them con- 
sists of vivid manifestations. And the like is still more 
conspicuously the case with those movements of the eyes 
and the head which are followed by new groups of vivid 
manifestations. Similarly with the antecedents to the 
vivid manifestations which we distinguish as those of 
touch and pressure. All the changeable ones have for 
their conditions of occurrence certain vivid manifestations 
which we know as sensations of muscular tension. It is 
true that the conditions to these conditions are manifes- 
tations of the faint order — those ideas of muscular actions 
which precede muscular actions. And we are here in- 
troduced to a complication arising from the fact that what 
is called the body is present to us as a set of vivid mani- 
festations connected with the faint manifestations in 
a special way — a way such that in it alone certain vivid 
manifestations are capable of being produced by faint 
manifestations. There must be named, too, the kindred 
exception furnished by the emotions — an exception which, 
however, serves to enforce the general proposition. For 
while it is true that the emotions are to be considered as a 
certain kind of vivid manifestations, and are yet capable 
of being produced by the faint manifestations we call ideas; 



126 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

it is also true that because the conditions to their occur- 
rence thus exist among the faint manifestations, we class 
them as belonging to the same general aggregate as the 
faint manifestations — do not class them with such other 
vivid manifestations as colors, sounds, pressures, smells, 
etc. But omitting these peculiar vivid manifestations 
which we know as muscular tensions and emotions, and 
which we habitually class apart, we may say of all the 
rest, that the conditions to their existence as vivid mani- 
festations are manifestations belonging to their own class. 
In the parallel current we find a parallel truth. Though 
many manifestations of the faint order are partly a 
by manifestations of the vivid order, which call up mem- 
ories as we say, and suggest inferences; yet these results 
mainly depend on certain antecedents belonging to the 
faint order. A cloud drifts across the sun. and may or 
may not produce an effect on the current of ideas; the 
inference that it is about to rain may arise, or there may 
be a persistence in the previous train of thought — a dif- 
ference obviously determined by conditions among the 
thoughts. Again, such power as a vivid manifest 
has of causing certain faint manifestations to arise, de- 
pends on the pre-e\isteiice of certain appropriate faint 
manifestations. If I have never heard a curlew, tl • 
which an unseen one makes fails to produce an i 
the bird. And we have but to remember what various 
trains of reflection are aroused by the same Bight, I 
how essentially the occurrence of each faint manifestation 
depends on its relations to other faint manifestations that 
have gone before or that co-exist. 

Here we are introduced, lastly. t<> one of the most strik- 
ing, and perhaps the most important, of the diffei 
between those two orders of manifestations — a difference 
continuous with that just pointed out, but one which may 
with advantage he separately insisted upon. The con- 
ditions of occurrence are not distinguished solely by the 
fact that each set, when identifiable, belongs to its own 
order of manifestations: but they are further distinguished 
in a very significant way. Manifestations of the faint or- 
der have traceable antecedents: can be made to occur by 
establishing their conditions of occurrences: and can be 
suppressed by establishing other conditions. But mani- 
festations of the vivid order continually occur without 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 127 

previous presentation of their antecedents ; and in many 
cases they persist or cease, under either known or un- 
known conditions, in such way as to show that their con- 
ditions are wholly beyond control. The impression dis- 
tinguished as a flash of lightning breaks across the current 
of our thoughts, absolutely without notice. The sounds 
from a band that strikes up in the street or from a crash 
of china in the next room, are not connected with any of 
the previously-present manifestations, either of the faint 
or of the vivid order. Often these vivid manifestations, 
arising unexpectedly, persist in thrusting themselves 
across the current of the faint ones; which not only can- 
not directly affect them, but cannot even indirectly affect 
them. A wound produced by a violent blow from behind 
is a vivid manifestation the conditions of occurrence of 
which were neither among the faint nor among the vivid 
manifestations; and the conditions to the persistence of 
which are bound up with the vivid manifestations in some 
nnmanifested way. So that whereas, in the faint order, 
the conditions of occurrence are always among the pre- 
existing or co-existing manifestations ; in the vivid order, 
the conditions of occurrence are often not present. 

Thus we find many salient characters in which manifes- 
tations of the one order are like one another, and unlike 
those of the other order. Let us briefly re-enumerate these 
salient characters. Manifestations of the one order are 
vivid and those of the other are faint. Those of the one 
order are originals, while those of the other order are 
copies. The first form with one another a series, or heter- 
ogeneous current, that is never broken; and the second 
also form with one another a parallel series or current that 
is never broken; or, to speak strictly, no breakage of either 
is ever directly known. Those of the first order cohere 
with one another, not only longitudinally but also trans- 
versely; as do also those of the second order with one an- 
other. Between manifestations of the first order the 
cohesions, both longitudinal and transverse, are indissol- 
uble; but between manifestations of the second order, 
these cohesions are most of them dissoluble with ease. 
While the members of each series or current are so cohe- 
rent with one another that the current cannot be broken, 
the two currents, running side by side as they do, have but 
little coherence — the great body of the vivid current is 



128 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

absolutely unmodifiable by the faint, and the faint may 
become almost separate from the vivid. The conditions 
under which manifestations of either order occur, them- 
selves belong to that order; but whereas in the faint order 
the conditions are always present, in the vivid order the 
conditions are often not present, but lie somewhere outside 
of the series. Seven separate characters, then, mark off 
these two orders of manifestations from one another. 

§ 44. What is the meaning of this? The foregoing 
analysis was commenced in the belief that the proposition 
postulated by Philosophy must affirm some ultimate classes 
of likenesses and unlikenesses, in which all other classes 
merge; and here we have found that all manifestations 
of the Unknowable are divisible into two such classes. 
What is the division equivalent to? 

Obviously it corresponds to the division between object 
and subject. This profoundest of distinctions among the 
manifestations of the Unknowable we recognize by group- 
ing them into self and not-self. These faint manifes- 
tations, forming a continuous whole differing from the 
other in the quantity, quality, cohesion, and conditions 
of existence of its parts, we call the ego; and these vivid 
manifestations, indissolubly bound together in relatively- 
immense masses, and having independent conditions of 
existence, we call the non-ego. Or rather, more truly — 
each order of manifestations carries with it the irresistible 
implication of some power that manifests itself: and by 
the words ego and non-ego respectively, we mean the power 
that manifests itself in the faint forms, and the | 
that manifests itself in the vivid forms. 

As we here see, these consolidated conceptions thus 
antithetically named do not originate in some inscrutable 
way; hut they have for their explanation the ultimate law 
of thought that is beyond appeal. The persistent con- 
sciousness of likeness or difference is one which, by its 
very persistence, makes itself accepted; and one which 
transcends scepticism, since without it even doubt be- 
comes impossible. And the primordial division t : 
from not-self is a cumulative result of persistent con- 
sciousnesses of likenesses and differences among manifes- 
tations. Indeed, thought exists only through a kind of 
act which leads us, from moment to moment, to refer eer- 



i 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 129 

ta\n manifestations to the one class with which they have 
so \iany common attributes, and others to the other class 
withwhich they h^ve common attributes equally numer- 
ous. \ind the myriad-fold repetitions of these classings, 
bringittor about the myriad-fold associations of each man- 
ifestation with those of its own class, brings about this 
union ari\ong the members of each class, and this dis- 
union of t\e two classes. 

Strictly sneaking, this segregation of the manifestations 
and coalescence of them into two distinct wholes, is in 
great part spontaneous, and precedes all deliberate judg- 
ments; though it is indorsed by such judgments when 
they come to be made. For the manifestations of each 
order have not simply that kind of union implied by 
grouping them as individual objects of the same class; 
but, as we have seen, they have the much more intimate 
union implied by actual cohesion. This cohesive union 
exhibits itself before any conscious acts of classing take 
place. So that, in truth, these two contrasted orders of 
manifestations are substantially self-separated and self- 
consolidated. The members of each, by clinging to one 
another and parting from their opposites, themselves form 
these united wholes constituting object and subject. It is 
this self -union which gives to these wholes formed of 
them their individualities as wholes, and that separateness 
from each other which transcends judgment; and judg- 
ment merely aids the predetermined segregation by as- 
signing to their respective classes such manifestations as 
have not distinctly united themselves with the rest of their 
kind. 

One further perpetually-repeated act of judgment there 
is, indeed, which strengthens this fundamental antithesis, 
and gives a vast extension to one term of it. We contin- 
ually learn that while the conditions of occurrence of faint 
manifestations are always to be found, the conditions of 
occurrence of vivid manifestations are often not to be 
found. We also continually learn that vivid manifes- 
tations which have no perceivable antecedents among the 
vivid manifestations are like certain preceding ones which 
had perceivable antecedents among the vivid manifes- 
tations. Joining these two experiences together, there re- 
sults the irresistible conception that some vivid manifes- 
tations have conditions of occurrence existing out of the 



130 FIRST PRIXCIPLES. 

current of vivid manifestations — existing as potential 
vivid manifestations capable of becoming actual. And 
so we are made vaguely conscious of an indefinitely ex- 
tended region of power or being, not merely separate from 
the current of faint manifestations constituting the wo, 
but lying beyond the current of vivid manifestations con- 
stituting the immediately-present portion of the non-ego. 

§ 45. In a very imperfect way, passing ovrr objections 
and omitting needful explanations, I have thus, in the 
narrow space that could properly be devoted to it, indi- 
cated the essential nature and justification of that primor- 
dial proposition which Philosophy requires as a datum. 
I might, indeed, safely have assumed fc&ifl ultimate truth; 
which Common Sense asserts, which every step in Science 
takes for granted, and which no metaphysician ever 
moment succeeded in expelling from eonsciousn s. Set- 
ting out with the postulate that the manifestations of the 
Unknowable fall Into the two Bepafal gates constitu- 

ting the world of consciousness and the I con- 

sciousness, I might have let the justification of this \ 
late depend o\\ its subsequently-proved congrnity with 
every result of experience, direct and indirect. J>ut 
that follows proceeds upon this postulate, it seemed 
able briefly to indicate its warrant, with the view of shut- 
ting out criticisms that might else lie made It .-reined 
desirable to show that this fundamental cognition is 
neither, as the idealist asserts, an illusion, nor, as the 
Bceptic thinks, of doubtful worth, nor, as is held by the 
natural realist, an inexplicable intuition; but that it is a 
legitimate deliverance of consci ts ma- 

terials after the laws of its normal action. While, in 
o( time, the establishment of this distinction pi 
reasoning, and while, running through our mental struc- 
ture as it does, we are debarred from reasoning about it 
without taking for granted its existence, analysis neverthe- 
less enables us to justify the assertion of its exister. 
showing that it is also the outcome of a classification 
on accumulated likenesses and accumulated dilTerences. 
In other words. Reasoning, which is itself but a formation 
of cohesions among manifestations, here strengthens, by 
the cohesions it forms, the cohesions which it finds already 
existing. 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 131 

$o much, then, for the data of Philosophy. In common 
with Religion, Philosophy assumes the primordial implica- 
tion^, consciousness, which, as we saw in the last part, 
has ths deepest of all foundations. It assumes the validity 
of a certain primordial process of consciousness, without 
which inference is impossible, and without which there 
cannot even, be either affirmation or denial. And it as- 
sumes the validity of a certain primordial product of 
consciousness, which, though it originates in an earlier 
process, is also, in one sense, a product of this process, 
since by this process it is tested and stamped as genuine. 
In brief, our postulates are: an Unknowable Power; the 
existence of knowable likenesses and differences among the 
manifestations of that Power; and a resulting segregation 
of the manifestations into those of subject and object. 

Before proceeding with the substantial business of Phi- 
losophy — the complete unification of the knowledge par- 
tially unified by Science — a further preliminary is needed. 
The manifestations of the Unknowable, separated into the 
two divisions of self and not-self, are re-divisible into cer- 
tain most general forms, the reality of which Science, as 
well as Common Sense, from moment to moment assumes. 
In the chapter on " Ultimate Scientific Ideas " it was shown 
that we know nothing of these forms, considered in them- 
selves. As, nevertheless, we must continue to use the 
words signifying them, it is needful to say what interpre- 
tations are to be put on these words. 



CHAPTER III. 

SPACE, TIME, MATTER, MOTION", AND FORCE. 

§ 46. That sceptical state of mind which the criticisms 
of Philosophy usually produce is, in great measure, caused 
by the misinterpretation of words. A sense of universal 
illusion ordinarily follows the reading of metaphysics, and 
is strong in proportion as the argument has appeared con- 
clusive. This sense of universal illusion would probably 
never have arisen had the terms used been always rightly 
construed. Unfortunately, these terms have by association 
acquired meanings that are quite different from those given 
to them in philosophical discussions; and the ordinary 



132 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

meanings being unavoidably suggested, there results more 
or less of that dreamlike idealism which is so incongruous 
with our instinctive convictions. The word phenmehan 
and its equivalent word appearance are in great part to 
blame for this. In ordinary speech these are uniformly 
employed in reference to visual perceptions. Habit, al- 
most, if not quite, disables us from thinking of appearance 
except as something seen; and though phenomenon has a 
more generalized meaning, yet we cannot rid it of associ- 
ations with appearance, which is its verbal equivalent. 
When, therefore, Philosophy | troves that our knowledge of 
the external world can be but phenomenal — when it con- 
cludes that the tilings of which we are conscious are 
appearances — it inevitably arouses in us the notion of an 
illusiveness like that to which our visual perceptions are 
so liable in comparison with our tactual perceptions. Good 
pictures show us that the aspects of things may he very 
nearly simulated by colors on canvas. The looking-glass 
still more distinctly proves how deceptive is Bight when 
unverified by touch. And the frequent cases in which 
we misinterpret the impressions made on our eves, and 
think we see something which we do not see. further shake 
our faith in vision. So that the implication of uncertainty 
has infected the very word appearance. Hence Philosophy, 
by giving it an extended meaning, leads us to think i 
our senses as deceiving us in the same way that tin 
do, and so makes us feel ourselves floating in a world of 
phantasms. Bad phenomenon and appearance no such mis- 
leading associations, little if any of this mental con!' - 
would result. Or did we in place of them use the term 
effect^ which is equally applicable to all impressions pro- 
duced on consciousness through any of the senses, 
which carries with it in thought the necessary correlative 
cause, with which it is equally real, we should be in little 
danger of falling into the insanities of idealism. 

Such danger as there might still remain would disappear 
on making a further verbal correction. At present, the 
confusion resulting from the above misinterpretation is 
made greater by an antithetical misinterpretation. We 
increase the seeming unreality of that phenomenal exist- 
ence which we can alone know, by contrasting it with a 
noumenal existence which we imagine would, if we could 
know it, be more truly real to us. But we delude our- 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 133 

selves with a verbal fiction. What is the meaning of the 
word real? This is the question which underlies every 
metaphysical inquiry, and the neglect of it is the remain- 
ing cause of the chronic antagonisms of metaphysicians. In 
the interpretation put on the word real, the discussions of 
philosophy retain one element of the vulgar conception of 
things, while they reject all its other elements and create 
confusion by the inconsistency. The peasant, on contem- 
plating an object, does not regard that which he contem- 
plates as something in himself, but believes the thing of 
which he is conscious to be the external object — imagines 
that his consciousness extends to the very place where the 
object lies. To him the appearance and the reality are 
one and the same thing. The metaphysician, however, 
is convinced that consciousness cannot embrace the reality, 
but only the appearance of it ; and so he transfers the ap- 
pearance into consciousness and leaves the reality outside. 
This reality left outside of consciousness he continues to 
think of much in the same way as the ignorant man thinks 
of the appearance. Though the reality is asserted to be 
out of consciousness, yet the realness ascribed to it is con- 
stantly spoken of as though it were a knowledge possessed 
apart from consciousness. It seems to be forgotten that 
the conception of reality can be nothing more than some 
mode of consciousness; and that the question to be consid- 
ered is, What is the relation between this mode and other 
modes? 

By reality we mean persistence in consciousness — a per- 
sistence that is either unconditional, as our consciousness 
of space, or that is conditional, as our consciousness of a 
body while grasping it. The real, as we conceive it, is 
distinguished solely by the test of persistence; for by this 
test we separate it from what we call the unreal. Between 
a person standing before us, and the idea of such a person, 
we discriminate by our ability to expel the idea from con- 
sciousness and our ability, while looking at him, to expel 
the person from consciousness. And when in doubt as to 
the validity or illusiveness of some impression made upon 
us in the dusk, we settle the matter by observing whether 
the impression persists on closer observation ; and we pred- 
icate reality if the persistence is complete. How truly 
persistence is what we mean by reality is shown in the 
fact that when, after criticism has proved that the real as 



134 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

we are conscious of it is not the objectively real, the in- 
definite notion which we form of the objectively real is of 
something which persists absolutely, under all changes of 
mode, form, or appearance. And the fact that Ave cannot 
form even an indefinite notion of the absolutely real, 
except as the absolutely persistent, clearly implies that 
persistence is our ultimate test of the real as present to 
consciousness. 

Reality then, as we think of it, being nothing more 
than persistence in consciousness, the result must be the 
same to us whether that which we perceive be the Unknow- 
able itself or an effect invariably wrought on us by the 
Unknowable. If, under constant conditions furnished by 
our constitutions, some Power of which the nature is be- 
yond conception always produces some mode of conscious- 
ness — if this mode of consciousness is as persistent as would 
be this Power were it in consciousness, the reality will be to 
consciousness as complete in the one case as in the other. 
Were Unconditioned Being itself present in thought it 
could but be persistent; and if, instead, there is present 
Being conditioned by the forms of thought, but no less 
persistent, it must be to us no less real. 

Hence there may be drawn these conclusions: First, that 
we have an indefinite consciousness of an absolute reality 
transcending relations, which is produced by the absolute 
persistence in us of something which survives all changes 
of relation. Second, that we have a definite consciousness 
of relative reality, which unceasingly persists in us under 
one or other of its forms, and under each form so long as 
the conditions of presentation are fulfilled; and that the 
relative reality, being thus continuously persistent in us, 
is as real to us as would be the absolute reality could it be 
immediately known. Third, that thought beil _ 
only under relation, the relative reality can be conceived as 
such only in connection with an absolute reality; and the 
connection between the two being absolutely persistent in 
our consciousness, is real in the same sense as the terms it 
unites are real. 

Thus, then, we may resume with entire confidence those 
.realistic conceptions which philosophy at first sight seems 
to dissipate. Though reality under the forms of our con- 
sciousness is but a conditioned effect of the absolute reality, 
yet this conditioned effect standing in indissoluble relation 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 135 

with its unconditioned cause, and being equally persistent 
with it so long as the conditions persist, is, to the con- 
sciousness supplying those conditions, equally real. The 
persistent impressions being the persistent results of a per- 
sistent cause are for practical purposes the same to us as 
the cause itself, and may be habitually dealt with as its 
equivalents. Somewhat in the same way that our visual 
perceptions, though merely symbols found to be the equiv- 
alents of tactual perceptions, are yet so identified with 
those tactual perceptions that we actually appear to see 
the solidity and hardness which we do but infer, and. thus 
conceive as objects what are only the signs of objects; so, 
on a higher stage, do we deal with these relative realities 
as though they were absolutes instead of effects of the ab- 
solute. And we may legitimately continue so to deal with 
them as long as the conclusions to which they help us are 
understood as relative realities and not absolute ones. 

This general conclusion it now remains to interpret spe- 
cifically, in its application to each of our ultimate scientific 
ideas. 

§ 47.* We think in relations. This is truly the form 
of all thought; and if there are any other forms they must 
be derived from this. We have seen (Chap. iii. Part I!) 
that the several ultimate modes of being cannot be known 
or conceived as they exist in themselves, that is, out of 
relation to our consciousness. We have seen, by analyzing 
the product of thought (§ 23), that it always consists of 
relations, and cannot include anything beyond the most 
general of these. On analyzing the process of thought we 
found that cognition of the Absolute was impossible because 
it presented neither relation, nor its elements — difference 
and likeness. Further, we found that not only Intelligence 
but Life itself consists in the establishment of internal 
relations in correspondence with external relations. And 
lastly, it was shown that though by the relativity of our 
thought we are eternally debarred from knowing or con- 
ceiving Absolute Being, yet that this very relativity of our 
thought necessitates that vague consciousness of Absolute 
Being which no mental effort can suppress. That relation 

* For the psychological conclusions briefly set forth in this and the three 
sections following it, the justification will be found in the writer's "Principles 
of Psychology." 



136 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

is the universal form of thought, is thus a truth which all 
kinds of demonstration unite in proving. 

By the transcendentalists, certain other phenomena of 
consciousness are regarded as forms of thought. Presum- 
ing that relation would be admitted by them to be a uni- 
versal mental form, they would class with it two others as 
also universal. Were their hypothesis otherwise tenable, 
however, it must still be rejected if such alleged further 
forms are interpretable as generated by the primary form. 
If we think in relations, and if relations have certain uni- 
versal forms, it is manifest that such universal forms of 
relations will become universal forms of our consciousness. 
And if these further universal forms are thus explicable it 
is superfluous and therefore unphilosophical to assign them 
an independent origin. Xow relations are of two orders: 
relations of sequence and relations of co-existence : of which 
the one is original and the other derivative. The relation 
of sequence is given in every change of consciousness. The 
relation of co-existence, which cannot be originally given 
in a consciousness of which the states are serial, becomes 
distinguished only when it is found that certain relations 
of sequence have their terms presented in consciousn 
either order with equal facility, while the others are pre- 
sented only in one order. Relations of which the terms 
are not reversible become recognized as sequences proper; 
while relations of which the terms occur indifferently in 
both directions become recognized as co-existences. End- 
less experiences, which from moment to moment present 
both orders of these relations, render the distinction be- 
tween them perfectly definite, and at the same time 
generate an abstract conception of each. The abstract of 
all sequences is Time. The abstract of all co-existence is 
Space. From the fact that in thought time is inseparable 
from sequence, and Space from co-existence, we do not here 
infer that Time and Space are original conditions of 
sciousness under which sequences and co-existences are 
known; but we infer that our conceptions of time and 
space are generated, as other abstracts are generated, from 
other concretes, the only difference being that the organ- 
ization of experiences has, in these cases, been goi] 
throughout the entire evolution of intelligence. 

This synthe>is is confirmed by analysis. Our conscious- 
ness of Space is a consciousness of co-existent positions. 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 137 

Any limited portion of space can be conceived only by 
representing its limits as co-existing in certain relative 
positions, and each of its imagined boundaries, be it line 
or plane, can be thought of in no other way than as made 
up of co-existent positions in close proximity. And since 
a position is not an entity — since the congeries of positions 
which constitute any conceived portion of space and mark 
its bounds are not sensible existences, it follows that the 
co-existent positions which make up our consciousness of 
Space are not co-existences in the full sense of the word 
(which implies realities as their terms), but are the blank 
forms of co-existences, left behind when the realities are 
absent; that is, are the abstracts of co-existences. The 
experiences out of which, during the evolution of intelli- 
gence, this abstract of all co-existences has been generated 
are experiences of individual positions as ascertained by 
touch ; and each of such experiences involves the resistance 
of an object touched and the muscular tension which 
measures this resistance. By countless unlike muscular 
adjustments, involving unlike muscular tensions, different 
resisting positions are disclosed; and these, as they can be 
experienced in one order as readily as another, we regard 
as co-existing. But since, under other circumstances, the 
same muscular adjustments do not produce contact with 
resisting positions, there result the same states of con- 
sciousness minus the resistances — blank forms of co-exist- 
ence from which the co-existent objects before experienced 
are absent. And from a building up of these, too elaborate 
to be here detailed, results that abstract of all relations of 
co-existence which we call Space. It remains only to point 
out, as a thing which we must not forget, that the ex- 
periences from which the consciousness of Space arises are 
experiences of force. A certain correlation of the muscu- 
lar forces we ourselves exercise is the index of each posi- 
tion as originally disclosed to us; and the resistance which 
makes us aware of something existing in that position is 
an equivalent of the pressure we consciously exert. Thus, 
experiences of forces variously correlated are those from 
which our consciousness of Space is abstracted. 

That which we know as Space being thus shown alike by 
its genesis and definition to be purely relative, what are 
we to say of that which causes it? Is there an absolute 
Space which relative Space in some sort represents? Is 



138 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

Space in itself a form or condition of absolute existence, 
producing in our minds a corresponding form or condition 
of relative existence? These are unanswerable questions. 
Our conception of Space is produced by some mode of the 
Unknowable; and the complete unchangeableness of our 
conception of it simply implies a complete uniformity in 
the effects wrought by this mode of the Unknowable upon 
us. But therefore to call it a necessary mode of the Un- 
knowable is illegitimate. All we can assert is that Space 
is a relative reality; that our consciousness of this unchang- 
ing relative reality implies an absolute reality equally 
unchanging in so far as we are concerned, and that the 
relative reality may be unhesitatingly accepted in thought 
as a valid basis for our reasonings, which, when rightly 
carried on, will bring us to truths that have a like relative 
reality — the only truths which concern us or can possibly 
be known to us. 

Concerning Time, relative and absolute, a parallel argu- 
ment Leads to parallel conclusions. These are too ol 
to need specifying in detail. 

£ -is. Our conception of Matter, reduced to its simplest 
shape, i- that of co-existent positions that offer resistance, 
as contrasted with our conception of Space, in which the 
co-existent positions offer no resistance. We think of 
Body as hounded by surfaces that resist, and as made up 
throughout of parts that resist. Mentally abstract the 
co-e\istent resistances ami the consciousness of Body dis- 
appears, leaving behind it the consciousness of Space. And 
since the group of co-existing resisteni positions consti- 
tuting a portion of matter is uniformly capable of giving 
us impressions of resistance in combination with various 
muscular adjustments, according as we touch its near, its 
remote, its right, or its left side, it results that as different 
muscular adjustments habitually indicate diff 
existences, we are obliged to conceive every portion of 
matter as containing more than one resistent position — 
that is, as occupying Space. Hence the necessity we are 
under of representing to ourselves the ultimate elements 
o( Matter as being at once extended and resistent. This 
being the universal form of our sensible experiences 
Matter becomes the form which our conception of it can- 
not transcend, however minute the fragments which imag- 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 139 

inary subdivisions produce. Of these two inseparable 
elements the resistance is primary and the extension sec- 
ondary. Occupied extension, or Body, being distinguished 
in consciousness from unoccupied extension, or Space, by 
its resistance, this attribute must clearly have precedence 
in the genesis of the idea. Such a conclusion is, indeed, 
an obvious corollary from that at which we arrived in the 
foregoing section. If, as was there contended, our con- 
sciousness of Space is a product of accumulated experiences, 
partly our own but chiefly ancestral — if, as was pointed 
out, the experiences from which our consciousness of Space 
is abstracted can be received only through impressions of 
resistance made upon the organism, the necessary inference 
is that experiences of resistance being those from which 
the conception of Space is generated, the resistance-attri- 
bute of matter must be regarded as primordial and the 
space-attribute as derivative. Whence it becomes manifest 
that our experience of force is that out of which the idea 
of Matter is built. Matter as opposing our muscular ener- 
gies being immediately present to consciousness in terms 
of force, and its occupancy of Space being known by an 
abstract of experiences originally given in terms of force, 
it follows that forces standing in certain correlations form 
the whole content of our idea of Matter. 

Such being our cognition of the relative reality, what 
are we to say of the absolute reality? We can only say 
that it is some mode of the Unknowable, related to the 
Matter we know, as cause to effect. The relativity of our 
cognition of Matter is shown alike by the above analysis 
and by the contradictions which are evolved when we deal 
with the cognition as an absolute one (§ 16). But, as we 
have lately seen, though known to us only under relation, 
Matter is as real in the true sense of that word as it would 
be could we know it out of relation ; and further, the rela- 
tive reality which we know as Matter is necessarily repre- 
sented to the mind as standing in a persistent or real rela- 
tion to the absolute reality. W T e may therefore deliver 
ourselves over without hesitation to those terms of thought 
which experience has organized in us. We need not in 
our physical, chemical, or other researches refrain from 
dealing with Matter as made up of extended and resistent 
atoms; for this conception, necessarily resulting from our 
experiences of Matter, is not less legitimate than the con- 



140 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

ception of aggregate masses as extended and resistent. 
The atomic hypothesis, as well as the kindred hypothesis 
of an all-pervading ether consisting of molecules, is simply 
a necessary development of those universal forms which the 
actions of the Unknowable have wrought in us. The con- 
clusions logically worked out by the aid of these hypotheses 
are sure to be in harmony with all others which these same 
forms involve, and will have a relative truth that is equally 
complete. 

§ 49. The conception of Motion as presented or repre- 
sented in the developed consciousness involves the c- 
tions of Space, of Time, and of Matter. A something that 
moves, a series of positions occupied in succession, and a 
group of co-existent positions united in thought with the 
successive ones — these are the constituents of the idea. 
And since, as we have seen, these are severally elaborated 
from experiences of force as given in certain correlal 
it follows that from a further synthesis of such experience 
the idea of Motion is also elaborated. A certain other 
element in the idea, which is in truth its fundamental ele- 
ment (namely, the necessity which the moving body is 
under to go on changing its position), results immedi 
from the earliest experiences of force. Movemen 
different parts of the organism in relation other 

are the first presented in consciousness. Th 
by the action of the muscles, necessitate r - npon 

consciousness in the shape of sensations of muscular ten- 
sion. Consequently, each stretching-out or drawing-in of 
a limb is originally known as a series of muscular tensions, 
varying in intensity as the position of the limb cha 
And tliis rudimentary consciousness of Motion, consisting 
of serial impressions of force, becomes inseparably united 
with the conscious Space ami Time as 

are abstracted from further impressions of force. Or 
rather, out of this primitive conception of Motion 
adult conception of it is developed simultaneously with 
the development of the conceptions i S and Tin.-. 

three being evolved from the more multiplied and varied 
impressions of muscular tension and objective I - - 
Motion, as we know it, is thus traceable, in common with 
the other ultimate scientific ideas, to experiences of force. 

That this relative reality answers to some absolute reality 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 141 

it is needful only for form's sake to assert. What has 
been said above respecting the Unknown Cause which pro- 
duces in us the effects called Matter, Space, and Time, will 
apply, on simply changing the terms, to Motion. 

§ 50. We come down then, finally, to Force as the ulti- 
mate of ultimates. Though Space, Time, Matter, and 
Motion are apparently all necessary data of intelligence, 
yet a psychological analysis (here indicated only in rude 
outline) shows us that these are either built up of, or ab- 
stracted from, experiences of Force. Matter and Motion, 
as we know them, are differently conditioned manifesta- 
tions of Force. Space and Time, as we know them, are 
disclosed along with these different manifestations of Force 
as the conditions under which they are presented. Matter 
and Motion are concretes built up from the contents of 
various mental relations ; while Space and Time are abstracts 
of the forms of these various relations. Deeper down than 
these, however, are the primordial experiences of Force, 
which, as occurring in consciousness in different combina- 
tions, supply at once the materials whence the forms of 
relations are generalized, and the related objects built up. 
A single impression of force is manifestly receivable by a 
sentient being devoid of mental forms: grant but sensi- 
bility, with no established power of thought, and a force 
producing some nervous change will still be presentable at 
the supposed seat of sensation. Though no single impres- 
sion of force so received could itself produce consciousness 
(which implies relations between different states), yet a 
multiplication of such impressions, differing in kind and 
degree, would give the materials for the establishment of 
relations, that is, of thought. And if such relations 
differed in their forms as well as in their contents, the 
impressions of such forms would be organized simultane- 
ously with the impressions they contained. Thus all other 
modes of consciousness are derivable from experiences of 
Force ; but experiences of Force are not derivable from any- 
thing else. Indeed, it needs but to remember that con- 
sciousness consists of changes to see that the ultimate datum 
of consciousness must be that of which change is the man- 
ifestation ; and that thus the force by which we ourselves 
produce changes, and which serves to symbolize the cause 
of changes in general, is the final disclosure of analysis. 



142 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

It is a truism to say that the nature of this undecom- 
posable element of our knowledge is inscrutable. If, to 
use an algebraic illustration, we represent Matter, Motion, 
and Force by the symbols #, y, z, then we may ascertain 
the values of x and y in terms of z; but the value of z can 
never be found : z is the unknown quantity which must 
forever remain unknown, for the obvious reason that there 
is nothing in which its value can be expressed. It is within 
the possible reach of our intelligence to go on simplifying 
the equations of all phenomena until the complex symbols 
which formulate them are reduced to certain functions of 
this ultimate symbol; but when we have done this we have 
reached that limit which eternally divides science from 
nescience. 

That this undecomposable mode of consciousness into 
which all other modes may be decomposed, cannot be itself 
the Power manifested to us through phenomena, has been 
already proved (§ 18). We saw that to assume an identity 
of nature between the cause of changes as it absolutely ex- 
ists, and that cause of change of which we are conscious in 
our own muscular efforts betrays us into alternative im- 
possibilities of thought. Force, as we know it, can be 
regarded only as a certain conditioned effect of the Uncon- 
ditioned Cause — as the relative reality indicating to us an 
Absolute Reality by which it is immediately produced. And 
here, indeed, we see even more clearly than before how 
inevitable is that transfigured realism to which sceptical 
criticism finally brings us round. Getting rid of all com- 
plications, and contemplating pure Force, we are irresistibly 
compelled by the relativity of our thought to vaguely con- 
ceive some unknown force as the correlative of the known 
force. Noumenon and phenomenon are here presented in 
their primordial relation as two sides of the same change, 
of which we are obliged to regard the last as no lees 
than the first. 

§ 51. In closing this exposition of the derivative data 
needed by Philosophy as the unifier of Science, we may 
properly glance at their relations to the primordial data 
set forth in the last chapter. 

An Unknown Cause of the known effects which we call 
phenomena, likenesses and differences among these known 
effects, and a segregation of the effects into subject and 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 143 

object — these are the postulates without which we cannot 
think. Within each of the segregated masses of manifes- 
tations there are likenesses and differences involving sec- 
ondary segregations which have also become indispensable 
postulates. The vivid manifestations constituting the 
non-ego do not simply cohere, but their cohesions have cer- 
tain invariable modes; and among the faint manifestations 
constituting the ego, which are products of the vivid, there 
exist corresponding modes of cohesion. These modes of 
cohesion under which manifestations are invariably pre- 
sented, aud therefore invariably represented, we call, when 
contemplated apart, Space and Time, and when contem- 
plated along with the manifestations themselves, Matter 
aud Motion. The ultimate natures of these modes are as 
unknown as is the ultimate nature of that which is mani- 
fested. But just the same warrant which we have for 
asserting that subject and object co-exist, we have for 
asserting that the vivid manifestations we call objective 
exist under certain constant conditions, that are symbol- 
ized by these constant conditions among the manifestations 
we call subjective. 



CHAPTER IV. 

THE INDESTRUCTIBILITY OF MATTER. 

§ 52. Not because the truth is unfamiliar is it needful 
here to say something concerning the indestructibility of 
Matter, but partly because the symmetry of our argument 
demands the enunciation of this truth, and partly because 
the evidence on which it is accepted requires examination. 
Could it be shown, or could it with any rationality be even 
supposed, that Matter, either in its aggregates or in its 
units, ever became non-existent, there would be need either 
to ascertain under what conditions it became non-existent, 
or else to confess that Science and Philosophy are impossi- 
ble. For if, instead of having to deal with fixed quantities 
and weights, we had to deal with quantities and weights 
which were apt, wholly or in part, to be annihilated, there 
would be introduced an incalculable element, fatal to all 
positive conclusions. Clearly, therefore, the proposition 



144 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

that matter is indestructible must be deliberately consid- 
ered. 

So far from being admitted as a self-evident truth, this 
would, in primitive times, have been rejected as a self- 
evident error. There was once universally current a notion 
that things could vanish into absolute nothing or arise out 
of absolute nothing. If we analyze early superstitions, or 
that faith in magic which was general in later times and 
even still survives among the uncultured, we find one of 
its postulates to be that by some potent spell Matter can 
be called out of nonentity, and can be made non-existent. 
If men did not believe this in the strict sense of the word 
(which would imply that the process of creation or anni- 
hilation was clearly represented in consciousness), they still 
believed that they believed it; and how nearly, in their 
confused thoughts, the one was equivalent to the other, is 
shown by their conduct. Nor, indeed, have dark ages and 
inferior minds alone betrayed this belief. The current 
theology, in its teachings respecting the beginning and 
end of the world, is clearly pervaded by it: and it may be 
even questioned whether Shakespeare, in his poetical antic- 
ipation of a time when all things shall disappear and 
"leave not a wrack behind," was n<*t under its influence. 
The gradual accumulation of experiences, however, and 
still more the organization of experiences, has tended 
slowly to reverse this conviction, until now the doctrine 
that Matter is indestructible has become a commonplace. 
All the apparent proofs that something can come out of 
nothing, a wider knowledge has one by one cancelled. The 
comet that is suddenly discovered in the heavens and 
nightly waxes larger is proved not to be a newly created 
body, but a body that was until lately beyond the range of 
vision. The cloud which in the course of a few minutes 
forms in the sky consists not of substance that has just 
begun to be, but of substance that previously existed in a 
more diffused and transparent form. And similarly with a 
crystal or precipitate in relation to the fin id depositing it. 
Conversely, the seeming annihilations of Matter turn out, 
on closer observation, to be only changes of state. It is 
found that the evaporated water, though it has become 
invisible, may be brought by condensation to its original 
shape. The discharged fowling-piece gives evidence that 
though the gunpowder has disappeared there have appeared 



FIEST PRINCIPLES. 145 

in place of it certain gases, which, in assuming a larger 
volume, have caused the explosion. Not, however, until 
the rise of quantitative chemistry could the conclusion 
suggested by such experiences be harmonized with all the 
facts. When, having ascertained not only the combina- 
tions formed by various substances, but also the propor- 
tions in which they combine, chemists were enabled to 
account for the matter that had. made" its appearance or 
become invisible, scepticism was dissipated. And of the 
general conclusion thus reached, the exact analyses daily 
made, in which the same portion of matter is pursued 
through numerous disguises and finally separated, furnish 
never-ceasing confirmations. 

Such has become the effect of this specific evidence, 
joined to that general evidence which the continued exist- 
ence of familiar objects unceasingly gives us, that the 
indestructibility of Matter is now held by many to be 
a truth of which the negation is inconceivable. 

§ 53. This last fact naturally raises the question, whether 
we have any warrant for this fundamental belief than the 
warrant of conscious induction. Before showing that we 
have a higher warrant, some explanations are needful. 

The consciousness of logical necessity is the conscious- 
ness that a certain conclusion is implicitly contained in 
certain premises explicitly stated. If, contrasting a young 
child and an adult, we see that this consciousness of logical 
necessity, absent from the one is present in the other, we 
are taught that there is a growing up to the recognition of 
certain necessary truths, merely by the unfolding of the 
inherited intellectual forms and faculties. 

To state the case more specifically: Before a truth can 
be known as necessary, two conditions must be fulfilled. 
There must be a mental structure capable of grasping the 
terms of the proposition and the relation alleged between 
them; and there must be such definite and deliberate 
mental representation of these terms, as makes possible a 
clear consciousness of this relation. Non-fulfilment of 
either condition may cause non-recognition of the necessity 
of the truth. Let us take cases. 

The savage who cannot count the fingers on one hand, 
can frame no definite thought answering to the statement 
10 



146 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

that 7 and 5 are 12; still less can he frame the conscious- 
ness that no other total is possible. 

The boy adding up figures inattentively, says to himself 
that 7 and 5 are 11 ; and may repeatedly bring out a wrong 
result by repeatedly making this error. 

Neither the non-recognition of the truth that 7 and 5 
are 12, which in the savage results from undeveloped men- 
tal structure, nor the assertion, due to the boy's careless 
mental action, that they make 11, leads us to doubt the 
necessity of the relation between these two separately 
existing numbers and the sum they make when existing 
together. Nor does failure from either cause to apprehend 
the necessity of this relation, make us hesitate to say that 
when its terms are distinctly represented in thought, its 
necessity will be seen; and that, apart from any multiplied 
experiences, this necessity becomes cognizable when struct- 
ures and functions are so far developed that groups of 7 
and 5 and 12 can be intellectually grasped. 

Manifestly, then, there is a recognition of necessary 
truths, as sueh which accompanies mental evolution. 
Along with acquirement of more complex faculty and 
more vivid imagination, there conies a power of perceiving 
to be necessary truths, what were before not recognized as 
truths at all. And there are ascending gradations in these 
recognitions. A boy who has intelligence enough I 
that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to 
one another, may be unable to see that ratios which are 
severally equal to certain other ratios that are unequal to 
each other, are themselves unequal: though to a more- 
developed mind this last axiom is no less obviously nee 
than the first. 

All this which holds of logical and mathematical truths, 
holds, with change of terms, of physical truths. There 
are necessary truths in Physics for the apprehens: 
which, also, a developed and disciplined intelligence is 
required; and before such intelligence arises, not only 
may there be failure to apprehend the necessity of them, 
but there may be vague beliefs in their contraries. Up 
to comparatively recent times, all mankind were in this 
state of incapacity with respect to physical axioms: and 
the mass of mankind are so still. Various popular notions 
betray inability to form clear ideas of forces and their re- 
lations, or carelessness in thinking, or both. EtTeets are 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 147 

expected without causes of fit kinds; or effects extremely 
disproportionate to causes are looked for; or causes are 
supposed to end without effects.* But though many are 
incapable of grasping physical axioms, it no more follows 
that physical axioms are not knowabie a priori by a de- 
veloped intelligence, than it follows that logical relations 
are not necessary, because undeveloped intellects cannot 
perceive their necessity. 

It is thus with the notions which have been current 
respecting the creation and annihilation of Matter. In 
the first place, there has been an habitual confounding of 
two radically different things — disappearance of Matter 
from that place where it was lately perceived, and passage 
of Matter from existence into non-existence. Only when 
there is reached a power of discrimination beyond that 
possessed by the uncultured, is there an avoidance of the 
confusion between vanishing from the range of perception, 
and vanishing out of space altogether; and until this con- 
fusion is avoided, the belief that Matter can be annihilated 
readily obtains currency. In the second place, the currency 
of this belief continues so long as there is not such power 
of introspection that it can be seen what happens when 
the attempt is made to annihilate Matter in thought. But 
when, during mental evolution, the vague ideas arising in a 
nervous structure imperfectly organized are replaced by 
the clear ideas arising in a definite nervous structure; this 
definite structure, moulded by experience into correspon- 
dence with external phenomena, makes necessary in thought 
the relations answering to absolute uniformities in things. 
Hence, among others, the conception of the Indestructi- 
bility of Matter. 

For careful self -analysis shows this to be a datum of 
consciousness. Conceive the space before you to be cleared 
of all bodies save one. Now imagine the remaining one 
not to be removed from its place, but to lapse into noth- 

* I knew a lady who contended that a dress folded up tightly, weighed more 
than when loosely folded up; and who, under this belief, had her trunks made 
large that she might diminish the charge for freight ! Another whom I know, 
ascribes the feeling of lightness which accompanies vigor, to actual decrease 
of weight; believes that by stepping gently she can press less upon the 
ground; and, when cross-questioned, asserts that, if placed in scales, she can 
make herself lighter by an act of will ! Various popular notions betray like 
states of mind— show, in the undisciplined, such inability to form ideas of 
forces and their relations, or such randomness in thinking, or both, as inca- 
pacitates them for grasping physical axioms, and makes them harbor numer- 
ous delusions respecting physical actions. 



148 FIRST PRIXCIPLES. 

ing while standing in that place. You fail. The space 
which was solid you cannot conceive becoming empty, 
save by transfer of that which made it solid. What is 
termed the ultimate incompressibility of Matter, is an 
admitted law of thought. However small the bulk to 
which we conceive a piece of matter reduced, it is im- 
possible to conceive it reduced into nothing. While 
we can represent to ourselves the parts of the matter as ap- 
proximated, we cannot represent to ourselves the quan- 
tity of matter as made less. To do this would be to 
imagine some of the constituent parts compressed into 
nothing; which is no more possible than to imagine com- 
pression of the whole into nothing. Onr inability to 
conceive Matter becoming non-existent is immediately 
consequent on the nature of thought. Thought consists 
in the establishment of relations. There can be no relation 
established, and therefore no thought framed, when one 
of the related terms is absent from consciousness. Hence 
it is impossible to think of something becoming nothing, 
for the same reason that it is impossible to think of 
nothing becoming something — the reason, namely, that 
nothing cannot become an object of consciousness. The 
annihilation of Matter is unthinkable for the same r 
that the creation of matter is unthinkable. 

It must be added that no experimental verification of 
the truth that Matter is indestructible, is possible without 
a tacit assumption of it. For all such verification implies 
weighing, and weighing implies that the matter forming 
the weight remains the same. In other words, the proof 
that certain matter dealt with in certain ways is nnchi 
in quantity, depends on the assumption that other mi 
otherwise dealt with, is unchanged in quantity. 

£ o4. That, however, which it most concerns us here to 
observe, is the nature of the perceptions by which the 
permanence of Matter is perpetually illustrated to us. 
These perceptions, under all their forms, amount simply 
to this — that the force which a given quantity of matter 
exercises remains always the same. This is the proof on 
which common sense and exact science alike rely. When, 
for example, an object known to have existed years since 
is said to exist still, by one who yesterday saw it, his 
tion amounts to this — that an object which in past time 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 149 

wrought on his consciousness a certain group of changes, 
still exists, because a like group of changes has been again 
wrought on his consciousness : the continuance of the potver 
thus to impress him, he holds to prove the continuance of 
the object. Even more clearly do we see that force is our 
ultimate measure of Matter, in those cases where the shape 
of the Matter has been changed. A piece of gold given to 
an artisan to be worked into an ornament, and which when 
brought back appears to be less, is placed in the scales; 
and if it balances a much smaller weight than it did in its 
rough state, we infer that much has been lost either in 
manipulation or by direct abstraction. Here the obvious 
postulate is, that the quantity of Matter is finally deter- 
minable by the quantity of gravitative force it mani- 
fests. And this is the kind of evidence on which Science 
bases its alleged induction that Matter is indestructible. 
Whenever a piece of substance lately visible and tangible, 
has been reduced to an invisible, intangible state, but is 
proved by the weight of the gas into which it has been 
transformed to be still existing; the assumption is that, 
though otherwise insensible to us, the amount of matter is 
the same if it still tends toward the Earth with the same 
force. Similarly, every case in which the weight of an 
element present in combination is inferred from the known 
weight of another element which it neutralizes, is a case 
in which the quantity of matter is expressed in terms of 
the quantity of chemical force it exerts; and in which this 
specific chemical force is assumed to be the correlative of 
a specific gravitative force. 

Thus, then, by the Indestructibility of Matter, we really 
mean the indestructibility of the force with which Matter 
affects us. As we become conscious of Matter only through 
that resistance which it opposes to our muscular energy, 
so do we become conscious of the permanence of matter 
only through the permanence of this resistance; either as 
immediately or as mediately proved to us. And this truth 
is made manifest not only by analysis of the a posteriori 
cognition, but equally so by analysis of the a priori one.* 

* Lest he should not have observed it, the reader must be warned that the 
terms "a priori truth" and "necessary truth," as used in this work, are to be 
interpreted not in the old sense, as implying cognitions wholly independent 
of experiences, but as implying cognitions that have been rendered organic 
by immense accumulations of experiences, received partly by the individual, 
but mainly by all ancestral individuals whose nervous systems he inherits. 
On referring to the "Principles of Psychology" (§§ 426 — 433), it will be seen that 



CHAPTER V. 

THE CONTINUITY OF MOTION. 

§ 55. Another general truth of the same order with 
the foregoing, must here be specified. Like the Indestruc- 
tibility of Matter, the Continuity of Motion, or, more 
strictly, of that something which has Motion for one of its 
sensible forms, is a proposition on the truth of which de- 
pends the possibility of exact Science, and therefore of a 
Philosophy which unities the results of exact Science. 
Motions, visible and invisible, of masses and of molecules, 
form the larger half of the phenomena to he interpreted j 
and if such motions might either proceed from nothing or 
lapse into nothing, there could be no scientific interpreta- 
tion of them. 

This second fundamental truth, like the first, is by no 
means self-evident to primitive men or to the uncultured 
among ourselves. Contrariwise, to undeveloped minds the 
opposite seems self-evident. The facts that a stone thrown 
up soon 1 -ending motion, and that after the blow 

its fall gives to the Earth, it remains quiescent, apparently 
prove that the principle of activity* which the stone man- 
ifested may disappear absolutely. Accepting, without 
criticism, the dicta of unaided perception, to the 
that adjacent objects put in motion soon return to rest, all 
men once believed, and most believe still, that motion can 
pass into nothing; and ordinarily d But the 

establishment of certain facts having an opposite implica- 
tion led to inquiries which have gradually proved these 
appearances to be illusive. The discovery that the planets 
revolve round the Sun with undiminishing speed, r - 
the suspicion that a moving body, when not inter 
with, will go on forever without change of velocity: and 
suggested the question whether bodies which lose their 
motion do not at the same time communicate as much 
motion to other bodies. It was a familiar fact that a 

the warrant allseed for one of tnese irreversible ultimate conviction* 
on the hypothesis of Evolution, it represents an immeasurably greater ac- 
cumulation of experience that can be acquired by any sincle individual. 

* Throughout tins chapter 1 use this phrase, not with any metaj 
meaning, "but merely to avoid foregone conclusions. 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 151 

stone would glide further over a smooth surface, such as 
ice, presenting no small objects to which it could part 
with its motion by collision, than over a surface strewn 
with such small objects ; and that a projectile would travel 
a far greater distance through a rare medium like air, than 
through a dense medium like water. Thus the primitive 
notion that moving bodies had an inherent tendency to 
lose their motion and finally stop — a notion of which the 
Greeks did not get rid, but which lasted till the time of 
Galileo — began to give way. It was further shaken by 
such experiments as those of Hooke, which proved that 
the spinning of a top continues long in proportion as it is 
prevented from communicating motion to surrounding 
matter. 

To explain specifically how modern physicists interpret 
all disappearances and diminutions of visible motion, 
would require more knowledge than I possess and more 
space than I can spare. Here it must suffice to state, 
generally, that the molar motion which disappears when a 
bell is struck by its clapper, reappears in the bell's vibra- 
tions and in the waves of air they produce; that when a 
moving mass is stopped by coming against a mass that is 
immovable, the motion which does not reappear in sound 
reappears as molecular motion ; and that, similarly, when 
bodies rub against one another, the motion lost by friction 
is gained in the motion of molecules. But one aspect of 
this general truth, as it is displayed to us in the motions 
of masses, we must carefully contemplate; for otherwise 
the doctrine of the Continuity of Motion will be entirely 
misapprehended. 

§ 56. As expressed by Newton, the first law of motion is 
that " every body must persevere in its state of rest, or of 
uniform motion in a straight line, unless it be compelled 
to change that state by forces impressed upon it." 

With this truth may be associated the truth that a body 
describing a circular orbit round a centre which detains it 
by a tractive force, moves in that orbit with undiminished 
velocity. 

The first of these abstract truths is never realized in the 
concrete, and the second of them is but approximately 
realized. Uniform motion in a straight line implies the 
absence of a resisting medium; and it further implies the 



152 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

absence of forces, gravitative or other, exercised by neigh- 
boring masses: conditions never fulfilled. So, too, the 
maintenance of a circular orbit by any celestial body im- 
plies both that there are no perturbing bodies, and that 
there is a certain exact adjustment between its velocity 
and the tractive force of its primary: neither requirement 
ever being conformed to. In all actual orbits, sensibly 
elliptical as they are, the velocity is sensibly variable. 
And along with great eccentricity there goes great varia- 
tion. 

To the case of celestial bodies which, moving in eccentric 
orbits, display at one time little motion and at another 
much motion, may be joined the case of the pendulum. 
With speed now increasing and now decreasing, the pen- 
dulum alternates between extremes at which motion c 

How shall we so conceive these allied phenomena as to 
express rightly the truth common to them? The first law 
of motion, nowhere literally fulfilled, is yet, in a - 
implied by these facts which seem at variance with it. 
Though in a circular orbit the direction of the motion is 
continually being changed, yet the velocity remains un- 
changed. Though in an elliptical orbit there is now 
acceleration and now retardation, yet the a eed is 

constant through successive revolutions. Though the 
pendulum conies to a momentary rest at the end of 
swing, and then begins a reverse motion, yet the oscilla- 
tion, considered as a whole, is continuous: friction and 
atmospheric resistance being absent, this alternation of 
states will go on forever. 

What, then, do these cases show us in common? That 
which vision familiarizes us witli in Motion, and thai 
which has thus been made the dominant element in our 
conception of Motion, is not the element of which v< 
allege continuity. If we regard Motion simply as change 
of place, then the pendulum shows us both that the rate 
of this change may vary from instant to instant, and that,- 
ceasing at intervals, it may be afresh initiated. 

But if what we may call the translation-element i: 
tion is not eon t inn cms, what is continuous? If, watching 
like Galileo a swinging chandelier, we observe, not its 
isochronism, but the recurring reversal of its swing, we 
are impressed with the fact that though, at the end of 
each swing, the translation through spa s 5, yet there 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 153 

is something which does not cease; for the translation 
recommences in the opposite direction. And on remem- 
bering that when a violent push was given to the chande- 
lier it described a larger arc, and was a longer time before 
the resistance of the air destroyed its oscillations, we are 
shown that what continues to exist during these oscillations 
is some correlative of the muscular effort which put the 
chandelier in motion. The truth forced on our attention 
by these facts and inferences, is that translation through 
space is not itself an existence; and that hence the cessation 
of Motion, considered simply as translation, is not the 
cessation of an existence, but is the cessation of a certain 
sign of an existence — a sign occurring under certain con- 
ditions. 

Still there remains a difficulty. If that element in the 
chandelier's motion of which alone we can allege conti- 
nuity, is the correlative of the muscular effort which moved 
the chandelier, what becomes of this element at either 
extreme of the oscillation? Arrest the chandelier in the 
middle of its swing, and it gives a blow to the hand — ex- 
hibits some principle of activity such as muscular effort 
can give. But touch it at either turning-point, and it 
displays no such principle of activity. This has disap- 
peared just as much as the translation through space has 
disappeared. How, then, can it be alleged that though 
the Motion through space is not continuous, the principle 
of activity implied by the Motion is continuous? 

Unquestionably the facts show that the principle of 
activity continues to exist under some form. When not 
perceptible it must be latent. How is it latent? A clew 
to the answer is gained on observing that though the 
chandelier, when seized at the turning-point of its swing, 
gives no impact in the direction of its late movement, it 
forthwith begins to pull in the opposite direction; and on 
observing, further, that its pull is great when the swing 
has been made extensive by a violent push. Hence the 
loss of visible activity at the highest point of the upward 
motion, is accompanied by the production of an invisible 
activity which generates the subsequent motion downwards. 
To conceive this latent activity gained as an existence 
equal to the perceptible activity lost, is not easy; but we 
may help ourselves so to conceive it by considering cases of 
another class. 



154 • FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

§ 57. When one who pushes against a door that has 
stuck fast produces by great effort no motion, but eventu- 
ally by a little greater elTort bursts the door open, swinging 
it back against the Avail and tumbling headlong into the 
room; he has evidence that a certain muscular strain 
which did not produce translation of matter through 
space, was yet equivalent to a certain amount of such 
translation. Again, when a railway-porter gradually stops 
a detached carriage by pulling at the butter, he shows us 
that (supposing friction, etc., absent) the slowly dimin- 
ished motion of the carriage over a certain space is the 
equivalent of the constant backward strain put upon the 
carriage while it is travelling through that space. Carry- 
ing with us the conception thus reached, we will now 
consider a case which makes it more definite. 

When used as a plaything by boys, a ball fastened to the 
end of an india-rubber string yields a clear idea of the 
correlation between perceptible activity and latent activity. 
If, retaining one end of the string, a boy throws the ball 
from him horizontally, its motion is resisted by the in- 
creasing strain on the string; and the string, Btretched 
more and more as the ball recedes, presently brings it to 
rest. Where now exists the principle oi activity which the 
moving ball displayed? It exists in the strained thread 
of india-rubber. Under what form of changed molecular 
it exists we Deed not ask. It surlices that the string 
is the seat of a tension generated by the motion of the ball, 
ami equivalent to it. When the ball has been an 
the stretched string begins to generate in it an opposite 
motion; and continues to accelerate that motion until the 
ball comes back to the point at which the stretching of the 
string commenced — a point at which, but 1'or loss by at- 
mospheric resistance and molecular redistribution, its 
velocity would he equal to the original velocity. Here the 
truth that the principle of activity, alternating between 
visible and invisible modes, does not a 
the translation through space i exist, is readily 

comprehensible; and it becomes easy to understand the 
corollary that at each point in the path of the ball the 
quantity of its perceptible activity, plus the quantity 
which is latent in the stretched string, yield a constant 
sum. 

Aided by this illustration we can, in a general way, con- 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 155 

ceive what happens between bodies connected with one 
another, not by a stretched string, but by a traction exer- 
cised through what seems empty space. It matters not to 
our general conception that the intensity of this traction 
varies in a totally different manner: decreasing as the 
square of the distance increases, but being practically con- 
stant for terrestrial distances. These differences being 
recognized, there is nevertheless to be recognized a truth 
common to both cases. The weight of something held in 
the hand shows that there exists between one body in space 
and another, a strain: this downward pull, ascribed to 
gravity, affects the hand as it might be affected by a 
stretched elastic string. Hence, when a body projected 
upward, and gradually retarded by gravity, finally stops, 
we must regard the principle of activity manifested during 
its upward motion, but disappearing at its turning-point, 
as having become latent in the strain between it and the 
Earth — a strain of which the quantity is to be conceived as 
the product of its intensity and the distance through 
which it acts. Carrying a step further our illustration of 
the stretched string, will elucidate this. To simulate the 
action of gravity at terrestrial distances, let us imagine 
that when the attached moving body has stretched the 
elastic string to its limit, say at the distance of ten feet, 
a second like string could instantly be tied to the end of 
the first and to the body, which, continuing its course, 
stretched this second string to an equal length, and so on 
with a succession of such strings, till the body was arrested. 
Then, manifestly, the quantity of the principle of activity 
which the moving body had displayed, but which has now 
become latent in the series of stretched strings, is' meas- 
ured by the number of such strings similarly stretched — 
the number of feet through which this constant strain has 
been encountered, and over which it still extends. Now 
though we cannot conceive the tractive force of gravity to 
be exercised in a like way — though the gravitative action, 
utterly unknown in nature, is probably a resultant of 
actions pervading the ethereal medium; yet the above 
analogy suggests the belief that the principle of activity 
in a moving body arrested by gravity has not ceased to 
exist, but has become so much imperceptible or latent 
activity in the medium occupying space, and that when 
the body falls, this is re-transformed into its equivalent of 



156 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

perceptible activity. If we conceive the process at all, we 
must conceive it thus: otherwise, we have to conceive that 
a power is changed into a space-relation, and this is incon- 
ceivable. 

Here, then, is the solution of the difficulty. The space- 
element of Motion is not in itself a thing. Change of 
position is not an existence, but the manifestation of an 
existence. This existence may cease to display itself as 
translation; but it can do so only by displaying itself as 
strain. And this principle of activity, now shown by 
translation, now by strain, and often by the two together, 
is alone that which in Motion we can call continuous. 

§ 58. What is this principle of activity? Vision gives 
us no idea of it. If by a mirror we cast the image of an 
illuminated object on to a dark wall, and then suddenly 
changing the attitude of the mirror, make the reflected 
image pass from side to side, the image, if recognized as 
such, does not raise the thought that there is present in it 
a principle of activity. Before we can conceive the pres- 
ence of this, we must regard the impression yielded through 
our eyes as symbolizing something tangible — something 
which offers resistance. Hence the principle of activity, 
as known by sight, is inferential: visible translation sug- 
gests by association the presence of a principle "f activity 
which would be appreciable by our skin and muscles did 
we lay hold of the body. Evidently, then, this principle 
of activity which Motion Bhowa us is the objective correl- 
ative of our subjective sense of effort. By pushing and 
pulling we get feelings which, generalized and abstracted, 
yield our ideas of resistance and tension. Now displayed 
by changing position and now by unchanging strain, this 
principle of activity is ultimately conceived by us under 
the single form of its equivalent muscular effort. So that 
the continuity of Motion, as well as the indestructibility 
of Matter, is really known to us in terms of Force. 

£ 59. And now we reach the essential truth to be here 
especially noted. All proofs of the Continuity of Motion 
involve the postulate that the quantity of force is constant. 
Observe what results when we analyze the reasoning 
which the Continuity of Motion, as here understo 
shown. 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 157 

A particular planet can be identified only by its constant 
power to affect our visual organs in a special way. Fur- 
ther, such planet has not been seen to move by the astro- 
nomical observer; but its motion is inferred from a com- 
parison of its present position with the position it before 
occupied. If rigorously examined, this comparison proves 
to be a comparison between the different impressions pro- 
duced on him by the different adjustments of his observ- 
ing instruments. And, manifestly, the validity of all the 
inferences drawn from these likenesses and unlikenesses 
depends on the truth of the assumption that these masses 
of matter, celestial and terrestrial, will continue to affect 
his senses in exactly the same ways under the same condi- 
tions; and that no changes in their powers of affecting 
him can have arisen without force having been expended 
in working those changes. Going a step further back, it 
turns out that difference in the adjustment of his observ- 
ing instrument, and by implication in the planet, is 
meaningless until shown to correspond with a certain cal- 
culated position which the planet must occupy, supposing 
that no motion has been lost. And if, finally, we examine 
the implied calculation, we find that it takes into account 
those accelerations and retardations which elliptic! ty of 
the orbit involves, as well as those variations of velocity 
caused by adjacent planets — we find, that is, that the mo- 
tion is concluded to be indestructible not from the uniform 
velocity of the planet, but from the constant quantity of 
motion exhibited when allowance is made for the motion 
communicated to, or received from, other celestial bodies. 
And when we ask how this communicated motion is esti- 
mated, we discover that the estimate is based on certain 
laws of force ; which laws, one and all, embody the postu- 
late that force cannot be destroyed. Without the axiom 
that action and reaction are equal and opposite, astron- 
omy could not make its exact predictions. 

Similarly with the a priori conclusion that Motion is 
continuous. That which defies suppression in thought, is 
really the force which the motion indicates. We can imag- 
ine retardation to result from the action of external bodies. 
But to imagine this, is not possible without imagining ab- 
straction of the force implied by the motion. We are obliged 
to conceive this force as impressed in the shape of reaction 
on the bodies that cause the arrest. And the motion com- 



158 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

municated to them, we are compelled to regard, not as 
directly communicated, but as a product of the communi- 
cated force. We can mentally diminish the velocity or 
space-element of motion, by diffusing the momentum or 
force-element over a larger mass of matter; but the quan- 
tity of this force-element, which we regard as the cause of 
the motion, is unchangeable in thought.* 



CHAPTER VI. 

THE PERSISTENCE OF FORCE. \ 

§ GO. In the foregoing two chapters, maifestations of 
force of two fundamentally-different classes have been dealt 
with — the force by which matter demonstrates itself to us 
as existing, ami the force by which it demonstrates itself 
to us as acting. 

Body is distinguishable from space by its power of affect- 
ing our Benses, and, in the last resort, by its opposition to 
our efforts. We can cone \w of body only by joining in 
thought extension and resistance: take away resit 

* It is needful t<> stat" that this exposition differs in its point of view from 
the expositions ordinarily Riven; ana thai ■ words en 

as strain, have somewhat larger implications. Unable to learn anything 
about the nature of Faroe, physicista bare, of Ian mulated ulti- 

mate physical truths in such ways as often tacitly to exclude U 
bees of Porce: conceiving cause, as Hume proposed, in terms of antec 
and sequence only. "Potential energy," for example, i> defined as 
tuted by such relations in space as permil 
certain motions, but as being in Itself nothing;. while this m 
ceiving the phenomena suffices for physical inquiries, it >'. Hce for 

the purposes of philosophy, after referring to the "Prii 
ogy, *=; 847—850, the reader will understand what 1 mean I ..; since 

our ideas of Body, spare. Motion, are derived from our oscular 

tension, which are the ultimate symbols into which all our other 
symbols are interpretable. to formulate phenomena in the proximate I 
Body, Space. Motion, while dis 
oi i\ rie, is to acknowledge the superstructure while Ignoring the foui 

t Some explanation of this title seems needful. In the text Itself ar 
the reasons for using the word " !' ■ : and 

here 1 must say why 1 think "p 

Some two years ago (this was written in Ifl to my friend 

Professor Huxley my dissatisfaction with the (then) current expression— 
"Conservation of Force:" assigning as reasons, tirst. that the 
Bervation" implies a oonserver anil an a> cond, that it 

does not imply the existence of the force before the particular man if < 
of it which is contemplated. And I may now add, as a further fault, the 
tacit assumption that, without some act of conservation, foree would dis- 
appear. All these implications are at variance with the conception to be 
conveyed. In place of "conservation" Prof. Huxle. 

This meets most of the objections, and though it i j uhst it 

that it does not directly imply pre existence of the force at any time mani- 
fested, yet no other word less faulty in this respect can be found. In the 
absence of a word specially coined for the purpose, it seems the best : and as 
such I adopt it. 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 159 

and there remains only space. In what way this force 
which produces space-occupancy is conditioned we do not 
know. The mode of force which is revealed to us only by 
opposition to our own powers, may be in essence the same 
with the mode of force which reveals itself by the changes 
it initiates in our consciousness. That the space a body 
occupies is in part determined by the degree of that activ- 
ity possessed by its molecules which we call heat, is a 
familiar truth. Moreover, we know that such molecular 
re-arrangement as occurs in the change of water into ice, 
is accompanied by an evolution of force which may burst 
the containing vessel and give motion to the fragments. 
Nevertheless, the forms of our experience oblige us to dis- 
tinguish between two modes of force; the one not a worker 
of change and the other a worker of change, actual or 
potential. The first of these — the space-occupying kind 
of force — has no specific name. 

For the second kind of force, distinguishable as that by 
which change is either being caused or will be caused if 
counterbalancing forces are overcome, the specific name 
now accepted is "Energy." That which in the last chap- 
ter was spoken of as perceptible activity, is called by phys- 
icists, " actual energy ;" and that which was called latent 
activity, is called ' k potential energy." While including 
the mode of activity shown in molar motion, Energy in- 
cludes also the several modes of activity into which molar 
motion is transformable — heat, light, etc. It is the com- 
mon name for the power shown alike in the movements 
of masses and in the movements of molecules. To our 
perceptions this second kind of force differs from the first 
kind as being not intrinsic but extrinsic. 

In aggregated matter as presented to sight and touch, 
this antithesis is, as above implied, much obscured. Es- 
pecially in a compound substance, both the potential energy 
locked up in the chemically-combined molecules, and the 
actual energy made perceptible to us as heat, complicate 
the manifestations of intrinsic force by the manifestations 
of extrinsic force. But the antithesis here partially hid- 
den, is clearly seen on reducing the data to their lowest 
terms — a unit of matter, or atom, and its motion. The 
force by which it exists is passive but independent; while 
the force by which it moves is active but dependent on its 
past and present relations to other atoms. These two can- 



160 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

not be identified in our thoughts. For as it is impossible 
to think of motion without something that moves; so it is 
impossible to think of energy without something possessing 
the energy. 

While recognizing this fundamental distinction between 
that intrinsic force by which body manifests itself as occu- 
pying space, and that extrinsic force distinguished as 
energy, I here treat of them together as being alike per- 
sistent. And I thus treat of them together partly for the 
reason that, in our consciousness of them, there is the same 
essential element. The sense of effort is our subjective 
symbol for objective force in general, passive and active. 
Power of neutralizing that which we know as our own 
muscular strain, is the ultimate element in our idea of body 
as distinguished from space; and any energy which n 
give to body, or receive from it, is thought of as equal to 
a certain amount of muscular strain. The two i 
nesses differ essentially in this, that th< .; of effort 

common to the two is in the lasi , with con- 

sciousness of change of position, but in t 

There is, however, a further and more important r 
for here dealing with the truth thi under each of 

these forms persists. We have to examine its warrant. 

§ 61. At the risk of trying the reader's patienci 
must reconsider the reasoning through which the inde- 
structibility of Matter and the continuity of Motion are 
established, that we may sec how impossible it is to arrive 
by parallel reasoning at the Persistence i 

In all three cases the question is one of quantity: does 
the Matter, or Motion, or Force, ever diminish in quantity? 
Quantitative science implies measurement; and measure- 
ment implies a unit of measure. The units of measure 

* In respect to the fundamental distinction here made between th 
occupying kind of force, sad the kind of force shown In 
activity, I am, as in the last chat 

friends. They do "ox admit that the concept: .in the 

conception of a unit of matter. From th 

ever, Matter, in all its properties, is the unknown cause of the 
produces in us; of which the one which remains when all - are ab- 

sent, is resistance of our efforts incewe are 

the equivalei muscular force it opposes. In i: unit of 

matter we may not ignore this symbol, by which al 
be figured in thought as an existence, it is not allowable 
there remained a conception of an existence when that conception has been 
eviscerated— deprived of the element of thought by which it is distinguished 
from empty space. Invest the conceived unit of matter of the object . 
relate to our subjective sense of effort, and the entire fabric of physical con- 
ceptions disappears. 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 161 

from which all others of any exactness are derived, are 
units of linear extension. Our units of linear extension 
are the lengths of masses of matter, or the spaces between 
marks made on the masses ; and we assume these lengths, 
or these spaces between marks, to remain unchanged while 
the temperature is unchanged. From the standard meas- 
ure preserved at Westminster, are derived the measures for 
trigonometrical surveys, for geodesy, the measurement of 
terrestrial arcs, and the calculations of astronomical dis- 
tances, dimensions, etc., and therefore for Astronomy at 
large. Were these units of length, original and derived, 
irregularly variable, there could be no celestial dynamics; 
nor any of that verification yielded by it of the constancy 
of the celestial masses or of their energies. Hence, per- 
sistence of the space-occupying species of force cannot be 
proved; for the reason that it is tacitly assumed in every 
experiment or observation by which it is proposed to prove 
it. The like holds of the force distinguished as energy. 
The endeavor to establish this by measurement, takes for 
granted both the persistence of the intrinsic force by which 
body manifests itself as existing and the persistence of the 
extrinsic force by which body acts. For it is from these 
equal units of linear extension, through the medium of 
the equal-armed lever or scales, that we derive our equal 
units of weight, or gravitative force ; and only by means 
of these can we make those quantitative comparisons by 
which the truths of exact science are reached. Through- 
out the investigations leading the chemist to the conclusion 
that of the carbon which has disappeared during combus- 
tion, no portion has been lost, what is his repeatedly 
assigned proof? That afforded by the scales. In what 
terms is the verdict of the scales given? In grains — in 
units of weight — in units of gravitative force. And what 
is the total content of the verdict? That as many units 
of gravitative force as the carbon exhibited at first, it ex- 
hibits still. The validity of the inference, then, depends 
entirely upon the constancy of the units of force. If the 
force with which the portion of metal called a grain- 
weight, tends toward the Earth, has varied, the inference 
that matter is indestructible is vicious. Everything turns 
on the truth of the assumption that the gravitation of the 
weights is persistent; and of this no proof is assigned, or 
can be assigned. In the reasonings of the astronomer 
11 



162 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

there is a like implication ; from which we may draw the 
like conclusion, ^so problem in celestial physics caa be 
solved without the assumption of some unit of force. This 
unit need not be, like a pound or a ton, one of which we 
can take direct cognizance. It is requisite only that the 
mutual attraction which some two of the bodies concerned 
exercise at a given distance, should be taken as one; so 
that the other attractions with which the problem deals 
may be expressed in terms of this one. Such unit being 
assumed, the motions which the respective masses will gen- 
erate in each other in a given time are calculated; and 
compounding these with the motions they already have, 
their places at the end of that time are predicted. The 
prediction is verified by observation. From this, either 
of two inferences may be drawn. Assuming tin- 
be unchanged, their energies, actual and potential, may 
be proved to be undiminished; or be their ei. 

to be undiminished, the masses may he proved unchai _ 
But the validity of cue ot other inference depend swholly 
on the truth of the assumption that the unit i 
unchanged. Let it be suppost ! that the gravitation of 
the two bodies toward each other at the given distance 
lias varied, and the conclusions drawn are no longer true. 
Nor is it only in their concrete data that the reasonings 
terrestrial and celestial physics assume the ace of 

Force. The equality of action and reaction is taken for 
granted from beginning to end of eitl 
to assert that action and reaction are equal and 
is to assert that Force is persistent. The allegation really 
amounts to this, that there cannot be an isolated 
beginning and ending in nothing; but t force 

manifested, implies an equal a: I force from which 

it is derived, and against which it is a reaction. 

We might indeed be certain, even in the absence of any 
such analysis as the foregoing, that there must exist 
principle which, as being the basis of science, cannot be 
established by science. All reasoned-out conclusions what- 
ever must rest on some postulate. As before shown i § 
we cannot go on merging derivative truths in th 
and wider truths from which they are derived, without 
reaching at last a widest truth which can be merged in no 
other, or derived from no other. And whoever contem- 
plates the relation in which it stands to the truths of 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 163 

science in general, will see that this truth transcending 
demonstration is the Persistence of Force. 

§ 62. But now what is the force of which we predicate 
persistence? It is not the force we are immediately con- 
scious of in our own muscular efforts ; for this does not 
persist. As soon as an outstretched limb is relaxed, the 
sense of tension disappears. True, we assert that in the 
stone thrown, or in the weight lifted, is exhibited the 
effect of this muscular tension ; and that the force which 
has ceased to be present in our consciousness exists else- 
where. But it does not exist elsewhere under any form 
cognizable by us. In § 18 we saw that though, on raising 
an object from the ground, we are obliged to think of its 
downward pull as equal ^nd opposite to our upward pull; 
and though it is impossible to represent these as equal 
without representing them as like in kind; yet, since their 
likeness in kind would imply in the object a sensation of 
muscular tension, which cannot be ascribed to it, we are 
compelled to admit that force as it exists out of our con- 
sciousness is not force as we know it. Hence the force of 
which we assert persistence is that Absolute Force of which 
we are indefinitely conscious, as the necessary correlate of 
the force we know. By the Persistence of Force, we really 
mean the persistence of some Cause whicn transcends our 
knowledge and conception. In asserting it we assert an 
Unconditioned Beality, without beginning or end. 

Thus, quite unexpectedly, we come down once more to 
that ultimate truth in which, as we saw, Religion and Sci- 
ence coalesce. On examining the data underlying a rational 
Theory of Things, we find them all at last resolvable into 
that datum without which consciousness was shown to be 
impossible — the continued existence of an Unknowable as 
the necessary correlative of the Knowable. 

The sole truth which transcends experience by underly- 
ing it, is thus the Persistence of Force. This being the 
basis of experience, must be the basis of any scientific 
organization of experiences. To this an ultimate analysis 
brings us down; and on this a rational synthesis must 
build up. 



CHAPTER VII. 

THE PERSISTENCE OF RELATIONS AMONG FORCE-. 

§ 63. The first deduction to be drawn from the ultimate 
universal truth that force persists, is that the reli 
among forces persist. Supposing a given manifestation of 
force, under a given form and given conditions, be cither 
preceded by or succeeded by some other manifestation, it 
must, in all cases where the form and conditions are the 
same, be preceded by or succeeded by sueh other manifes- 
tation. Every antecedent mode of the Unknowable must 
have an invariable connection, quantitative and qualita- 
tive, with that mode of the Unknowable which we call its 
6onsequent. 

For to say otherwise is to deny the persistence of force. 
If in any two eases there is exact Life I only between 

those mosi conspicuous antecedents which we distinguish 
as the causes, but also between those accompanying ante- 
cedents which we call the conditions, we cannot affirm 
that the effects will differ, without affirming either that 
some force bas come into existence or that BOme force has 
ceased t<> exist. If the cooperative forces in the 01 
are equal to those in the other, each t<> each, in distribu- 
tion and amount; then it is imp i conceive the 
product of their joint action in the one case as unlike that 
in the other, without conceiving one or more of the I 
to have increased or diminished in quantity; and this is 
conceiving that force is not persistent. 

To impress the truth here enunciated under its most 
abstract form, some illustrations will be desirable. 

§ 64. Eet two equal bullets be projected with equal 
forces; then, in equal times, equal distances must be trav- 
elled by them. The assertion that one of them will 
describe an assigned space sooner than the other, t: 
their initial momenta were alike and they have been equally 
resisted (for if they are unequally resisted the antecedents 
differ) is an assertion that equal quantities of force have 
not done equal amounts of work; and this cannot be 






FIRST PRINCIPLES. 165 

thought without thinking that some force has disappeared 
into nothing or arisen out of nothing. Assume, further, 
that during its flight, one of them has been drawn by the 
Earth a certain number of inches out of its original line of 
movement; then the other, which has moved the same 
distance in the same time, must have fallen just as far 
toward the Earth. No other result can be imagined with- 
out imagining that equal attractions acting for equal 
times, have produced unequal effects; which involves the 
inconceivable proposition that some action has been created 
or annihilated. Again, one of the bullets having pene- 
trated the target to a certain depth, penetration by the 
other bullet to a smaller depth, unless caused by altered 
shape of the bullet or greater local density in the target, 
cannot be mentally represented. Such a modification of 
the consequents without modification of the antecedents, 
is thinkable only through the impossible thought that 
something has become nothing or nothing has become 
something. 

It is thus not with sequences only, but also with simul- 
taneous changes and permanent co- existences. Given 
charges of powder alike in quantity and quality, fired 
from barrels of the same structure, and propelling bullets 
of equal weight, sizes, and forms, similarly rammed down ; 
and it is a necessary inference that the concomitant actions 
which make up the explosion will bear to one another 
like relation of quantity and quality in the two cases. The- 
proportions among the different products of combustion 
will be equal. The several amounts of force taken up in 
giving momentum to the bullet, heat to the gases, and 
sound on their escape, will preserve the same ratios. The 
quantities of light and smoke in the one case will be what 
they are in the other ; and the two recoils will be alike. 
For no difference of proportion, or no difference of rela- 
tion, among these concurrent phenomena can be imagined 
as arising, without imagining such difference of proportion 
or relation as arising uncaused — as arising by the creation or 
annihilation of force. 

That which here holds between two cases must hold 
among any number of cases; and that which here holds 
between antecedents and consequents that are compara- 
tively simple, must hold however involved the antecedents 
become and however involved the consequents become. 



166 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

§ 65. Thus what we call uniformity of law, resolvable 
as we find it into the persistence of relations among forces, 
is an immediate corollary from the persistence of force. 
The general conclusion that there exist constant connec- 
tions among phenomena, ordinarily regarded as an induc- 
tive conclusion only, is really a conclusion deducible from 
the ultimate datum of consciousness. Though, in saying 
this, we seem to be illegitimately inferring that what is 
true of the ego is also true of the rum-ego; yet here this 
inference is legitimate. For that which we thus predicate 
as holding in common of ego and non-ego, is that which 
they have in common as being both exist. .. -. T: ■ 
tion of an existence beyond consciousness, is itself an 
a*ssertion that there is something beyond eonscionsnesB 
which persists; for persistence is nothing more than con- 
tinued existence, and existence cannot be thought of as 
other than continued. And we cannot assert persistence 
of this something beyond consciousness, without at 
ing that the relations among its manifestations are per- 
sistent. 

That uniformity of law thus follows inevitably from 
the persistence of force, will become more and more clear 
as we advance. The next chapter will indirectly supply 
abundant illustrations of it. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

THE TRANSFORMATION AND EQUIVALENCE OF FOR' 

§ 60. When, to the unaided senses, Science began to add 
supplementary senses in the shape of measuring instru- 
ments, men began to perceive various phenomena which 
eyes and fingers could not distinguish. Of known forms 
of force, minuter manifestations became appreciable; and 
forms of force before unknown were rendered cognizable 
and measurable. Where forces had apparently ended in 
nothing, and had been carelessly supposed to have actu- 
ally done so, instrumental observation proved that effects 
had in every instance been produced: the forces reappear- 
ing in new shapes. Hence there has at length arisen the 
inquiry whether the force displayed in each surrounding 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 167 

change does not in the act of expenditure undergo meta- 
morphosis into an equivalent amount of some other force 
or forces. And to this inquiry experiment is giving an 
affirmative answer, which becomes daily more decisive. 
Meyer, Joule, Grove and Helmholtz are more than any 
others to be credited with the clear enunciation of this 
doctrine. Let us glance at the evidence on which it rests. 
Motion, wherever we can directly trace its genesis, we 
find to pre-exist as some other mode of force. Our own 
voluntary acts have always certain sensations of muscular 
tension as their antecedents. When, as in letting fall a 
relaxed limb, we are conscious of a bodily movement re- 
quiring no effort, the explanation is that the effort was 
exerted in raising the limb to the position whence it fell. 
In this case, as in the case of an inanimate body descending 
to the Earth, the force accumulated by the downward mo- 
tion is ju«t equal to the force previously expended in the 
act of elevation. Conversely, Motion that is arrested 
produces, under different circumstances, heat, electricity, 
magnetism, light. From the warming of the hands by 
rubbing them together, up to the ignition of a railway- 
brake by intense friction — from the lighting of detonating 
powder by percussion, up to the setting on fire a block of 
wood by a few blows from a steam-hammer; we have abun- 
dant instances in which heat arises as Motion ceases. It 
is uniformly found that the heat generated is great in 
proportion as the Motion lost is great; and that to dimin- 
ish the arrest of Motion, by diminishing the friction, is 
to diminish the quantity of heat evolved. The produc- 
tion of electricity by Motion is illustrated equally in the 
boy's experiment with rubbed sealing-wax, in the common 
electrical machine, and in the apparatus for exciting elec- 
tricity by the escape of steam. Wherever there is friction 
between heterogeneous bodies, electrical disturbance is one 
of the consequences. Magnetism may result from Motion 
either immediately, as through percussion on iron, or me- 
diately as through electric currents previously generated 
by Motion. And similarly, Motion may create light; 
either directly, as in the minute incandescent fragments 
struck off by violent collisions, or indirectly, as through 
the electric spark. " Lastly, Motion may be again repro- 
duced by the forces which have emanated from Motion ; 
thus, the divergence of the electrometer, the revolution of 



168 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

the electric wheel, the deflection of the magnetic needle, 
are, when resulting from frictional electricity, palpable 
movements reproduced by the intermediate modes of force 
which have themselves been originated by motion." 

That mode of force which we distinguish as Heat is now 
generally regarded by physicists as molecular motion — not 
motion as displayed in the changed relations of sensible 
masses to each other, but as occurring among the units of 
which such sensible m; sist If we cease to think 

of Heat as that particular sensation given to us by bodies 
in certain conditions, and consider the phenomena other- 
wise presented by these bodi find that motion, either 
in them or in surrounding bodies, or in both, is all that 
we have evidence of. With one or two exceptions which 
are obstacles to every theory of Heat, heated I [pand ; 
and expansion can be interpreted only as a movement of 
the units of a mass in relation to each other. Tl 
called radiation through which anything of higher tem- 
perature than things around it communicates Heat to 
them, i- dearly a - :;. Moreover, the 
dence afforded by the thermometer that Heat thus diffuses 
itself, is simply a niovement caused in the mercurial col- 
umn. And that the molecular motion which we call Heat 
may be transformed into visible motion, familiar proof is 
given by the steam-engine; in which " the nd all 
Dcomitant masses oi matter are moved by the molec- 
ular dilatation of the vapor of water." Where li 
absorbed without apparent result, modern inquiries 
that decided though unobtrusii duced: as 
on glass, the molecular state of which i- BO far I I 
heat, that a polarized ray of light it be- 
comes visible, which it does not do when the gi; 38 if 
or as on polished metallic surfaces, which are so far el 
in structure by thermal radiations from objects verj 
to them, as to retain permanent impressions of Buch ob- 
The transformation of Heat into electricity occurs 
when dissimilar metals touching each other are heated at 
the point of contact: electric currents being so ind 
Solid, incombustible matter introduced into h< 
as lime into the oxv-hydrogen flame, becomes incandee 
and so exhibits the conversion of Heat into light. The 
production of magnetism by Heat, if it cannot be proved 
to take place directly, may be proved to take place indi- 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 169 

rectly through the medium of electricity. And through 
the same medium may be established the correlation of 
Heat and chemical affinity — a correlation -which is indeed 
implied by the marked influence that Heat exercises on 
chemical composition and decomposition. 

The transformation of Electricity into other modes of 
force are still more clearly demonstrable. Produced by 
the motion of heterogeneous bodies in contact, Electricity, 
through attractions and repulsions, will immediately re- 
produce motion in neighboring bodies. Now a current of 
Electricity generates magnetism in a bar of soft iron ; and 
now the rotation of a permanent magnet generates currents 
of Electricity. Here w r e have a battery in which from the 
play of chemical affinities an electric current results; and 
there, in the adjacent cell, we have an electric current 
effecting chemical decomposition. In the conducting wire 
we witness the transformation of Electricity into heat; 
while in electric sparks and in the voltaic arc w-e see light 
produced. Atomic arrangement, too, is changed by Elec- 
tricity: as instance the transfer of matter from pole to 
pole of a battery; the fractures caused by the disruptive 
discharge; the formation of crystals under the influence 
of electric currents. And whether, conversely, Electricity 
be or be not directly generated by re-arrangement of the 
atoms of matter, it is at any rate indirectly so generated 
through the intermediation of magnetism. 

How from Magnetism the other physical forces result, 
must be next briefly noted — briefly, because in each suc- 
cessive case the illustrations become in great part the 
obverse forms of those before given. That Magnetism pro- 
duces motion is the ordinary evidence we have of its exist- 
ence. In the magneto-electric machine we see a rotating 
magnet evolving electricity. And the electricity so evolved 
may immediately after exhibit itself as heat, light, or 
chemical affinity. Faraday's discovery of the effect of 
Magnetism on polarized light, as w r ell as the discovery that 
change of magnetic state is accompanied by heat, point to 
further like connections. Lastly, various experiments 
show that the magnetization of a body alters its internal 
structure; and that, conversely, the alteration of its inter- 
nal structure, as by mechanical strain, alters its magnetic 
.condition. 

Improbable as it seemed, it is now proved that from 



170 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

Light also may proceed the like variety of agencies. The 
solar rays change the atomic arrangements of particular 
crystals. Certain mixed gases, which do not otherwise 
combine, combine in the sunshine. In some compounds 
Light produces decomposition. Since the inquiries of 
photographers have drawn attention to the subject, it has 
been shown that " a vast number of substances, both ele- 
mentary and compound, are notably affected by this agent, 
even those apparently the most unalterable in character, 
such as metals." And when a daguerreotype plate is con- 
nected with a proper apparatus " we get chemical action 
on the plate, electricity circulating through the wires, 
magnetism in the coil, heat in the helix, and motion in 
the needles." 

The genesis of all other modes of force from Chemical 
Action scarcely needs pointing out. The ordinary accom- 
paniment of chemical combination is heat; and when the 
affinities art- intense, light also is, under fit conditions, 
produced. Chemical changes involving alteration of bulk 
cause motion, both in the combining elements and in ad- 
jacent masses of matter: witness the propulsion of a bullet 
by the explosion of gunpowder. In the galvanic battery 
we see electricity resulting from chemical composition and 
decomposition. While through the medium of this elec- 
tricity, Chemical Action produces magnetism. 

These facts, the larger part of which are culled from 
Mr. Grove's work on u The Correlation of Physical Foi 
show as that each force is transformable, directly or indi- 
rectly, into the others. In every change Force undi 
metamorphosis ; and from the new form or forms it assumes, 
may subsequently result either the previous one or any of 
the rest, in endless variety of order and combination. It is 
further becoming manifest that the physical forces stand 
not simply in qualitative correlations with each other, but 
also in quantitative correlations. Besides proving that 
one mode of force may be transformed into another mode, 
experiments illustrate the truth that from a definite amount 
of one, definite amounts of others always arise. Ordinarily 
it is indeed diffcult to show this; since it mostly happens 
that the transformation of any force is not into some one 
of the rest but into several of them: the proportions being 
determined by the ever-varying conditions. But in cer- 
tain cases, positive results have been reached. Mr. Joule 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 171 

has ascertained that the fall of 772 lbs. through one foot, 
will raise the temperature of a pound of water one degree 
of Fahrenheit. The investigations of Dulong, Petit, and 
Neumann have proved a relation in amount between the 
affinities of combining bodies and the heat evolved during 
their combination. Between chemical action and voltaic 
electricity, a quantitative connection has also been estab- 
lished: Faraday's experiments implying that a specific 
measure of electricity is disengaged by a given measure of 
chemical action. The well-determined relations between 
the quantities of heat generated and water turned into 
steam, or still better the known expansion produced in 
steam by each additional degree of heat, may be cited in 
further evidence. Whence it is no longer doubted that 
among the several forms which force assumes, the quanti- 
tative relations are fixed. The conclusion tacitly agreed 
on by physicists is, not only that the physical forces un- 
dergo metamorphoses, but that a certain amount of each 
is the constant equivalent of certain amounts of the others. 

§ 67. Everywhere throughout the Cosmos this truth must 
invariably hold. Every successive change, or group of 
changes, going on in it, must be due to forces affiliable on 
the like or unlike forces previously existing; while from 
the forces exhibited in such change or changes must be 
derived others more or less transformed. And besides 
recognizing this necessary linking of the forces at any 
time manifested, with those preceding and succeeding 
them, we must recognize the amounts of these forces as 
determinate — as necessarily producing such and such quan- 
tities of results, and as necessarily limited to those quan- 
tities. 

That unification of knowledge which is the business of 
Philosophy is but little furthered by the establishment of 
this truth under its general form. We must trace it out 
under its leading special forms. Changes, and the accom- 
panying transformations of forces, are everywhere in prog- 
ress, from the movements of stars to the currents of our 
thoughts; and to comprehend, in any adequate way, the 
meaning of the great fact that forces, unceasingly meta- 
morphosed, are nowhere increased or decreased, it is requi- 
site for us to contemplate the various orders of changes 
going on around, for the purpose of ascertaining whence 



172 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

arise the forces they imply and what becomes of these 
forces. Of course if answerable at all, these questions can 
be answered only in the rudest way. We cannot hope to 
establish equivalence among the successive manifestations 
of force. The most we can hope is to establish a qualita- 
tive correlation that is indefinitely quantitative — quanti- 
tative to the extent of involving something like a due 
proportion between causes and effects. 

Let us, with the view of trying to do this, consider in 
succession the several classes of phenomena which the sev- 
eral concrete sciences deal with. 

§ G8. The antecedents of those forces which our Solar 
System displays, belong to a past of which we can never 
have anything but inferential knowledge; and at present 
we cannot be said to have even this. Numerous and strong 
as are the reasons for believing the Nebular Hypothesis, 
we cannot jet regard it as more than an hypothesis. If, 
however, we assume that the matter composing the 8 
System once existed in a diffused state, we have, in the 
gravitation of its parts, a force adequate to produce the 
motions now going on. 

Classes of precipitated nebulous matter, moving toward 
their common centre of gravity through the resisting me- 
dium from which they were precipitated, will inevitably 
cause a general rotation, increasing in rapidity as the con- 
centration progress - So far as the evidence carries us, 
we perceive some quantitative relation between the motions 
so generated and the gravitative forces expended in gener- 
ating them. The planets formed from that matter which 
has travelled the shortest distance toward the common cen- 
tre of gravity, have the smallest velocities. Doubtless this 
is explicable on the teleological hypothesis: since it is a 
condition to equilibrium. But without insisting that this 
is beside the question, it will suffice to point out that the 
like cannot be said of the planetary rotations. No such 
final cause can be assigned for the rapid axial movement 
of Jupiter and Saturn, or the slow axial movement of 
Mercury. If, however, in pursuance of the doctrine of 
transformation, we look for the antecedents of these gyra- 
tions which all planets exhibit, the nebular hypothesis fur- 
nishes us with antecedents which bear manifest quantitative 
relations to the motions displayed. For the planets that 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 173 

turn on their axes with extreme rapidity are those having 
great masses and large orbits — those, that is, of which the 
once diffused elements moved to their centres of gravity 
through immense spaces, and so acquired high velocities. 
While, conversely, the planets which rotate with the small- 
est velocities are those formed out of the smallest nebulous 
rings — a relation still better shown by satellites. 

" But what," it may be asked, " has in such case become 
of all that motion which brought about the aggregation of 
this diffused matter into solid bodies? " The answer is 
that it has been radiated in the form of heat and light ; 
and this answer the evidence, so far as it goes, confirms. 
Geologists conclude that the heat of the Earth's still molten 
nucleus is but a remnant of the heat which once made 
molten the entire Earth. The mountainous surfaces of the 
Moon and Venus (which alone are near enough to be scru- 
tinized), indicating, as they do, crusts that have, like our 
own, been corrugated by contraction, imply that these 
bodies too have undergone refrigeration. Lastly, we have 
in the Sun a still-continued production of this heat and 
light, which must result from the arrest of diffused matter 
moving toward a common centre of gravity. Here also, 
as before, a quantitative relation is traceable. Among the 
bodies which make up the Solar System, those containing 
comparatively small amounts of matter whose centripetal 
motion has been destroyed, have already lost nearly all the 
produced heat: a result which their relatively larger sur- 
faces have facilitated. But the Sun, a thousand times as 
great in mass as the largest planet, and having therefore 
to give off an enormously greater quantity of heat and 
light due to arrest of moving matter, is still radiating with 
great intensity. 

§ 69. If we inquire the origin of those forces which have 
wrought the surface of our planet into its present shape, we 
find them traceable to the primordial source just assigned. 
Assuming the solar system to have arisen as above sup- 
posed, then geologic changes are either direct or indirect 
results of the unexpended heat caused by nebular conden- 
sation. These changes are commonly divided into igneous 
and aqueous — heads under which we may most conveniently 
consider them. 

All those periodic disturbances which we call earth- 



174 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

quakes, all those elevations and subsidences which they 
severally produce, all those accumulated effects of many 
such elevations and subsidences exhibited in ocean-basins, 
islands, continents, table-lands, mountain-chains, and all 
those formations which are distinguished as volcanic, 
geologists now regard as modifications of the Earth's crust 
produced by the still-molten matter occupying its interior. 
However untenable may be the details of M. Elie de Beau- 
mont's theory, there is good reason to accept the general 
proposition that the disruptions and variations of level 
which take place at intervals on the terrestrial surface, are 
due to the progressive collapse of the Earth's solid envelope 
upon its cooling and contracting nucleus. Even suppos- 
ing that volcanic eruptions, extrusions of igneous rock, 
and upheaved mountain-chains, could be otherwise satis- 
factorily accounted for, which they cannot, it would be 
impossible otherwise to account for those wide-spread ele- 
vations and depressions whence continents and oceans re- 
sult. The conclusion to be drawn is, then, that the 
forces displayed in these so-called igneous changes are de- 
rived positively or negatively from the unexpended heat of 
the Earth's interior. Such phenomena as the fusion or 
agglutination of sedimentary deposits, the wanning of 
springs, the sublimation of metals into the fissures where 
we fmd them as ores, may he regarded as positive results 
of this residuary heat; while fractures of strata and alter- 
ations of level are its negative results, since they ensi 

scape. The original cause of all these effects is still, 
however, as it has been from the first, the gravitating 
movement of the Earth's matters toward the Earth's cen- 
tre; seeing that to this is due both the internal heat itself 
and the collapse which takes place as it is radiated into 
space. 

When we inquire under what fo~ms previously existed 
the force which works out the geological chang 
as aqueous, the answer is less obvious. The effects of rain, 
of rivers, of winds, of waves, of marine currents, do not 
manifestly proceed from one general boui ;;!ysis, 

nevertheless, proves to us that they have a common | 
sis. If we ask, Whence comes the power of the river- 
current, bearing sediment down to the sea'.- the reply is, 
The gravitation of water throughout the tract which this 
river drains. If we ask, How came the water to be dis- 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 175 

persed over this tract? the reply is, It fell in the shape 
of rain. If we ask, How came the rain to be in that 
position whence it fell? the reply is, The vapor from 
which it was condensed was drifted there by the winds. 
If we ask, How came this vapor to be at that elevation? 
the reply is, It was raised by evaporation. And if we 
ask, What force thus raised it? the reply is, The sun's 
heat. Just that amount of gravitative force which the 
sun's heat overcame in raising the atoms of water is given 
out again in the fall of those atoms to the same level. 
Hence the denudations effected by rain and rivers, during 
the descent of this condensed vapor to the level of the sea, 
are indirectly due to the sun's heat. Similarly with the 
winds that transport the vapors hither and thither. Con- 
sequent as atmospheric currents are on differences of tem- 
perature (either general, as between the equatorial and 
polar regions, or special, as between tracts of the Earth's 
surface of unlike physical characters), all such currents are 
due to that source from which the vanying quantities of 
heat proceed. And if the winds thus originate, so too do 
the waves raised by them on the sea's surface. Whence it 
follows that whatever changes waves produce — the wearing 
away of shores, the breaking down of rocks into shingle, 
sand, and mud — are also traceable to the solar rays as their 
primary cause. The same may be said of ocean-currents. 
Generated as the larger ones are by the excess of heat 
which the ocean in tropical climates continually acquires 
from the Sun, and generated as the smaller ones are by 
minor local differences in the quantities of solar heat ab- 
sorbed, it follows that the distribution of sediment and 
other geological processes which these marine currents 
effect, are affiliable upon the force which the sun radiates. 
The only aqueous agency otherwise originating is that of 
the tides — an agency which, equally with the others, is 
traceable to unexpended astronomical motion. But making 
allowance for the changes which this works, we reach the 
conclusion that the slow wearing down of continents and 
gradual filling up of seas, by rain, rivers, winds, waves, 
and ocean-streams, are the indirect effects of solar heat. 

Thus the inference forced on us by the doctrine of 
transformation, that the forces which have moulded and 
remoulded the Earth's crust must have pre-existed under 
some other shape, presents no difficulty if nebular genesis 



176 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

be granted ; since this presupposes certain forces that are 
both adequate to the results, and cannot be expended with- 
out producing the results. We see that while the geologi- 
cal changes classed as igueous arise from the still-pro- 
gressing motion of the Earth's substance to its centre of 
gravity, the antagonistic changes classed as aqueous arise 
from the still-progressing motion of the Son's substance 
toward its centre of gravity — a motion which, transformed 
into heat and radiated to us, is here retransformed, di- 
rectly into motions of the gaseous and liquid matters on 
the Earth's surface, and indirectly into motions of the 
solid matters. 

§ 70. That the forces exhibited in vital actions, vege- 
tal and animal, are similarly derived, is so obvious a 
deduction from the facts of organic chemistry thai it will 
meet with ready acceptance from readers acquainted with 
these facts. Let us note first the physiological general- 
izations, and then the generalizations which they necessi- 
tate. 

Plant-life is all directly or indirectly dependent on the 
heat and light of the sun — directly dependent in the 
immense majority of plants, and indirectly dependent in 
plants which, as the fungi, nourish in the dark : since these, 
growing as they do at the expense of decaying organic 
matter, mediately draw their forces from the same original 
source. Eaeli plant owes the carbon and hydrogen of 
which it mainly consists to the carbonic acid and water 
contained in the surrounding air and earth. The carbonic 
acid and water must, however, be decomposed before their 
carbon and hydrogen can be assimilated. To overcome 
the powerful affinities which hold their elements together 
requires the expenditure of force; and this force is sup- 
plied by the Sun. In what manner the decomposition is 
effected we do not know. But we know that when, under 
fit conditions, plants are exposed to the Sun's rays, they 
give off oxygen and accumulate carbon and hydrogen. In 
darkness this process ceases. It ceases too when the quan- 
tities of light and heat received are greatly reduced, as in 
winter. Conversely, it is active when the light and heat 
are great, as in summer. And the like relation is seen in 
the fact that while plant-life is luxuriant in the tropics, it 
diminishes in temperate regions and disappears as we ap- 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 177 

proach the poles. Thus the irresistible inference is that 
the forces by which plants abstract the materials of their 
tissues from surrounding inorganic compounds — the forces 
by which they grow and carry on their functions, are 
forces that previously existed as solar radiations. 

That animal life is immediately or mediately dependent 
on vegetal life is a familiar truth ; and that, in the main, 
the processes of animal life are opposite to those of vegetal 
life is a truth long current among men of science. Chem- 
ically considered, vegetal life is chiefly a process of de- 
oxidation and acimal life chiefly a process of oxidation: 
chiefly, we must say, because in so far as plants are ex- 
penders of force for the purposes of organization, they are 
oxidizers (as is shown by the exhalation of carbonic acid 
during the night) ; and animals, in some of their minor pro- 
cesses, are probably deoxidizers. But with this qualifica- 
tion, the general truth is that while the plant, decomposing 
carbonic acid and water and liberating oxygen, builds up 
the detained carbon and hydrogen (along with a little ni- 
trogen and small quantities of other elements elsewhere 
obtained) into branches, leaves, and seeds, the animal, 
consuming these branches, leaves, and seeds, and absorb- 
ing oxygen, recomposes carbonic acid and water, together 
with certain nitrogenous compounds in minor amounts. 
And while the decomposition effected by the plant is at 
the expense of certain forces emanating from the sun, 
which are employed in overcoming the affinities of carbon 
and hydrogen for the oxygen united with them, the re- 
composition effected by the animal is at the profit of these 
forces, which are liberated during the combination of such 
elements. Thus the movements, internal and external, 
of the animal, are reappearances in new forms of a power 
absorbed by the plant under the shape of light and heat. 
Just as, in the manner above explained, the solar forces 
expended in raising vapor from the sea's surface are given 
out again in the fall of rain and rivers to the same level 
and in the accompanying transfer of solid matters, so the 
solar forces that in the plant raised certain chemical ele- 
ments to a condition of unstable equilibrium are given out 
again in the actions of the animal during the fall of these 
elements to a condition of stable equilibrium. 

Besides thus tracing a qualitative correlation between 
these two great orders of organic activity, as well as be- 
12 



178 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

tween both of them and inorganic agencies, we may rudely 
trace a quantitative correlation. Where vegetal life is 
abundant, we usually find abundant animal life; and as we 
advance from torrid to temperate and frigid climates, the 
two decrease together. Speaking generally, the animals 
of each class reach a larger size in regions where vegetation 
is abundant than in those where it is sparse. And fur- 
ther, there is a tolerably apparent connection between 
the quantity of energy which each species of animal ex- 
pends, and the quantity of force which the nutriment it 
absorbs gives out during oxidation. 

Certain phenomena of development in both plants and 
animals illustrate still more directly the ultimate truth 
enunciated. Pursuing the suggestion made by Mr. Grove, 
in the first edition of his work on the " Correlation of the 
Physical Forces," that a connection probably exists be- 
tween the forces classed as vital and those classed as phys- 
ical, Dr. Carpenter has pointed out that such a conm 
is clearly exhibited during incubation. The transforma- 
tion of the unorganized contents of an egg into the organ- 
ized chick is altogether a question of heat: withhold 
heat and the proeos does not commence; supply heat and 
it goes on while the temperature is maintained, hut ceases 
when the agg is allowed to cool. The developmental 
changes can he completed only by keeping the temperature 
with tolerable constancy at a definite height for a definite 
time; that is, only by supplying a definite quantity of 
heat. In the metamorphoses of inserts we may die 
parallel facts. Experiments show not only that the hatch- 
ing of their eggs is determined by temperature, hut also 
that the evolution of the pupa into the imago is similarly 
determined; and may he immensely accelerated or retarded 
according as heat is artificially supplied or withheld. It 
will suffice just to add that the germination of plant.- pre- 
sents like relations of cause and effect — relations so similar 
that detail is superfluous. 

Thus, then, the various changes exhibited to us by the 
organic creation, whether considered as a whole, or in its 
two great divisions, or in its individual members, conform, 
so far as we can ascertain, to the general principle. 
Where, as in the transformation of an egg into a chick, 
we can investigate the phenomena apart from all compli- 
cations, we find that the force manifested in the process 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 179 

of organization involves expenditure of a pre-existing 
force. Where it is not, as in the egg or the chrysalis, 
merely the change of a fixed quantity of matter into a new 
shape, but where, as in the growing plant or animal, we 
have an incorporation of matter existing outside, there is 
still a pre-existing force at the cost of which this incor- 
poration is effected. And where, as in the higher division 
of organisms, there remain, over and above the forces ex- 
pended in organization, certain surplus forces expended in 
movement, these too are indirectly derived from this same 
pre-existing external force. 

§ 71. Even after all that has been said in the foregoing 
part of this work, many will be alarmed by the assertion 
that the forces which we distinguish as mental come 
within the same generalization. Yet there is no alterna- 
tive but to make this assertion: the facts which justify, 
or rather which necessitate it, being abundant and con- 
spicuous. They fall into the following groups. 

All impressions from moment to moment made on our 
organs of sense, stand in direct correlation with physical 
forces existing externally. The modes of consciousness 
called pressure, motion, sound, light, heat, are effects pro- 
duced in us by agencies which, as otherwise expended, 
crush or fracture pieces of matter, generate vibrations in 
surrounding objects, cause chemical combinations, and re- 
duce substances from a solid to a liquid form. Hence if 
we regard the changes of relative position, of aggregation, 
or of chemical state, thus arising, as being transformed 
manifestations of the agencies from which they arise, so 
must we regard the sensations which such agencies pro- 
duce in us as new forms of the forces producing them. 
Any hesitation to admit that between the physical forces 
and the sensations there exists a correlation like that be- 
tween the physical forces themselves, must disappear on 
remembering how the one correlation, like the other, is 
not qualitative only, but quantitative. Masses of matter 
which, by scales or dynamometer, are shown to differ 
greatly in weight, differ as greatly in the feelings of press- 
ure they produce on our bodies. In arresting moving ob- 
jects, the strains we are conscious of are proportionate to 
the momenta of such objects as otherwise measured. Un- 
der like conditions the impressions of sounds given to us 



180 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

by vibrating strings, bells, or columns of air are found to 
vary in strength with the amount of force applied. Fluids 
or solids proved to be markedly contrasted in temperature 
by the different degrees of expansion they produce in the 
mercurial column, produce in us correspondingly different 
degrees of the sensation of heat. And similarly unlike 
intensities in our impressions of light answer to unlike 
effects as measured by photometers. 

Besides the correlation and equivalence between external 
physical forces and the mental forces generated by them 
in us under the form of sensations, th< orrelation 

and equivalence between sensations and those physical 
forces which, in the shape of bodily actions, result from 
them. The feelings we distinguish as light, heat, sound, 
odor, taste, pressure, etc., do not die away without im- 
mediate results, but are invariably followed by other man- 
ifestations of force. In addition to the excitements of 
secreting organs that are in some cases traceable, there 
arises a contraction of the involuntary muscles, or of the 
voluntary muscles, or of both. S< :i<>n^ increase the 
action of the heart — slightly when they are Blight, mark- 
edly when they are marked, and recent ph; _ aJ in- 
quiries imply not only that contraction of the heart is 
excited by every sensation, hut also that the muscular 
fibres throughout the whole vascular system, are at the 
same time more or less contracted. The respiratory inus- 
cles, too, are stimulated into greater activity by - 
The rate of breathing is visibly and audibly i 
both by pleasurable and painful inn on the n< 
when these reach any intensity. It has 
shown that inspiration becomi a frequent on tran- 
sition from darkness into sunshine — a result probably due 
to the increased amount of direct and indirect nervous 
stimulation involved. When the quantity ->f sensation is 
gieat, it generates contractions of the voluntary mus 
as well as of the involuntary ones. Unusual excitement of 
the nerves of touch, as by tickling, is followed by almost un- 
controllable movements of the limbs. Violent pains cause 
violent struggles. The start that succeeds a load sound, 
the wry face" produced by the taste of anything 
disagreeable, the jerk with which the hand or i 
snatched out of water that is very hot, are mstan 
the transformation of feeling into motion: and in thesj 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 181 

cases, as in all others, it is manifest that the quantity of 
bodily action is proportionate to the quantity of sensation. 
Even where from pride there is a suppression of the 
screams and groans expressive of great pain (also indirect 
results of muscular contraction), we may still see in the 
clinching of the hands, the knitting of the brows, and the 
setting of the teeth, that the bodily actions developed are 
as great, though less obtrusive in their results. If we 
take emotions instead of sensations, we find the correlation 
and equivalence equally manifest. Not only are the modes 
of consciousness directly produced in us by physical forces, 
retransformable into physical forces under the form of 
muscular motions and the changes they initiate ; but the 
like is true of those modes of consciousness which are not 
directly produced in us by the physical forces. Emotions 
of moderate intensity, like sensations of moderate inten- 
sity, generate little beyond excitement of the heart and 
vascular system, joined sometimes with increased action of 
glandular organs. But as the emotions rise in strength, 
the muscles of the face, body, and limbs, begin to move. 
Of examples may be mentioned the frowns, dilated nos- 
trils, and stampings of anger; the contracted brows, and 
wrung hands, of grief; the smiles and leaps of joy; and 
the frantic struggles of terror or despair. Passing over 
certain apparent, but only apparent, exceptions, we see 
that whatever be the kind of emotion, there is a manifest 
relation between its amount, and the amount of muscular 
action induced; alike from the erect carriage and elastic 
step of exhilaration, up to the dancings of immense de- 
light, and from the fidgetiness of impatience up to the 
almost convulsive movements accompanying great mental 
agony. To these several orders of evidence must be joined 
the further one, that between our feelings and those 
voluntary motions into which they are transformed, there 
comes the sensation of muscular tension, standing in man- 
ifest correlation with both — a correlation that is distinctly 
quantitative: the sense of strain varying, other things 
equal, directly as the quantity of momentum generated. 

" But how," it may be asked, " can we interpret by the 
law of correlation the genesis of those thoughts and feel- 
ings which, instead of following external stimuli, arise 
spontaneously? Between the indignation caused by an 
insult, and the loud sounds or violent acts that follow, the 



182 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

alleged connection may hold; but whence come the crowd 
of ideas and the mass of feelings that expend themselves 
in these demonstrations? They are clearly not equivalents 
of the sensations produced by the words on the ears; for 
the same words otherwise arranged, would not have caused 
them. The thing said bears to the mental action ir excites, 
much the same relation that the pulling of a trigger bears 
to the subsequent explosion — does not produce the power, 
but merely liberates it. Whence then arises this immense 
amount of nervous energy which a whisper or a glance 
may call forth? " The reply is, that the immediate corre- 
lates of these and other such modes of consciousness, are 
not to be found in the agencies acting on us externally, but 
in certain internal agencies. The forces called vital, 
which we have seen to be correlates of the forces called 
physical, are the immediate sources of these thoughts and 
feelings, and are expended in producing them. The 
proofs of this are various. Here are some of them. It is 
a conspicuous fact that mental action is contingent on the 
presence of a certain nervous apparatus; and that, greatly 
obscured as it is by numerous and involved conditi 
general relation may be traced between ti.. ■:' this 

apparatus and the quantity of mental action as measured 
by its results. Further, this apparatus has a particular 
chemical constitution on which its activity depends; and 
there is one element in it between the amount of which 
and the amount of function performed, there is an i 
tained connection: the proportion of phosphorus present 
in the brain being the smallest in infancy. and 

idiocy, and the greatest during the prime of life, 
next that the evolution of thought ami emotion varies, 
other things equal, with the supply oi blood to the brain. 
On the one hand, a cessation of the cerebral circulation, 
from arrest of the heart's action, immediately entails 
unconsciousness. On the other hand, i 
circulation (unless it is such as to cause undue press 
results in an excitement, rising finally to delirium. Xot the 
quantity only, but also the condition oi the blood passing 
through the nervous system, influences the mental manifes- 
tations. The arterial currents must be duly aerated, to 
produce the normal amount of cerebration. At the one 
extreme, we find that if the blood is not allowed to exchange 
its carbonic acid for oxygen, there results asphyxia, with ite 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 183 

accompanying stoppage of ideas and feelings. While at the 
other extreme, we find that by the inspiration of nitrous 
oxide, there is produced an excessive, and indeed irrepres- 
sible, nervous activity. Besides the connection between 
the development of the mental forces and the presence of 
sufficient oxygen in the cerebral arteries, there is a kin- 
dred connection between the development of the mental 
forces and the presence in the cerebral arteries of certain 
other elements. There must be supplied special materials 
for the nutrition of the nervous centres, as well as for their 
oxidation. And how what we may call the quantity of 
consciousness, is, other things equal, determined by the con- 
stituents of the blood, is unmistakably seen in the exaltation 
that follows when certain chemical compounds, as alcohol 
and the vegeto-alkalies, are added to it. The gentle exhila- 
ration which tea and coffee create is familiar to all ; and 
though the gorgeous imaginations and intense feelings of 
happiness produced by opium and hashish, have been ex- 
perienced by few (in this country at least), the testimony 
of those who have experienced them is sufficiently conclu- 
sive. Yet another proof that the genesis of the mental 
energies is immediately dependent on chemical change, is 
afforded by the fact, that the effete products separated 
from the blood by the kidneys, vary in character with the 
amount of cerebral action. Excessive activity of mind is 
habitually accompanied by the excretion of an unusual 
quantity of the alkaline phosphates. Conditions of ab- 
normal nervous excitement bring on analogous effects. 
And the "peculiar odor of the insane," implying as it 
does morbid products in the perspiration, shows a connec- 
tion between insanity and a special composition of the 
circulating fluids — a composition which, whether regarded 
as cause or consequence, equally implies correlation of the 
mental and the physical forces. Lastly we have to note 
that this correlation, too, is, so far as we can trace it, 
quantitative. Provided the conditions to nervous action 
are not infringed on, and the concomitants are the same, 
there is a tolerably constant ratio between the amounts of 
the antecedents and consequents. Within the implied 
limits, nervous stimulants and anaesthetics produce effects 
on the thoughts and feelings, proportionate to the quan- 
tities administered. And conversely, where the thoughts 
and feelings form the initial term of the relation, the de- 



184 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

gree of reaction on the bodily energies is great, in pro- 
portion as they are great : reaching in extreme cases a total 
prostration of physique. 

Various classes of facts thus unite to prove that the law 
of metamorphosis, which holds among the physical forces, 
holds equally between them and the mental forces. Those 
modes of the Unknowable which we call motion, heat, light, 
chemical affinity, etc., are alike transformable into each 
other, and into those modes of the Unknowable which we 
distinguish as sensation, emotion, thought: these, in their 
turns, being directly or indirectly retransformable into 
the original shapes. That no idea or feeling arises, save 
as a result of some physical force expended in producing 
it, is fast becoming a commonplace of science; and who- 
ever duly weighs the evidence will see, that nothing but 
an overwhelming bias in favor of a preconceived theory, 
can explain its non-acceptance. How this metamor- 
phosis takes place — how a force existing as motion, heat, 
or light, can become a mode of consciousness — how it is 
possible for aerial vibrations to generate the sensation we 
call sound, or for the forces liberated by chemical chi 
in the brain to give rise to emotion — these are mysteries 
which it is impossible to fathom. But they are not pro- 
founder mysteries than the transformations of the physical 
forces into each other. They are not more completely be- 
yond our comprehension than the natures of Mind and 
Matter. They have simply the same insolubility as all other 
ultimate questions. We can learn nothing more than that 
here is one of the uniformities in the order of phenomena. 

£ 72. If the general law of transformation and equiva- 
lence holds of the forces we class as vital and mental, it most 
hold also of those which we class as social. Whatever 
place in a society is due to organic or inorganic agencies, 
or to a combination of the two — results either from the 
undirected physical forces around, from these physical 
forces as directed by men, or from the forces of the men 
themselves. No change can occur in its organization, its 
modes of activity, or the effects it produces on the face of 
the Earth, but what proceeds, mediately or immediately, 
from these. Let us consider first the correlation between 
the phenomena which societies display, and the vital 
phenomena. 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 185 

Social power and life varies, other things equal, with 
the population. Though different races, differing widely 
in their fitness for combination, show us that the forces 
manifested in a society are not necessarily proportionate 
to the number of people; yet we see that under given 
conditions, the forces manifested are confined within the 
limits which the number of people imposes. A small so- 
ciety, no matter how superior the character of its mem- 
bers, cannot exhibit the same quantity of social action as a 
iarge one. The production and distribution of commod- 
ities must be on a comparatively small scale. A multitu- 
dinous press, a prolific literature, or a massive political 
agitation, is not possible. And there can be but a small 
total of results in the shape of art-products and scientific 
discoveries. The correlation of the social with the phys- 
ical forces through the intermediation of the vital ones, 
is, however, most clearly shown in the different amounts 
of activity displayed by the same society according as its 
members are supplied with different amounts of force from 
the external world. In the effects of good and bad har- 
vests, we clearly see this relation illustrated. A greatly 
deficient yield of wheat is soon followed by a diminution 
of business. Factories are worked half-time, or closed 
entirely; railway traffic falls; retailers find their sales 
much lessened; house-building is almost suspended; and 
if the scarcity rises to famine, a thinning of the population 
still more diminishes the industrial vivacity. Conversely, 
an unusually abundant harvest, occurring under conditions 
not otherwise unfavorable, both excites the old producing 
and distributing agencies and sets up new ones. The 
surplus social energy finds vent in speculative enterprises. 
Capital seeking investment carries out inventions that 
have been lying unutilized. Labor is expended in opening 
new channels of communication. There is increased en- 
couragement to those who furnish the luxuries of life and 
minister to the aesthetic faculties. There are more mar- 
riages, and a greater rate of increase in population. Thus 
the social organism grows larger, more complex, and more 
active. When, as happens with most civilized nations, 
the whole of the materials for subsistence are not drawn 
from the area inhabited, but are partly imported, the peo- 
ple are still supported by certain harvests elsewhere grown 
at the expense of certain physical forces. Our own cotton- 






186 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

spinners and weavers supply the most conspicuous instance 
of a section in one nation living in great part, on im- 
ported commodities, purchased by the labor they expend 
on other imported commodities. But though the sociai 
activities of Lancashire are due chiefly to materials not 
drawn from our own soil, they are none the less evolved 
from physical forces elsewhere stored up in fit forms and 
then brought here. 

If we ask whence come these physical forces from which, 
through the intermediation of the vital forces, the social 
forces arise, the reply is of course as heretofore — the solar 
radiations. Based as the life of a society is on animal and 
vegetal products; and dependent as these animal and 
vegetal products are on the light and heat of the sun: it 
follows that the changes going on in societies are effects 
of forces having a common origin with those which produce 
all the other orders of changes that have been analyzed. 
Not only is the force expended by the horse harnessed to 
the plough, and by the Laborer guiding it, derived from 
the same reservoir as is the force of the falling cataract 
and the roaring hurricane, but to this Bame reservoir are 
eventually traceable those subtler and more complex mani- 
festations of force which humanity, as socially embodied, 
evolves. The assertion is a startling one, and by many will 
be thought ludierous; but it is an unavoidable deduction 
which cannot here be passed over. 

Of the physical forces that are directly transformed into 
social ones, the like is to lie said. Currents of air and 
water v which before the use of steam were the only agencies 
brought in aid of muscular effort for the performance of 
industrial processes, are, as we have seen, generated by the 
heat of the sun. And the inanimate power that now, to 
so vast an extent, supplements human labor, is similarly 
derived. The late George Stephenson was one of the first 
to recognize the fact that the force impelling his locomo- 
tive, originally emanated from the sun. Step by step we 
go back— from the motion of the piston to the evapora- 
tion of the water; thence to the heat evolved during the 
oxidation of coal; thence to the assimilation of carbon by 
the plants of whose imbedded remains coal consists; thence 
to the carbonic acid from which their carbon was obtained; 
and thence to the rays of light that deoxidized th - 
bonic acid. Solar forces millions of years ago expended 






FIRST PRINCIPLES. 187 

on the Earth's vegetation, and since locked up beneath its 
surface, now smelt the metals required for our machines, 
turn the lathes by which the machines are shaped, work 
them when put together, and distribute the fabrics they 
produce. And in so far as economy of labor makes possi- 
ble the support of a larger population ; gives a surplus of 
human power that would else be absorbed in manual occu- 
pations; and facilitates the development of higher kinds 
of activity ; it is clear that these social forces which are 
directly correlated with physical forces anciently derived 
from the sun, are only less important than those whose 
correlates are the vital forces recently derived from it. 

§ 73. Regarded as an induction, the doctrine set forth 
in this chapter will most likely be met by a demurrer. 
Many who admit that among physical phenomena at least, 
transformation of forces is now established, will probably 
say that inquiry has not yet gone far enough to enable us 
to predicate equivalence. And in respect of the forces 
classed as vital, mental, and social, the evidence assigned, 
however little to be explained away, they will consider by 
no means conclusive even of transformation, much less of 
equivalence. 

To those who think thus, it must now, however, be 
pointed out, that the universal truth above illustrated 
under its various aspects, is a necessary corollary from the 
persistence of force. Setting out with the proposition 
that force can neither come into existence, nor cease to 
exist, the several foregoing general conclusions inevitably 
follow. Each manifestation of force can be interpreted 
only as the effect of some antecedent force: no matter 
whether it be an inorganic action, an animal movement, 
a thought, or a feeling. Either this must be conceded, 
or else it must be asserted that our successive states of con- 
sciousness are self-created. Either mental energies, as 
well as bodily ones, are quantitatively correlated to certain 
energies expended in their production, and to certain 
other energies which they initiate; or else nothing must 
become something and something must become nothing. 
The alternatives are, to deny the persistence of force, or 
to admit that every physical and psychical change is gener- 
ated by certain antecedent forces, and that from given 
amounts of such forces neither more nor less of such phys- 



188 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

ical and psychical changes can result. And since the per- 
sistence of force, being a datum of consciousness, cannot 
be denied, its unavoidable corollary must be accepted. 
This corollary cannot indeed be made more certain by 
accumulating illustrations. The truth as arrived at de- 
ductively, cannot be inductively confirmed. For every one 
of such facts as those above detailed, is established only 
through the indirect assumption of that persistence of 
force, from which it really follows as a direct consequence. 
The most exact proof of correlation and equivalence which 
it is possible to reach by experimental inquiry, is that 
based on measurement of the forces expended and the 
forces produced. But, as was shown in the last chapter, 
any such process of measurement implies the use of some 
unit of force which is assumed to remain constant; and 
for this assumption there can be no warrant but that it 
is a corollary from the persistence of force. How then 
can any reasoning based on this corollary, prove the equally 
direct corollary that when a given quantity of 1'" 
to exist under one form, an equal quantity must come 
into existence under some other form or forms? Clearly 
the a priori truth expressed in this last corollary cannot 
be more firmly established by any a posteriori proofs which 
the first corollary helps us to. 

" What then," it may he asked, " is the use of these in- 
vestigations by which transformation and equivalence of 
forces is sought to be established as an inductive truth? 
Surely it will not be alleged that they are useless. Yet if 
the correlation cannot be made more certain by them 
than it is already, does not their use! sarily 

follow? " Xo. They are of value as disclosing the many 
particular implications which the general truth does 
specify. They are of value as teaching us how much <>f 
one mode of force is the equivalent of so much of another 
mode. They are of value as determining under what 
conditions each metamorphosis occurs. And they ai 
value as leading us to impiire in what shape the remnant 
of force has escaped when the apparent results are not 
equivalent to the cause. 



CHAPTER IX. 

THE DIRECTION OF MOTION. 

§ 74. The Absolute Cause of changes, no matter what 
may be their special natures, is not less incomprehensible 
in respect of the unity or duality of its action, than in all 
other respects. We cannot decide between the alternative 
suppositions, that phenomena are due to the variously- 
conditioned workings of a single force, and that they are 
due to the conflict of two forces. Whether, as some con- 
tend, everything is explicable on the hypothesis of univer- 
sal pressure, whence what we call tension results differ- 
entially from inequalites of pressure in opposite direct- 
ions ; or whether, as might be with equal propriety con- 
tended, things are to be explained on the hypothesis of 
universal tension, from which pressure is a differential re- 
sult; or whether, as most physicists hold, pressure and 
tension everywhere coexist, are questions which it is im- 
possible to settle. Each of these three suppositions makes 
the facts comprehensible, only by postulating an incon- 
ceivability. To assume a universal pressure, confessedly 
requires us to assume an infinite plenum — an unlimited 
space full of something which is everywhere pressed by 
something beyond ; and this assumption cannot be men- 
tally realized. That universal tension is the immediate 
agency to which phenomena are due, is an idea open to a 
parallel and equally fatal objection. And however verbally 
intelligible may be the proposition that pressure and ten- 
sion everywhere coexist, yet we cannot truly represent 
to ourselves one ultimate unit of matter as drawing another 
while resisting it. 

Nevertheless, this last belief is one which we are com- 
pelled to entertain. Matter cannot be conceived except 
as manifesting forces of attraction and repulsion. Body is 
distinguished in our consciousness from space, by its op- 
position to our muscular energies; and this opposition we 
feel under the twofold form of a cohesion that hinders 
our efforts to rend, and a resistance that hinders our 
efforts to compress. Without resistance there can be merely 
empty extension. Without cohesion there can be no re- 



190 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

sistance. Probably this conception of antagonistic forces, 
is originally derived from the antagonism of our flexor 
and extensor muscles. But be this as it may, we are 
obliged to think of all objects as made up of parts that 
attract and repel each other; since this is the form of our 
experience of all objects. 

By a higher abstraction results the conception of attrac- 
tive and repulsive forces pervading space. We cannot dis- 
sociate force from occupied extension, or occupied exten- 
sion from force because we have never an immediate 
consciousness of either in the absence of the other. Never- 
theless, we have abundant proof that force is exercised 
through what appears to our senses a vacuity. Mentally 
to represent this exercise, we are hence obliged to fill the 
apparent vacuity with a species of matter — an ethereal 
medium. The constitution we assign to this ethereal 
medium, however, like the constitution we assign to solid 
substance, is necessarily an abstract of the impressions re- 
ceived from tangible bodies. The opposition to pn 
which a tangible body oilers to us, is not shown in one 
direction only, but in all directions; and so likewise is its 
tenacity. Suppose countless lines radiating from its 
tre on every side, and it i _ each of these lines 

and coheres along each of these lines. Hence t. 
tution of those ultimate units through the instrumen- 
tality of which phenomena are interpreted. Be they 
atoms of ponderable matter or molecules of ether, the 
properties we conceive them to possess are nothing else 
than these perceptible properties idealized. Cent: 
force attracting and repelling each other in all directions, 
are simply insensible portions of matter having the endow- 
ments common to sensible portions of matter — endowments 
of which we cannot by any mental effort divest them. In 
brief, they are the invariable elements of the conception 
of matter, abstracted from its variable elements — size, 
form, quality, etc. And so to interpret manifestations of 
force which cannot l»c tactnally experienced, we use the 
terms of thought supplied by our tactual experiences; and 
this for the sufficient reason that we must use tlu - 
none. 

After all that has been before shown, and after the hint 
given above, it needs scarcely be said that these universally 
coexistent forces of attraction and repulsion must not be 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 191 

taken as realities, but as our symbols of the reality. They 
are the forms under which the workings of the Unknow- 
able are cognizable by us — modes of the Unconditioned as 
presented under the conditions of our consciousness. But 
while knowing that the ideas thus generated in us are not 
absolutely true, we may unreservedly surrender ourselves 
to them as relatively true ; and may proceed to evolve a 
series of deductions having a like relative truth. 

§ 75. From universally coexistent forces of attraction 
and repulsion, there result certain laws of direction of all 
movement. Where attractive forces alone are concerned, 
or rather are alone appreciable, movement takes place in 
the direction of their resultant; which may, in a sense, 
be called the line of greatest traction. Where repulsive 
forces alone are concerned, or rather are alone appreciable, 
movement takes place along their resultant;, which is usu- 
ally known as the line of least resistance. And where 
both attractive and repulsive forces are concerned, or are 
appreciable, movement takes place along the resultant of all 
the tractions and resistances. Strictly speaking, this last 
is the sole law; since, by the hypothesis, both forces are 
everywhere in action. But very frequently the one kind 
of force is so immensely in excess that the effect of the 
other kind may be left out of consideration. Practically 
we may say that a body falling to the Earth follows the 
line of greatest traction; since, though the resistance of 
the air must, if the body be irregular, cause some diver- 
gence from this line (quite perceptible with feathers and 
leaves), yet ordinarily the divergence is so slight that we 
may omit it. In the same manner, though the course 
taken by the steam from an exploding boiler differs some- 
what from that which it would take were gravitation out 
of the question ; yet, as gravitation affects its course in- 
finifcesimally, we are justified in asserting that the escaping 
steam follows the line of least resistance. Motion then, 
we may say, always follows the line of greatest traction, or 
the line of least resistance, or the resultant of the two : 
bearing in mind that though the last is alone strictly 
true, the others are in many cases sufficiently near the 
truth for practical purposes. 

Movement set up in any direction is itself a cause of 
further movement in that direction, since it is the em- 



192 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

bodiment of a surplus force in that direction. This holds 
equally with the transit of matter through space, the tran- 
sit of matter through matter, and the transit through mat- 
ter of any kind of vibration. In the case of matter mov- 
ing through space, this principle is expressed in the law 
of inertia — a law on winch the calculations of physical as- 
tronomy are wholly based. In the case of matter moving 
through matter, we trace the same truth under the famil- 
iar experience that any breach made by one solid through 
another, or any channel formed by a fluid through a solid, 
becomes a route along which, other things equal, subse- 
quent movements of like nature take place. And in the 
case of motion passing through matter under the form of 
an impulse communicated from part to part, the L 
magnetization go to show that the establishment of un- 
dulations along certain lines, determines their continuance 
along those lines. 

It farther follows from the conditions, that the direction 
of movement can rarely if ever he perfectly straight For 
matter in motion to pursue continuously the exact line in 
which it Beta out, the forces of attraction and repulsion 
must be symmetrically disposed around its path: and the 
chances against this are infinitely great. The impossibility 
of making an absolutely true edge t<> a bar of metal — the 
fact that all which can be t!<»ne by the best mechanical ap- 
pliances is to reduce the irregularities of such an & 
amounts that cannot he perceived without magni: 
sufficiently exemplifies how, in consequence of the ui 
metrical distribution of fo and the lin< 

ment, the movement is rendered more or less indirect. It 
may be well to add that in proportion as the for 
work are numerous and varied, the curve a moving 
describes is necessarily complex: witness the contra 
tween the flight of an arrow and the gyrations of a stick 
tossed about by breakers. 

As a step toward unification of knowledge we have now 
to trace these general laws throughout the various ord 
changes which the Cosmos exhil its. We have to note how 
every motion takes place along the line o: trac- 

tion, of least resistance, or of their resultant; how the 
setting up of motion along a certain line becomes a cause 
of its continuance along that line: how, nevertheless, 
change of relations to external forces, always renders this 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 193 

line indirect ; and how the degree of its indirectness in- 
creases with every addition to the number of influences at 
work. 

§ 76. If we assume the first stage in nebular condensa- 
tion to be the precipitation into flocculi of denser matter 
previously ditf used through a rarer medium (a supposition 
both physically justified, and in harmony with certain 
astronomical observations), we shall find that nebular mo- 
tion is interpretable in pursuance of the above general 
laws. Each portion of such vapor-like matter must begin 
to move toward the common centre of gravity. The 
tractive forces which would of themselves carry it in a 
straight line to the centre of gravity, are opposed by the 
resistant forces of the medium through which it is drawn. 
The direction of movement must be the resultant of these 
— a resultant which, in consequence of the unsymmetrical 
form of the flocculus, must be a curve directed, not to the 
centre of gravity, but toward one side of it. And it may 
be readily shown that in an aggregation of such flocculi, 
severally thus moving, there must, by composition of 
forces, eventually result a rotation of the whole nebula in 
one direction. 

Merely noting this hypothetical illustration for the 
purpose of showing how the law applies to the case of neb- 
ular evolution, supposing it to have taken place, let us 
pass to the phenomena of the Solar System as now exhib- 
ited. Here the general principles above set forth are every 
instant exemplified. Each planet and satellite has a mo- 
mentum which would, if acting alone, carry it forward in 
the direction it is at any instant pursuing. This mo- 
mentum hence acts as a resistance to motion in any other 
direction. Each planet and satellite, however, is drawn by 
a force which, if unopposed, would take it in a straight 
line toward its primary. And the resultant of these two 
forces is that curve which it describes — a curve manifestly 
consequent on the unsymmetrical distribution of the forces 
around its path. This path, when more closely examined, 
supplies us with further illustrations. For it is not an 
exact circle or ellipse; which it would be were the tan- 
gential and centripetal forces the only ones concerned. 
Adjacent members of the Solar System, ever varying in 
their relative positions, cause what we call perturbations; 
13 



194 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

that is, slight divergences in various directions from that 
circle or ellipse which the two chief forces would produce. 
These perturbations severally show us in minor degrees, 
how the line of movement is the resultant of all the forces 
engaged; and how this line becomes more complicated in 
proportion as the forces are multiplied. If instead of the 
motions of the planets and satellites as wholes, we consider 
the motions of their parts, we meet with comparatively 
complex illustrations. Every portion of the Earth's sub- 
stance in its daily rotation, describes a curve which is in 
the main a resultant of that resistance which checks its 
nearer approach to the centre of gravity, that momentum 
which would carry it off at a tangent, and those for< 
gravitation and cohesion which keep it from being so car- 
ried off. If this axial motion he compounded with the 
orbital motion, the com h part is .-ten to be a much 

more involved one. And we find it to have a still greater 
complication on taking into account that lunar attraction 
which mainly produces the tides and the precession of the 
equinoxes. 

§ 1 ;. We come next to terrestrial changes: present ones 
as observed, and past one- as inferred by geologl 
us set out with the hourly-occurring alterations in the 
Earth's atmosphere ; descend to the slower alterati< 

progress on its surface; and then to the still slower ones 
going on beneath. 

.Masses of air, absorbing heat from surfaces warmed by 
the sun, expand, and BO Lessen the weight of the atmo- 
spheric columns of which they are parts. Hence they 
offer to adjacent atmospheric columns, diminished lateral 
resistance: and these, moving in the din - t the 

diminished resistance, displace the expanded air: while 
this, pursuing an upward course, displays a motion along 
that line in which there is least pressure. When again, by 
the ascent of such heated masses from extended areas like 
the torrid zone, there is produced at the upper surf; 
the atmosphere, a protuberance beyond the limits 
librium — when the air forming this protuberance begins 
to overflow laterally toward the poles; it does so because, 
while the tractive force of the Earth is nearly the same, the 
lateral resistance is greatly diminished. And throughout 
the course of each current thus generated, as well as 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 195 

throughout the course of each counter-current flowing into 
the vacuum that is left, the direction is always the resultant 
of the Earth's tractive force and the resistance offered by 
the surrounding masses of air: modified only by conflict 
with other currents similarly determined, and by collision 
with prominences on the Earth's crust. The movements 
of water, in both its gaseous and liquid states, furnish 
further examples. In conformity with the mechanical 
theory of heat, it may be shown that evaporation is the 
escape of particles of water in the direction of least resist- 
ance; and that as the resistance (which is due to the 
pressure of the water diffused in a gaseous state) dimin- 
ishes, the evaporation increases. Conversely, that rushing 
together of particles called condensation, which takes place 
when any portion of atmospheric vapor has its temperature 
much lowered, may be interpreted as a diminution of the 
mutual pressure among the condensing particles, while the 
pressure of surrounding particles remains the same; and 
so is a motion taking place in the direction of lessened 
resistance. In the course followed by the resulting rain- 
drops, we have one of the simplest instances of the joint 
effect of the two antagonist forces. The Earth's attraction, 
and the resistance of atmospheric currents ever varying in 
direction and intensity, give as their resultants, lines which 
incline to the horizon in countless different degrees and 
undergo perpetual variations. More clearly still is the law 
exemplified by these same rain-drops when they reach the 
ground. In the course they take while trickling over its 
surface, in every rill, in every larger stream, and in every 
river, we see them descending as straight as the antagonism 
of surrounding objects permits. From moment to mo- 
ment, the motion of water toward the Earth's centre is 
opposed by the solid matter around and under it; and 
from moment to moment its route is the resultant of the 
lines of greatest traction and least resistance. So far from 
a cascade furnishing, as it seems to do, an exception, it 
furnishes but another illustration. For though all solid 
obstacles to a vertical fall of the water are removed, yet 
the water's horizontal momentum is an obstacle; and the 
parabola in which the stream leaps from the projecting 
ledge, is generated by the combined gravitation and mo- 
mentum. It may be well just to draw attention to the 
degree of complexity here produced in the line of move- 



196 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

ment by the variety of forces at work. In atmospheric 
currents, and still more clearly in water-courses (to which 
might be added ocean-streams), the route followed is too 
complex to be defined, save as a curve of three dimensions 
with an ever-varying equation. 

The Earth's solid crust undergoes changes that supply 
another group of illustrations. The denudation of lands 
and the depositing of the removed sediment in new strata 
at the bottoms of seas and lakes, is a process through- 
out which motion is obviously determined in the same way 
as is that of the water effecting the transport. Again, 
though we have no direct inductive proof that the forces 
classed as igneous, expend themselves along lines of 
resistance; yet what little we know of them is in harmony 
with the belief that they do so. Earthquakes continually 
revisit the same localities, and special tracts undergo for 
long periods together successive elevations or subsidences 
— facts which imply that already-fractured portions of the 
Earth's crust are those most prone to yield under the 
pressure caused by further contractions. The distribution 
o! volcanoes along certain line-, as well as the frequent 
recurrence of eruptions l*rom the same vents, are facts of 
like meaning. 

£ 78. That organic growth takes place in the direction 
of least resistance, is a proposition that has been set forth 
and illustrated by Mr. James Ilinton, in the M 
rurgxcaX Review for October, 1858, After detailing a 
of the early observations which led him to this general- 
ization, he formulates it thus: 

14 Organic form is the result of motion." 
"Motion takes the direction of least resistanc 
" Therefore organic form is the result of motion in the 
direction of least resistance." 

After an elucidation and defence of this position, Mr. 
Ilinton proceeds to interpret, in conformity with it, sun- 
dry phenomena of development. Speaking of plants he 
says: 

. " The formation of the root furnishes a beautiful illus- 
tration of the law of least resistance, for it grows by insin- 
uating itself, cell by cell, through the interstices of the 
soil ; it is by such minute additions that it inci 
winding and twisting whithersoever the obstacles it meets 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 197 

in its path determine, and growing there most where the 
nutritive materials are added to it most abundantly. As 
we look on the roots of a mighty tree, it appears to us as if 
they had forced themselves with giant violence into the 
solid earth. But it is not so ; they were led on gently, 
cell added to cell, softly as the dews descended, and the 
loosened earth made way. Once formed, indeed, they ex- 
pand with an enormous power, but the spongy condition 
of the growing radicles utterly forbids the supposition that 
they are forced into the earth. Is it not probable, indeed, 
that the enlargement of the roots already formed may 
crack the surrounding soil, and help to make the interstices 
into which the new rootlets grow? "... 

" Throughout almost the whole of organic nature the 
spiral form is more or less distinctly marked. Now, mo- 
tion under resistance takes a spiral direction, as may be 
seen by the motion of a body rising or falling through 
water. A bubble rising rapidly in water describes a spiral 
closely resembling a corkscrew, and a body of moderate 
specific gravity dropped into water may be seen to fall in 
a. curved direction, the spiral tendency of which may be 
distinctly observed. ... In this prevailing spiral form 
of organic bodies, therefore, it appears to me, that there 
is presented a strong prima facie case for the view I have 
maintained. . . . The spiral form of the branches of 
many trees is very apparent, and the universally spiral 
arrangement of the leaves around the stem of plants needs 
only to be referred to. . . . The heart commences as a 
spiral turn, and in its perfect form a manifest spiral may 
be traced through the left ventricle, right ventricle, right 
auricle, left auricle and appendix. And what is the spiral 
turn in which the heat commences but a necessary result 
of the lengthening, under a limit, of the cellular mass of 
which it then consists?". . . 

" Every one must have noticed the peculiar curling up 
of the young leaves of the common fern. The appearance 
is as if the leaf were rolled up, but in truth this form is 
merely a phenomenon of growth. The curvature results 
from the increase of the leaf ; it is only another form of the 
wrinkling up, or turning at right angles by extension un- 
der limit." 

" The rolling up or imbrication of the petals in many 
flower-buds is a similar thing ; at an early period the small 



198 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

petals may be seen lying side by side, afterward growing 
within the capsule, they become folded round one an- 
other." . . . 

" If a flower-bud be opened at a sufficiently early period, 
the stamens will be found as if moulded in the cavity 
between the pistil and the corolla, which cavity the anthers 
exactly fill; the stalks lengthen at an after-period. I have 
noticed also in a few instances, that in those flowers in 
which the petals are imbricated, or twisted together, the 
pistil is tapering as growing up between the petals; in 
some flowers which have the petals so arranged in the bud 
as to form a dome (as the hawthorn, '-.//.). the pistil is 
flattened at the apex, and in the bnd ot cnpiee .-pace pre- 
cisely limited by the stamens below and the inclosing 
petals above and at the sides. 1 have nut, however, satis- 
lied myself that this holds gn od in all 

Without indorsing all Mr, Hinton's illustrations, to 
some of which exception mighl be taken, his conclusion 
may be accepted as a Large ii stalmenl of the truth. It is, 
however, to be remarked that in tin.- case of organic 
growth, as in all other cases, the line of movement is in 
strictness the resultant of tractive and resistant t 
and that the tractive forces here form iderablean 

element that the formula is Bcarcely complete without 
them. The shapes of plants are manifestly modified by 
gravitation: the direction of each branch is not what it 
would have been were the tractive force of the Earth absent; 
ami every flower and leaf is somewhat altered in the course 
of development by the weight of its parts. Though in 
animals such effects are less conspicuous, yet the insti 
in which flexible organs have their directions in great 
measure determined by gravity, justify the assertion that 
throughout the whole organism the forms of parts must 
be a fleeted by this force. 

The organic movements which constitute growth, are 
not, however, the only organic movements to be inter] . 
There are also those which constitute function. And 
throughout these the same general principles are difi 
ible. That the vessels along which blood, lymph, bile, and 
all the secretions, find their ways, are channels of least re- 
sistance, is a fact almost too conspicuous to be named as an 
illustration. Less conspicuous, however, is the truth, that 
the currents setting along these vessels are affected by the 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 199 

tractive force of the Earth : witness varicose veins ; witness 
the relief to an inflamed part obtained by raising it; wit- 
ness the congestion of head and face produced by stoop- 
ing. And the fact that dropsy in the legs gets greater 
by day and decreases at night, while, conversely, that 
oedematous fulness under the eyes common in debility, 
grows worse during the hours of .reclining and decreases 
after getting up, shows us how the transudation of fluid 
through the walls of the capillaries varies according as 
change of position changes the effect of gravity in differ- 
ent parts of the body. 

It may be well in passing just to note the bearing of the 
principle on the developments of species. From a dy- 
namic point of view, " natural selection" implies structural 
changes along lines of least resistance. The multiplication 
of any kind of plant or animal in localities that are favor- 
able to it, is a growth where the antagonistic forces are 
less than elsewhere. And the preservation of varieties that 
succeed better than their allies in coping with surround- 
ing conditions, is the continuance of vital movement in 
those directions where the obstacles to it are most eluded. 

§ 79. Throughout the phenomena of mind the law 
enunciated is not so readily established. In a large part 
of them, as those of thought and emotion, there is no per- 
ceptible movement. Even in sensation and volition, 
which show us in one part of the body an effect produced 
by a force applied to another part, the intermediate move- 
ment is inferential rather than visible. Such indeed are 
the difficulties that it is not possible here to do more than 
briefly indicate the proofs which might be given did space 
permit. 

Supposing the various forces throughout an organism 
to be previously in equilibrium, then any part which be- 
comes the seat of a further force, added or liberated, must 
be one from which the force, being resisted by smaller 
forces around, will initiate motion toward some other part 
of the organism. If elsewhere in the organism there is a 
point at which force is being expended, and which so is 
becoming minus a force which it before had, instead of 
plus a force which it before had not, and thus is made 
a point at which the reaction against surrounding forces 
is diminished; then, manifestly, a motion taking place 



200 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

between the first and the last of these points is a motion 
along the line of least resistance. Now a sensation im- 
plies a force added to, or evolved in, that part of the or- 
ganism which is its seat; while a mechanical movement 
implies an expenditure or loss of force in that part of the 
organism which is its seat. Hence if, as we find to be 
the fact, motion is habitually propagated from those parts 
of an organism to which the external world adds forces in 
tiie shape of nervous impressions, to those parts of an or- 
ganism which react on the external world through muscu- 
lar contractions, it is simply a fulfilment of the law above 
enunciated. From this genera] conclusion we may pass 
to a more special one. When there is anything in the 
circumstances of an animal's life, involving that a sen- 
sation in one particular place is habitually followed by a 
contraction in another particular place — when tic 
thus a frequently-repeated motion through the organism 

bet wc.'ii these places; what must be the result as respects 
the line along which the motions take place? R 
of equilibrium between the points at which the forces have 
been increased and decreased must take place through 
some channel. If this channel is affected by the 

— if the obstructive action of the tissue? traversed, involves 

any reaction upon them, deducting from their obstructive 
power; then a subsequent motion between these two | 
will meet with less resistance along this channel than the 
previous motion met with; and will consequently take this 
channel still more decidedly. If so. every repetition will 
still further diminish the resistance offered by this route: 
and hence will gradually be formed between the two a 
permanent line of communication, differing greatly from 
the surrounding tissue in respect of the ease with which 
force traverses it. "We see, therefore, that if between a 
particular impression and a particular motion associated 
with it. there is established a connection producing what 
is called reflex action, the law that motion follows the line 
of least resistance, and that, if the conditions remain 
constant, resistance in any direction is diminished by mo- 
tion occurring in that direction, supplies an explanation. 
Without further details it will be manifest that a like in- 
terpretation may be given to the succession of all other 
nervous changes. If in the surrounding world there are 
objects, attributes, or actions, that usually occur together, 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 201 

the effects severally produced by them in the organism 
will become so connected by those repetitions which we 
call experience, that they also will occur together. In 
proportion to the frequency with which any external con- 
nection of phenomena is experienced, will be the strength 
of the answering internal connection of nervous states. 
Thus there will arise all degrees of cohesion among nervous 
states, as there are all degrees of commonness among the 
surrounding coexistences and sequences that generate 
them: whence must result a general correspondence be- 
tween associated ideas and associated actions in the en- 
vironment. * 

The relation between emotions and actions may be sim- 
ilarly construed. As a first illustration let us observe what 
happens with emotions that are undirected by volitions. 
These, like feelings in general, expend themselves in 
generating organic changes, and chiefly in muscular con- 
tractions. As was pointed out in the last chapter, there 
result movements of the involuntary and voluntary mus- 
cles, that are great in proportion as the emotions are 
strong. It remains here to be pointed out, however, that 
the order in which these muscles are affected is explicable 
only on the principle above set forth. Thus, a pleasurable 
or painful state of mind of but slight intensity, does little 
more than increase the pulsations of the heart. Why? 
For the reason that the relation between nervous excitement 
and vascular contraction, being common to every genus 
and species of feeling, is the one of most frequent repeti- 
tion; that hence the nervous connection is, in the way 
above shown, the one which offers the least resistance to a 
discharge; and is therefore the one along which a feeble 
force produces motion. A sentiment or passion that is 
somewhat stronger, affects not only the heart but the mus- 
cles of the face, and especially those around the mouth. 
Here the like explanation applies; since these muscles, 
being both comparatively small, and, for purposes of 
speech, perpetually used, offer less resistance than other 
voluntary muscles to the nervo-motor force. By a further 
increase of emotion the respiratory and vocal muscles 
become perceptibly excited. Finally, under strong pas- 

* This paragraph is a restatement, somewhat amplified, of an idea set forth 
in the Medico -Chirurgical Review for January, 1859 (pp. 189 and 190); and 
contains the germ of the intended fifth part of the "Principles of Psychology," 
which was withheld for the reasons given in the preface to that work. 



202 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

si on, the muscles in general of the trunk and limbs are 
violently contracted. Without saying that the facts can 
be thus interpreted in all their details (a task requiring 
data impossible to obtain) it may be safely said that the 
order of excitation is from muscles that are small and fre- 
quently acted on, to those which are larger and less fre- 
quently acted on. The single instance of laughter, which 
is an undirected discharge of feeling that affects first the 
muscles round the mouth, then those of the vocal and respir- 
atory apparatus, then those of the limbs, and then those 
of the spine;* suffices to show that when no special route 
is opened for it, a force evolved in the nervous centres 
produces motion along channels which otter the least re- 
gistance, and if it is too great to escape by these, produces 
motion along channels offering successively greater resist- 
ance. 

Probably it will be thought impossible to extend this 
reasoning so as to include volitions. Yet we are not with- 
out evidence that the transition from special desires to 
special muscular acts, conforms to the same principle 
may be shown that the mental antecedents of a voluntary 
movement, are antecedents which temporarily make the 
lino along which this movement takes place, the line of 
least resistance. For a volition, suggested as it necessarily 
is by some previous thought connected with it by as 
tions that determine the transition, is itself a rep] 
tat ion of the movements that are willed, and of their 
sequences. Hut to represent in conscioustftss certain of 
our own movements, is partially to rouse the sensations 
accompanying such movements, inclusive of those of mus- 
cular tension — is partially to excite the appropriate motor- 
nerves and all the other nerves implicated. That is to 
say, the volition is itself an incipient discharge a' 
line which previous experiences have rendered a 111 
least resistance. And the passing of volition into action 
is simply a completion of the discharge. 

One corollary from this must be noted before proceed- 
ing; namely, that the particular set of muscular move- 
ments by which any object of desire is reached, are move- 
ments implying the smallest total of forces to he overcome. 
As each feeling generates motion along the line of least 

* For details see a paper on "The rhysioloiry of Laughter," published in 
Maan Man's Magazine for March, 1S00. 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 203 

resistance, it is tolerably clear that a group of feelings, 
constituting a more or less complex desire, will generate 
motion along a series of lines of least resistance. That is 
to say, the desired end will be achieved with the smallest 
expenditure of effort. Should it be objected that through 
want of knowledge or want of skill, a man often pursues 
the more laborious of two courses, and so overcomes a 
larger total of opposing forces than was necessary; the 
reply is, that relatively to his mental state the course he 
takes is that which presents the fewest difficulties. 
Though there is another which in the abstract is easier, 
yet his ignorance of it, or inability to adopt it, is, phys- 
ically considered, the existence of an insuperable obstacle 
to the discharge of his energies in that direction. Experi- 
ence obtained by himself, or communicated by others, has 
not established in him such channels of nervous com- 
munication as are required to make this better course the 
course of least resistance to him. 

§ 80. As in individual animals, inclusive of man, mo- 
tion follows lines of least resistance, it is to be inferred 
that among aggregations of men, the like will hold good. 
The changes in a society, being due to the joint actions of 
its members, the courses of such changes will be deter- 
mined as are those of all other changes wrought by com- 
position of forces. 

Thus when we contemplate a society as an organism, and 
observe the direction of its growth, we find this direction 
to be that in which the average of opposing forces is the 
least. Its units have energies' to be expended in self- 
maintenance and reproduction. These energies are met 
by various environing energies that are antagonistic to 
them — those of geological origin, those of climate, of wild 
animals, of other human races with whom they are at 
enmity or in competition. And the tracts the society 
spreads over, are those in which there is the smallest total 
antagonism. Or, reducing the matter to its ultimate 
terms, we may say that these social units have jointly and 
severally to preserve themselves and their offspring from 
those inorganic and organic forces which are ever tending 
to destroy them (either indirectly by oxidation and by un- 
due asbtraction of heat, or directly by bodily mutilation) ; 
that these forces are either counteracted by others which 



204 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

are available in the shape of food, clothing, habitations, 
and appliances of defence, or are, as far as may be, eluded ; 
and that population spreads in whichever directions there 
is the readiest escape from these forces, or the least exer- 
tion in obtaining the materials for resisting them, or both. 
For these reasons it happens that fertile valleys where 
water and vegetal produce abound, are early peopled, 
shores, too, supplying a large amount of easily-gathered 
food, are lines along which mankind have commonly 
spread. The general fact that, so far as we can judge 
from the traces left by them, large societies first appeared 
in those tropical regions where the fruits of the earth are 
obtainable with comparatively little exertion, and where 
the cost of maintaining bodily heat is but slight, is a fact 
of like meaning. And to these instances may be added 
the allied one daily furnished by emigration; which we 
see going on toward countries presenting the fewest ob- 
stacles to the self-preservation of individuals, and therefore 
to national growth. Similarly with that resistance to the 
movements of a society wuich neighboring societies offer. 
Each of the tribes or nations inhabiting any region, in- 
creases in numbers until it outgrows its means of su 
ence. In each there is thus a force, ever pressing outward 
on to adjacent areas — a force antagonized by Iik( 
the tribes or nations occupying those areas. And the 
ever-recurring wars that result — the conquests of weaker 
tribes or nations, and the over-running of their territories 
by the victors, are instances of social movements taking 
place in the directions of least resistance. Nor do the 
conquered peoples, when they escape extermination or en- 
slavement, fail to show us movements that are similarly 
determined. For migrating as they do to less fertile re- 
gions — taking refuge in deserts or among mountains — 
moving in a direction where the resistance to social growth 
is comparatively great: they still do this only under an 
excess oi pressure in all other directions: the physical ob- 
stacles to self-preservation they encounter, being really 
less than the obstacles offered by the enemies from whom 
they lly. 

' Internal social movements may also be thus interpreted. 
Localities naturally fitted for producing particular com- 
modities — that is, localities in which such commodity 
got at the least cost of force — that is, localities in which 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 205 

the desires for these commodities meet with the least re- 
sistance; become localities especially devoted to the ob- 
tainment of these commodities. Where soil and climate 
render wheat a profitable crop, or a crop from which the 
greatest amount of life-sustaining power is gained by a 
given quantity of effort, the growth of wheat becomes the 
dominant industry. Where wheat cannot be economically 
produced, oats, or rye, or maize, or rice, or potatoes, is 
the agricultural staple. Along sea-shores men support 
themselves with least effort by catching fish ; and henec 
choose fishiug as an occupation. And in places that ore 
rich in coal or metallic ores, the population, finding that 
labor devoted to the raising of these materials brings a 
larger return of food and clothing than when otherwise 
directed, becomes a population of miners. This last in- 
stance introduces us to the phenomena of exchange; which 
equally illustrate the general law. For the practice of 
barter begins as soon as it facilitates the fulfilment of men's 
desires, by diminishing the exertion needed to reach the 
objects of those desires. When instead of growing his* 
own corn, weaving his own cloth, sewing his own shoes, 
each man began to confine himself to farming, or weaving, 
or shoemaking; it was because each found it more labor- 
ious to make everything he wanted, than to make a great 
quantity of one thing and barter the surplus for the rest: 
by exchange, each procured the necessaries of life without 
encountering so much resistance. Moreover, in deciding 
what commodity to produce, each citizen was, as he is at 
the present day, guided in the same manner. For besides 
those local conditions which determine whole sections of 
a society toward the industries easiest for them, there are 
also individual conditions and individual aptitudes which 
to each citizen render certain occupations preferable ; and 
in choosing those forms of activity which their special 
circumstances and faculties dictate, these social units are 
severally moving toward the objects of their desires in the 
directions which present to them the fewest obstacles. 
The process of transfer which commerce presupposes, sup- 
plies another series of examples. So long as the forces to 
be overcome in procuring any necessary of life in the dis- 
trict where it is consumed, are less than the forces to be 
overcome in procuring it from an adjacent district, ex- 
change does not take place. But when the adjacent dis- 



206 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

trict produces it with an economy that is not out-balanced 
by cost of transit — when the distance is so small and the 
route so easy that the labor of conveyance plus the labor 
of production is less than the labor of production in the 
consuming district, transfer commences. Movement in the 
direction of least resistance is also seen in the establish- 
ment of the channels along which intercourse takes place. 
At the outset, when goods are carried on the backs of men 
and horses, the paths chosen are those which combine 
shortness with levelness and freedom from obstacles — those 
which are achieved with the smallest exertion. And in 
the subsequent formation of each highway, the course 
taken is that which deviates horizontally from a straight 
line so far only as is needful to avoid vertical deviations 
entailing greater labor in draught. The smallest total of 
obstructive forces determines the route, even in seemingly 
exceptional cases; as where a detour is made to avoid the 
opposition of a landowner. All subsequent improvements 
ending in macadamized roads, canals, and railways, which 
reduce the antagonism of friction and gravity to a mini- 
mum, exemplify the same truth. After there con 
be a choice of roads between one point and another, we 
still see that the road chosen i- that along which th< 
of transit is the least: cost being the measure of I 
ance. Even where time bi _ 'moderation, the more 

expensive route is followed, it is so because the 1 
time involves loss of force. When, division of labor hav- 
ing been carried to a considerable extent and meal 
communication made easy, there arises a marked local- 
ization of industries, the relative growths of the popu- 
lations devoted to them may be interpreted on the same 
principle. The influx of people to each industrial centre, 
as well as the rate of multiplication of those already in- 
habiting it, is determined by the payment for labor: that 
is — by the quantity of commodities which a given amount 
of effort will obtain. To say that artif . to places 

where, inconsequence of facilities for production, an extra 
proportion of produce can be given in tin shape of i 
is to say that they flock to places where t the small- 

est obstacles to the support of themselves and families. 
Hence, the rapid increase of number which occurs in sueh 
places, is really a social growth at points where the oppos- 
ing forces are the least. 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 207 

Nor is the law less clearly to be traced in those functional 
changes daily going on. The flow of capital into busi- 
nesses yielding the largest returns; the buying in the 
cheapest market and selling in the dearest ; the introduc- 
tion of more economical modes of manufacture; the de- 
velopment of better agencies for distribution; and all those 
variations in the currents of trade that are noted in our 
newspapers and telegrams from hour to hour; exhibit 
movement taking place in directions where it is met by 
the smallest total of opposing forces. For if we analyze 
each of these changes — if instead of interest on capital we 
read surplus of products which remains after maintenance 
of laborers; if we so interpret large interest or large sur- 
plus to imply labor expended with the greatest results ; and 
if labor expended with the greatest results means muscular 
action so directed as to evade obstacles as far as possible; 
we see that all these commercial phenomena are compli- 
cated motions set up along lines of least resistance. 

Objections of two opposite kinds will perhaps be made to 
these sociological applications of the law. By some it may 
be said that the term force as here used, is used metaphori- 
cally — that to speak of men as impelled in certain directions 
by certain desires, is a figure of speech and not the state- 
ment of a physical fact. The reply is, that the foregoing 
illustrations are to be interpreted literally, and that the 
processes described are physical ones. The pressure of 
hunger is an actual force — a sensation implying some state 
of nervous tension; and the muscular action which the 
sensation prompts is really a discharge of it in the shape 
of bodily motion — a discharge which, on analyzing the 
mental acts involved, will be found to follow lines of least 
resistance. Hence the motions of a society whose mem- 
bers are impelled by this or any other desire, are actually, 
and not metaphorically, to be understood in the manner 
shown. An opposite objection may possibly be, that the 
several illustrations given are elaborated truisms; and that 
the law of direction of motion being once recognized, 
the fact that social movements, in common with all others, 
must conform to it, follows inevitably. To this it may be 
rejoined, that a mere abstract assertion that social move- 
ments must do this, would carry no conviction to the ma- 
jority; and that it is needful to show how they do it. 
For social phenomena to be unified with phenomena of 



208 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

simpler kinds, it is requisite that such generalizations as 
those of political economy shall be reduced to equivalent 
propositions expressed in terms of force and motion. 

Social movements of these various orders severally con- 
form to the two derivative principles named at the outset. 
In the first place we may observe how, once set up in given 
directions, such movements, like all others, tend to con- 
tinue in these directions. A commercial mania or panic, 
a current of commodities, a social custom, a political agi- 
tation, or a popular delusion, maintains its course for a 
longtime after its original source has ceased; and requires 
antagonistic forces to arrest it. In the second place it is 
to be noted that in proportion to the complexity of social 
forces is the tortuousness of social movements. The in- 
volved series of muscular contractions gone through by 
the artisan, that lie may get the wherewithal to buy a 
loaf lying at the baker's next door, show us how extreme 
becomes the indirectness of motion when the agenc 
work become very numerous — a truth still better illustrated 
by the more public social actions; as those which end in 
bringing a successful man of business, toward the cl 
his life, into Parliament. 

§ SI. And now of the general truth set forth in this 
chapter, as of that dealt with in the last, let us ask — what 
is our ultimate evidence? Must we accept it simply as an 
empirical generalization? or may it be established as a 
corollary from a still deeper truth? The reader will an- 
ticipate the answer. We shall rind it deducible from that 
datum of consciousness which underlies all science. 

Suppose several tractive forces, variously directed, to 
be acting on a given body. Bj what is known among 
mathematicians as the composition of forces, there may be 
found for any two of these, a single force of such amount 
and direction as to produce on the body an exactly equal 
effect. If in the direction of each of them there be drawn 
a. straight line, and if the lengths of these two straight 
lines be made proportionate to the amounts of the forces; 
and if from the end of each line there be drawn a line 
parallel to the other, so as to complete a parallelogram: 
then the diagonal of this parallelogram represents the 
amount and direction of a force that is equivalent to the 
two. Such a resultant force, as it is called, mav be found 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 209 

for any pair of forces throughout the group. Similarly, 
for any pair of such resultants a single resultant may be 
found. And by repeating this course, ali of them may 
be reduced to two. If these two are equal and opposite — 
that is, if there is no line of greatest traction, motion does 
not take place. If they are opposite but not equal, motion 
takes place in the direction of the greater. And if they 
are neither equal nor opposite, motion takes place in the 
direction of their resultant. For in either of these cases 
there is an unantagonized force in one direction. And 
this residuary force that is not neutralized by an opposing 
one, must move the body in the direction in which it is 
acting. To assert the contrary is to assert that a force can 
be expended without effect — without generating an equiva- 
lent force ; and by so implying that force can cease to ex- 
ist, this involves a denial of the persistence of force. It 
need scarcely be added that if in place of tractions we take 
resistances, the argument equally holds; and that it holds 
also where both tractions and resistances are concerned. 
Thus the law that motion follows the line of greatest trac- 
tion, or the line of least resistance, or the resultant of the 
two, is a necessary deduction from that primordial truth 
which transcends proof. 

Reduce the proposition to its simplest form, and it be- 
comes still more obviously consequent on the persistence of 
force. Suppose two weights suspended over a pulley or 
from the ends of an equal-armed lever ; or better still — 
suppose two men pulling against each other. In such 
cases we say that the heavier weight will descend, and that 
the stronger man will draw the weaker toward him. But 
now, if we are asked how we know which is the heavier 
weight or the stronger man; we can only reply that it is 
the one producing motion in the direction of its pull. 
Our only evidence of excess of force is the movement it 
produces. But if of two opposing tractions we can know 
one as greater than the other only by the motion it gener- 
ates in its own direction, then the assertion that motion 
occurs in the direction of greatest traction is a truism. 
When, going a step further back, we seek a warrant for 
the assumption that of the two conflicting forces, that is 
the greater which produces motion in its own direction, 
we find no other than the consciousness that such part of 
the greater force as is unneutralized by the lesser, must 
14 



210 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

produce its effect — the consciousness that this residuary 
force cannot disappear, but must manifest itself in some 
equivalent change — the consciousness that force is per- 
sistent. Here too, as before, it may be remarked that no 
amount of varied illustrations, like those of which this 
chapter mainly consists, can give greater certainty to the 
conclusion thus immediately drawn from the ultimate da- 
tum of consciousness. For in all cases, as in the simple 
ones just given, we can identify the greatest force only by 
the resulting motion. It is impossible for us ever to get 
evidence of the occurrence of motion in any other direc- 
tion than that of the greatest force; since our measure of 
relative greatness among forces is their relative power of 
generating motion. And clearly, while the comparative 
greatness of forces is thus determined, no multiplication 
of instances can add certainty to a law of direction of 
movement which follows immediately from the persistence 
of force. 

From this same primordial truth, too, may be deduced the 
principle that motion once set up along any line, becomes 
itself a cause of subsequent motion along that line The 
mechanical axiom that, it left to itself, matter moving in 
any direction will continue in that direction with un- 
diminished velocity, is bnt an indirect assertion of the 
persistence of force; since it is an assertion that the force 
manifested in the transfer of a body along a certain length 
of a certain line in a certain time, cannot disappear with- 
out producing some equal manifestation — a manifestation 
which, in the absence of conflicting forces, must be a fur- 
ther transfer in the same direction at the same velocity. 
In the case of matter traversing matter the like inference 
is necessitated. Here indeed the actions are much more 
complicated. A liquid that follows a certain channel 
through or over a solid, as water along the Earth's surface, 
loses part of its motion in the shape of heat, through fric- 
tion and collision with the matters forming its bed. A 
further amount of its motion may be absorbed in over- 
coming forces which it liberates; as when it loosens a mass 
which falls into, and blocks up, its channel. But after 
these deductions by transformation into other modes of 
force, any further deduction from the motion of the water 
is at the expense of a reaction on the channel, which by 
so much diminishes its obstructive power: such reaction 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 211 

being shown in the motion acquired by the detached por- 
tions which are carried away. The cutting out of river- 
courses is a perpetual illustration of this truth. Still more 
involved is the case, of motion passing through matter by 
impulse from part to part; as a nervous discharge through 
animal tissue. Some chemical change may be wrought 
along the route traversed, which may render it less fit than 
before for conveying a current. Or the motion may itself 
be in part metamorphosed into some obstructive form of 
force; as in metals, the conducting power of which is, for 
the time, decreased by the heat which the passage of elec- 
tricity itself generates. The real question is, however, 
what structural modification, if any, is produced through- 
out the matter traversed, apart from incidental disturbing 
forces — apart from everything but the necessary resistance 
of the matter: that, namely, which results from the inertia 
of its units? If we confine our attention to that part of 
the motion which, escaping transformation, continues its 
course, then it is a corollary from the persistence of force 
that as much of this remaining motion as is taken up in 
changing the positions of the units, must leave these by 
so much less able to obstruct subsequent motion in the 
same direction. 

Thus in all the changes heretofore and at present dis- 
played by the Solar System ; in all those that have gone on 
and are still going on in the Earth's crust; in all processes 
of organic development and function ; in all mental actions 
and the effects they work on the body ; and in all modifi- 
cations of structure and activity in societies; the implied 
movements are of necessity determined in the manner 
above set forth. Wherever we see motion, its direction 
must be that of the greatest force. Wherever we see the 
greatest force to be acting in a given direction, in that 
direction motion must ensue. These are not truths hold- 
ing only of one class, or of some classes, of phenomena; 
but they are among those universal truths by which our 
knowledge of phenomena in general is unified. 



CHAPTER X. 

THE RHYTHM OF MOTION. 

§ 82. When the pennant of a vessel lying becalmed first 
shows the coming breeze, it does so by gentle undulations 
that travel from its fixed to its free end. Presently the 
sails begin to flap; and their blows against the mast in- 
crease in rapidity as the breeze rises. Even when, being 
fully bellied out, they are in great part steadied by the 
strain of the yards and cordage, their free edges tremble 
with each stronger gust. And should there come a gale, 
the jar that is felt on laying hold of the shrouds shows that 
the rigging vibrates; while the rush and whistle of the wind 
prove that in it, also, rapid undulations are generated. 
Ashore the conflict between the current of air and the 
things it meets results in a like rhythmical action. The 
leaves all shiver in the blast; each branch oscillates; and 
every exposed tree sways to and fro. The bla les of grass 
and dried bents in the meadows, and still better the stalks 
in tin' neighboring eorn-lields, exhibit the same rising and 
falling movement. Nor do the more stable objects fail to 
do the like, though in a less manifest fashion; as witness 
the shudder that may be felt throughout a house during 
the paroxysms of a violent storm. Streams of water pro- 
duce in opposing objects the same general effects as do 
streams of air. Submerged weeds growing in the middle 
of a brook, undulate from end to end. Branches brought 
down by the last Hood and left entangled at the bottom, 
where the current is rapid, are thrown into a state of up- 
and-down movement that is slow or quick in proportion as 
they are large or small; and where, as in great rivers like 
the Mississippi, whole trees are thus held, the name 
"sawyers," by which they are locally known, sufficiently 
describes the rhythm produced in them. Note again the 
effect of the antagonism between the current and its chan- 
nel. In shallow places, where the action of the bottom 
on the water flowing over it is visible, we see a ripple pro- 
duced — a series of undulations. And if we study the 
action and reaction going on between the moving fluid 
and its banks, we still tind the principle illustrated, though 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 213 

in a different way. For in every rivulet, as in the mapped- 
out course of every great river, the bends of the stream 
from side to side throughout its tortuous course constitute 
a lateral undulation — an undulation so inevitable that 
even an artificially straightened channel is eventually 
changed into a serpentine one. Analogous phenomena 
may be observed where the water is stationary and the 
solid matter moving. A stick drawn laterally through 
the water with much force, proves by the throb which it 
communicates to the hand that it is in a state of vibration. 
Even where the moving body is massive, it only requires 
that great force should be applied to get a sensible effect 
of like kind: instance the screw of a screw-steamer, which 
instead of a smooth rotation falls into a rapid rlrythm that 
sends a tremor through the whole vessel. The sound 
which results when a bow is drawn over a violin-string, 
shows us vibrations produced by the movement of a solid 
over a solid. In lathes and planing machines, the at- 
tempt to take off a thick shaving causes a violent jar cf 
the whole apparatus, and the production of a series of 
waves on the ^ iron or wood that is cut. Every boy in 
scraping his slate-pencil finds it scarcely possible to help 
making a ridged surface. If you roll a ball along the 
ground or over the ice, there is always more or less up-and- 
down movement — a movement that is visible while the 
velocity is considerable, but becomes too small and rapid 
to be seen by the unaided eye as the velocity diminishes. 
However smooth the rails, and however perfectly built the 
carriages, a railway train inevitably gets into oscillations, 
both lateral and vertical. Even where moving matter 
is suddenly arrested by collision, the law is still illus- 
trated ; for both the body striking and the body struck 
are made to tremble; and trembling is rhythmical move- 
ment. Little as we habitually observe it, it is yet certain 
that the impulses our actions impress from moment to 
moment on surrounding objects, are propagated through 
them in vibrations. It needs but to look through a tele- 
scope of high power, to be convinced that each pulsation 
of the heart gives a jar to the whole room. If we pass to 
motions of another order — those, namely, which take place 
in the ethereal medium — we still find the same thing. 
Every fresh discovery confirms the hypothesis that light 
consists of undulations. The rays of heat, too, are now 



214 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

found to have a like fundamental nature: their undula- 
tions differing from those of light only in their compara- 
tive lengths. Nor do the movements of electricity fail to 
furnish us with an illustration; though one of a different 
order. The northern aurora may often be observed to 
pulsate with waves of greater brightness; and the electric 
discharge through a vacuum shows us by its strati tied 
appearance that the current is not uniform, but 
in gushes of greater and lesser intensity. Should it be 
said that at any rate there are some motions, as those of 
projectiles, which are not rhythmical, the reply is, that 
the exception is apparent only; and that these motions 
would be rhythmical if fchey were not interrupted. It is 
common to assert that the trajectory of a cannon-ball is 
a parabola; audit is true that (omitting atmospheric re- 
sistance) the curve described differs so Blightly from a 
parabola that it may practically be regarded as one. Hut, 
strictly speaking, it is a portion of an extremely eccentric 
ellipse, having the Earths centre of gravity for i 
focus; and but for its arrest l>\ the Bubstanceof the Earth, 
the cannon-ball would travel round that focus and return 
to the point whence it started j again to repeat this 
rhythm, Indeed, while Beeming at first Bight to do the 
reverse, the discharge of a cannon furnishes one of th< 
illustrations of the principle enunciated. The exp] 
produces violent undulations in the surrounding air. 
The whizz of the shot, as it ilies toward it< mark, is due 
to another series of atmospheric undulations. And the 
movement to and from the Earth's centre, which the 
cannon-ball is beginning to perform, being checked by 
solid matter, is transformed into a rhythm of another 
order; namely, the vibration which the blow sends thl 
neighboring bodies.* 

Rhythm is very generally not simple but compound. 
There arc usually at work various forces, causing undula- 
tions differing in rapidity; and hence it continually hap- 
pens that besides the primary rhythms there are secondary 
.rhythms, produced by the periodic coincidence and antag- 
onism of the primary ones. Double, triple, and 
quadruple rhythms, are thus generated. One of the sim- 

* After haying for some years supposed myself alone in the belief that all 
motion is rhythmical, 1 discovered that my friend Professor Tymlall ah 
this doctrine. 



! 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 215 

plest instances is afforded by what in acoustics are known 
as " beats:" recurring intervals of sound and silence which 
are perceived when two notes of nearly the same pitch are 
struck together; and which are due to the alternate cor- 
respondence and antagonism of the atmospheric waves. 
In like manner the various phenomena due to what is 
called interference of light, severally result from the peri- 
odic agreement and disagreement of ethereal undulations 
— undulations which, by alternately intensifying and neu- 
tralizing each other, produce intervals of increased and 
diminished light. On the sea-shore may be noted sundry 
instances of compound rhythm. We have that of the 
tides, in which the daily rise and fall undergoes a fort- 
nightly increase and decrease, due to the alternate coinci- 
dence and antagonism of the solar and lunar attractions. 
We have again that which is perpetually furnished by the 
surface of the sea: every large wave bearing smaller ones 
on its sides, and these still smaller ones; with the result 
that each flake of foam, along with the portion of water 
bearing it, undergoes minor ascents and descents of several 
orders while it is being raised and lowered by the greater 
billows. A quite different and very interesting example 
of compound rhythm occurs in the little rills which, at 
low tide, run over the sand out of the shingle banks above. 
Where the channel of one of these is narrow, and the stream 
runs strongly, the sand at the bottom is raised into a series 
of ridges corresponding to the ripple of the water. On 
watching for a short time, it will be seen that these ridges 
are being raised higher and the ripple growing stronger; 
until at length, the action becoming violent, the whole 
series of ridges is suddenly swept away, the stream runs 
smoothly, and the process commences afresh. Instances of 
still more complex rhythms might be added ; but they will 
come more appropriately in connection with the several 
kinds of cosmical changes, hereafter to be dealt with. 

From the ensemble of the facts as above set forth, it will 
be seen that rhythm results wherever there is a conflict of 
forces not in equilibrium. If the antagonist forces at any 
point are balanced, there is rest ; and in the absence of 
motion there can of course be no rhythm. But if instead 
of a balance there is an excess of force in one direction — if, 
as necessarily follows, motion is set up in that direction ; 
then for that motion to continue uniformly in that direc- 



216 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

tion, it is requisite that the moving matter should, not- 
withstanding its unceasing change of place, present un- 
changing relations to the sources of force by which its 
motion is produced and opposed. This, however, is impos- 
sible. Every further transfer through space must alter the 
ratio between the forces concerned — must increase or 
decrease the predominance of one force over the other — 
must prevent uniformity of movement. And if the move- 
ment cannot be uniform, then, in the absence of accele- 
ration or retardation continued through infinite time and 
space (results which cannot be conceived), the only alter- 
native is rhythm. 

A secondary conclusion must not be omitted. In the 
last chapter we saw that motion is never absolutely recti- 
linear; and here it remains to be added that, as a con- 
sequence, rhythm is necessarily incomplete. A truly 
rectilinear rhythm can arise only when the opposing forces 
are in exactly the Bame line; and the probabilities against 
this are infinitely great. To generate a perfectly circular 
rhythm, the two forces concerned must be exactly at right 
angles to each other, and must have exactly a certain ratio; 
and against this the probabilities are likewise infinitely 
great. All other proportions and directions of the two 
forces will produce an ellipse of greater or less eccentricity. 
And when, as indeed always happens, above two l'oiv 
engaged, the curve described must be more complex; and 
cannot exactly repeat itself. So that in fact throughout 
nature, this act ion and reaction of forces never brings about 
a complete return to a previous state. Where the move- 
ment is much involved, and especially where it is that of 
some aggregate whose units are partially independent, 
anything like a regular curve is no longer traceable; we 
see nothing more than a general oscillation. And on the 
completion of any periodic movement, the degree in which 
the state arrived at differs from the state departed from, is 
usually marked in proportion as the influences at work are 
numerous. 

§ 83. That spiral arrangement so general among the 
more diffused uebulse — an arrangement which must be 
assumed by matter moving toward a centre of gravity 
through a resisting medium — shows us the progr 
establishment of revolution, and therefore of rhythm, in 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 217 

those remote spaces which the nebulae occupy. Double 
stars, moving round common centres of gravity in periods 
some of which are now ascertained, exhibit settled rhyth- 
mical actions in distant parts of our siderial system. And 
another fact which, though of a different order, has a like 
general significance, is furnished by variable stars — stars 
which alternately brighten and fade. 

The periodicities of the planets, satellites, and comets, 
are so familiar that it would be inexcusable to name them, 
were it not needful here to point out that they are so many 
grand illustrations of this general law of movement. But 
besides the revolutions of these bodies in their orbits (all 
more or less eccentric) and their rotations on their axes, 
the solar system presents us with various rhythms of a less 
manifest and more complex kind. In each planet and 
satellite there is the revolution of the nodes — a slow change 
in the position of the orbit-plane, which after completing 
itself commences afresh. There is the gradual alteration 
in the length of the axis major of the orbit; and also of its 
eccentricity: both of which are rhythmical alike in the 
sense that they alternate between maxima and minima, 
and in the sense that the progress from one extreme to the 
other is not uniform, but is made with fluctuating veloc- 
ity. Then, too, there is the revolution of the line of 
apsides, which in course of time moves round the heavens 
— not regularly, but through complex oscillations. And 
further we have variations in the directions of the plane- 
tary axes — that known as nutation, and that larger gy- 
ration which, in the case of the Earth, causes the precession 
of the equinoxes. These rhythms, already more or less 
compound, are compounded with each other. Such an 
instance as the secular acceleration and retardation of the 
moon, consequent on the varying eccentricity of the 
Earth's orbit, is one of the simplest. Another, having 
more important consequences, results from the changing 
direction of the axes of rotation in planets whose orbits 
are decidedly eccentric. Every planet, during a certain 
long period, presents more of its northern than of its 
southern hemisphere to the sun at the time of its nearest 
approach to him ; and then again, during a like period, 
presents more of its southern hemisphere than of its north- 
ern — a recurring coincidence which, though causing in 
some planets no sensible alterations of climate, involves in 



218 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

the case of the Earth an epoch of 21,000 years, during 
which each hemisphere goes through a cycle of temperate 
seasons, and seasons that are extreme in their heat and 
cold. Nor is this all. There is even a variation of this 
variation. For the summers and winters of the whole 
Earth become more or less strongly contrasted, as the ec- 
centricity of its orbit increases and decreases. Hence dur- 
ing increase of the eccentricity, the epochs of moderately 
contrasted seasons and epochs of strongly contrasted sea- 
sons, through which alternately each hemisphere passes, 
must grow more and more different in the degrees of their 
contrasts; and contrariwise during decrease of the eccen- 
tricity. So that in the quantity of light and heat which 
any portion of the Earth receives from the sun, there goes 
on a quadruple rhythm: that of day and night; that of 
summer and winter; that due to the changing position of 
the axis at perihelion and aphelion, taking 21,000 years to 
complete; and that involved by the variation of the orbit's 
eccentricity, gone through in millions of years. 

§ 8-4. Those terrestrial processes whose dependence on 
the solar heat is direct, of course exhibit a rhythm that 
corresponds to the periodically changing amount of heat 
which each part of the Earth receives. The simplest, 
though the least obtrusive, instance is supplied by the 
magnetic variations. In these there is a diurnal in 
and decrease, an annual increase and decrease, and a de- 
cennial increase and decrease; the latter answering to a 
period during which the solar spots become alternately 
abundant ami scarce: besides which known variations 
there are probably other corresponding with the astronom- 
ical cycles just described. More obvious examples are 
furnished by the movements of the ocean and the atmo- 
sphere. Marine currents from the equator to the poles 
above, and from the poles to the equator beneath, show us 
an unceasing backward and forward motion throughout 
this vast mass of water — a motion varying in amount ac- 
cording to the seasons, and compounded with smaller like 
motions of local origin. The similarly- caused general 
currents in the air, have similar annual variations similarly 
modified. Irregular as they are in detail, we still see in 
the monsoons and other tropical atmospheric disturbances, 
or even in our own equinoctial gales and spring east 






FIRST PRINCIPLES. 219 

winds, a periodicity sufficiently decided. Again, we have 
an alternation of times during which evaporation predomi- 
nates with times during which condensation predominates: 
shown in the tropics by strongly marked rainy seasons and 
seasons of drought, and in the temperate zones by cor- 
responding changes of which the periodicity, though less 
definite, is still traceable. The diffusion and precipitation 
of water, besides the slow alternations answering to differ- 
ent parts of the year, furnish us with examples of rhythm 
of a more rapid kind. During wet weather, lasting, let 
us say, over some weeks, the tendency to condense, though 
greater than the tendency to evaporate, does not show it- 
self in continuous rain; but the period is made up of 
rainy days and days that are wholly or partially fair. Nor 
is it in this rude alternation only that the law is mani- 
fested. During any day throughout this wet weather a 
minor rhythm is traceable; and especially so when the ten- 
dencies to evaporate and to condense are nearly balanced. 
Among mountains this minor rhythm and its causes may 
be studied to great advantage. Moist winds, which do 
not precipitate their contained water in passing over the 
comparatively warm lowlands, lose so much heat when 
they reach the cold mountain peaks, that condensation 
rapidly takes place. Water, however, in passing from the 
gaseous to the fluid state, gives out a considerable amount 
of heat; and hence the resulting clouds are warmer than 
the air that precipitates them, and much warmer than the 
high rocky surfaces round which they fold' themselves. 
Hence in the course of the storm, these high rocky sur- 
faces are raised in temperature, partly by radiation from 
the enwrapping cloud, partly by contact of the falling rain- 
drops. Giving off more heat than before, they no longer 
lower so greatly the temperature of the air passing over 
them; and so cease to precipitate its contained water. 
The clouds break ; the sky begins to clear ; and a gleam of 
sunshine promises that the day is going to be fine. But 
the small supply of heat which the cold mountain's sides 
have received, is soon lost : especially when the dispersion 
of the clouds permits free radiation into space. Very 
soon, therefore, these elevated surfaces, becoming as cold 
as at first (or perhaps even colder in virtue of the evapo- 
ration set up), begin again to condense the vapor in the 
air above; and there comes another storm, followed by 



220 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

the same effects as before. In lowland regions this action 
and reaction is usually less conspicuous, because the con- 
trast of temperatures is less marked. Even here, however, 
it may be traced ; and that not only on showery days, but 
on days of continuous rain; for in these we do not see 
uniformity: always there are fits of harder and gentler 
rain that are probably caused as above explained. 

Of course these meteorologic rhythms involve something 
corresponding to them in the changes wrought by wind 
and water on the Earth's surface. Variations in the 
quantities of sediment brought down by rivers that rise 
and fall with the seasons must cause variations in the 
resulting strata — alternations of color or quality in the 
successive laminae. Beds formed from the detritus of 
shores worn down and carried away by the waves must 
similarly show periodic differences answering to the peri- 
odic winds of the locality. In so far as frost influences 
the rate of denudation, its recurrence is a factor in the 
rhythm of sedimentary deposits. And the geol 
changes produced by glaciers and icebergs must similarly 
have their alternating periods of greater and less intensity. 

There is evidence also that modifications in the Earth's 
crust due to igneous action have a certain periodicity. 
Volcanic eruptions are not continuous but intermittent, 
and, as far as the data enable us to judge, have a certain 
average rate of recurrence; which rate of recurren 
complicated by rising into epoch- of greater activity and 
falling into epochs of comparative quiescence. So too is 
it with earthquakes and the elevations or dep: ftUBed 

by them. At the mouth of the Mississippi, the alternation 
of strata gives decisive proof of successive sinkings of the 
surface, that have taken [dace at tolerably equal intervals. 
Everywhere, in the extensive groups of conformable strata 
that imply small subsidences recurring with a certain 
average frequency, we see a rhythm in the action and re- 
action between the Earth's crust and its molten contents — 
a rhythm compounded with those slower ones shown in 
the termination of groups of strata, and the commence- 
ment of other groups not conformable to them. There is 
even reason for suspecting a geological periodicity that 
is immensely slower and far wider in its effects; namely, 
an alternation of those vast upheavals and submergeneies 
by which continents are produced where there were oceans, 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 221 

and oceans where there were continents. For supposing, 
as we may fairly do, that the Earth's crust is throughout 
of tolerably equal thickness, it is manifest that such por- 
tions of it as become most depressed below the average 
level must have their inner surfaces most exposed to the cur- 
rents of molten matter circulating within, and will therefore 
undergo a larger amount of what may be called igneous 
denudation; while, conversely, the withdrawal of the in- 
ner surfaces from these currents where the Earth's crust 
is most elevated will cause a thickening more or less com- 
pensating the aqueous denudation going on externally. 
Hence those depressed areas over which the deepest oceans 
lie, being gradually thinned beneath and not covered by 
much sedimentary deposit above, will become areas of least 
resistance, and will then begin to yield to the upward pres- 
sure of the Earth's contents; whence will result, through- 
out such areas, long continued elevations, ceasing only 
when the reverse state of things has been brought about. 
Whether this speculation be well or ill founded, does not, 
however, affect the general conclusion. Apart from it we 
have sufficient evidence that geologic processes are rhythmi- 
cal. 

§ 85. Perhaps nowhere are the illustrations of rhythm 
so numerous and so manifest as among the phenomena of 
life. Plants do not, indeed, usually show us any decided 
periodicities, save those determined by day and night and 
by the seasons. But in animals we have a great variety of 
movements in which the alternation of opposite extremes 
goes on with all degrees of rapidity. The swallowing of 
food is effected by a wave of constriction passing along the 
oesophagus; its digestion is accompanied by a muscular 
action of the stomach that is also undulatory; and the 
peristaltic motion of the intestines is of like nature. The 
blood obtained from this food is propelled not in a uniform 
current but in pulses; and it is aerated by lungs that 
alternately contract and expand. All locomotion results 
from oscillating movements: even where it is apparently 
continuous, as in many minute forms, the microscope 
proves the vibration of cilia to be the agency by which 
the creature is moved smoothly forward. 

Primary rhythms of the organic actions are compounded 
with secondary ones of longer duration. These various 



222 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

modes of activity have their recurring periods of increase 
and decrease. We see this in the periodic need for food, 
and in the periodic need for repose. Each meal induces 
a more rapid rhythmic action of the digestive organs; the 
pulsation of the heart is accelerated; and the inspirations 
become more frequent. During sleep, on the contrary, 
these several movements slacken. So that in the course 
of the twenty-four hours, those small undulations of which 
the different kinds of organic action are constituted 
undergo one long wave of increase and decrease, complicated 
with several minor waves. Experiments have shown that 
there are still slower rises and falls of functional activity. 
Waste and assimilation are not balanced by every meal, 
but one or other maintains for some time a slight ea 
so that a person in ordinary health is found to undergo 
an increase and decrease of weight during recurring inter- 
vals of tolerable equality. Besides these regular periods 
there are still longer and comparatively irregular ones; 
namely, those alterations of greater and less vigor, which 
even healthy people experience. So inevitable are these 
oscillations that even men in training cannot be kept 
stationary at their highest power, but when they have 
reached it begin to retrograde. Further evidence of 
rhythm in the vital movement- is furnished by invalids. 
Sundry disorders are named from the intermittent char- 
acter of their symptoms. Even where the periodicity is 
not very marked, it is mostly traceable. Patients rarely 
if ever get uniformly worse; and convalescents have usually 
their days of partial relapse or of less decided advan 

Aggregates of living creatures illustrate the general 
truth in other ways. If each species of organism be re- 
garded as a whole, it displays two kinds of rhythm. Life 
as it exists in all the members of such species is an ex- 
tremely complex kind of movement, more or less distinct 
from the kinds of movement which constitute life in other 
species. In each individual of the species, this extremely 
complex kind of movement begins, rise to its climax, de- 
clines, and ceases in death. And every successive gener- 
ation thus exhibits a wave of that peculiar activity 
characterizing the species as a whole. The other form of 
rhythm is to be traced in that variation of number which 
each tribe of animals and plants is ever undergoing. 
Throughout the unceasing conflict between the tendency of 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 223 

a species to increase and the antagonistic tendencies, there 
is never an equilibrium: one always predominates. In the 
case even of a cultivated plant or domesticated animal, 
where artificial means are used to. maintain the supply at a 
uniform level, we still see that oscillations of abundance 
and scarcity cannot be avoided. And among the creat- 
ures uncared for by man, such oscillations are usually more 
marked. After a race of organisms has been greatly 
thinned by enemies or lack of food, its surviving members 
become more favorably circumstanced than usual. Dur- 
ing the decline in their numbers their food has grown 
relatively more abundant; while their enemies have di- 
minished from want of prey. The conditions thus remain 
for some time favorable to their increase ; and they multi- 
ply rapidly. By and by their food is rendered relatively 
scarce, at the same time that their enemies have become 
more numerous; and the destroying influences being thus 
in excess, their number begins to diminish again. Yet one 
more rhythm, extremely slow in action, may be traced in 
the phenomena of Life, contemplated under their most 
general aspect. The researches . of paleontologists show 
that there have been going on, during the vast period of 
which our sedimentary rocks bear record, successive 
changes of organic forms. Species have appeared, become 
abundant, and then disappeared. Genera, at first con- 
stituted of but few species, have for a time gone on grow- 
ing more multiform, and then have begun to decline in 
the number of their subdivisions: leaving at last but one 
01 two representatives, or none at all. During longer 
epochs whole orders have thus arisen, culminated, and 
dwindled away. And even those wider divisions contain- 
ing many orders have similarly undergone a gradual rise, 
a high tide, and a long-continued ebb. The stalked 
Crinoidea, for example, which, during the carboniferous 
epoch, became abundant, have almost disappeared: only 
a single species being extant. Once a large family of 
molluscs, the Brachiopoda have now become rare. The 
shelled Cephalopods, at one time dominant among the in- 
habitants of the ocean, both in number of forms and of 
individuals, are in our day nearly extinct. And after an 
"age of reptiles," there has come an age in which reptiles 
have been in great measure supplanted by mammals. 
Whether these vast rises and falls of different kinds of life 



224 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

ever undergo anything approaching to repetitions (which 
they may possibly do in correspondence with these vast 
cycles of elevation and subsidence that produce continents 
and oceans), it is sufficiently clear that Life on the Earth 
has not progressed uniformly, but in immense undulations. 

§ 86. It is not manifest that the changes of conscious- 
ness are in any sense rhythmical. Yet here, too, analysis 
proves both that the mental state existing at aitv moment 
is not uniform, but is decomposable into rapid oscillations; 
and also that mental states pass through longer intervals 
of increasing and decreasing intensity. 

Though while attending to any single sensation, or any 
group of related sensations constituting the consciousness 
of an object, we seem to remain for the time in a persis- 
tent and homogeneous condition of mind, a careful self- 
examination shows that this apparently unbroken mental 
state is in truth traversed by a number of minor states, in 
which various other sensations and perceptions are rapidly 
presented and disappear. From the admitted fact that 
thinking consists in the establishment of relations, it is 
a necessary corollary that the maintenance of conscious- 
ness in any one state to the entire exclusion of other 
states, would be a cessation of thought, that is, of con- 
sciousness. So that any seemingly continuous feelin_ 
of pressure, really consists of portions of that feeling per- 
petually recurring after the momentary intrusion of other 
feelings and ideas — quick thoughts concerning the place 
where it is felt, the external object producing it, its conse- 
quences, and other things suggested by association. Thus 
there is going on an extremely rapid departure from, and 
return to, that particular mental state which we regard as 
persistent. Besides the evidence of rhythm in conscious- 
ness which direct analysis thus affords, we may gather 
further evidence from the correlation between feeling and 
movement. Sensations and emotions expend themselves 
in producing muscular contractions. If a sensation or 
emotion were strictly continuous, there would be a contin- 
uous discharge along those motor nerves acted upon. But 
so far as experiments with artificial stimuli enable us to 
judge, a continuous discharge along the nerve leading 
muscle, does not contract it: a broken discharge is re- 
quired — a rapid succession of shoeks. Hence muscular 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 225 

contraction presupposes that rhythmic state of conscious- 
ness which direct observation discloses. A much more 
conspicuous rhythm, having longer waves, is seen during 
the outflow of emotion into danciug, poetry, and music. 
The current of mental energy that shows itself in these 
modes of bodily action is not continuous, but falls into a 
succession of pulses. The measure of a dance is produced 
by the alternation of strong muscular contractions with 
weaker ones; and, save in measures of the simplest order 
such as are found among barbarians and children, this 
alternation is compounded with longer rises and falls in 
the degree of muscular excitement. Poetry is a form of 
speech which results when the emphasis is regularly recur- 
rent ; that is, when the muscular effort of pronunciation 
has definite periods of greater and less intensity — periods 
that are complicated with others of like nature answering 
to the successive verses. Music, in still more various 
ways, exemplifies the law. There are the recurring bars, 
in each of which there is a primary and a secondary beat. 
There is the alternate increase and decrease of muscular 
strain, implied by the ascents and descents to the higher 
and lower notes — ascents and descents composed of smaller 
waves, breaking the rises and falls of the larger ones, in a 
mode peculiar to each melody. And then we have, fur- 
ther, the alternation of piano and forte passages. That 
these several kinds of rhythm, characterizing aesthetic ex- 
pression, are not, in the common sense of the word, arti- 
ficial, but are intenser forms of an undulatory movement 
habitually generated by feeling in its bodily discharge, is 
shown by the fact that they are all traceable in ordinary 
speech; which in every sentence has its primary and 
secondary emphases, and its cadence containing a chief rise 
and fall complicated with subordinate rises and falls; and 
which is accompanied by a more or less oscillatory action 
of the limbs when the emotion is great. Still longer un- 
dulations may be observed by every one, in himself and in 
others, on occasions of extreme pleasure or extreme pain. 
Note, in the first place, that pain having its origin in 
bodily disorder is nearly always perceptibly rhythmical, 
During hours in which it never actually ceases, it has its 
variations of intensity — fits or paroxysms; and then after 
these hours of suffering there usually come hours of com- 
parative ease. Moral pain has the like smaller and larger 
15 



226 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

waves. One possessed by intense grief does not utter con- 
tinuous moans, or shed tears with an equable rapidity ; but 
these signs of passion come in recurring bursts. Then 
after a time during which such stronger and weaker waves 
of emotion alternate, there comes a calm — a time of com- 
parative deadness; to which again succeeds another inter- 
val, when dull sorrow rises afresh into acute anguish, with 
its series of paroxysms. Similarly in great delight, es- 
pecially as manifested by children who have its display less 
under control, there are visible variations in the intensity 
of feeling shown — fits of laughter and dancing about, 
separated by pauses in which smiles, and other slight man- 
ifestations of pleasure, suffice to discharge the lea 
excitement. Nor are there wanting evidences of mental 
undulations greater in length than any of these — un- 
dulations which take weeks, or months, or years, to com- 
plete themselves. We continually hear of - which 
recur at intervals. Very many pochs 
of vivacity and depression. There are periods of industry 
following periodsof idleness; and times at which particular 
subjects or tastes are cultivated with seal, alternating with 
times at which they are neglected. Reepe sting which 
oscillations, the only qualification to he mad- being 
affected by numerous influences, they are comparatively 
irregular. 

£ ST. In nomadic societies the changes of pis 
mined as they usually are by exhai - r failure of the 

supply of food, are periodic; and in many iow a 

recurrence answering to the - Bach tribe that 

has become in some degree fixed in it- localit; . 
increasing, till, under the pressures of unsatisfied d 
there results migration of some part of it to a new r S 
■ — a process repeated at intervals. From such i 
population, and such successive waves of migration, come 
conflicts with other tribes: which are also increasing and 
tending to diffuse themselves. This antagonism, lik 
others, results not in a uniform motion, but in an inter- 
mittent one. War, exhaustion recoil — pea . sperity, 
and renewed aggression — see here the alternation more or 
less discernible in the military activities of both savage and 
civilized nations. And irregular as is this rhythm, it is 
not more so than the different sizes of tlK s, and 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 227 

the extremely involved causes of variation in their strengths, 
would lead us to anticipate. 

Passing from external to internal changes, we meet with 
this backward and forward movement under many forms. 
In the currents of commerce it is especially conspicuous. 
Exchange during early times is almost wholly carried on 
at fairs, held at long intervals in the chief centres of pop- 
ulation. The flux and reflux of people and commodities 
which each of these exhibits becomes more frequent as 
national development leads to greater social activity. The 
more rapid rhythm of weekly markets begins to supersede 
the slo*v rhythm of fairs. And eventually the process of 
exchange becomes at certain places so active, as to bring 
about daily meetings of buyers and sellers — a daily wave of 
accumulation and distribution of cotton, or corn, or cap- 
ital. If from exchange we turn to production and con- 
sumption, ive see undulations, much longer indeed in 
their periods, but almost equally obvious. Supply and de- 
mand are never completely adapted to each other ; but each 
of them, from time to time in excess, leads presently to an 
excess of the other. Farmers who have one season produced 
wheat very abundantly, are disgusted with the consequent 
low price; and next season, sowing a milch smaller quan- 
tity, bring to market a deficient crop; whence follows 
a converse effect. Consumption undergoes parallel un- 
dulations that need not be specified. The balancing of 
supplies between different districts, too, entails analogous 
oscillations. A place at which some necessary of life is 
scarce becomes a place to which currents of it are set up 
from other places where it is relatively abundant; and 
these currents from all sides lead to a wave of accumulation 
where they meet — a glut: whence follows a recoil — a par- 
tial return of the currents. But the undulatory character 
of these actions is perhaps best seen in the rises and falls 
of prices. These, given in numerical measures which may 
be tabulated and reduced to diagrams, show us in the 
clearest manner how commercial movements are com- 
pounded of oscillations of various magnitudes. The price 
of consols or the price of wheat, as thus represented, is seen 
to undergo vast ascents and descents whose highest and 
lowest points are reached only in the course of years. 
These largest waves of variations are broken by others 
extending over periods of perhaps many months. On 



228 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

these ; again come others having a week or two's duration. 
And were the changes marked in greater detail, we should 
have the smaller undulations that take place each da}*, 
and the still smaller ones which brokers telegraph from 
hour to hour. The whole outline would show a compli- 
cation like that of a vast ocean-swell, on whose surface 
there rise large billows, which themselves bear waves of 
moderate size, covered by wavelets, that are roughened by 
a minute ripple. Similar diagramatic representations of 
births, marriages, and deaths, of disease, of crime, of 
pauperism, exhibit involved conflicts of rhythmical mo- 
tions throughout societv under these several asp' 

There are like characteristics in social changes of a more 
complex kind. Both in England and among continental 
nations, the action and reaction of political progress have 
come to be generally recognized. Religion, besides its 
occasional revivals of smaller magnitude, has its long peri- 
ods of exaltation and depression — generations of belief and 
self- mortification, following generations of indifference and 
laxity. There are poetical epochs, and epochs in which 
the sense of the beautiful seems almost dormant. Philoso- 
phy, after having been awhile predominant, lapses for a long 
season into neglect; and then again slowly revives. 
B( iencc has its eras of deductive reasoning, and ite 
when attention is chiefly directed to collecting and colli- 
gating facts. And how in such minor but more obtrusive 
phenomena as those of fashion, there are ever goii 
oscillations from one extreme to the other, is a trite ob- 
servation. 

As may be foreseen, social rhythms well illustrate the 
irregularity that results from combination of many causes. 
Where the variations are those of one simple element in 
national life, as the supply of a particular commodity, we 
do indeed witness a return, after many involved move- 
ments, to a previous condition — the price may become 
what it was before: implying a like relative abundance. 
V>\\t where the action is one into which many factors enter, 
there is never a recurrence of exactly the same state. A 
poltical reaction never brings round just the old form of 
things. The rationalism of the present day differs widely 
from the rationalism of the last century. And though 
fashion from time to time revives extinct types of 
these always reappear with decided modificatioi 



f FIRST PRINCIPLES. 229 

§ 88. The universality of this principle suggests a ques- 
tion like that raised in foregoing cases. Khythm being 
manifested in all forms of movement, we have reason to 
suspect that it is determined by some primordial condition 
to action in general. The tacit implication is that it is 
deducible from the persistence of force. This we shall 
find to be the fact. 

When the prong of a tuning-fork is pulled on one side 
by the finger, a certain extra tension is produced among 
its cohering particles; which resist any force that draws 
them out of their state of equilibrium. As much force as 
the finger exerts in pulling the prong aside, so much op- 
posing force is brought into play among the cohering par- 
ticles. Hence, when the prong is liberated, it is urged 
back by a force equal to that used in deflecting it. When, 
therefore, the prong reaches its original position, the force 
impressed on it during its recoil has generated "in it a 
corresponding amount of momentum — an amount of mo- 
mentum nearly equivalent, that is, to the force originally 
impressed (nearly, we must say, because a certain portion 
has gone in communicating motion to the air, and a cer- 
tain other portion has been transformed into heat). 
This momentum carries the prong beyond the position of 
rest, nearly as far as it was originally drawn in the reverse 
direction; until at length, being gradually used up in pro- 
ducing an opposing tension among the particles, it is all 
lost. The opposing tension into which the expended 
momentum has been transformed then generates a sec- 
ond recoil; and so on continually — the vibration eventually 
ceasing only because at each movement a certain amount of 
force goes in creating atmospheric and etherial undula- 
tions. Now it needs but to contemplate this repeated ac- 
tion and reaction, to see that it is, like every action and 
reaction, a consequence of the persistence of force. The 
force exerted by the finger in bending the prong cannot 
disappear. Under what form then does it exist? It exists 
under the form of that cohesive tension which it has gener- 
ated among the particles. This cohesive tension cannot 
cease without an equivalent result. What is its equivalent 
result? The momentum generated in the prong while 
being carried back to its position of rest. This momentum 
too — what becomes of it? It must either continue as 
momentum, or produce some correlative force of equal 



230 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

amount. It cannot continue as momentum, since change 
of place is resisted by the cohesion of the parts; and thus 
it gradually disappears by being transformed into tension 
among these parts. This is retransformed into the equiv- 
alent momentum; and so on continuously. If instead of 
motion that is directly antagonized by the cohesion of mat- 
ter, we consider motion through space, the same truth 
presents itself under another form. Though here no op- 
posing force seems at work and therefore no cause of 
rhythm is apparent, yet its own accumulated momentum 
must eventually carry the moving body beyond the body 
attracting it; and so must become a force at variance with 
that which generated it. From this conflict, rhythm 
necessarily results as in the foregoing case. The force 
embodied as momentum in a given direction cannot be 
destroyed; and if it eventually disappears, it reappears in 
the reaction on the retarding body; which begins afresh 
to draw the now arrested mass back from its aphelion. 
The only conditions under which there could be absence 
of rhythm — the only conditions, that is, under which there 
could be a continuous motion through space in the same 
Btraight line for ever, would be the existence of an infinity 
void of everything but the moving body. Ami neither of 
these conditions can be represented in thought. Infinity 
is inconceivable; and so also is a motion which never had 
a commencement in some pre-existing source of power. 

Thus, then, rhythm is a accessary characteristic of all 
motion. Given the coexistence everywhere of antagonist 
forces — a postulate which, as we have seen, is necessitated 
by the form of our experience — and rhythm is an inevi- 
table corollary from the persistence of force. 

[Xotf..— In the Edinburgh Rcvicir for January. 1SS4. there was an antago- 
nistic criticism of this work. The writer of the criticism, Lord Grimthorpo. 
made much of the exception furnished by non-periodic comers to the law 
above set forth. I was about to admit this exception when, on looking into 
the matter, I found no need for doing so. Thou.cn live or six cometary orbits 
are said to lie hyperbolic, yet. as I learn From one who has paid special at- 
tention to comets (having tabulated the directions of their aphelia). "no 
such orbit has, 1 believe, been computed for a well-observed comet." Hence 
the probability that all the orbits are ellipses is overwhelming:. Ellipses and 
hyperbolas have countless varieties of forms, but there is only one form of 
parabola; or, to speak literally, all parabolas aiv similar, while there are in- 
finitely numerous dissimilar" ellipses and dissimilar hyperbolas. Conse- 
quently, anything coming to the Sun from a creat distance must have one 
exact amount of proper motion to produce a parabola: all other amounts 
would give hyperbolas or ellipses. And if therv are no hyperbolic orbits, 
then it is infinity to one that all the orbits are elliptieal.] 



CHAPTER XI. 

RECAPITULATION, CRITICISM, AND RECOMMENCEMENT. 

§ 89. Let us pause awhile to consider how far the con- 
tents of the foregoing chapters go toward forming a body 
of knowledge such as was defined at the outset as constitut- 
ing philosophy. 

In respect of its generality, the proposition enunciated 
and exemplified in each chapter, is of the required kind — 
is a proposition transcending those class-limits which Sci- 
ence, as currently understood, recognizes. " The Inde- 
structibility of Matter" is a truth not belonging to me- 
chanics more than to chemistry, a truth assumed alike by 
molecular physics and the physics that deal with sensible 
masses, a truth which the astronomer and the biologist 
equally take for granted. Not merely do those divisions 
of Science which deal with the movements of celestial and 
terrestrial bodies postulate " The Continuity of Motion," 
but it is no less postulated in the physicist's investigations 
into the phenomena of light and heat, and is tacitly, if 
not avowedly, implied in the generalizations of the higher 
sciences. So, too, " The Persistence of Force," invoked 
in each of the preceding propositions, is coextensive with 
them, as is also its corollary, " The Persistence of Eelations 
among Forces. " These are not truths of a high generality, 
but they are universal truths. Passing to the deductions 
drawn from them, we see the same thing. That force is 
transformable, and that between its correlates there exist 
quantitative equivalences, are ultimate facts not to be classed 
with those of mechanics, or thermology, or electricity, or 
magnetism ; but they are illustrated throughout phenom- 
ena of every order, up to those of mind and society. Sim- 
ilarly, the law that motion follows the line of least resist- 
ance or the line of greatest traction or the resultant of the 
two, we found to be an all-pervading law ; conformed to 
alike by each planet in its orbit and by the moving matters, 
aerial, liquid, and solid, on its surface — conformed to no 
less by every organic movement and process than by every 
inorganic movement and process. And so likewise, in the 
chapter just closed, it has been shown that rhythm is 



232 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

exhibited universally, from the slow gyrations of double 
stars down to the inconceivably rapid oscillations of mole- 
cules — from such terrestrial changes as those of recurrent 
glacial epochs and gradually alternating elevations and 
subsidences, down to those of the winds and tides and 
waves; and is no less conspicuous in the functions of living 
organisms, from the pulsations of the heart up to the par- 
oxysms of the emotions. 

Thus these truths have the character which constitutes 
them parts of philosophy, properly so called. They are 
truths which unify concrete phenomena belonging to all 
divisions of Nature; and so must be components of that 
complete, coherent conception of things which Philosophy 
seeks. 

§ 90. But now what parts do these truths play in form- 
ing such a conception:' Does any one of them singly 
convey an idea of the Cosmos: meaning by this word the 
totality of the manifestations of the Unknowable? Do 
all of them taken together yield us an adequate idea of 
this kind? Do they even when thought of in combina- 
tion compose anything like such an idea? To each of 
these questions the answer must be — No. 

Neither these truths or any other such truths, separately 
or jointly, constitute that integrated knowledge in which 
only Philosophy finds its goal. It has been supposed by 
one thinker that when Science has succeeded in reducing 
all more complex laws to some most simple law, as of 
molecular action, knowledge will have reached its limit. 
Another authority has tacitly asserted that all minor tacts 
are so merged in the major facts that the force everywhere 
in action is nowhere lest, that to express this is to express 
" the constitution of the universe." But either conclusion 
implies a misapprehension of the problem. 

For these are all analytical truths, and no analytical 
truth — no number of analytical truths, will make up that 
synthesis of thought which alone can be an interpretation 
of the synthesis of things. The decomposition of phe- 
nomena into their elements is but a preparation for 
understanding phenomena in their state of composition, 
as actually manifested. To have ascertained the la/ 
the factors is not at all to have ascertained the laws of 
their cooperation. The question is, not how any factor, 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 233 

Matter or Motion or Force, behaves by itself, or under 
some imagined simple conditions; nor is it even how one 
factor behaves under the complicated conditions of actual 
existence. The thing to be expressed is the joint product 
of the factors under all its various aspects. Only when 
we can formulate the total process, have we gained that 
knowledge of it which Philosophy aspires to. A clear 
comprehension of this matter is important enough to jus- 
tify some further exposition. 

§ 91. Suppose a chemist, a geologist, and a biologist 
have given the deepest explanations furnished by their 
respective sciences, of the processes going on in a burning 
candle, in a region changed by earthquake, and in a grow- 
ing plant. To the assertion that their explanations are not 
the deepest possible, they will probably rejoin : " What would 
you have? What remains to be said of combustion when 
light and heat and the dissipation of substance have all 
been traced down to the liberation of molecular motion as 
their common cause. When all the actions accompanying 
an earthquake are explained as consequent upon the slow 
loss of the Earth's internal heat, how is it possible to go 
lower? When the influence of light on the oscillations of 
molecules has been proved to account for vegetal growth, 
what is the imaginable further rationale? You ask for a 
synthesis. You say that knowledge does not end in the 
resolution of phenomena into the actions of certain fac- 
tors, each conforming to ascertained laws; but that the 
laws of the factors having been ascertained, there comes 
the chief problem — to show how from their joint action 
result the phenomena in all their complexity. Well, do not 
the above interpretations satisfy this requirement? Do we 
not, starting with the molecular motions of the elements 
concerned in combustion, build up synthetically an explana- 
tion of the light, and the heat, and the produced gases, and 
the movements of the produced gases? Do we not, setting 
out from the still-continued radiation of its heat, construct 
by synthesis a clear conception of the Earth's nucleus as 
contracting, its crust as collapsing, as becoming shaken 
and fissured and contorted and burst through by lava? 
And is it not the same with the chemical changes and 
accumulation of matter in the growing plant?" 

To all which the reply is, that the ultimate interpreta- 



234 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

tion to be reached by Philosophy is a universal synthesis 
comprehending and consolidating such snecial syntheses. 
The synthetic explanation which Science gives, even up 
to the most general, are more or less independent of one 
another. Though they may have like elements in them, 
they are not united by the likeness of their essential 
structures. It is to be supposed that in the burning can- 
dle, in the quaking Earth, and in the organism that is 
increasing, the processes as wholes are unrelated to one 
another? If it is admitted that each of the factors con- 
cerned always operates in conformity to a law, is it to be 
concluded that their cooperation conforms to no law? 
These various changes, artificial and natural, organic and 
inorganic, which for convenience sake we distinguish, are 
not from the highest point of view to be distinguished; 
for they are all changes going on in the same Cosmos, and 
forming parts of one vast transformation. The play of 
forces is essentially the same in principle throughout the 
whole region explored by our intelligence; and though, 
varying infinitely in their proportions and combinations, 
they work out results everywhere more or less different, 
and often seeming to have no kinship, yet there cannot 
but be among these results a fundamental community. 
The question to be answered is — what is the common ele- 
ment in the histories of all concrete processes? 

8 92. To resume, then, we have now to seek a law of 
composition of phenomena, coextensive with those laws of 
their components set forth in the foregoing chapters. 
Having seen that matter is indestructible, motion contin- 
uous, and force persistent — having seen that forces are 
everywhere undergoing transformation, and that motion, 
always following the line of least resistance, is invariably 
rhythmic, it remains to discover the similarly-invariable 
formula expressing the combined consequences of the ac- 
tions thus separately formulated. 

What must be the general character of such a formula? 
It must be one that specifies the course of the changes 
undergone by both the matter and the motion. Every 
transformation implies rearrangement of component parts; 
and a definition of it, while saying what has happened to 
the sensible or insensible portions of substance concerned, 
must also say what has happened to the movements, sensi- 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 235 

ble or insensible, which the rearrangement of parts implies. 
Further, unless the transformation always goes on in the 
same way and at the same rate, the formula must specify 
the conditions under which it commences, ceases, and is 
reversed. 

The law we seek, therefore, must be the law of the con- 
tinuous redistribution of matter and motion. Absolute rest 
and permanence do not exist. Every object, no less than 
the aggregate of all objects, undergoes from instant to 
instant some alteration of state. Gradually or quickly it 
is receiving motion or losing motion, while some or all of 
its parts are simultaneously changing their relations to one 
another. And the question to be answered is, What 
dynamic principle, true of the metamorphosis as a whole 
and in its details, expresses these ever-changing relations? 

This chapter has served its purpose if it has indicated 
the nature of the ultimate problem. The discussion on 
which we are now to enter may fitly open with a new pres- 
entation of this problem, carrying with it the clear 
implication that a Philosophy, rightly so-called, can come 
into existence only by solving the problem. 



CHAPTER XII. 

EVOLUTION" AND DISSOLUTION". 

§ 93. An entire history of anything must include its 
appearance out of the imperceptible and its disappearance 
into the imperceptible. Be it a single object or the whole 
universe, any account which begins with it in a concrete 
form, or leaves off with it in a concrete form, is incom- 
plete ; since there remains an era of its knowable existence 
undescribed and unexplained. Admitting, or rather as- 
serting, that knowledge is limited to the phenomenal, we 
have, by implication, asserted that the sphere of knowl- 
edge is coextensive with the phenomenal — coextensive 
with all modes of the Unknowable that can affect con- 
sciousness. Hence, wherever we now find Being so condi- 
tioned as to act on our senses, there arise the questions — ■ 
how came it thus conditioned? and how will it cease to be 
thus conditioned? Unless on the assumption that it 
acquired a sensible form at the moment of perception, and. 



236 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

lost its form the moment after perception, it must have 
had an antecedent existence under this sensible form, and 
will have a subsequent existence under this sensible form. 
These preceding and succeeding existences under sensible 
forms are possible subjects of knowledge; and knowledge 
lias obviously not reached its limits until it has united the 
past, present, and future histories into a whole. 

The sayings and doings of daily life imply more or less 
such knowledge, actual or potential, of states which have 
gone before and of states which will come after; and, 
indeed, the greater part of our knowledge involves these 
elements. Knowing any man personally implies having 
before seen him under a shape much the same as his pres- 
ent shape; and knowing him simply as a man, implies 
the inferred antecedent states of infancy, childhood, and 
youth. Though the man's future is not known specifi- 
callv, it is known generally; the facts that he will die. and 
that his body will decay, are facts which complete in out- 
line the changes t<» be hereafter gone through by him. 
witli all the objects around. Their coexistence under con- 
crete forms of the woollens, silks, and cottons we wear, we 
can trace some distance back. We are certain that our 
furniture consists of matter which v. - __ _ 1 by trees 
within these few generations. Even of the stones com- 
posing the walls of the house, we are to say that, years or 
centuries ago, they formed parts of some stratum imbedded 
in the earth. Moreover, respecting the hereafter of the 
wearable fabrics, the furniture, and the walls, we 
assert thus much, that they are all in process of decay, 
and in periods of various lengths will lose their pi 
coherent shapes. This general information which all men 
gain concerning the past and future careers of surrounding 
things. Science has extended, and continues unceasingly 
to Extend. To the biography of the individual man. it 
adds an intra-uterine biography beginning with him as a 
microscopic germ; and it follows out his ultimate el.: _ - 
until it finds his body resolved into the gaseous products 
of decomposition. Not stopping short at the sheep's back 
and the caterpillar's cocoon, it identities in wool and silk 
the nitrogenous matters absorbed by the sheep and the 
caterpillar from plants. The substance of a plant's 1 
in common with the wood from which furniture is made. 
it again traces back to the vegetable assimilation of g 9 - 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 237 

from the air and of certain minerals from the soil. And 
inquiring whence came the stratum of stone that was quar- 
ried to build the house, it finds that this was once a loose 
sediment deposited in an estuary or on the sea bottom. 

If, then, the past and the future of each object, is a 
sphere of possible knowledge ; and if intellectual progress 
consists largely, if not mainly, in widening our acquaint- 
ance with this past and this future; it is obvious that we 
have not acquired all the information within the grasp of 
our intelligence until we can, in some way or other, express 
the whole past and the whole future of each object and the 
aggregate of objects. Usually able, as we are, to say of 
any visible tangible thing how it came to have its present 
shape and consistence, we are fully possessed with the 
conviction that, setting out abruptly as we do with some 
substance which already had a concrete form, our history 
is incomplete : the thing had a history preceding the state 
with which we started. Hence *our Theory of Things, 
considered individually or in their totality, is confessedly 
imperfect so long as any past or future portions of their 
sensible existences are unaccounted for. 

May it not be inferred that Philosophy has to formulate 
this passage from the imperceptible into the perceptible, 
and again from the perceptible into the imperceptible? Is 
it not clear that this general law of the redistribution of 
matter and motion, which we lately saw is required to 
unify the various kinds of changes, must also be one that 
unifies the successive changes which sensible existences, 
separately and together, pass through? Only by some 
formula combining these characters can knowledge be 
reduced to a coherent whole. 

§ 94. Already in the foregoing paragraphs the outline 
of such a formula is foreshadowed. Already in recognizing 
the fact that Science, tracing back the genealogies of vari- 
ous objects, finds their components were once in diffused 
states, and, pursuing their histories forward, finds diffused 
states will be again assumed by them, we have recognized 
the fact that the formula must be one comprehending the 
two opposite processes of concentration and diffusion. 
And already in thus describing the general nature of the 
formula, we have approached a specific expression of it. 
The change from a diffused, imperceptible state, to a con- 



238 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

centrated, perceptible state, is an integration of matter 
and concomitant dissipation of motion; and the change 
from a concentrated, perceptible state, to a diffused, 
imperceptible state, is an absorption of motion and con- 
comitant disintegration of matter. These are truisms. 
Constituent parts cannot aggregate without losing some of 
their relative motion; and they cannot separate without 
more relative motion being given to them. We are not 
concerned here with any motion which the components of 
a mass have with respect to other masses ; we are concerned 
only with the motion they have with respect to one another. 
Confining our attention to this internal motion, and to 
the matter possessing it, the axiom which we have to rec- 
ognize is that a progressing consolidation involves a decrease 
of internal motion ; and that incresae of internal motion 
involves a progressing unconsolidation. 

"When taken together, the two opposite processes thus 
formulated constitute the history of every sensible exist- 
ence, under its simplest form. Loss of motion and conse- 
quent integration, eventually followed by gain of motion 
and consequent disintegration — see here a statement com- 
prehensive of the entire series of changes passed through ; 
comprehensive in an extremely general way, as any state- 
ment which holds of sensible existences at large must be ; 
but still comprehensive in the sense that all the changes 
gone through fall within it. This will probably be thought 
too sweeping an assertion; but we shall quickly find it 
justified. 

§ 95. For here we have to note the further all-important 
fact, that every change undergone by every sensible exist- 
ence is a change in one or other of these two opposite 
directions. Apparently an aggregate which has passed 
out of some originally discrete state into a concrete state, 
thereafter remains for an indefinite period without under- 
going further integration, and without beginning to dis- 
integrate. But this is untrue. All things are growing or 
decaying, accumulating matter or wearing away, integrat- 
ing or disintegrating. All things are varying in their 
temperatures, contracting or expanding, integrating or 
disintegrating. Both the quantity of matter contained in 
an aggregate, and the quantity of motion contained in it, 
increase or decrease; and increase or decrease of either is 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 239 

an advance toward greater diffusion or greater concentra- 
tion. Continued losses or gains of substance, however 
slow, imply ultimate disappearance or indefinite enlarge- 
ment; and losses or gains of the insensible motion we call 
heat will, if continued, produce complete integration or 
complete disintegration. The sun's rays falling on a cold 
mass, augmenting the molecular motions throughout it, 
and causing it to occupy more space, are beginning a proc- 
ess which if carried far will disintegrate the mass into 
liquid, and if carried farther will disintegrate the liquid 
into gas; and the diminution of bulk which a volume of 
gas undergoes, as it parts with some of its molecular motion,' 
is a diminution which, if the loss of molecular motion 
proceeds, will presently be followed by liquefaction and 
eventually by solidification. And since there is no such 
thing as an absolutely constant temperature, the necessary 
inference is that every aggregate is at every moment pro- 
gressing toward either greater concentration or greater 
diffusion. 

Not only does all change consisting in the addition or 
subtraction of matter come under this head; and not only 
does this head include all change called thermal expansion 
or contraction; but it is also, in a general way, comprehen- 
sive of all change distinguished as transposition. Every 
internal redistribution which leaves the component mole- 
cules or the constituent portions of a mass differently placed 
with respect to one another is sure to be at the same time 
a progress toward integration or toward disintegration — is 
sure to have altered in some degree the total space occupied. 
For when the parts have been moved relatively to one 
another, the chances are infinity to one that their average 
distances from the common centre of the aggregate are no 
longer the same. Hence whatever be the special character 
of the redistribution — be it that of superficial accretion or 
detachment, be it that of general expansion or contraction, 
be it that of rearrangement, it is always an advance in 
integration or disintegration. It is always this, though it 
may at the same time be something further. 

§ 96. A general idea of these universal actions under 
their simplest aspects having been obtained, we may now 
consider them under certain relatively complex aspects. 
Changes toward greater concentration or greater diffusion 



240 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

nearly always proceed after a manner much more involved 
than that above described. Thus far we have supposed one 
or other of the two opposite processes to go on alone — we 
have supposed an aggregate to be either losing motion and 
integrating, or gaining motion and disintegrating. But 
though it is true that every change furthers one or other 
of these processes, it is not true that either process is ever 
wholly unqualified by the other. For each aggregate is at 
all times both gaining motion and losing motion. 

Every mass, from a grain of sand to a planet, radiates 
heat to other masses, and absorbs heat radiated by other 
masses; and in so far as it does the one it becomes in- 
tegrated, while in so far as it does the other it becomes 
disintegrated. Ordinarily in inorganic objects this double 
process works but unobtrusive effects. Only in a few 
cases, among which that of a cloud is the most famil- 
iar, does the conflict produce rapid and marked transfor- 
mations. One of these floating bodies of vapor expands 
and dissipates, if the amount of molecular motion it re- 
ceives from the sun and earth exceeds that which it loses 
by radiation into space and toward adjacent surfaces; 
while, contrariwise, if, drifting over cold mountain tops, 
it radiates to them much more heat than it receives, the 
loss of molecular motion is followed by increasing integra- 
tion of the vapor, ending in the aggregation of it into 
liquid and the fall of rain. Here, as elsewhere, the inte- 
gration or the disintegration is a differentia] result. 

In living aggregates, and more especially those cl 
as animals, these conflicting processes go on with great 
activity under several forms. There is not merely what 
we may call the passive integration of matter, that results 
in inanimate objects from simple molecular attractions; 
but there is an active integration of it under the form of 
food. In addition to that passive superficial disintegration 
which inanimate objects suffer from external agents, ani- 
mals produce in themselves active internal disintegration, 
by absorbing such agents into their substance. While, 
like inorganic aggregates, they passively give off and re- 
ceive motion, they are also active absorbers of motion 
latent in food, and active expenders of that motion. But 
notwithstanding this complication of the two processes, 
and the immense exaltation of the conflict between them, 
it remains true that there is always a differential progress 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 241 

toward either integration or disintegration. During the 
earlier part of the cycle of changes, the integration pre- 
dominates — there goes on what we call growth. The 
middle part of the cycle is usually characterized, not by 
equilibrium between the integrating and disintegrating 
processes, but by alternate excesses of them. And the 
cycle closes with a period in which the disintegration, 
beginning to predominate, eventually puts a stop to inte- 
gration, and undoes what integration had originally done. 
At no moment are assimilation and waste so balanced that 
no increase or decrease of mass is going on. Even in cases 
where one part is growing while other parts are dwindling, 
and even in cases where different parts are differently ex- 
posed to external sources of motion so that some are 
expanding while others are contracting, the truth still 
holds. For the chances are infinity to one against these 
opposite changes balancing one another; and if they do 
not balance one another, the aggregate as a whole is inte- 
grating or disintegrating. 

Everywhere and to the last, therefore, the change at 
any moment going on forms a part of one or other of the 
two processes. While the general history of every aggre- 
gate is definable as a change from a diffused imperceptible 
state to a concentrated perceptible state, and again to a 
diffused imperceptible state; every detail of the history is 
definable as a part of either the one change or the other. 
This, then, must be that universal law of redistribution of 
matter and motion, which serves at once to unify the seem- 
ingly diverse groups of changes, as well as the entire 
course of each group. 

§ 97. The processes thus everywhere in antagonism, and 
everywhere gaining now a temporary and now a more or 
less permanent triumph the one over the other, we call 
Evolution and Dissolution. Evolution under its simplest 
and most general aspect is the integration of matter and 
concomitant dissipation of motion; while Dissolution is 
the absorption of motion and concomitant disintegration 
of matter. 

These titles are by no means all that is desirable; or 
rather we may say that while the last answers its purpose 
tolerably well, the first is open to grave objections. Evo- 
lution has other meanings, some of which are incongruous 
16 



242 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

with, and some even directly opposed to, the meaning here 
given to it. The evolution of a gas is literally an absorp- 
tion of motion and disintegration of matter, which is 
exactly the reverse of that which we here call Evolution — 
is that which we here call Dissolution. As ordinarily 
understood, to evolve is to unfold, to open and expand, to 
throw out, to emit; whereas, as we understand it, the act 
of evolving, though it implies increase of a concrete aggre- 
gate, and in so far an expansion of it, implies that its 
component matter has passed from a more diffused to a 
more concentrated state — has contracted. The antithetical 
word Involution would much more truly express the nature 
of the process; and would, indeed, describe better the sec- 
ondary characters of the process which we shall have to 
deal with presently. We are obliged, however, notwith- 
standing the liabilities to confusion that must result from 
these unlike and even contradictory meanings, to use Evo- 
lution as antithetical to Dissolution. The word is now so 
widely recognized as signifying, not, indeed, the general 
process above described, but sundry of the most conspicu- 
ous varieties of it, and certain of its secondary but most 
remarkable accompaniments, that we cannot now substitute 
another word. All we can do is carefully to define the 
interpretation to be given to it. 

While, then, Ave shall by Dissolution everywhere mean 
the process tacitly implied by its ordinary meaning — the 
absorption of motion and disintegration of matter; we 
shall everywhere mean by Evolution the process which is 
always an integration of matter and dissipation of motion, 
but which, as we shall now see, is in most cases much more 
than this. 



CHAPTER XIII. 

SIMPLE AND COMPOUND EVOLUTION. 

§ OS. Where the only forces at work are those directly 
tending to produce aggregation or diffusion, the whole 
history of an aggregate will comprise no more than the 
approaches of its component toward their common centre 
and their recessions from their common ceutre. The 
process of Evolution, including nothing beyond what Avas 
described at the outset of the last chapter, will be simple. 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 243 

Again, in cases where the forces which cause movements 
toward a common centre are greatly in excess of all other 
forces, any changes additional to those constituting aggre- 
gation will be comparatively insignificant — there will be 
integration scarcely at all modified by further kinds of 
redistribution. 

Or if, because of the smallness of the mass to be in- 
tegrated, or because of the little motion the mass receives 
from without in return for the motion it loses, the inte- 
gration proceeds rapidly, there will similarly be wrought 
but insignificant effects on the integrating mass by inci- 
dent forces, even though these are considerable. 

But when, conversely, the integration is but slow; either 
because the quantity of motion contained in the aggregate 
is relatively great; or because, though the quantity of mo- 
tion which each part possesses is not relatively great, the 
large size of the aggregate prevents easy dissipation of the 
motion; or because, though motion is rapidly lost more 
motion is rapidly received ; then, other forces will cause 
in the aggregate appreciable modifications. Along with 
the change constituting integration, there will take place 
supplementary changes. The Evolution, instead of being 
simple, will be compound. 

The several propositions thus briefly enunciated require 
some explanation. 

§ 99. So long as a body moves freely through space, 
every force that acts on it produces an equivalent in the 
shape of some change in its motion. No matter how high 
its velocity, the slightest lateral traction or resistance causes 
it to deviate from its line of movement — causes it to move 
toward the new source of traction or away from the new 
source of resistance, just as much as it would do had it no 
other motion. And the effect of the perturbing influence 
goes on accumulating in the ratio of the squares of the 
times during which its action continues uniform. This 
same body, however, will, if it is united in certain ways 
with other bodies, cease to be movable by small incident 
forces. When it is held fast by gravitation or cohesion, 
these small incident forces, instead of giving it some rela- 
tive motion through space, are otherwise dissipated. 

What here holds of masses holds, in a qualified way, of 
the sensible parts of masses, and of molecules. As the 



244 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

sensible parts of a mass, and the molecules of a mass, are, 
by virtue of their aggregation, not perfectly free, it is not 
true of each of them, as of a body moving through space, 
that every incident force produces an equivalent change of 
position : part of the force goes in working other changes. 
But in proportion as the parts or the molecules are feebly 
bound together, incident forces effect marked rearrange- 
ments among them. At the one extreme, where the inte- 
gration is so slight that the parts, sensible or insensible, 
are almost independent, they are almost completely amen- 
able to every additional action; and along with the 
concentration going on there go on other redistributions. 
Contrariwise, where the parts nave approached within 
such small distances that what we call the attraction of 
cohesion is great, additional actions, unless intei 
to have much power to cause secondary rearrangements. 
The firmly united parts no longer readily change their rel- 
ative positions in obedience to small perturbing milii- 
but each small perturbing influence usually does little or 
nothing more than temporarily modify the insensible 
molecular motions. 

How may we best express this dilTerence in the 
general terms? An aggregate that is widely diffua 
but little integrated, is an aggregate that contains a lar^e 
quantity of motion — actual or potential or both. An 
aggregate that has become completely integrated or dense, 
is one that contains comparatively littie motion : m 
the motion its parts once had has been lost during the 
integration that has rendered it dense. Hence, other 
things equal, in proportion to the quantity of motion 
wheh an aggregate contains will be the quantity of second- 
ary change in the arrangement of its parts that accompanies 
the primary change in their arrangement. Hence also, 
other things equal, in proportion to the time during which 
the internal motion is retained will be the quantity of this 
secondary redistribution that accompanies the primary 
redistribution. It matters not how these conditions are 
fulfilled. Whether the internal motion continues great 
because the components are of a kind that will not readily 
aggregate, or because surrounding conditions prevent them 
from parting with their motion, or because the loss of their 
motion is impeded by the size of the aggregate they form, 
or because thev directly or indirectly obtain more motion 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 245 

in place of that which they lose ; it throughout remains 
true that much retained internal motion must render sec- 
ondary redistributions facile, and that long retention of it 
must make possible an accumulation of such secondary 
redistributions. Conversely, the non-fulfilment of these 
conditions, however caused, entails opposite results. Be 
it that the components of the aggregate have special apti- 
tudes to integrate quickly, or be it that the smallness of 
the aggregate formed of them permits the easy escape of 
their motion, or be it that they receive little or no motion 
in exchange for that which they part with ; it alike holds 
that but little secondary redistribution can accompany the 
primary redistribution constituting their integration. 

These abstract propositions will not be fully understood 
without illustrations. Let us, before studying simple and 
compound Evolution as thus determined, contemplate a 
few cases in which the quantity of internal motion is arti- 
ficially changed, and note the effects on the rearrangement 
of parts. 

§ 100. We may fitly begin with a familiar experience, 
introducing the general principle under a rude but easily 
comprehensible form. When a vessel has been filled to 
the brim with loose fragments, shaking the vessel causes 
them to settle down into less space, so that more may be 
put in. And when among the fragments there are some 
of much greater specific gravity than the rest, these, in 
the course of a prolonged shaking find their way to the 
bottom. What now is the meaning of such results, when 
expressed in general terms? We have a group of units 
acted on by an incident force — the attraction of the Earth. 
So long as these units are not agitated, this incident force 
produces no changes in their relative positions; agitate 
them, and immediately their loose arrangement passes into 
a more compact arrangement. Again, so long as they are 
not agitated, the incident force cannot separate the heavier 
units from the lighter; agitate them, and immediately the 
heavier units begin to segregate. Mechanical disturbances 
of more minute kinds, acting on the parts of much denser 
aggregates, produce analogous effects. A piece of iron 
which, when it leaves the workshop, is fibrous in struc- 
ture, becomes crystalline if exposed to a perpetual jar. 
The polar forces mutually exercised by the atoms fail to 



246 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

change the disorderly arrangement into an orderly arrange- 
ment while the atoms are relatively quiescent ; but these 
forces succeed in rearranging them when the atoms are 
kept in a state of intestine agitation. Similarly, the fact 
that a bar of steel suspended in the magnetic meridian and 
repeatedly struck becomes magnetized, is ascribed to a 
rearrangement of particles that is produced by the magnetic 
force of the Earth when vibrations are propagated through 
them, but is not otherwise produced. .Now imperfectly as 
these cases parallel the mass of those we are considering, 
they nevertheless serve roughly to illustrate the effect which 
adding to the quantity of motion an aggregate contains, 
has in facilitating rearrangement of its parts. 

More fully illustrative are the instances in which, by 
artificially adding to or subtracting from that molecular mo- 
tion which we call its heat, we give an aggregate increased 
or diminished facility of rearranging its molecules. The 
process of tempering steel or annealing glass shows us that 
internal redistribution is aided by insensible vibrations, as 
we have just seen it to be by sensible vibrations. When 
some molten glass is dropped into water, and when its 
outside is thus, by sudden solidification, prevented from 
partaking in that contraction which the subsequent cooling 
of the inside tends to produce, the units are Kit in such a 
state of tension that the mass Hies into fragments if a sjnall 
portion of it be broken off. But if this mass be kept for 
a day or two at a considerable heat, though a heat not 
sufficient to alter its form or produce any sensible diminu- 
tion of hardness, this extreme brittleness disappears; the 
component particles being thrown into greater agitation, 
the tensile forces are enabled to rearrange them into a 
state of equilibrium. Much more conspicuously do we see 
the effect of the insensible motion called heat, where the 
rearrangement of parts taking place is that of visibl. 
rogation. An instance is furnished by the subsidence of 
fine precipitates. These sink down very slowly from solu- 
tions that are cold; while warm solutions deposit them 
with comparative rapidity. That is to say, exalting the 
molecular oscillation throughout the mass allows tin 
pended particles to separate more readily from the particles 
of fluid. The influence of heat on chemical changes is so 
familiar, that examples are scarcely needed. Be the sub- 
stances concerned gaseous, liquid, or solid, it equally holds 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 247 

that their chemical unions and disunions are aided by rise 
of temperature. Affinities which do not suffice to effect 
the rearrangement of mixed units that are in a state of 
feeble agitation, suffice to effect it when the agitation is 
raised to a certain point. And so long as this molecular 
motion is not great enough to prevent those chemical cohe- 
sions which the affinities tend to produce, increase of it 
gives increased facility of chemical rearrangement. 

Another class of facts may be adduced which, though 
not apparently, are really illustrative of the same general 
truth. Other things equal, the liquid form of matter 
implies a greater quantity of contained motion than the 
solid form — the liquidity is itself a consequence of such 
greater quantity. Hence, an aggregate made up partly of 
liquid matter and partly of solid matter contains a greater 
quantity of motion than one which, otherwise like it, is 
made up wholly of solid matter. It is inferable, then, that 
a liquid-solid aggregate, or, as we commonly call it, a 
plastic aggregate, will admit of internal redistribution 
with comparative facility; and the inference is verified 
by experience. A magma of unlike substances, ground 
up with water, while it continues thin allows a settlement 
of its heavier components — a separation of them from the 
lighter. As the water evaporates this separation is im- 
peded, and ceases when the magma becomes very thick. 
But even when it has reached the semi-solid state in which 
gravitation fails to cause further segregation of its mixed 
components, other forces may still continue to produce 
segregation : witness the fact, to which attention was first 
drawn by Mr. Babbage, that when the pasty mixture of 
ground flints and kaolin, prepared for the manufacture of 
porcelain, is kept some time, it becomes gritty and unfit 
for use, in consequence of the particles of silica separating 
themselves from the rest, and uniting together in grains; 
or witness the fact, known to every housewife, that in long- 
kept currant-jelly the sugar takes the shape of imbedded 
crystals. 

No matter, then, under what form the motion contained 
by an aggregate exists — be it mere mechanical agitation 
or the mechanical vibrations such as produce sound, be it 
molecular motion absorbed from without, or the constitu- 
tional molecular motion of some component liquid, the 
same truth holds throughout. Incident forces work sec- 



248 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

ondary redistributions easily when the contained motion 
is large in quantity; and work them with increasing diffi- 
culty as the contained motion diminishes. 

§ 101. Yet another class of facts that fall within the 
same generalization, little as they seem related to it, must 
be indicated before proceeding. They are those presented 
by certain contrasts in chemical stability. Speaking gen- 
erally, stable compounds contain comparatively little molec- 
ular motion: and in proportion as the contained molecu- 
lar motion is great the instability is great. 

The common and marked illustration of this to be first 
named is, that chemical stability decreai mprrature 

increases. Compounds of which the elements are strongly 
united and compounds of which the elements are feebly 
united are alike in this, that raising their heats or in 
Ing the quantities of their contained molecular motion 
diminishes the strengths of the unions of their elements; 
and by continually adding to the quantity of contained 
molecular motion, a point is in each I at which 

the chemical union is destroyed. That is to say, the re- 
distribution of matter which constitutes simple chemical 
decomposition is easy in proportion as the quantity of 
contained motion is great. The like holds with doable 
decompositions. Two compounds, A B ami C D, mingled 
together and kept at a low temperature, may severally re- 
main unchanged — the cross affinities between their com- 
ponents may fail to cause re-distribution. Increase the 
heat of the mixture, or add to the molecular motion 
throughout it, and redistribution takes place — ending in 
the formation of the compounds, A C and B 1'. 

Another chemical truth, having a like implication, is 
that chemical elements which, as they ordinarily 
contain much motion, have combinations less stable than 
those of which the elements, as they ordinarily exist, 
tain little motion. The gaseous form of matter implies 
a relatively large amount of molecular motion ; while the 
solid form implies a relatively small amount of molecular 
motion. "What are the characters of their respective com- 
pounds? The compounds which the permanent gases form 
with one another cannot resist high temperatures: most 
of them are easily decomposed by heat, and at a red heat 
even the stronger ones yield up their components. On 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 249 

the other hand, the chemical unions between elements that 
are solid except at very high temperatures are extremely 
stable. In many, if not indeed in most, cases, such com- 
bined elements are not separable by any heat we can pro- 
duce. 

There is, again, the relation, which appears to have a 
kindred meaning, between instability and amount of com- 
position. " In general, the molecular heat of a compound 
increases with the degree of complexity." With increase 
of complexity there also goes increased facility of decom- 
position. Whence it follows that molecules which contain 
much motion in virtue of their complexity are those of 
which the components are most readily redistributed. 
This holds not only of the complexity resulting from the 
union of several unlike elements, but it holds also of the 
complexity resulting from the union of the same elements 
in higher multiples. Matter has two solid states, distin- 
guished as crystalloid and colloid — of which the first is due 
to union of the individual atoms or molecules, and the 
second to the union of groups of such individual atoms or 
molecules, and of which the first is stable and the second 
unstable. 

But the most striking and conclusive illustration is fur- 
nished by the combinations into which nitrogen enters. 
These have the two characters of being specially unstable 
and of containing specially great quantities of motion. A 
recently ascertained peculiarity of nitrogen is that, instead 
of giving out heat when it combines with other elements, 
it absorbs heat. That is to say, besides carrying with it 
into the liquid or solid compound it forms, the motion 
which previously constituted it a gas, it takes up additional 
motion ; and where the other element with which it unites 
is gaseous, the molecular motion proper to this also is 
locked up in the compound. Now these nitrogen com- 
pounds are unusually prone to decomposition; and the 
decompositions of many of them take place with extreme 
violence. All our explosive substances are nitrogenous — 
the most terribly destructive of them all, chloride of 
nitrogen, being one which contains the immense quantity 
of motion proper to its component gases, plus a certain 
further quantity of motion. 

Clearly these general chemical truths are parts of the 
more general physical truth we are tracing out. We see in 



250 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

them that what holds of sensible aggregates holds also of 
the insensible aggregates we call molecules. Like the 
aggregates formed of them, these ultimate aggregates be- 
come more or less integrated according as they lose or gain 
motion; and like them also, according as they contain 
much or little motion, they are liable to undergo secondary 
redistributions of parts along with the primary redistri- 
bution. 

§ 102. And now, having got this general principle clearly 
into view, let us go on to observe how, in conformity with 
it, Evolution becomes, according to the conditions, either 
simple or compound. 

If a little sal-ammoniac or other volatile solid be heated, 
it is disintegrated by the absorbed molecular motion, and 
rises in gas. When the gas so produced, coming in con- 
tact with a cold surface, loses its excess of molecular motion, 
integration takes place — the substance assumes the form of 
crystals. This is a case of simple evolution. The process of 
concentration of matter and dissipation of motion does not 
here proceed in a gradual manner — does not pass through 
stages occupying considerable periods; but the molecular 
motion which reduced it to the gaseous state being dissi- 
pated, the matter passes suddenly to a completely solid 
state. The result is that along with this primary redis- 
tribution there go on no appreciable secondary redistribu- 
tions. Substantially the same thing holds with crystals 
deposited from solutions. Loss of that molecular motion 
which, down to a certain point, keeps the molecules from 
uniting, and sudden solidification when the Loss g - below 
that point, occur here as before: and here, as before, the 
absence of a period during which the molecules are par- 
tially free and gradually losing their freedom, is accompa- 
nied by the absence of supplementary rearrangements. 

Mark, conversely, what happens when the concentration 
is slow. A gaseous mass losing its heat, and undergoing a 
consequent decrease of bulk, is not subject only to this 
change, which brings its parts nearer to their common 
Centre, but also to many simultaneous changes. The great 
quantity of molecular motion contained in it, givr. _. 3 
Ave have seen that it must, great molecular mobility, ren- 
ders every part sensitive to every incident force: and. as a 
result, its parts have various motions besides that implied 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 251 

by their progressing integration. Indeed, these secondary- 
motions, which we know as currents, are so important and 
conspicuous as quite to subordinate the primary motion. 
Suppose that presently the loss of molecular motion has 
reached that point at which the gaseous state can no longer 
be maintained, and condensation follows. Under their 
more closely-united form, the parts of the aggregate dis- 
play, to a considerable degi;ee, the same phenomena as be- 
fore. The molecular motion and accompanying molecular 
mobility implied by the liquid state permit easy rearrange- 
ment ; and hence, along with further contraction of volume, 
consequent on further loss of motion, there go on rapid and 
marked changes in the relative position of parts — local 
streams produced by slight disturbing forces. But now, 
assuming the substance to be formed of molecules that have 
not those peculiarities leading to the sudden integration 
which we call crystallization, what happens as the molecu- 
lar motion further decreases? The liquid thickens — its 
parts cease to be relatively movable among one another 
with ease; and the transpositions caused by feeble incident 
forces become comparatively slow. Little by little the cur- 
rents are stopped, but the mass still continues modifiable by 
stronger incident forces. Gravitation makes it bend or 
spread out when not supported on all sides ; and it may easily 
be indented. As it cools, however, it continues to grow 
stiffer as we say — less capable of having its parts changed in 
their relative positions. And eventually, further loss of heat 
rendering it quite hard, its parts are no longer appreciably 
rearrangeable by any save violent actions. 

Among inorganic aggregates, then, secondary redistri- 
butions accompany the primary redistribution, throughout 
the whole process of concentration, where this is gradual. 
During the gaseous and liquid stages, the secondary redis- 
tributions, rapid and extensive as they are, leave no traces — 
the molecular mobility being such as to negative the fixed 
arrangement of parts we call structure. On approaching 
solidity we arrive at a condition called plastic, in which 
redistributions can still be made, though much less easily; 
and in which, being changeable less easily, they have a cer- 
tain persistence — a persistence which can, however, become 
decided, only where further solidification stops further re- 
distribution. 

Here we see, in the first place, what are the conditions 



252 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

under which Evolution instead of being simple becomes 
compound — while we see, in the second place, how the 
compounding of it can be carried far only under conditions 
more special than any hitherto contemplated; since, on 
the one hand, a large amount of secondary redistribution 
is possible only where there is a great quantity of contained 
motion, and, on the other hand, these redistributions can 
have permanence only where the contained motion has be- 
come small — opposing conditions which seem to negative 
any large amount of permanent secondary redistribution. 

§ 103. And now we are in a position to observe how 
these apparently contradictory conditions are reconciled; 
and how, by the reconciliation of them, permanent sec- 
ondary redistributions immense in extent are made possible. 
"We shall appreciate the distinctive peculiarity of the 
aggregates classed as organic, in which Evolution becomes 
so highly compounded; and shall see that this peculiarity 
consists in the combination of matter into a form embody- 
ing an enormous amount of motion at the same time that 
it has a great degree of concentration. 

For, notwithstanding its semi-solid consistence, organic 
matter contains molecular motion locked up in each of the 
ways above contemplated separately. Let us note its sev- 
eral constitutional traits. Three out of its four chief com- 
ponents are gaseous; and in their anoombined states the 
gases united in it have so much molecular motion that 
they are incondensible. lie nee as the characters of ele- 
ments, though disguised, cannot be absolutely lost in com- 
binations, it is to be inferred that the protein-molecule 
concentrates a comparatively large amount of motion in a 
small space. And since many equivalents of these gaseous 
elements unite in one of these protein-molecules, there 
must be in it a large quantity of relative motion in addi- 
tion to that which the ultimate atoms possess. Moreover, 
organic matter has the peculiarity that its molecules are 
aggregated into the colloid and not into the crystalloid 
arrangement; forming, as is supposed, clusters of clusters 
which have movements in relation to one another. Here, 
then, is a further mode in which molecular motion is in- 
cluded. Yet again, these compounds of which the -essential 
parts of organisms are built are nitrogenous; and we have 
lately seen it to be a peculiarity of nitrogenous compounds, 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 253 

that instead of giving out heat during their formation 
they absorb heat. To all the molecular motion possessed 
by gaseous nitrogen, is added more motion ; and the whole 
is concentrated in solid protein. Organic aggregates are 
very generally distinguished, too, by having much insen- 
sible motion in a free state — the motion we call heat. 
Though in many cases the quantity of this contained in- 
sensible motion is inconsiderable, in other cases a tempera- 
ture 'greatly above that of the environment is constantly 
maintained. Once more, there is the still larger quantity 
of motion embodied by the water that permeates organic 
matter. It is this which, giving to the water its high 
molecular mobility, gives mobility to the organic molecules 
partially suspended in it ; and preserves that plastic condi- 
tion which so greatly facilitates redistribution. 

From these several statements, no adequate idea can be 
formed of the extent to which living organic substance is 
thus distinguished from other substances having like sensi- 
ble forms of aggregation. But some approximation to 
such an idea may be obtained by contrasting the bulk 
occupied by this substance, with the bulk which its con- 
stituents would occupy if uncombined. An accurate com- 
parison cannot be made in the present state of science. 
What expansion would occur if the constituents of the 
nitrogenous compounds could be divorced without the 
addition of motion from without, is too complex a question 
to be answered. But respecting the constituents of that 
which forms some four-fifths of the total weight of an 
ordinary animal — its water — a tolerably definite answer 
can be given. Were the oxygen and hydrogen of water to 
lose their affinities, and were no molecular motion supplied 
to them beyond that contained in water at blood-heat, 
they would assume a volume twenty times that of the 
water.* Whether protein under like conditions would 
expand in a greater or a less degree, must remain an open 
question ; but remembering the gaseous nature of three out 
of its four chief components, remembering the above-named 
peculiarity of nitrogenous compounds, remembering the 
high multiples and the colloidal form, we may conclude 
that the expansion would be great. We shall not be far 
wrong, therefore, in saying that the elements of the human 

* I am indebted for this result to Dr. Frankland, who has been good enough 
to have the calculation made for me. 



254 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

body, if suddenly disengaged from one another, would oc- 
cupy a score times the space they do: the movements of 
their atoms would compel this wide diffusion. Thus the 
essential characteristic of living organic matter is that it 
unites this large quantity of contained motion with a 
degree of cohesion that permits temporary fixity of ar- 
rangement. 

§ 104. Further proofs that the secondary redistributions 
which make evolution compound depend for their possi- 
bility on the reconciliation of these conflicting conditions, 
are yielded by comparisons of organic aggregates with 
one another. Besides seeing that organic aggregates differ 
from other aggregates, alike in the quantity of motion 
they contain and the amount of rearrangement of parts 
that accompanies their progressive integration; we shall 
see that among organic aggregates themselves differences 
in the quantities of contained motion are accompanied by 
differences in the amounts of redistribution. 

The contrasts among organisms in chemical composi- 
tion yield us the first illustration. Animals are distin- 
guished from plants by their far greater amounts of 
structure, as well as by the far greater rapidity with 
which changes of structure go on in them; and, in com- 
parison with plants, animals are at the same time conspicu- 
ous for containing immensely larger proportions of those 
highly compounded nitrogenous molecules in which so much 
motion is locked up. So, too, is it with the contrasts be- 
tween the different parts of each animal. Though certain 
nitrogenous parts, as cartilage, are inert, yet the parts in 
which the secondary redistributions have gone on. and 
are ever going on, most actively are those in which the 
most highly compounded molecules predominate, and parts 
which, like the deposits of fat, consist of relatively simple 
molecules, are seats of but little structure and but little 
change. 

We find clear proof, too, that the continuance of the sec- 
ondary redistributions by which organic aggregates are so 
.remarkably distinguished depends on the presence of that 
motion contained in the water diffused through them: and 
that, other things equal, there is a direct relation between 
the amount of redistribution and the amount of contained 
water. The evidences may be put in three groups. There is 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 255 

the familiar fact that a plant has its formative changes ar- 
rested by cutting off the supply of water: the primary re- 
distribution continues — it withers and shrinks or becomes 
more integrated — but the secondary redistributions cease. 
There is the less familiar, but no less certain, fact, that 
the like result occurs in animals — occurs, indeed, as might 
be expected, after a relatively smaller diminution of water. 
Certain of the lower animals furnish additional proofs. 
The Rotifer a may be rendered apparently lifeless by desic- 
cation, and will yet revive if wetted. When the African 
rivers which it inhabits are dried up, the Lepiclosiren re- 
mains torpid in the hardened mud until the return of the 
rainy season brings water. Humboldt states that, during 
the summer drought, the alligators, of the Pampas lie bur- 
ied in a state of suspended animation beneath the parched 
surface, and struggle up out of the earth as soon as it 
becomes humid. The history of each organism teaches us 
the same thing. The young plant, just putting its head 
above the soil, is far more succulent than the adult plant; 
and the amount of transformation going on in it is rela- 
tively much greater. In that portion of an egg which dis- 
plays the formative processes during the early stages of 
incubation, the changes of arrangement are more rapid 
than those which an equal portion of the body of a hatched 
chick undergoes. As may be inferred from their respec- 
tive powers to acquire habits and aptitudes, the structural 
modifiability of a child is greater than that of an adult 
man; and the structural modifiability of an adult man is 
greater than that of an old man — contrasts which are ac- 
companied by corresponding contrasts in the densities of the 
tissues, since the ratio of water to solid matter diminishes 
with advancing age. And then we have this relation re- 
peated in the contrasts between parts of the same organ- 
ism. In a tree, rapid structural changes go on at the ends 
of shoots, where the ratio of water to solid matter is very 
great ; while the changes are very slow in the dense and 
almost dry substance of the trunk. Similarly in animals, 
wo have the contrast between the high rate of change going 
on in a soft tissue like the brain, and the low rate of 
change going on in dry non-vascular tissues, such as those 
which form hairs, nails, horns, etc, 

Other groups q£ facts, prove, in an equally unmistakable 
w^y ? that the quantity of secondary redistribution in an 



256 FIBST PRIXCIPLES. 

organism varies, cceteris paribus, according to the contained 
quantity of the motion we call heat. The contrasts be- 
tween different organisms, and different states of the same 
organism, unite in showing this. Speaking generally, the 
amounts of structure and rates of structural change are 
smaller throughout the vegetal kingdom than throughout 
the animal kingdom; and, speaking generally, the heat of 
plants is less than the heat of animals. A comparison of 
the several divisions of the animal kingdom with one an- 
other discloses among them parallel relations. Regarded 
as a whole, vertebrate animals are higher in temperature 
than invertebrate ones; and they are as a whole higher hi 
organic activity and complexity. Between subdivisions of 
the vertebrata themselves, like differences in the state of 
molecular vibration accompany like differences in the de- 
greeof evolution. The least compounded of the Vertebrata 
are the fishes; and in most cases the heat of fishes is nearly 
the same as that of the water in which they swim — only 
some of them being decidedly wanner. Though we habit* 
ually speak of reptiles a> cold-blooded, and though they 
have not much more power than lishes of maintaining a 
temperature above that of their medium, yet since their 
medium (which is, in the majority of cases, the air of 
warm climates) is on the average Warmer than the medium 
inhabited by lishes, the temperature of the class of reptiles 
is higher than that of the class of fishes; and we b 
them a correspondingly higher complexity. The much 
more active molecular agitation in mammals and birds is 
associated with a considerably greater multiformity of 
structure and a very far greater vivacity. The most in- 
structive contrasts, however, are th - orring in the 
same organic aggregates at different temperatures. Plants 
exhibit structural changes that vary in rate as the temper- 
ature varies. Though light is the agent which effects those 
molecular changes causing vegetal growth, yet we see that 
in the absence of heat such changes arc not effected: in 
winter there is enough light, but the heat being insuffi- 
cient plant-life is suspended. That this is the sole cause 
of the suspension is proved by the fact that at the 
season plants contained in hot-houses, where they receive 
even a smaller amount of light, go on producing leaves and 
flowers. We sec, too. that their seeds, to which light is 
not simply needless but detrimental, begin to germinate 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 257 

only when the return of a warm season raises the rate of 
molecular agitation. In like manner the ova of animals, 
undergoing those changes by which structure is produced 
in them, must be kept more or less warm; in the absence 
of a certain amount of motion among their molecules, the 
re-arrangement of parts does not go on. Hybernating ani- 
mals also supply proof that loss of heat carried far retards 
extremely the processes of transformation. In animals 
which do not hybernate, as in man, prolonged exposure to 
intense cold produces an irresistible tendency to sleep 
(which implies a lowered rate of structural and functional 
changes) ; and if the abstraction of heat continues, this 
sleep ends in death, or stoppage of these changes. 

Here, then, is an accumulation of proofs, general and 
special. Living aggregates are distinguished by the con- 
nected facts, that during integration they undergo very 
remarkable secondary changes which other aggregates do 
not undergo to any considerable extent ; and that they con- 
tain (bulks being supposed equal) immensely greater quan- 
tities of motion, locked up in various ways. 

§ 105. The last chapter closed with the remark that 
while Evolution is always an integration of Matter and 
dissipation of Motion, it is in most cases much more. And 
this chapter opened by briefly specifying the conditions 
under which evolution is integrative only, or remains sim- 
ple, and the conditions under which it is something fur- 
ther than integrative, or becomes compound. In illustrat- 
ing this contrast between simple and compound Evolution, 
and in explaining how the contrast arises, a vague idea of 
Evolution in general has been conveyed. Unavoidably, 
we have to some extent forestalled the full discussion of 
Evolution about to be commenced. 

There is nothing in this to regret. A preliminary con- 
ception, indefinite but comprehensive, is always useful as 
an introduction to a complete conception — cannot, indeed, 
be dispensed with. A complex idea is not communicable 
directly by giving one after another its component parts 
in their finished forms; since if no outline pre-exists in 
the mind of the recipient, these component parts will not 
be rightly combined. The intended combination can be 
made only when the recipient has discovered for himself 
how the components are to be arranged. Much labor has 
17 



258 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

to be gone through which would have been saved had a 
general notion, however cloudy, been conveyed before the 
distinct and detailed delineation was commenced. 

That which the reader has incidentally gathered respect- 
ing the nature of Evolution from the foregoing sections, he 
may thus advantageously use as a rude sketch, enabling him 
to seize the relations among the several parts of the en- 
larged picture as they are worked out before him. He 
will constantly bear in mind that the total history of every 
sensible existence is included in its Evolution and I): 
tion — which last process we leave, for the present, out of 
consideration. He will remember that, whatever aspect of 
it we are for the moment considering, Evolution is always 
to be regarded as fundamentally an integration of Matter 
and dissipation of Motion, which may be, and usually is, 
accompanied incidentally by other transformations of Mat- 
ter and Motion. And he will everywhere expect to find 
that the primary redistribution ends informing aggregates 
which are simple where it ia rapid, but which become 
compound in proportion as its slowness allows the affects of 
secondary redistributions to accumulate, 

§ 10G. There is much difficulty in tracing out trans- 
formations so vast, so varied, ami so intricate as those now 
to be entered upon. Besides having to deal with concrete 
phenomena of all orders, we have- to deal with each group 
of phenomena under several aspects, no one of which can 
be fully understood apart from the rest, and no one of 
which can be studied simultaneously with the 
Already we have seen that during Evolution two great 
- of changes are going on together: and we shall 
presently see that the second o\' tl .: classes is re- 

divisible. Entangled with one another as all these el., 
are, explanation of anyone class or order involves direct or 
indirect reference to others not yet explained. We have 
nothing for it but to make the best practicable compro- 
mise. 

It will be most convenient to devote the next chapter to 
a detailed account of Evolution under its primary aspect; 
tacitly recognizing its secondary aspects only so far as the 
exposition necessitates. 

The succeeding two chapters, occupied exclusively with 
the secoudarv redistributions, will make no reference to 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 259 

the primary redistribution beyond that which is unavoid- 
able — each being also limited to one particular trait of the 
secondary redistributions. 

In a further chapter will be treated a third, and still 
more distinct, character of the secondary redistributions. 



CHAPTEE XIV. 

THE LAW OF EVOLUTION". 

§ 107. Deduction has now to be verified by induction. 
Thus far the argument has been that all sensible existences 
must, in some way or other and at some time or other, reach 
their concrete shapes through processes of concentration ; 
and such facts as have been named have been named merely 
to clarify the perception of this necessity. But we cannot be 
said to have arrived at that unified knowledge constituting 
Philosophy, until we have seen how existences of all orders 
do exhibit a progressive integration of Matter and concom- 
itant loss of Motion. Tracing, so far as we may by ob- 
servation and inference, the objects dealt with by the 
Astronomer and the Geologist, as well as those which Biol- 
ogy, Psychology, and Sociology treat of, we have to consider 
what direct proof there is that the Cosmos, in general and 
in detail, conforms to this law. 

In doing this, manifestations of the law more involved 
than those hitherto indicated will chiefly occupy us. 
Throughout the classes of facts successively contemplated, 
our attention will be directed not so much to the truth 
that every aggregate has undergone, or is undergoing, in- 
tegration, as to the further truth that in every more or 
less separate part of every aggregate, integration has been, 
or is, in progress. Instead of simple wholes and wholes of 
which the complexity has been ignored, we have here to 
deal with wholes as they actually exist — mostly made up 
of many members combined in many ways. And in them 
we shall have to trace the transformation as displayed 
under several forms — a passage of the total mass from a 
more diffused to a more consolidated state ; a concurrent 
similar passage in every portion of it that comes to have a 
distinguishable individuality; and a simultaneous increase 
of combination among such individuated portions. 



260 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

§ 108. Our Sidereal System by its general form, by its 
clusters of stars of all degrees of closeness, aDd by its nebu- 
lae in all stages of condensation, gives us grounds*to suspect 
that, generally and locally, concentration is going on. 
Assume that its matter has been, and still is being, drawn 
together by gravitation, and we have an explanation of all 
its leading traits of structure — from its solidified masses 
up to its collections of attenuated flocculi barely discernible 
by the most powerful telescopes, from its double stars tip 
to such complex aggregates as the nubecula?. Without 
dwelling on this evidence, however, let us pass to the case 
of the Solar System. 

The belief, for which there are so many reasons, that 
this has had a nebular genesis, is the belief that it has 
arisen by the integration of matter and concomitant loss 
of motion. Evolution, under its primary aspect, is illus- 
trated, most simply and clearly by this passage of the 9 
System from a widely diffused incoherent state to a con- 
solidated coherent state. While, according to the nebular 
hypothesis, there has been going on this gradual eoncen- 
tration of the Solar System as an aggregate, there has 
a simultaneous concentration of each partially independ- 
ent member. The substance of every planet in passing 
through its stages of nebulous ring, gaseous spheroid, 
liquid spheroid, and spheroid externally Bolidified, has in 
essentials paralleled the changes gone through by the gene- 
ral mass; and every satellite has done the like. Moreover, 
at the same time that the matter of the whole, as well as 
the matter of each partially independent part, has been 
thus integrating, there has been the further integration 
implied by increasing combination among the parts. The 
satellites of each planet are linked with their primary into 
a balanced cluster; while the planets and their satellites 
form with the Sun a compound group of which the mem- 
bers are more strongly bound up with one another than 
were the far-spread portions of the nebulous medium out 
of which they arose. 

Even apart from the nebular hypothesis, the Solar Sys- 
tem furnishes evidence having a like general meaning. 
Not to make much of the meteoric matter perpetually 
being added to the mass of the Earth, and probably to the 
masses of other planets, as well as, in larger quantities, to 
the mass of the Sun, it will suiriee to name two generally 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 261 

admitted instances. The one is the appreciable retardation 
of comets by the ethereal medium, and the inferred retard- 
ation of planets — a process which, in time, must bring 
comets, and eventually planets, into the Sun. The other 
is the Sun's still-continued loss of motion in the shape of 
radiated heat, accompanying the still-continued integra- 
tion of his mass. 

§ 109. To geologic evolution we pass without break from 
the evolution which, for convenience, we separate as as- 
tronomic. The history of the Earth, as traced out from 
the structure of its crust, carries us back to that molten 
state which the nebular hypothesis implies ; and, as before 
pointed out (§ 69), the changes classed as igneous are the 
accompaniments of the progressing consolidation of the 
Earth's substance and accompanying loss of its contained 
motion. Both the general and the local effects may be 
briefly exemplified. 

Leaving behind the period when the more volatile ele- 
ments now existing as solids were kept by the high tem- 
perature in a gaseous form, we may begin with the fact 
that until the Earth's surface had cooled down below 212°, 
the vast mass of water at present covering three-fifths of 
it must have existed as vapor. This enormous volume of 
disintegrated liquid became integrated as fast as the dissi- 
pation of the Earth's contained motion allowed; leaving, 
at length, a comparatively small portion unintegrated, 
which would be far smaller but for the unceasing absorp- 
tion of molecular motion from the Sun. In the formation 
of the Earth's crust we have a similar change similarly 
caused. The passage from a thin solid film, everywhere 
fissured and movable on the subjacent molten matter, to a 
crust so thick and strong as to be but now and then very 
slightly dislocated by disturbing forces, illustrates the 
process. And while, in this superficial solidification, we 
see under one form how concentration accompanies loss of 
contained motion, we see it under another form in that 
diminution of the Earth's bulk implied by superficial 
corrugation. 

Local or secondary integrations have advanced along 
with this general integration. A molten spheroid merely 
skinned over with solid matter could have presented noth- 
ing beyond small patches of land and water. Differences 



262 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

of elevation great enough to form islands of considerable 
size imply a crust of some rigidity; and only as the crust 
grew thick could the land be united into continents 
divided by oceans. So, too, with the more striking eleva- 
tions. The collapse of a thin crust round its cooling and 
contracting contents would throw it into low ridg 
must have acquired a relatively great depth and strength 
before extensive mountain systems of vast elevation be- 
came possible. In sedimentary changes, also, a like prog- 
- inferable. Denudation acting on the small sur- 
cxposed during early stages would produce but 
small local deposits. The collection of detritus into 
strata of great extent, and the union of su i into 

extensive "systems," imply wide surfaces of land and 
water, as well aa subsidences great in both area and depth; 
whence it follows that integrations of this order must have 
grown more pronounced as the Earth's crust thickened. 

§ 110. Already we have recognized the fact that or- 
ganic evolution is primarily the formation of an aggregate 
by the continued incorporation of matter pit -oread 

through a wider space. Merely reminding the r 
that every plant grows by Concentrating in itself elements 
that were before eiiir':,- md that every animal 

grows by s previously 

I in surrounding plants and animals, it will be here 
proper to complete the conception by pointing out that 
the early history of a plant or animal, still more clearly 
than its later history, shows us this fundamental pr 
For the microscopic germ of each organism and* 
a long time, no other change than that implied ; 
tion of nutriment. Cells imbedded in the stroma of an 
ovarium become ova by little else than continued growth 
at the expense of adjacent materials. And when, after 
fertilization, a more active evolution commence-, 
conspicuous trait is the drawing-in, to a germinal centre, 
of the substance which the ovum ponta 

Here, however, our attention must be directed mainly 
to the secondary integrations which habitually accompany 
the primary integration. We have re how. along 

with the formation of a larger mass of matter, there 
on a drawing together and consolidation of the matter into 
parts, as well as an increasingly intimate combination of 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 263 

parts. In the mammalian embryo, the heart, at first a 
long, pulsating blood-vessel, by and by twists upon itself 
and integrates. The bile-cells constituting the rudiment- 
ary liver do not simply become different from the wall of 
the intestine in which they at first lie ; but, as they ac- 
cumulate, they simultaneously diverge from it and con- 
solidate into an organ. The anterior segments of the 
cerebro-spinal axis, which are at first continuous with the 
rest, and distinguished only by their larger size, undergo 
a gradual union; and at the same time the resulting head 
folds into a mass clearly marked off from the rest of the 
vertebral column. The like process, variously exemplified 
in other organs, is meanwhile exhibited by the body as a 
whole; which becomes integrated somewhat in the same 
way that an outspread handkerchief and its contents be- 
come integrated when its edges are drawn in and fastened 
to make a bundle. Analogous changes go on long after 
birth, and continue even up to old age. In man, that 
solidification of the bony framework which, during child- 
'hood, is seen in the coalescence of portions of the same 
bone ossified from different centres, is afterward seen in 
the coalescence of bones that were originally distinct. The 
appendages of the vertebrae unite with the vertebral cen- 
tres to which they belong — a change not completed until 
toward thirty. At the same time the epiphyses, formed 
separately from the main bodies of their respective bones, 
have their cartilaginous connections turned into osseous 
ones — are fused to the masses beneath them. The com- 
ponent vertebrae of the sacrum, which remain separate 
till about the sixteenth year, then begin to unite; and 
in ten or a dozen years more their union is complete. Still 
later occurs the coalescence of the coccygeal vertebrae; and 
there are some other bony unions which remain unfinished 
unless advanced age is reached. To which add that the 
increase of density and toughness, going on throughout 
the tissues in general during life, is the formation of a 
more highly integrated substance. 

The species of change thus illustrated under several as- 
pects in the unfolding human body may be traced in all 
animals. That mode of it which consists in the union of 
similar parts originally separate has been described by 
Milne-Edwards and others, as exhibited in various of the 
Invertebrata; though it does not seem to have been in- 



264 FIRST PEIXCTPLES. 

eluded by them as an essential peculiarity in the process 
of organic development. We shall, however, see clearly 
that local integration is an all-important part of this proc- 
ess, when we find it displayed not only in the successive 
stages passed through by every embryo, but also in as- 
cending from the lower creatures to the higher. As man- 
ifested in either way, it goes on both longitudinally and 
transversely — under which different forms we may. indeed, 
most conveniently consider it. Of longitudinal, integra- 
tion the sub-kingdom Annulosa supplies abundant exam- 
pies. Its lower members, such as worms and myriapods, 
are mostly characterized by the great number of segments 
composing them, reaching in some cases to several hun- 
dreds. But in the higher divisions — crustaceans, in* 
and spiders — we find this number reduced down to twenty- 
two, thirteen, or even fewer; while accompanying the re- 
duction there is a shortening or integration of the whole 
body, reaching its extreme in the crab and the spider. 
The significance of these contrasts, as hearing on thi 
eral doctrine of Evolution, will be seen when it is poi 
out that they are parallel to those which arise during the 
development of individual annulose animals. In the 
lobster the head and thorax form one compact I 
by the union of a number of segments which in tie 
bryo were separable. Similarly, the butterfly shows da - _- 
ments so much more closely united than they were i 
caterpillar as to be, some of them. _uish- 

able from one another. The Vertebraia again, thi 
out their successively higher classes, furnish like ins: 
of longitudinal union. In most fishes, and in reptiles 
that have no limbs, none of the vertebrae • . In 

most mammals ami in birds, a variable number of ver- 
tebra? become fused together to form the sacrum ; and in the 
higher apes and in man, the caudal vertebras also lose their 
separate individualities in a single Oh ?. That which 

we may distinguish as transverse integration is well illus- 
trated among the Annulosa in the development of the ner- 
vous system. Leaving out those most degraded forms 
which do not present distinct ganglia, it is to be observed 
that the lower annulose animals, in common with the 
larva 5 oi the higher, are severally characterized by a double 
chain of ganglia running from end to end of the body; 
while in the more perfectly formed annulose animals, this 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 265 

double chain becomes united into a single chain. Mr. 
Newport has described the course of this concentration as 
exhibited in insects; and by Rathke it has been traced in 
crustaceans. During the early stages of the Astacusfluvia- 
tilis, or common cray-fish, there is a pair of separate ganglia 
to each ring. Of the fourteen pairs belonging to the head 
and thorax, the three pairs in advance of the mouth con- 
solidate into one mass to form the brain, or cephalic gan- 
glion. Meanwhile, out of the remainder, the first six 
pairs severally unite in the median line, while the rest re- 
main more or less separate. Of these six double gan- 
glia thus formed, the anterior four coalesce into one mass; 
the remaining two coalesce into another mass; and then 
these two masses coalesce into one. Here we see longitu- 
dinal and transverse integration going on simultaneously; 
and in the highest crustaceans they are both carried still 
farther. The Vertebrata clearly exhibit transverse inte- 
gration in the development of the generative system. The 
lowest mammals — the Monotremata — in common with birds, 
to which they are in many respects allied, have oviducts 
which toward their lower extremities are dilated into cavi- 
ties, severally performing in an imperfect way the func- 
tion of a uterus. "In the Marsupialia there is a closer 
approximation of the two lateral sets of organs on the me- 
dian line ; for the oviducts converge toward one another 
and meet (without coalescing) on the median line ; so that 
their uterine dilatations are in contact with each other, 
forming a true 'double uterus'. ... As we ascend the 
series of 'placental' mammals, we find the lateral coales- 
cence becoming more and more complete. ... In many 
of the Rodent ia the uterus still remains completely divided 
into two lateral halves ; while in others these coalesce at their 
lower portions, forming a rudiment of the true 'body' of 
the uterus in the human subject. This part increases at 
the expense of the lateral 'cornua' in the higher herbivora 
and carnivora; but even in the lower quadrumana the 
uterus is somewhat cleft at its summit."* 

Under the head of organic integrations, there remain to 
be noted some which do not occur within the limits of one 
organism, and which only in an indirect way involve con- 
centration of matter and dissipation of motion. These are 
the integrations by which organisms are made dependent 

* Carpenter's Prin. of Comp. Phys., p. 617. 



266 FIRST PRIXCIPLES. 

on one another. We may set down two kinds of them — 
those which occur within the same species, and those 
which occur among different species. More or less of the 
gregarious tendency is general in animals; and when it is 
marked there is, in addition to simple aggregation, a cer- 
tain degree of combination. Creatures that hunt in packs, 
or that have sentinels, or that are governed by leaden, 
form bodies partially united by co-operation. Amoi 
lygamous mammals and birds this mutual dependence is 
closer; and the social Bhow as assemblages of in- 

dividuals of a still more consolidated character — some of 
them having carried the consolidation so far that the in- 
dividuals cannot exist if separated. How organisms in 
general arc mutually dependent, and in that sense inte- 
grated, we shall see on remembering — first, that while all 
animals live directly or indirectly on plants, plants lii 
the carbonic acid excreted by animals: second, that among 
animals the ilesh-caters cannot exist without the plant- 
eaters; third, that a large proportion of plants can 
tinne their respective races only by the help of ii 
and that in many cases particular plants need particular 
insects. Without detailing the more complex connections 
which Mr. Darwin has bo beautifully illustrated, it will 
Buffice to say that the Flora and Fauna in each habitat 
constitute an aggregate so far integrated that many of its 
species die out if placed amid the plants and animals of 
another habitat. And it is to be remarked that this inte- 
gration, too, increases inic evolution prog 

§ HI. The phenomena set down in the foregoing para- 
graph are introductory to others of a higher order, with 
which they ought, perhaps, in strictness grouped — 

phenomena which, for want of a better word, we may 
term super-organic. Inorganic bodies present us with 
certain facts. Certain other facts, mostly of a more in- 
volved kind, are presented by organic bodies. There re- 
main yet further facts, not presented By any organic 
taken singly; but which result from the actions __ - 

gated organic bodies, on one another and on inorg 
bodies. Though phenomena of this order are, as \\ 
foreshadowed among inferior organisms, tli Die so 

extremely conspicuous in mankind as socially united, that 
practically we may consider them to commence here. 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 267 

In the social organism integrative changes are clearly 
and abundantly exemplified. Uncivilized societies dis- 
play them when wandering families, such as we see among 
Bushmen, join into tribes of considerable numbers. A fur- 
ther progress of like nature is everywhere manifested in 
the subjugation of weaker tribes by stronger ones, and in 
the subordination of their respective chiefs to the con- 
quering chief. The combinations thus resulting, which, 
among aboriginal races, are being continually formed and 
continually broken up, become, among superior races, rel- 
atively permanent. If we trace the stages through which 
our own society or any adjacent one has passed, Ave see 
this unification from time to time repeated on a larger 
scale and gaining in stability. The aggregation of jun- 
iors and the children of juniors under elders and the chil- 
dren of elders; the consequent establishment of groups of 
vassals bound to their respective nobles; the subsequent 
subordination of groups of inferior nobles to dukes or 
earls, and the still later growth of the kingly power over 
dukes and earls, are so many instances of increasing con- 
solidation. This process through which petty tenures are 
aggregated in feuds, feuds into provinces, provinces into 
kingdoms, and finally contiguous kingdoms into a single 
one, slowly completes itself by destroying the original lines 
of demarcation. And it may be further remarked, of the 
European nations as a whole, that in the tendency to form 
alliances more or less lasting, in the restraining influences 
exercised by the several governments over one another, in 
the system, now becoming customary, of settling interna- 
tional disputes by congresses, as well as in the breaking 
down of commercial barriers and the increasing facilities 
of communication, we may trace the beginnings of a 
European federation — a still larger integration than any 
now established. 

But it is not only in these external unions of groups 
with groups, and of the compound groups with one another, 
that the general law is exemplified. It is exemplified also 
in unions that take place internally as the groups become 
more highly organized. There are two orders of these, 
which may be broadly distinguished as regulative and op- 
erative. A civilized society is made unlike a barbarous 
one by the establishment of regulative classes — govern- 
mental, administrative, military, ecclesiastical, legal, etc., 



268 FIRST PRIXCIPLES. 

which, while they have their several special bonds of 
union, constituting them sub-classes, are also held to- 
gether as a general class by a certain community of privi- 
leges, of blood, of education, of intercourse. In some so- 
cieties, fully developed after their particular types, this 
consolidation into castes, and this union among the upper 
castes by separation from the lower, eventually grow very 
decided — to be afterward rendered less decided only in 
cases of social metamorphosis caused by the industrial 
regime. The integrations that accompany the operative 
or industrial organization, later in origin, are not D 
of this indirect kind, but they are also direct — they 
us physical approach. We have integrations consequent 
on the simple growth of adjacent parts performing like 
functions; as, for instance, the junction • 
with its calico- weaving suburbs. We have other in1 
tions that arise when, out 

particular commodity, one monopolizing more and more 
of the business draws to it masters and wor 
leaves the ether places to dwindle; as witn< n 
of the Yorkshire cloth-districts at ; 
the West <>f England; or the absorption byStaffordshi 
the pottery manufacture, and the consequent d< 
establishments that once nourished at Derby and else- 
where. We have those more special integrations thai 
within the same city; whence result tin 
publishers in Paternoster Bow, of corn-mercha 
Mark Lane, <>f civil engineers in Great 
bankers in the centre of the city. Industrial combina- 
tions that consist, n<>t in the approximation or fusi 

parts, but in the establishment of common cent: 3 
nection, are exhibited in the Hank clearing-house and the 
Railway clearing-house. Whileof yet another specii 

those unions which bring into relation the more or less 
dispersed citizens who are occupied in like ways 
traders are brought by the Exchange, and ;is are profes- 
sional men by institutes like those of Civil Engineers, Ar- 
chitects, etc. 

At first sight these seem to be the last of our i 
Having followed up the general law to social a__ 
there apparently remain no other i which it 

can apply. This, however, is not true. Among what we 
have above distinguished as super-organic phenol 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 200 

shall find sundry groups of very remarkable and interesting 
illustrations. Though evolution of the various products 
of human activities cannot be said directly to exemplify 
the integration of matter and dissipation of motion, yet 
they exemplify it indirectly. For the progress of Lan- 
guage, of Science, and of the Arts, industrial and aesthetic, 
is an objective register of subjective changes. Alterations 
of structure in human beings, and concomitant alterations 
of structure in aggregates of human beings, jointly pro- 
duce corresponding alterations of structure iu all those 
things which humanity creates. As in the changed im- 
press on the wax we read a change in the seal, so in the 
integrations of advancing Language, Science, and Art we 
see reflected certain integrations of advancing human 
structure, individual and social. A section must be de- 
voted to each group. 

§ 112. Among uncivilized races, the many-syllabled 
names used for not uncommon objects, as well as the de- 
scriptive character of proper names, show us that the words 
used for the less familiar things are formed by compound- 
ing the words used for the more familiar things. This 
process of composition is sometimes found in its incipient 
stage — a stage in which the component words are tempo- 
rarily united to signify some un-named object, and, from 
lack of frequent use, do not permanently cohere. But in 
the majority of inferior languages, the process of " ag- 
glutination," as it is called, has gone far enough to pro- 
duce considerable stability in the compound words — there 
is a manifest integration. How small is the degree of this 
integration, however, when compared with that reached 
in well-developed languages, is shown both by the great 
length of the compound words used for things and acts of 
constant occurrence and by the separableness of their ele- 
ments. Certain North American tongues illustrate this 
very well. In a Eicaree vocabulary extending to fifty 
names of common objects, which in English are nearly all 
expressed by single syllables, there is not one monosyllabic 
word; and in the nearly-allied vocabulary of the Pawnees, 
the names for these same common objects are monosyllabic 
in but two instances. Things so familiar to these hunting 
tribes as dog and bow are, in the Pawnee language, as- 
Jiakish and teeragish; the hand and the eyes are respectively 



270 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

iksheeree and Jceereekoo; for day the term is shakoorooee- 
shairet, and for devil it is haheehsKkakoo-raiwah^ while the 
numerals are composed of from two syllables up to five, 
and in Kicaree up to seven. That the great length of these 
familiar words implies a low degree of development, and 
that in the formation of higher languages out of lower 
there is a progressive integration, which reduces the poly- 
syllables to dissyllables and monosyllables, is an inference 
confirmed by the history of our own language. Anglo- 
Saxon steorra has been in course of time consolidated into 
English itar, mona into moon, and noma into name. The 
transition through the intermediate Bern i -Saxon is clearly 
traceable. Sunu became in semi-Saxon sune and in 
lish son — the final e of sunebeing an evanescent form i 
original u. The change from the Anglo-Saxon plural, 
formed by the distinct syllable as, to our plural formed 
by the appended consonant >•, shows us the same thing; 
smithas in becoming sunlit*, and endas in becoming 
illustrate progressive coalescence. So, too, does tin- d 
pearance of the terminal an in the infinitive mood of verbs; 
shown in the transition from the Anglo-Saxon 
the semi-Saxon cumme, and to the English More- 

over, the process has been Blowly going on, even since what 
we distinguish as English was formed. In Elizabeth's 
time verbs were still very frequently pmralized by the ad- 
dition of en — we tell was w< . and in some rural dis- 
tricts this form of Bpeechmay even now be heard. In like 
manner the terminal ed of the past tense has united with 
the word it modifies. Bufn-ed has in pronunciation be- 
come burnt; and even in writing the terminal / has in 
some cases taken the place of the id. Only where antique 
forms in general are adhered to, as in the church-service, 
is the distinctness of this inflection still maintained. 
Further, we see that the compound vowels'have been, in 
many cases, fused into single vowels. That in bread t lie 
ami a were originally both sounded is proved by the 
fact that they are still so sounded in parts where old hab- 
its linger. We, however, have contracted the pronun- 
ciation into bred; and we have made like changes in many 
other common words. Lastly, let it be noted that where 
the frequency of repetition is greatest, the proc - 
ried farthest; as instance the contraction of lord (originally 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 271 

laford) into lud in the mouths of Barristers ; and, still bet- 
ter, the coalescence of God be with you into Good-by. 

Besides exhibiting in this way the integrative process, 
Language equally exhibits it throughout all grammatical 
development. The lowest kinds of human speech, having 
merely nouns and. verbs without inflections to them, man- 
ifestly permit no such close union of the elements of a 
proposition as results when the relations are marked either 
by inflections or by connective words. Such speech is 
necessarily what we significantly call " incoherent." To a 
considerable extent incoherence is seen in the Chinese 
language. " If, instead of saying 1 go to London, figs 
come from Turkey, the sun shines through the air, we said, 
/ go end London, figs come origin Turkey, the sun shine 
passage air, we should discourse after the manner of the 
Chinese. From this " aptotic" form, there is clear evi- 
dence of a transition, by coalescence, to a form in which 
the connections of words are expressed by the addition to 
them of certain inflectional words. " In Languages like 
the Chinese," remarks Dr. Latham, "the separate words 
most in use to express relation may become adjuncts or an 
nexes." To this he adds the fact that " the numerous in- 
flectional languages fall into two classes. In one, the in- 
flections have no appearance of having been separate words; 
in the other, their origin as separate words is demon- 
strable." From which the inference drawn is, that the 
" aptotic " languages, by the more and more constant use 
of adjuncts, gave rise to the " agglutinate" languages, or 
those in which the original separateness of the inflectional 
parts can be traced ; and that out of these, by further use, 
arose the " amalgamate " languages, or those in which 
the original separateness of the inflexional parts can no 
longer be traced. Strongly corroborative of this inference 
is the unquestionable fact that by such a process there 
have grown out of the amalgamate languages the " anap- 
totic" languages, of which our own is the most perfect ex- 
ample — languages in which, by further consolidation, in- 
flections have -almost disappeared, while to express the 
verbal relations certain new kinds of words have been de- 
veloped. When we see the Anglo-Saxon inflections grad- 
ually lost by contraction during the development of Eng- 
lish, and, though to a less degree, the Latin inflections 



272 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

dwindling away during the development of French, we 
cannot deny that grammatical structure is modified by 
integration; and, seeing how clearly the earlier 
grammatical structure are explained by it. we can scarcely 
doubt that it has been going on from the first. 

In proportion to the degree of this integration is the 
extent to which integration of another order is carried. 
Aptotic languages are, as already pointed out, necessarily 
incoherent: the elements of a proposition cannot be com- 
pletely tied into a whole. Bui aiescena 
duces inflected words, it becom ble i<< unite them 
into sentences of which tin* part- are so mutually depend- 
ent that no considerable change can be made without de- 
stroying the meaning. Yet a further stage in this proc- 
ess may be noted. After the development of those gram- 
matical forma which make definite Btatemenl 
do not at first find them used to express anythii _ 
statements of a simple kind. A single Bnbject with a 
single predicate, accompanied by but few qualifying terms, 
are usually all. If we compare, for instance, tie 
Scriptures with writings of modern times, a marked differ- 
ence of aggregation among the group- of words is visible. 
In the number of subordinate propositions which a< 
pany the principal one; in the various complements to 
subjects and predicates, and in the numerous qualifying 
clauses — all of them united into one complex whole — many 
sentences in modern compositions exhibit a degree of in- 
tegration not to be found in ancient 01 

?j L13. The history of Science presents facts of the same 
meaning at every step. Indeed, the integration of groups 
of like entities and like relations may be said to o 
ttite the most conspicuous part of scientific progn SB. A 
glance at the classificatory sciences shows us that the 
fused, incoherent aggregations which the vulgar make of 
natural objects are gradually rendered complete and com- 
pact, and bound up into groups within groups. While, 
instead of considering all marine creatures as fish, shell- 
fish, and jelly-fish, Zoology establishes divisions and Bob- 
divisions under the heads Vertebra&L, Ann"' i . 
etc. ; and while, in place of the wide and vague assemblage 
popularly described as "creeping things.'* it makes the 
specific classes Annelida* Myriopoda^ Insecta, Arachnida, 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 273 

it simultaneously gives to these an increasing consolida- 
tion. The several orders and genera of which each con- 
sists are arranged according to their affinities and tied 
together under common definitions; at the same time that, 
by extended observation and rigorous criticism, the pre- 
viously unknown and undetermined forms are integrated 
with their respective congeners. Nor is the process less 
clearly manifested in those sciences which have for their 
subject-matter, not classified objects but classified rela- 
tions. Under one of its chief aspects, scientific advance is 
the advance of generalization ; and generalizing is uniting 
into groups all like co-existences and sequences among 
phenomena. The colligation of many concrete relations 
into a generalization of the lowest order exemplifies this 
principle in its simplest form ; and it is again exemplified 
in a more complex form by the colligation of these lowest 
generalizations into higher ones, and these into still higher 
ones. Year by year are established certain connections 
among orders of phenomena that appear unallied; and 
these connections, multiplying and strengthening, grad- 
ually bring the seemingly unallied orders under a common 
bond. When, for example, Humboldt quotes the saying of 
the Swiss, " it is going to rain because we hear the mur- 
mur of the torrent nearer; " when he remarks the relation 
between this and an observation of his own, that the cat- 
aracts of the Orinoco are heard at a greater distance by 
night than by day; when he notes the essential parallelism 
existing between these facts and the fact that the unusual 
visibility of remote objects is also an indication of coming 
rain, and when he points out that the common cause of 
these variations is the smaller hindrance offered to the 
passage of both light and sound by media which are com- 
paratively homogeneous, either in temperature or hygro- 
metric state, he helps in bringing under one generalization 
the phenomena of light and those of sound. Experiments 
having shown that these conform to like laws of reflection 
and refraction, the conclusion that they are both produced 
by undulations gains probability: there is an incipient 
integration of two great orders of phenomena, between 
which no connection was suspected in times past. A still 
more decided integration has been of late taking place be- 
tween the once independent sub-sciences of Electricity, 
Magnetism, and Light. 
18 



274 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

The process will manifestly be carried much further. 
Such propositions as those set forth in preceding chapters 
on " 'She Persistence of Force," "The Transformation and 
Equivalence of Forces," "The Direction of Motion," and 
"The Rhythm of Motion," unite within single bonds phe- 
nomena belonging to all orders of existences. And if there 
is such a thing as that which we here understand by phi- 
losophy, there must eventually be reached a universal in- 
tegration. 

§114. Nor do the industrial and aesthetic Arts fail to 
supply as with equally conclusive evidence. The progress 
from rude, small, and Bimple tools to perfect, complex, and 
large machines is a progress in integration. Among what 
are classed as the mechanical powers the advance from the 
lever to the wheel-and-axle is an advance from a simple 
agent to an agent made up of several simple ones. I »:i 
comparing the wheel-and-axle or any of the maehim - 
in early times with those used now, we Bee that in each of 
our machines several of the primitive machines are united 
into one. A modern apparatus for spinning or wee 
for making stockings or lace, contains not simply a lever, 
an inclined plane, a Bcrew, a wheel-and-axle,joined 
but several of each integrated into one whole. Again, in 
early ages, when horse-power and man-power were alone 
employed, the motive agent was dot bound up with the 
tool moved; hut the two have now become in many 
fused together. The tire-box and boiler of a locomotive 
are combined with the machinery which the steam works. 
A still more extensive integration is exhibited in every 
factory. Here we find a large nnml 
machines, all connected by driving shafts with the same 
steam-engine — all united with it into one vast apparatus. 

Contrast the mural decorations of the Egyptians and 
Assyrians with modern historical paintings, and the* 
comes manifest a great advance in unity of composition — 
in the subordination of the parts to the whole, (hie of 
these ancient frescoes is, in troth, made up of a number 
of pictures that have little mutual dependence. Tic 
oral figures of which each group consists show very im- 
perfectly by their attitudes, and not at all by their expres- 
sions, the relations in which they stand to each other: the 
respective groups might be separated with but little loss 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 275 

of meaning; and the centre of chief interest, which should 
link all parts together, is often inconspicuous. The 
same trait may be noted in the tapestries of medisevspiays. 
Representing, perhaps, a hunting-scene, one of these con- 
tains men, horses, dogs, beasts, birds, trees, and flowers, 
miscellaneously dispersed: the living objects being vari- 
ously occupied, and mostly with no apparent consciousness 
of each others' proximity. But in the paintings since 
produced, faulty as many of them are in this respect, there 
is always a more or less distinct co-ordination of parts — an 
arrangement of attitudes, expressions, lights, and colors, 
such as to combine the picture into an organic whole ; and 
the success with which unity of effect is educed from 
variety of components is a chief test of merit. 

In music, progressive integration is displayed in still 
more numerous ways. The simple cadence embracing but 
a few notes, which in the chants of savages is monotonously 
repeated, becomes among civilized races a long series of 
different musical phrases combined into one whole; and 
so complete is the integration that the melody cannot be 
broken off in the middle, nor shorn of its final note, with- 
out giving us a painful sense of incompleteness. When 
to the air a bass, a tenor, and an alto are added, and 
when to the harmony of different voice-parts there is added 
an accompaniment, we see exemplified integrations of an- 
other order, which grow gradually more elaborate. And 
the process is carried a stage higher when these complex 
solos, concerted pieces, choruses, and orchestral effects are 
combined into the vast ensemble of a musical drama — of 
which, be it remembered, the artistic perfection largely 
consists in the subordination of the particular effects to 
the total effect. 

Once more the Arts of literary delineation, narrative and 
dramatic, furnish us with parallel illustrations. The tales 
of primitive times, like those with which the story-tellers 
of the East still daily amuse their listeners, are made up 
of successive occurrences that are not only in themselves 
unnatural, but have no natural connection ; they are but 
so many separate adventures put together without necessary 
sequence. But in a good modern work of imagination 
the events are the proper products of the characters work- 
ing under given conditions, and cannot at will be changed 
in their order or kind without injuring or destroying the 



276 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

general effect. Further, the characters themselves, which 
in ear^ fictions play their respective parts without show- 
ing hw their minds are modified by one another or by the 
events, are now presented to us as held together by complex 
moral relations, and as acting and reacting upon one an- 
other's natures. 

§ 115. Evolution then, under, its primary aspect, is a 
change from a less coherent form to a more coherent form, 
consequent on the dissipation of motion and integration 
of matter. This is the universal process through which 
sensible existences individually and as a whole pass during 
the ascending halves of their histories. This pro 
be a character displayed equally in those earliest 
which the Universe at large is sirpposed to have undergone. 
and in those latest changes which we trace in society and 
the products of social life. And throughout the unifica- 
tion proceeds in several ways simultaneously. 

Alike during the evolution of the Solar System, of a 
planet, of an organism, of a nation, there is progn 
aggregation of the entire mass. This may be b1 own by 
the increasing density of the matter already contained in 
it; or by the drawing into it of matter that « 
separate; or by both. But in any case it implies a loss 
of relative motion. At the same time, the parts into which 
the mass has divided severally consolidate in like man- 
ner. We see this in that formation of planet- and satellites 
which has gone on along with the concentration of the 
nebula out of which the Solar System originated; we - 
in the growth of separate organs that advances, pari \ 
with the growth of each organism; we Bee it in that rise 
of special industrial centres and special masses of popula- 
tion which is associated with the rise of each society. 
Always more or less of local integration accompanies the 
general integration. And then, beyond the inci 
closeness of juxtaposition among the components of the 
whole and among the components of each part, there is 
increased closeness of combination among the parts, pro- 
ducing mutual dependence of them. Dimly foreshad 
as this mutual dependence is in inorganic existences, both 
celestial anil terrestrial, it becomes distinct in organic and 
super-organic existences. From the lowest living forms 
upward, the degree of development is marked by the de- 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 277 

gree in which the several parts constitute a co-operative 
assemblage. The advance from those creatures which live 
on in each part when cut to pieces, up to those creatures 
which cannot lose any considerable part without death, nor 
any inconsiderable part without great constitutional dis- 
turbance, is an advance to creatures which, while more 
integrated in respect to their solidification, are also more 
integrated as consisting of organs that live for and by each 
other. The like contrast between undeveloped and de- 
veloped societies need not be shown in detail ; the ever- 
increasing co-ordination of parts is conspicuous to all. 
And it must suffice just to indicate that the same thing 
holds true of social products: as, for instance, of Science, 
which has become highly integrated not only in the sense 
that each division is made up of mutually dependent prop- 
ositions, but in the sense that the several divisions are 
mutually dependent — cannot carry on their respective in. 
vestigations without aid from one another. 



CHAPTER XV. 

THE LAW OF EVOLUTION" CONTINUED. 

§ 116. Changes great in their amounts and various in 
their kinds, which accompany those dealt with in the last 
chapter, have thus far been wholly ignored — or, if tacitly 
recognized, have not been avowedly recognized. Integra- 
tion of each whole has been described as taking place 
simultaneously with integration of each of the parts into 
which the whole divides itself. But how comes each whole 
to divide itself into parts? This is a transformation more 
remarkable than the passage of the whole from an inco- 
herent to a coherent state; and a formula which says 
nothing about it omits more than half the phenomena to 
be formulated. 

This larger half of the phenomena we have now to 
treat. In this chapter we are concerned with those second- 
ary redistributions of matter and motion that go on along 
with the primary redistribution. We saw that while, in 
very incoherent aggregates, secondary re-distributions pro- 
duce but evanescent results, in aggregates that reach and 
maintain a certain medium state, neither very incoherent 



278 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

nor very coherent, results of a relatively persistent char- 
acter are produced — structural modifications. And our 
next inquiry must be, What is the universal expression 
for these structural modifications? 

Already an implied answer has been given by the title — 
Compound Evolution. Already in distinguishing, as simple 
Evolution, that integration of matter and dissipation of 
motion which is unaccompanied by secondary redistribu- 
tions, it has been tacitly asserted that where secondary 
redistributions occur complexity arises. Obviously if, 
while there has gone on a transformation of the incoherent 
into the coherent, there have gone on other transfor- 
mations, the mass, instead of remaining uniform, must have 
become multiform. The proposition is an identical one. 
To say that the primary re-distribution is accompanied by 
secondary redistributions is to say that along with the 
change from a diffused to a conoentra te there g 

on a change from a homogeneous state to a h< 
state. The components of the mass while they become 
integrated also become differentiated.* 

This, then, is the second aspect under which we ha 
study Evolution. As in the last chapter we COntempL 
existences of all orders as displaying progressive integ 
tion, so in this chapter we have to contemplate them 
displaying progressive differentiation. 

>j 11?. A growing variety of structure throughout 

Sidereal System is implied by the eontrasts that indi 
an aggregative proeess throughout it. We have nebula? 
that are diffused and irregular, and others that are spiral, 
annular, spherical, etc. We have groups of star- the 
members of which are scattered, and grow utrated 

in all degrees down to closely packed globular clusti - 
We have these groups differing m the numbers of their 
members, from those containing several thouss 
those containing but two. Among individual stars t:. 
are great contrasts, real as well as apparent, of size; and 

* The terms here used must be nrvlerstooil in relal we know 

of no snob thing as absolute diffusion or absolute 
can never be anything but* change from a more diffusa 

state— from smaller coherence to greater coherenc - no 

concrete existences present US with al - - - - l»er- 

fectly uniform— as we nowhere find complete nom ma- 

tion is literally always toward pr rm- 

ity. or further heterogeneity. T..;> qualifical lally 
bear in mind. 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 279 

from their unlike colors, as well as from their unlike spec- 
tra, numerous contrasts among their physical states are 
inferable. Beyond which heterogeneities in detail there 
are general heterogeneities. Nebulae are abundant in some 
regions of the heavens, while in others there are only 
stars. Here the celestial spaces are almost void of objects, 
and there we see dense aggregations, nebular and stellar 
together. 

The matter of our Solar System during its concentration 
has become more multiform. The aggregating gaseous 
spheroid, dissipating its motion, acquiring more marked 
unlikenesses of density and temperature between interior 
and exterior, and leaving behind from time to time annular 
portions of its mass, underwent differentiations that in- 
creased in number and degree until there was evolved the 
existing organized group of sun, planets, and satellites. 
The heterogeneity of this is variously displayed. There 
are the immense contrasts between the sun and the plan- 
ets, in bulk and in weight; as well as the subordinate con- 
trasts of like kind between one planet and another, and 
between the planets and their satellties. There is the 
further contrast between the sun and the planets in re- 
spect of temperature; and there is reason to suppose that 
the planets and satellites differ from one another in their 
proper heats as well as in the heats which they receive 
from the sun. Bearing in mind that they also differ in 
the inclinations of their orbits, the inclinations of their 
axes, in their specific gravities, and in their physical con- 
stitutions, we see how decided is the complexity wrought 
in the Solar System by those secondary redistributions that 
have accompanied the primary redistribution. 

§ 118. Passing from this hypothetical illustration, which 
must be taken for what it is worth, without prejudice to the 
general argument, let us descend to an order of evidence 
less open to objection. 

It is now generally agreed among geologists that the 
Farth was once a mass of molten matter, and that its inner 
parts are still fluid and incandescent. Originally, then, it 
was comparatively homogeneous in consistence; and, be- 
cause of the circulation that takes place in heated fluids, 
must have been comparatively homogeneous in temperature. 
It must, too, have been surrounded by an atmosphere con- 



280 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

sisting partly of the elements of air and water and partly 
of those various other elements which assume gaseous forms 
at high temperatures. That cooling by radiation which, 
though originally far more rapid than now, necessarily re- 
quired an immense time to produce decided change must 
at length have resulted in differentiating the portion most 
able to part with its heat ; namely, the surface. A farther 
cooling, leading to deposition of all solidifiable elements 
contained in the atmosphere, and finally to precipitation 
of the water and separation of it from the air, mast thus 
have caused a second marked differentiation; and i 
condensation must have commenced on the <•• urts of 

the surface — namely, about the poles — there must so have 
resulted the first geographical distinct i 

To these illustrations of growing heterogeneity, which, 
though deduced from the known laws of matter, may be 
regarded as hypothetical, Geology adds an extene 
that have been inductively established. The Earth's struct- 
ure has been age after age further involved by the multi- 
plication of the strata which form its cruet; and it has 
been age after age further involved by the in _ com- 

position of these strata, the more recent of which. f< 
from the detritus of the more ancient, are many of them 
rendered highly complex by the mixtures of materials they 
contain. This heterogeneity has been vastly increased by 
the action of the Earth's still molten nucleus on its envel- 
ope; whence have resulted not only a great variety of ig- 
neous rocks, but the tilting up of sedimentary strata at all 
angles, the formation of faults and metallic veins. fch< 
duction of endless dislocations and ii regularities. A| 
geologists teach us that the Earth's surface lias been e 
ing more varied in elevation — that the most ancient moun- 
tain systems are the smallest, and the Andes and Himalayas 
the most modern; while, in all probability, there have 
been corresponding changes in the bed of the ocean. As 
a consequence o( this ceaseless multiplication of differ* 
we now find that no considerable portion of the Earth's 
exposed surface is like any other portion, either in 
tour, in geologic structure, or in chemical composition; 
and that, in most parts, the surface changes from mile to 
mile in all these characterise 

There has been simultaneously going on a gradual dif- 
ferentiation of climates. As fast as the Earth cooled and 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 281 

its crust solidified, inequalities of temperature arose be- 
tween those parts of its surface most exposed to the sun 
and those less exposed ; and thus in time there came to be 
the marked contrasts between regions of perpetual ice and 
snow — regions where winter and summer alternately reign 
for periods varying according to the latitude, and regions 
where summer follows summer with scarcely an apprecia- 
ble variation. Meanwhile, elevations and subsidences, recur- 
ring here and there over the Earth's crust, tending as they 
have done to produce irregular distribution of land and 
sea, have entailed various modifications of climate beyond 
those dependent on latitude; while a yet further series of 
such modifications has been produced by increasing dif- 
ferences of height in the lands, which have in sundry places 
brought arctic, temperate, and tropical climates to within 
a few miles of one another. The general results- of these 
changes are, that every extensive region has its own meteor- 
ologic conditions, and that every locality in each region dif- 
fers more or less from others in those conditions ; as in its 
structure, its contour, its soil. 

Thus, between cur existing Earth, the phenomena of 
whose varied crust neither geographers, geologists, mineral- 
ogists, nor meteorologists have yet enumerated, and the 
molten globe out of which it was evolved, the contrast in 
heterogeneity is sufficiently striking. 

§ 119. The clearest, most numerous, and most varied 
illustrations of the advance in multiformity that accom- 
panies the advance in integration are furnished by living 
organic bodies. Distinguished as we found these to be by 
the great quantity of their contained motion, they exhibit 
in an extreme degree the secondary redistributions which 
contained motion facilitates. The history of every plant 
and every animal, while it is a history of increasing bulk, 
is also a history of simultaneously increasing differences 
among the parts. This transformation has several as- 
pects. 

The chemical composition which is almost uniform 
throughout the substance of a germ, vegetal or animal, 
gradually ceases to be uniform. The several compounds, 
nitrogenous and non-nitrogenous, which were homoge- 
neously mixed, segregate by degrees, become diversely pro- 
portioned in diverse places, and produce new compounds by 



282 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

transformation or modification, hi plants the albuminous 
and amylaceous matter which form the substance of the 
embryo give origin here to a preponderance of chlorophyll 
and there to a preponderance of cellulose. Over the parts 
that are becoming leaf-surfaces certain of the materials 
are metamorphosed into wax. In this place starch 
into one of its isomeric equivalents, sugar; and in that 
place into another of its i equivalents, gum. By 

secondary change some of the cellulose is modified iuto 
wood; while some of it is modified into the allied substance 
which, in large masses, we distinguish as cork. And the 
more numerous compounds thus gradually arising initiate 
further unlik< in unlik An 

animal ovum, the components of which are at first evenly 
diffused among oin- another, chemically transforms 
in like manner. Its protein, its fat-. t, become 

dissimilarly proportioned in different Localities; and mul- 
tiplication of isomer] further mixtures 
and combinations that constitute many minor distinctions 
of parts. Here a mass darkening by accumulation of hem- 
atine, presently di into blood. There fatty albu- 
minous matters uniting, compose nei . Atthic 
the nitrogenous substance takes on the character of carti- 
lage; and at that, cal< salts, gatherii ler in 
the cartilage, lay the foundation of bone. \\\ these chem- 
ical differentiations slowly and insensibly more 
marked and more multiplied. 

Simultaneously there arise contn struc- 

ture. Distincl - take the place of matter that had 

previously no recognisable unlikenesses of parte 
of the tissues first produced un i idea- 

tions, causing BUb-species of tissues. The granular j 
plasm of the vegetal germ, equally with that which forms 
the unfolding point of every 3 origin 1 

that are at first alike. 

ten and unite by their edg - form the outer layer. 

Others elongate greatly, and Bame time join 

in bundles to lay the foundation of woody fibre. B 
the) begin to elongate, certain of tl. - 
ing-up of the lining deposit, which, duril E ..tion, 

becomes a spiral thread, or a reticulated framework. 
series of rings; and by the longitudinal union l 
lined, vessels are formed. Meanwhile each of these diller- 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 283 

entiated tissues is redifferentiated: instance that which 
constitutes the essential part of the leaf, the upper stratum 
of which is composed of chlorophyll-cells that remain close- 
ly packed, while the lower stratum becomes spongy. Of 
the same general character are the transformations under- 
gone by the fertilized ovum, which, at first a cluster of 
similar cells quickly reaches a stage in which these cells 
become dissimilar. More frequently recurring fission of 
the superficial cells, a resulting smaller size of them and 
subsequent union of them into an outer layer, constitute 
the first differentiation; and the middle area of this layer 
is rendered unlike the rest by still more active processes 
of like kind. By such modifications upon modifications, 
too multitudinous to enumerate here, arise the classes and 
sub-classes of tissues which, variously involved one with 
another, compose organs. 

Equally conforming to the law are the changes of general 
shape and of the shapes of organs. All germs are at first 
spheres, and all organs are at first buds or mere rounded 
lumps. From this primordial uniformity and simplicity, 
there takes place divergence, both of the wholes and the 
leading parts, toward multiformity of contour and to- 
ward complexity of contour. Cut away the compactly 
folded young leaves that terminate every shoot, and the 
nucleus is found to be a central knob bearing lateral knobs, 
one of which may grow into either a leaf, a sepal, a petal, 
a stamen, a carpel: all these eventually unlike parts being 
at first alike. The shoots themselves also depart from their 
primitive unity of form; and while each branch becomes 
more or less different from the rest, the whole exposed part 
of the plant becomes different from the imbedded part. 
So, too, is it with the organs of animals. One of the Arti- 
culata, for instance, has limbs that are originally indistin- 
guishable from one another — compose a homogeneous series ; 
but by continuous divergences there arise among them 
unlikenesses of size and form, such as we see in the crab 
and the lobster. Vertebrate creatures equally exemplify 
this truth. The wings and legs of a bird are of similar 
shapes when they bud out from the sides of the embryo. 

Thus in every plant and animal conspicuous secondary 
redistributions accompany the primary redistribution. A 
first difference between two parts ; in each of these parts 
other differences that presently become as marked as the 



284 FIBST PRINCIPLES. 

first; and a like multiplication of differences in geometri- 
cal progression, until there is reached that complex com- 
bination constituting the adult. This is the history of all 
living things whatever. Pursuing an idea which Harvey set 
afloat, it has been shown by Wolff and Von Baer, that 
during its evolution each organism passes from a state of 
homogeneity to a state of heterogeneity. For a generation 
this truth has been accept by biologists.* 

§ 120. When we pass from individual forms of life to 
life in general, and ask whether the same law is Been in 
the ensemble of its manifestations — whether modern plants 
and animals have more heterogeneous structures than an- 
cient ones, and whether the Earth's present Flora and 
Fauna are more heterogeneous than the Flora and Fauna 
of the past — we find the evidence bo fragmentary, that 
every conclusion is open to dispute. Two-thirds of the 
Earth's surface being covered by water. ■ great part of the 
exposed land being inaccessible to, or antravelled by, the 
geologist — the greater part of the remainder having 
scarcely more than glanced at, and even the most familiar 
portions, as England, having been bo imperfectly explored 
that a new series of Btrata has been added within these few 
years — it is manifestly impossible for as to say with any 
certainty what creatures have, and what have not, existed 

*It was in is.7: that I beoame acquainted with Von Raer's expression of this 
genera] principle. The universality of law bad ever been \\ ith m 
carrying with it a correlative belief, tacit it" not avowed, in unity of method 
throughout Nature. This statement, that every plant and anim i 
homogeneous, becomes gradually heterogeneous, set up a 
nation anions accumulated thoughts thai 

partially organised. It is true that in "Social Statics" Part IV . u 
written oef ore meeting %\ith Von Beer's formula, the development 
individual organism and the development of the social organism aredes 
as alike consisting in advance from simplicity to complexity, and from in- 
dependent like parts to mutually-dependent unlike parts- a parallelism implied 
by Milne-Edwards' doctrine of "the physiological division of labor 
though admitting of extension toother super-organic phenomena, this 
mentwaa too special to admit of extension to inorganic phenomena. The 
great aid rendered by Von Beer's formula arose from its higher generality; 
since, only when organic transformations had been 

general terms, was the way opened for seeing what tney had in common 
with inorganic transformations. The conviction that this 
gone through by each evolving organism is a process gone ta 
things, found its' first coherent statement in an essay on "Progr 
and Cause," which I published in the Westminster Re vi e w for 
nn essay with the first half of which this chapter coincides in sul s 
and partly in form. In that essay, however, as also in the first edition of 
this work". I fell into the error of supposing that the transformation of the 
homogeneous into the heterogeneous constitutes Evolution, w] 
have seen, it constitutes the secondary redistribution accompanying the pri- 
mary redistribution in that Evolution which we distinguish SS compound— or 
rather, as wo shall presently see, it constitutes the most eouspieuous part of 
this secondary redistribution. 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 285 

at any particular period. Considering the perishable na- 
ture of many of the lower organic forms, the metamor- 
phosis of many sedimentary strata, and the gaps that occur 
among the rest, we shall see further reason for distrusting 
oar deductions. On the one hand, the repeated discovery 
of vertebrate remains in strata previously supposed to con- 
tain none — of reptiles where only fish were thought to 
exist — of mammals where it was believed there were no 
creatures higher than reptiles — renders it daily more mani- 
fest how small is the value of negative evidence. On the 
other hand, the worthlessness of the assumption that we 
have discovered the earliest, or anything like the earliest, 
organic remains, is becoming equally clear. That the old- 
est known aqueous formations have been greatly changed by 
igneous action, and that still older ones have been totally 
transformed by it, is becoming undeniable. And the fact 
that sedimentary strata, earlier than any we know, have 
been melted up, being admitted, it must also be admitted 
that we cannot say how far back in time this destruction of 
sedimentary strata has been going on. Thus it is mani- 
fest that the title Palmozoic, as applied to the earliest 
known fossilif erous strata, involves a petitio principii; and 
that, for aught we know to the contrary, only the last few 
chapters of the Earth's biological history may have come 
down to us. 

All inferences drawn from such scattered facts as we find, 
must thus be extremely questionable. If, looking at the 
general aspect of evidence, a progressionist argues that the 
earliest isnown vertebrate remains are those of Fishes, which 
are the most homogeneous of the vertebrata, that Eeptiles, 
which are more heterogeneous, are later, and that later 
still, and more heterogeneous still, are Mammals and 
Birds, it may be replied that Palaeozoic deposits, not be- 
ing estuary deposits, are not likely to contain the remains 
of terrestrial vertebrata, which may nevertheless have ex- 
isted at that era. The same answer may be made to the 
argument that the vertebrate fauna of the Palaeozoic 
period, consisting, so far as we know, entirely of Fishes, was 
less heterogeneous than the modern vertebrate fauna, which 
includes Reptiles, Birds and Mammals, of multitudinous 
genera; or the uniformitarian may contend, with great 
show of truth, that this appearance of higher and more 
varied forms in later geologic eras was due to progressive 



286 FIRST PRIXCIPLES. 

immigration — that a continent slowly upheaved from the 
ocean, at a point remote from pre-existing continents, would 
necessarily be peopled from them in a succession like that 
which our strata display. At the same time the counter- 
arguments may be proved equally inconclusive. When, to 
show that there cannot have been a continuous evolution 
of the more homogeneous organic forma into the more 
heterogeneous ones, the uniformitarian points to the breaks 
that occur in the succession of these forms, there is the 
sufficient answer that current geological changes show us 
why such breaks must occur, and why, by subsidences and 
elevations of large area, there must be produced such 
marked breaks as those which divide the three great geo- 
logic epochs. Or again, if the opponent of the develop- 
ment hypothesis cites the facts set forth by Pn 
Huxley in his lecture on " Persistent Types" — it* he points 
out that "of some two hundred known orders of plants, net 
one is exclusively fossil," while "among animals, there is 
not a single totally extinct class; and i t* the ordets, at the 
outside not more than Beven per cent are unrepresented in 
the existing creation:" if he urges that among these some 
have continued from the Silurian ■ our *wn day 

with scarcely any change; and if lie infers that thi 
evidently a much greater average resemblam n the 

living forms of the past and those of the present, than con- 
sists with this hypothesis, there is still a satisfactory reply, 
on which, in fart. Professor Huxley insists; namely, that 
We have evidence of a " pre-geologi unknown du- 

ration. And, indeed, when it is remembered mat the 
enormous subsidences of the Silurian period Bhow the 
Earth's crust to have been approximately as thick then as it 
is now — when it is concluded that the time taken to form 
so thick a crust must have been immense as compared with 
the time which has since elapsed — when it is assumed, as it 
must be, that during this comparatively immense time the 
geologic and biologic changes went on at their usual rates; 
it becomes manifest, not only that the pala?ontologieal re- 
cords which we find do not negative the theory of evolu- 
tion, but that they are such as might rationally be looked 
for. 

Moreover, it must not be forgotten that though the evi- 
dence suffices neither for proof nor disproof, yet some of 
it? most conspicuous facts support the belief that the more 



FIRST PRINCIPLE®, 287 

heterogeneous organisms and groups of organisms have 
been evolved from the less heterogeneous ones. The 
aveiage community of type between the fossils of adjacent 
strata, and still more the community that is found between 
the latest tertiary fossils and creatures now existing, is one 
of these facts. The discovery in some modern deposits of 
such forms as the Palseotherium and Anaplotherium, which, 
if we maj rely on Professor Owen, had a type of structure 
intermediate between some of the types now existing, is 
another of these facts. And the comparatively recent ap- 
pearance of Man is a third fact of this kind, which pos- 
sesses still greater significance. Hence we may say, that 
though o.ir knowledge of past life upon the Earth is too 
scanty to justify us in asserting an evolution of the simple 
into the complex, either in individual forms or in the ag- 
gregate of forms, yet the knowledge we have not only 
consists with the belief that there has been such an evolu- 
tion, but rather supports it than otherwise. 

§ 121. Whether an advance from the homogeneous to 
tie heterogeneous is or is not displayed in the biological 
Jistory of the globe, it is clearly enough displayed in the 
progress of the latest and most heterogeneous creature — 
Man. It is alike true that, during the period in which 
the Earth has been peopled, the human organism has grown 
more heterogeneous among the civilized divisions of the 
species, and that the species, as a whole, has been made 
more heterogeneous by the multiplication of races and the 
differentiation of these races from each other. In proof of 
the first of these positions, we may cite the fact that, in 
the relative development of the limbs, the civilized man 
departs more widely from the general type of the placental 
mammalia than do the lower human races. Though often 
possessing well-developed body and arms, the Papuan has 
extremely small legs: thus reminding us of the quadru- 
mana, in which there is no great contrast in size between 
the hind and fore limbs. But in the European, the greater 
length and massiveness of the legs has become very marked 
— the fore and hind limbs are relatively more heteroge- 
neous. Again, the greater ratio which the cranial bones 
bear to the facial bones illustrates the same truth. Among 
the vertebrata in general evolution is marked by an in- 
creasing heterogeneity in the vertebral column, and more 



888 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

especially in the segments constituting the skull : the higher 
forms being distinguished by the relatively larger size of 
the bones which cover the brain, and the relatively smaller 
size of those which form the jaws, etc. Now, this charac- 
teristic, which is stronger in Man than in any other creat- 
ure, is stronger in the European than in the savage. 
Moreover, judging from the greater extent and rariety of 
faculty lie exhibits, we may infer that the civilized man 
has also a more complex or heterogeneous nervous system 
than the uncivilized man; and indeed the fact I in parr 
visible in the increased ratio which his cerebruii bears to 
the subjacent ganglia. If further elucidation be needed, 
we may find it in every nursery. The infant European 
has sundry marked points of resemblance to the lower hu- 
man i in the flatness of the ahv of the nos.-. the de- 
pression of its bridg . _ adforwarl 
of the nostrils, the form of the lips, the absence of ,t 1*. 
sinus, the width between the eyes, the smallness of the le>a. 
Now, as the developmental pro which these trats 
are turned into those of the adult European is a eontini- 
ation of that change from the horn* s - to the heterv 
geneons displayed daring the previous evolution of th> 
embryo, which every physiologist will admit, it follows 
that the parallel developmental process, by which the like 
traits of the barbarous races have been turned into those 
of the civilized races, has sis D a continuation of the 
change from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous. 
The truth of the second position — that Mankind, as a 
whole, have become more heterogeneous — is so obvious as 
scarcely to need illustration. Every work on Ethn 
by its divisions and subdivisions of races, bears testimony 
to it. Even were we to admit the hypothesis that Man- 
kind originated from several separate stocks, it would still 
remain true that as from each of these stocks there have 
sprung many now widely different tribes, which are proved 
by philological evidence to have had a common origin, 
the race as a whole is far less homogeneous than it once 
was. Add to which, that we have, in the Anglo-Ameri- 
cans, an example of a new variety arising within these few- 
generations ; and that, if we may trust to the descriptions 
of observers, we are likely soon to have another such ex- 
ample in Australia. 



i 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 289 

§ 122. On passing from Humanity under its individual 
form to Humanity as socially embodied, we find the general 
law still more variously exemplified. The change from the 
homogeneous to the heterogeneous is displayed equally in 
the progress of civilization as a whole, and in the progress 
of every tribe or nation, and is still going on with in- 
creasing rapidity. 

As we see in existing barbarous tribes, society in its first 
and lowest form is a homogeneous aggregation of individ- 
uals having like powers and like functions : the only marked 
difference of function being that which accompanies differ- 
ence of sex. Every man is warrior, hunter, fisherman, 
tool-maker, builder; every woman performs the same 
drudgeries; every family is self-sufficing, and, save for 
purposes of aggression and defence, might as well live apart 
from the rest. Very early, however, in the process of so- 
cial evolution, we find an incipient differentiation between 
the governing and the governed. Some kind of chieftain- 
ship seems coeval with the first advance from the state of 
separate wandering families to that of a nomadic tribe. 
The authority of the strongest makes itself felt among a 
body of savages, as in a herd of animals, or a posse of 
schoolboys. At first, however, it is indefinite, uncertain; 
is shared by others of scarcely inferior power, and is un- 
accompanied by any difference in occupation or style of 
living: the first ruler kills his own game, makes his own 
weapons, builds his own hut, and, economically considered, 
does not differ from others of his tribe. Gradually, as the 
tribe progresses, the contrast between the governing and the 
governed grows more decided. Supreme power becomes 
hereditary in one family; the head of that family, ceasing 
to provide for his own wants, is served by others ; and he 
begins to assume the sole office of ruling. At the same 
time there has been arising a co-ordinate species of govern- 
ment — that of Eeligion. As all ancient records and tradi- 
tions prove, the earliest rulers are regarded as divine 
personages. The maxims and commands they uttered dur- 
ing their lives are held sacred after their deaths and are 
enforced by their divinely descended successors, who in 
their turns are promoted to the pantheon of the race, there 
to be worshipped and propitiated along with their prede- 
cessors, the most ancient of whom is the supreme god, and 
the rest subordinate gods. For a long time these connate 
19 



290 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

forms of government — civil and religious — continue closely 
associated. For many generations the king continues to 
be the chief priest, and the priesthood to be members of the 
royal race. For many ages religious law continues to con- 
tain more or less of civil regulation, and civil law to possess 
more or less of religious sanction; and even among the 
most advanced nations these two controlling agencies are 
by no means completely differentiated from each other. 
Having a common root with these, and gradually diverg- 
ing from them, we find yet another controlling agency — 
that of Manners or ceremonial usages. All titles of honor 
are originally the names of the god-king; afterward of 
God and the king; still later of persons of high rank; and 
finally come, some of them, to be used between man and 
man. All forms of complimentary address were at first the 
expressions of submission from prisoners to their 
queror, or from subjects to their ruler, either human or 
divine — expressions that were afterward used to propitiate 
subordinate authorities, and slowly descended into ordi- 
nary intercourse. All modes of salutation were once 
obeisances made before the monarch and used in worship 
of him after his death Presently others of the g> 
scended race were similarly saluted : and by degrees some 
of the salutations have become the due of all.* Thus, no 
sooner does the originally homogeii'. iiffer- 

entiate into the governed and the governing parts, than 
this last exhibits an incipient differentiation into religious 
and secular — Church and State; while at the same time 
there begins to be differentiated from both, that less definite 
species of government which rules our daily intercourse — 
a species of government which, as we may see in heralds' 
colleges, in books of the peerage, in masters of ceremonies, 
is not without a certain embodiment of its own. Each of 
these kinds of government is itself subject to successive 
differentiations. In the course of ages, there arises, as 
among ourselves, a highly complex political organize 
of monarch, ministers, lords and commons, with their sub- 
ordinate administrative departments, courts of jng 
revenue offices, etc., supplemented in the provim 
municipal governments, county governments, parish or 
union governments, all of them more or less elaborated. 
By its tide there grows up a highly complex religious 
* For detailed proof of these 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 291 

organization, with its various grades of officials from 
archbishops down to sextons, its colleges, convocations, 
ecclesiastical courts, etc. ; to all which must be added the 
ever-multiplying independent sects, each with its general 
and local authorities. And at the same time there is de- 
veloped a highly complex aggregation of customs, manners, 
and temporary fashions, enforced by society at large, and 
serving to control those minor transactions between man 
and man which are not regulated by civil and religious law. 
Moreover, it is to be observed that this ever-increasing 
heterogeneity in the governmental appliances of each na- 
tion has been accompanied by an increasing heterogeneity 
in the governmental appliances of different nations: all of 
which are more or less unlike in their political systems 
and legislation, in their creeds and religious institutions, 
in their customs and ceremonial usages 

Simultaneously there has been going on a second differ- 
entiation of a more familiar kind; that, namely, by which 
the mass of the community has been segregated into distinct 
classes and orders of workers. While the governing part 
has undergone the complex development above detailed, 
the governed part has undergone an equally complex de- 
velopment, which has resulted in that minute division of 
labor characterizing advanced nations. It is needless to 
trace out this progress from its first stages, up through the 
caste divisions of the East and the incorporated guilds of 
Europe, to the elaborate producing and distributing or- 
ganization existing among ourselves. Political economists 
have long since indicated the evolution which, beginning 
with a tribe whose members severally perform the same 
actions, each for himself ends with a civilized community 
whose members severally perform different actions for each 
other; and they have further pointed out the changes 
through which the solitary producer of any one commodity 
is transformed into a combination of producers whom, 
united under a master, take separate parts in the manu- 
facture of such commodity. But there are yet other and 
higher phases of this advance from the homogeneous to 
the heterogeneous in the industrial organization of society. 
Long after considerable progress has been made in the di- 
vision of labor among the different classes of workers, there 
is still little or no division of labor among the widely sep- 
arated parts of the oommunitv: the nation continues com- 



292 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

paratively homogeneous in the respect that in each district 
the same occupations are pursued. But -when roads and 
other means of transit become numerous and good, the 
different districts begin to assume different functions, and 
to become mutually dependent. The calico manufacture 
locates itself in this county, the woollen manufacture in 
that; silks are produced here, lace there; stockings in one 
place, shoes in another; pottery, hardware, cutlery, come 
to have their special towns; and ultimately every locality 
grows more or less distinguished from the rest by the lend- 
ing occupation carried on in it. Nay, more, this subdi- 
vision of functions shows itself not only among the different 
parts of the same nation, but among different nations. That 
exchange of commodities which free-trade promises so 
greatly to increase will ultimately have the effect of spe- 
cializing, in a greater or less degree, the industry of each 
people. So that beginning with a barbarous tribe, almost 
if not quite homogeneous in the functions of its members, 
the progress has been, and still is, toward an econon. 
gregation of the whole human race; growing evermore 
heterogeneous in respect of the separate functions assumed 
by separate nations, the separate functions assumed by the 
local sections of each nation, the separate functions assumed 
by the many kinds of makers and traders in each town, and 
the separate functions assumed by the workers united in 
producing each commodity. 

i^ 123. Not only is the law thus clearly exemplified in the 
evolution of the social organism, but it is exemplified with 
equal clearness in the evolution of all products of human 
thought and action; whether concrete or abstract, real or 
ideal. Let us take Language as our first illustration. 

The lowest form of language is the exclamation, by which 
an entire idea is vaguely conveyed through a single sound; 
as among the lower animals. That human language ever 
consisted solely of exclamations, and so was strictly homo- 
geneous in respect of its parts of speech, we have no evi- 
dence. But that language can be traced down to a form 
in which nouns and verbs are its only elements, is an es- 
tablished fact. In the gradual multiplication of parts of 
speech out of these primary ones — in the differentiation of 
verbs into active and passive, of nouns into abstract and 






FIRST PRINCIPLES. 293 

concrete — in the rise of distinctions of mood, tense, person, 
of number and case — in the formation of auxiliary verbs, 
of adjectives, adverbs, pronouns, prepositions, articles — in 
the divergence of those orders, genera, species, and varieties 
of parts of speech by which civilized races express minute 
modifications of meaning — we see a change from the homo- 
geneous to the heterogeneous. And it may be remarked, 
in passing, that it is more especially in virtue of having 
carried this subdivision of functions to a greater extent 
and completeness, that the English language is superior to 
all others. Another aspect under which we may trace the 
development of language is the differentiation of words of 
allied meanings. Philology early disclosed the truth that 
in all languages words may be grouped into families having 
a common ancestry. An aboriginal name, applied indis- 
criminately to each of an extensive and ill-defined class of 
things or actions, presently undergoes modifications by 
which the chief divisions of the class are expressed. These 
several names springing from the primitive root, them- 
selves become the parents of other names still further mod- 
ified. And by the aid of those systematic modes which 
presently arise, of making derivatives and forming com- 
pound terms expressing still smaller distinctions, there is 
finally developed a tribe of words so heterogeneous in sound 
and meaning that to the uninitiated it seems incredible 
they should have had a common origin. Meanwhile, from 
other roots there are being evolved other such tribes, until 
there results a language of some sixty thousand or more 
unlike words, signifying as many unlike objects, qualities, 
acts. Yet another way in which, language in general ad- 
vances from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous is in 
the multiplication of languages. Whether, as Max Mtiller 
and Bunsen think, all languages have grown from one stock, 
or whether, as some philologists say, they have grown from 
two or more stocks, it is clear that since large families of 
languages, as the Indo-European, are of one parentage, they 
have become distinct through a process of continuous di- 
vergence. The same diffusion over the Earth's surface 
which has led to the differentiation of the race, has simul- 
taneously led to a differentiation of their speech : a truth 
which we see further illustrated in each nation by the pe- 
culiarities of dialect found in separate districts. Thus the 
progress of Language conforms to the general law, alike in 



2if4 FIRST PRIXCIPLES. 

the evolution of languages, in the evolution of families of 
words, and in the evolution of parts of speech. 

On passing from spoken to written language, we come 
upon several classes of facts, all having similar implica- 
tions. Written language is connate with Painting and 
Sculpture; and at first all three are appendages of Archi- 
tecture, and have a direct connection with the primary form 
of all Government — the theocratic. Merely noting by the 
way the fact that sundry wild races, as for example the 
Australians and the tribes of South Africa, are given to 
depicting personages and events npon the walls of caves, 
which are probably regarded as sacred places, let us p 
the case of the Egyptians. Among them, as also among 
the Assyrians, we find mural paintings used to decorate the 
temple of the god and the palace of the king (which were, 
indeed, originally identical) ; and as such they were govern- 
mental appliances in the same sense that state pageants 
and religious feasts were. Further, they were govern- 
mental appliances in virtue of representing the worship of 
the god, the triumphs of the god-king, the submission of 
his subjects, and the punishment of the rebellions. And 
yet again tiny were governmental, as being the products 
of an art reverenced by the peopl -red mysl 

From the habitual use of this pictorial representation, 
there naturally grew up the but slightly modified practice 
of picture-writing — a practice which was found still extant 
among the Mexicans at the time they were discovered. By 
abbreviations analogous to those still going on in our own 
written and spoken language, the most familiar o* these 
pictured figures were successively simplified ; and ultimately 
there grew up a system of symbols, most of which had but 
a distant, resemblance to the things for which t: 
The inference that the hieroglyphics of the Egyptians were 
thus produced is confirmed by the fact that the picture- 
writing of the Mexicans was found to have given birth to a 
like family of ideographic forms; and among them, as 
among the Egyptians, these had been partially differenti- 
ated into the kuriological oi imitative, and the tropical or 
symbolic: which were, however, used together in the same 
record. In Egypt, written language underwent a further 
differentiation; whence resulted the hieratic and the ejnsto- 
lographic or enchorial: both of which are derived from the 
original hieroglyphic. At the same time we liud that for 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 295 

the expression of proper names, which could not be other- 
wise conveyed, phonetic symbols were employed; and 
though it is alleged that the Egyptians never actually 
achieved complete alphabetic writing, yet it can scarcely be 
doubted that these phonetic symbols occasionally used in 
aid of their ideographic ones were the germs out of which 
alphabetic writing grew. Once having become separate 
from hieroglyphics, alphabetic writing itself underwent 
numerous differentiations — multiplied alphabets were pro- 
duced: between most of which, however, more or less 
connection can still be traced. And in each civilized na- 
tion there has now grown up, for the representation of one 
set of sounds, several sets of written signs, used for distinct 
purposes. Finally, through a yet more important differ- 
entiation came printing; which, uniform iu kind as it was 
at first, has since become multiform. 

§ 124. While written language was passing through its 
earlier stages of development, the mural decoration which 
formed its root was being differentiated into Painting and 
Sculpture. The gods, kings, men, and animals represented 
were originally marked by indented outlines and colored. 
In most cases these outlines were of such depth, and the 
object they circumscribed so far rounded and marked out 
in its leading parts, as to form a species of work inter- 
mediate between intaglio and bas-relief. In other cases 
we see an advance upon this- the raised spaces between the 
figures being chiselled off, and the figures themselves ap- 
propriately tinted, a painted bas-relief was produced. The 
restored Assyrian architecture at Sydenham exhibits this 
style of art carried to greater perfection — the persons and 
things represented, though still barbarously colored, are 
carved out with more truth and in greater detail ; and in the 
winged lions and bulls used for the angles of gateways, we 
may see a considerable advance toward a completely sculp- 
tured figure; which, nevertheless, is still colored, and still 
forms part of the building. But while in Assyria the 
production of a statue proper seems to have been little, if 
at all, attempted, we may trace in Egyptian art the gradual 
separation of the sculptured figure from the wall. A walk 
through the collection in the British Museum will clearly 
show this; while it will at the same time afford an oppor- 
tunity of observing the evident traces which the indepen- 



29 G FIRST PRINCIPLES, 

dent statues bear of their derivation from bas-relief: 
seeing that nearly all of them not only display that union 
of the limbs with the body which is the characteristic oi 
bas-relief, but have the back of the statue united from head 
to foot with a block which stands in place of the original 
wall. Greece repeated the leading stages of this pr« •_ 
As in Egypt and Assyria, these twin arts were at first 
united with each other and with their parent. Architecture; 
and were the aids of Religion and Government. On the 
friezes of Greek temples, we see colored bas-reliefs repre- 
senting .sacrifices, battles, processions, games — all in 
sort religious. On the pediments we see painted sculp- 
tures more or less united with the tympanum, and having 
for subjects the triumphs of gods or heroes. Even when 
we come to statues that are delink I from the 

buildings to which they pertain, we still lind them colored; 
and only in the later per! - Greek civilization does 
the differentiation of sculpture from painting appear to 
have become complete. In Christian art we may elearly 
trace a parallel n - All early painti] \ sculp- 

tures throughout Europe w< - in subject — repre- 

sented Christs, crucifixions, virgins, holy families, 
saints. They formed integral parts of church arcnite 
and were among the means of excitii 
Roman Catholic eountries they still are. Moreover, the 
early sculptures of Christ on the 

saints, were colored; and it needs but to rail to mind the 
painted madonnas and crucifixes still abundant in i 
nental churches and highway.-, to perceive the Big 
fact that painting and sculpture continue in cl< 
nection with each other, where they continue in i 
connection with their parent. Even when Christian sculp- 
ture was pretty elearly differentiated from painting, it was 
still religious and governmental in its subje - 
for tombs in churches and statues of kings: while, at the 
same time, painting, where not purely 
applied to the decoration of palaces, ami. 
ing royal personages, was almost wholly dev< 
legends. Only in quite recent times have paint 
sculpture become entirely secular arts. Only within 
few centuries has painting been divided into historical, 
landscape, marine, architectural, genre, animal, still-life, 
etc., and sculpture grown heterogenous in respect of the 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

variety of real and ideal subjects with which it occupies 
itself. 

Strange as it seems, then, we find it no less true that all 
forms of written language, of painting, and of sculpture, 
have a common root in the politico-religious decorations of 
ancient temples and palaces. Little resemblance as they 
now have, the bust that stands on the console, the land- 
scape that hangs against the wall, and the copy of the 
Times lying upon the table, are remotely akin ; not only in 
nature, but by extraction. The brazen face of the knocker 
which the postman has just lifted is related not only to 
the woodcuts of the Illustrated London News which he is 
delivering, but to the characters of the billet-doux which 
accompanies it. Between the painted window, the prayer- 
book on which its light falls, and the adjacent monument, 
there is consanguinity. The effigies on our coins, the 
signs over shops, the figures that fill every ledger, the coat 
of arms outside the carriage-panel, and the placards inside 
the omnibus, are, in common with dolls, blue-books, and 
paper-hangings, lineally descended from the rude sculpture- 
paintings in which the Egyptians represented the triumphs 
and worship of the god-kings. Perhaps no example can be 
given which more vividly illustrates the multiplicity and 
heterogeneity of the products that in course of time may 
arise by successive differentiations from a common stock. 

Before passing to other classes of facts it should be ob- 
served that the evolution of the homogeneous into the 
heterogeneous is displayed not only in the separation of 
Painting and Sculpture from Architecture and from each 
other, and in the greater variety of subjects they embody; 
but it is further shown in the structure of each work. A 
modern picture or statue is of far more heterogeneous na- 
ture than an ancient one. An Egyptian sculpture-fresco 
represents all its figures as on one plane — that is, at the 
same distance from the eye; and so is less heterogeneous 
than a painting that represents them as at various dis- 
tances from the eye. It exhibits all objects as exposed to 
the same degree of light ; and so is less heterogeneous than 
a painting which exhibits different objects, and different 
parts of each object, as in different degrees of light. It 
uses scarcely any but the primary colors, and these in their 
full intensity ; and so is less heterogeneous than a painting 
which, introducing the primary colors but sparingly, em- 



298 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

ploys an endless variety of intermediate tirrts, each of het- 
erogeneous composition, and differing from the rest not 
only in quality but in intensity. Moreover, we see in these 
earliest works a great uniformity of conception. The same 
arrangement of figures is perpetually reproduced — the same 
actions, attitudes, faces, dresses. In Egypt, the modes of 
representation were so fixed that it was .-aerilege to intro- 
duce a novelty; and indeed it could have been only in 
consequence of a fixed mode of representation that a system 
of hieroglyphics became possible. The Assyrian bas-re- 
liefs display parallel characters. Deities, kings, attendant*, 
winged figures, and animals are severally depicted in like 
positions, holding like implements, doing like things, and 
with like expression or non-expression of fare. If a palm- 
grove is introduced, all the trees are of the same height, 
have the same number of leaves, and are equidistant. When 
water is imitated, each wave is a counterpart of the rest; and 
tiie fish, almost always of one kind, are evenly distributed 
over the surface. The beards of the kings, the gods, 
the winged figures are everywhere similar; as are the 
manea of the lions, and equally bo those of the 1. 
Hair is represented throughout by one form of curl. The 
king's beard is quite architecturally built up of compound 
tiers of uniform curls, alternating with twisted tiers i 
in a transverse direction and arranged with perfect regu- 
larity; and the terminal tufts of the bulls' tails are repre- 
sented in exactly the same manner. Without tracing out 
analogous facts in early Christian art, in which, though less 
striking, they are still visible, the advance in heterogeneity 
will be sufficiently manifest on remembering that in the 
pictures of our own day the composition is endlessly va- 
ried : the attitudes, faces, expressions, unlike; the subor- 
dinate objects different in size, form, position, texture; 
more or less of contrast even in the smallest details. I ••/ 
if we compare an Egyptian statue seated bolt upright on 
a block, with hands on knees, lingers outspread and paral- 
lel, eyes looking straight forward, and the two sides perfectly 
symmetrical in every particular, with a statue of the ad- 
vanced Greek or the modern school, which is asymmetrical 
in respect of the position of the head, the body, the limbs, 
the arrangement of the hair, dress, appendages, and in its 
relations to neighboring objects, we shall see the change from 
the homogeneous to the heterogeneous clearly manifested. 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 299 

§ 125. In the co-ordinate origin and gradual differentia- 
tion of Poetry, Music, and Dancing, we have another series 
of illustrations. Rhythm in speech, rhythm in sound, and 
rhythm in motion were, in the beginning, parts of the 
same thing, and have only in process of time become sep- 
arate things. Among various existing barbarous tribes 
we find them still united. The dances of savages are ac- 
companied by some kind of monotonous chant, the clapping 
of hands, the striking of rude instruments; there are 
measured movements, measured words, and measured tones; 
and the whole ceremony, usually having reference to war 
or sacrifice, is of governmental character. In the early rec- 
ords of the historic races, we similarly find these three forms 
of metrical action united in religious festivals. In the 
Hebrew writings we read that the triumphal ode composed 
by Moses on the defeat of the Egyptians was sung to an 
accompaniment of dancing and timbrels. The Israelites 
danced and sung " at the inauguration of the golden calf. 
And as if it is generally agreed that this representation of 
the Deity was borrowed from the mysteries of Ajois, it is 
probable that the dancing was copied from that of the 
Egyptians on those occasions. " There was an annual dance 
in Shiloh on the sacred festival; and David danced before 
the ark. Again, in Greece the like relation is everywhere 
seen: the original type being there, as probably in other 
cases, a simultaneous chanting and mimetic representa- 
tion of the life and adventures of the god. The Spartan 
dances were accompanied by hymns and songs; and in gen- 
eral the Greeks had " no festivals or religious assemblies but 
what were accompanied with songs and dances" — both of 
them being forms of worship used before altars. Among 
the Romans, too, there were sacred dances : the Salian and 
Lupercalian being named as of that kind. And even in 
Christian countries, as at Limoges in comparatively recent 
times, the people have danced in the choir in honor of a 
saint. The incipient separation of these once united arts 
from each other and from religion was early visible in 
Greece. Probably diverging from dances partly religious, 
partly warlike, as the Corybantian, came the war-dances 
proper, of which there were various kinds; and from these 
resulted secular dances. Meanwhile Music and Poetry, 
though still united, came to have an existence separate from 
dancing. The aboriginal Greek poems, religious in sub- 



300 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

ject, were not recited, but chanted; and though at first the 
chant of the poet was accompanied by the dance of the 
chorus, it ultimately grew into independence. Later still, 
when the poem had been differentiated into epic and 
lyric — when it became the custom to sing the lyric aud 
recite the epic — poetry proper was bora. As during the 
same period musical instruments were being multiplied, 
we may presume that music came to have an existence 
apart from words. And both of them were beginni 
assume other forms besides the religious. Facts having 
like implications might be cited from the histories of later 
times and peoples; as the pracl i nr own early min- 

strels, who sang to the harp hemic mirrativ. - [ed by 

themselves to music of their own composition : thus uniting 
the new separate offices of poet, composer, vocalist, and in- 
strumentalist. But, without further illustration, the com- 
mon origin and gradual differentiation of Dancing, 
and Music will be sufficiently man:: 

The advance from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous 
is displayed not only in the separation of i 
each other and from religion, hut also in the multiplied 
differentiations which each of them afterward un<l< 
Not to dwell a pon the numberless kinds of dancing 
have, in course of time, come into use: and not t<> occupy 
space in detailing the progress "f poetry, in the de- 

velopment of the various forma of metre, of rhyme, and of 
general organization; let us confine ution t<. music 

as a type of the group. A- argued by Dr. Burney, ami as 
implied by the customs df still extant barbarous races, the 
first musical instruments were, without doubt, percussive — 
sticks, calabashes, tom-toms — and were used simply to 
mark the time of the dance: and in this constant repetition 
of the same sound, Ave see music in its most In I 
neons form. The Egyptians had a lyre with three strings. 
The early lyre of the Greeks had four, constituting 
tetrachord. In course of some centuries lyres of seven and 
eight strings were employed. And, by the ezpin 
thousand years, they had advanced to their " gre 
of the double octave. Through all which change - 
course arose a greater heterogeneity of melody. Simul- 
taneously there came into use the different modes — Dorian, 
Ionian. Phrygian, JSolian, and Lydian — answering to our 
keys: and of these there were ultimately fifteen. Ae 



. FIRST PRINCIPLES. 301 

however, there was but little heterogeneity in the time of 
their music. Instrumental music during this period being 
merely the accompaniment of vocal music, and vocal mu- 
sic being completely subordinated to words; the singer be- 
ing also the poet, chanting his own compositions and 
making the lengths of his notes agree with the feet of his 
verses — there unavoidably arose a tiresome uniformity of 
measure, which, as Dr. Burney says, " no resources of mel- 
ody could disguise." Lacking the complex rhythm ob- 
tained by our equal bars and unequal notes, the only rhythm 
was that produced by the quantity of the syllables, and was 
of necessity comparatively monotonous. And further, it 
may be observed that the chant thus resulting, being like 
recitative, was much less clearly differentiated from or- 
dinary speech than is our modern song. Nevertheless, 
considering the extended range of notes in use, the variety 
of modes, the occasional variations of time consequent on 
changes of metre, and the multiplication of instruments, 
we see that music had, toward the close of Greek civiliza- 
tion, attained to considerable heterogeneity: not indeed as 
compared with our music, but as compared with that which 
preceded it. As yet, however, there existed nothing but 
melody: harmony was unknown. It was not until Chris- 
tian church-music had reached some development, that 
music in parts was evolved; and then it came into existence 
through a very unobtrusive differentiation. Difficult as 
it may be to conceive, a priori, how the advance from 
melody to harmony could take place without a sudden leap, 
it is none the less true that it did so. The circumstance 
which prepared the way for it was the employment of two 
choirs singing alternately the same air. Afterward it be- 
came the practice (very possibly first suggested by a mis- 
take) for the second choir to commence before the first had 
ceased; thus producing a fugue. With the simple airs 
then in use, a partially harmonious fugue might not im- 
probably thus result; and a very partially harmonious 
fugue satisfied the ears of that age, as we know from still 
preserved examples. The idea having once been given, 
the composing of airs productive of fugal harmony would 
naturally grow up ; as in some way it did grow up out of 
this alternate choir-singing. And from the fugue to con- 
certed music of two, three, four, and more parts, the tran- 
sition was easy. Without pointing out in detail the in- 



302 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

creasing complexity that resulted from introducing notes 
of various lengths, from the multiplication of keys, from 
the use of accidentals, from varieties of time, from modu- 
lations and so forth, it needs but to contrast music as it is 
with music as it was, to see how immense is the increase of 
heterogeneity. We see this if, looking at music in its 
ensemble, we enumerate its many different genera and 
species — if we consider the divisions into vocal, instrumen- 
tal, and mixed, and their subdivisions into music for differ- 
ent voices and different instruments — if we observe the many 
forms of sacred music, from the simple hymn, the chant, 
the canon, motet, anthem, etc., up to the oratorio: and 
the still more numerous forms of secular music, from the 
ballad up to the serenata, from the instrumental solo up to 
the symphony. Again, the same truth is seen on compar- 
ing any one sample of aboriginal music with a sample of 
modern music — even an ordinary song for the piano ; which 
we find to be relatively highly heterogeneous, not only in 
respect of the varieties in the pitch and in the length of 
the notes, the number of different notes sounding a1 
same instant in company with the voice, and the varia- 
tions of strength with which they are sounded and sung, 
but in respect of the changes of key, the changes of time, 
the changes of timbre of the voice, and the many other 
modifications of expression. While between the old mo- 
notonous dance-chant ami a grand opera of our own day, 
with its endless orchestral complexities and vocal combina- 
tions, the contrast in heterogeneity is so extreme that it 
seems scarcely credible that the one should have been the 
ancestor of the other. 

§ 126. Were they needed, many further illustrations 
might be cited. Going back to the early time when the 
deeds of the god-king, chanted and numerically represented 
in dance round his altar, were further narrated in picture- 
writings on the walls of temples and palaces, and so con- 
stituted a rude literature, we might trace the development 
of Literature through phases in which, as in the Hebrew 
.Scriptures, it presents in one work theology, cosmogony, 
history, biography, civil law, ethics, poem; through other 
phases in which', as in the Iliad, the religious, martial, 
historical, the epic, dramatic, and lyric elements are sim- 
ilarly commingled; down to its present heterogeneous 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 303 

development, in which its divisions and subdivisions are so 
numerous and varied as to defy complete classification. 
Or we might track the evolution of science: beginning 
with the era in which it was not yet differentiated from 
Art, and was, in union with Art, the handmaid of Religion ; 
passing through the era in which the sciences were so few and 
rudimentary as to be simultaneously cultivated by the same 
philosophers; and ending with the era in which the genera 
and species are so numerous that few can enumerate them, 
and no one can adequately grasp even one genus. Or we 
might do the like with Architecture, with the Drama, with 
Dress. But doubtless the reader is already weary of illustra- 
tions; and my promise has been amply fulfilled. I believe 
it has been shown beyond question that that which the 
German physiologists have found to be a law of organic 
development is a law of all development. The advance 
from the simple to the complex, through a process of suc- 
cessive differentiations, is seen alike in the earliest changes 
of the Universe to which we can reason our way back, and 
in the earliest changes which we can inductively establish ; 
it is seen in the geologic and ciimatic evolution of the 
Earth, and of every single organism on its surface; it is 
seen in the evolution of Humanity, whether contemplated 
in the civilized individual or in the aggregations of races; 
it is seen in the evolution of Society, in respect alike of its 
political, its religious, and its economical organization; 
and it is seen in the evolution of all those endless concrete 
and abstract products of human activity which constitute 
the environment of our daily life. From the remotest past 
which Science can fathom, up to the novelties of yesterday, 
an essential trait of Evolution has been the transformation 
of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous. 

§ 127. Hence, the general formula arrived at in the last 
chapter needs supplementing. It is true that Evolution, 
under its primary aspect, is a change from a less coherent 
form to a more coherent form, consequent on the dissi- 
pation of motion and integration of matter; but this is by 
no means the whole truth. Along with a passage from the 
coherent to the incoherent, there goes on a passage from 
the uniform to the multiform. Such, at least, is the fact 
wherever Evolution is compound ; which it is in the im- 
mense majority of cases. While there is a progressing con- 



304 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

centration of the aggregate, either by the closer approach 
of the matter within its limits, or by the drawing in of 
further matter, or by both ; and while the more or less 
distinct parts into which the aggregate divides and sub- 
divides are severally concentrating: these parte are als 
coming unlike — unlike in size, or in form, or in texture, 
or in composition, or in several or all of these. The same 
process is exhibited by the whole and by its members. 
The entire mass is integrating, and simultaneously differ- 
entiating from other masses; and each member of it - is 
also integrating and simultaneously differentiating from 
other members. 

Our conception, then, must unite these characters. As 
we now understand it, Evolnti on is definable as a change 
from an incoherent homogeneity to a coherent bet- 
neity, accompanying the dissipation of motion and in1 
tion of matter. 



OHAPTEK XVI. 

THE LAW OK EVOLUTION CONTINUED. 

§128. But now, does this generalization express the 

whole truth? Hoes it include everything essentially char- 
acterising Evolution, and excludes everything else? Does 

it comprehend all the phenomena of secondary redistribu- 
tion which Compound Evolution presents, without com- 
prehending any other phenomena? A critical examination 
of the facts will show that it dees neither. 

Changes from the less heterogeneous to the more hetero- 
geneous, which do nor come within what we call Evolution, 
occur in every local disease. A portion of the body in 
which there arises a morbid growth displays a new differ- 
entiation. Whether this morbid growth be, or k 
more heterogeneous than the tissues in which it is seated, 
is not the question. The question is, whether the or- 
ganism as a whole is, or is not. rendered more heterogeneous 
by the addition of a part unlike every pre-existing part, in 
form, or composition, or both. And to this question there 
can be none but an affirmative answer. Again, it may be 
contended that the earlier stages of decomposition in a 
dead body involve increase of heterogeneity. Supposing 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 305 

the chemical changes to commence in some parts sooner 
than in other parts, as they commonly do ; and to affect 
different tissues in different ways, as they must; it seems 
to be a necessary admission that the entire body, made up 
of undecomposed parts, and parts decomposed in various 
modes and degrees, has become more heterogeneous than 
it was. Though greater homogeneity will be the eventual 
result, the immediate result is the opposite. And yet this 
immediate result is certainly not Evolution. Other in- 
stances are furnished by social disorders and disasters. A 
rebellion, which, while leaving some provinces undisturbed, 
develops itself here in secret societies, there in public dem- 
monstrations, and elsewhere in actual conflicts, necessarily 
renders the society, as a whole, more heterogeneous. Or 
when a dearth causes commercial derangement with its 
entailed bankruptcies, closed factories, discharged oper- 
atives, food-riots, incendiarisms; it is manifest that, as a 
large part of the community retains its ordinary organiza- 
tion displaying the usual phenomena, these new phenom- 
ena must be regarded as adding to the complexity previously 
existing. But such changes, so far from constituting fur- 
ther Evolution, are steps toward Dissolution. 

Clearly, then, the definition arrived at in the last chap- 
ter is an imperfect one. The changes above instanced as 
coming within the formula as it now stands are so ob- 
viously unlike the rest that the inclusion of them implies 
some distinction hitherto overlooked. Such further dis- 
tinction we have now to supply. 

§ 129. At the same time that Evolution is a change from 
the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, it is a change from 
the indefinite to the definite. Along with an advance 
from simplicity to complexity, there is an advance from 
confusion to order — from undetermined arrangement to 
determined arrangement. Development, no matter of what 
kind, exhibits not only a multiplication of unlike parts, 
but an increase in the distinctness with which these parts 
are marked off from one another. And this is the distinc- 
tion sought. For proof, it needs only to reconsider the 
instances given above. The changes constituting disease 
have no such definiteness, either in locality, extent, or out- 
line, as the changes constituting development. Though 
certain morbid growths are more common in some parts of 
20 



306 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

the body than in others (as warts on the hands, cancer on 
the breasts, tubercle in the lungs), yet they are not con- 
fined to these parts; nor, when found on them, are they 
anything like so precise in their relative positions as are 
the normal parts around them. Their sizes are extremely 
variable: they bear no such constant proportions to the 
body as organs do. Their forms, too, are far less specific 
than organic forms. And they are extremely confused in 
their internal structures. That is, they are in all respects 
comparatively indefinite. The like peculiarity may be 
traced in decomposition. That total indefiniteness to which 
a dead body is finally reduced is a state toward which the 
putrefactive changes tend from their commencement. The 
advancing destruction of the organic compounds blurs the 
minute structure — diminishes its distinctness. From the 
portions that have undergone most decay, there is a _ 
ual transition to the less decayed portions. And step by 
step the lines of organization, once so precise, disappear. 
Similarly with social changes of an abnormal kind. The 
disaffection which initiates a political outbreak implies a 
loosening of those ties by which citizens are bound up into 
distinct classes and subclasses. Agitation, growing into 
revolutionary meetings, fuses ranks that are usually sep- 
arated, Acts of insubordination break through the or- 
dained limits to individual conduct, and tend to obliterate 
the lines previously existing between those in authority 
and those beneath them. At the same time, by the arrest 
of trade, artisans and cithers lose their occupations, and, in 
ceasing to be functionally distinguished, merge into an 
indefinite mass. And when at last there comes positive 
insurrection, all magisterial and official powers, all class 
distinctions, and all industrial differences cease: orgsj 
society lapses into an unorganized aggregation of social 
units. Similarly, in so far as famines and pestilences 
cause changes from order toward disorder, they cause 
changes from definite arrangements to indefinite arrange- 
ments. 

Thus, then, is that increase of heterogeneity which con- 
stitutes Evolution distinguished from that increase of het- 
erogeneity which does not do so. Though in disease and 
death, individual or social, the earliest modifications are 
additions to the pre-existing heterogeneity, they are not 
additions to the pre-existing definiteness. They begin 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 307 

from the very outset to destroy this definiteness, and grad- 
ually produce a heterogeneity that is indeterminate instead 
of determinate. As a city, already multiform in its va- 
riously arranged structures of various architecture, may be 
made more multiform by an earthquake, which leaves part 
of it standing and overthrows other parts in different ways 
and degrees, but is at the same time reduced from orderly 
arrangement to disorderly arrangement; so may organized 
bodies be made for a time more multiform by changes 
which are nevertheless disorganizing changes. And in the 
one case as in another, it is the absence of definiteness 
which distinguishes the multiformity of regression from the 
multiformity of progression. 

If advance from the indefinite to the definite is an es- 
sential characteristic of Evolution, we shall of course find 
it everywhere displayed; as in the last chapter we found 
the advance from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous. 
With a view of seeing whether it is so, let us now recon- 
sider the same several classes of facts. 

§ 130. Beginning, as before, with a hypothetical illus- 
tration, we have to note that each step in the evolution of 
the Solar System, supposing it to have originated from dif- 
fused matter, was an advance toward more definite struc- 
ture. At first irregular in shape and with indistinct 
margin, the attenuated substance, as it concentrated and 
began to rotate, must have assumed the form of an oblate 
spheroid, which, with every increase of density, became 
more specific in outline, and had its surface more sharply 
marked oil from the surrounding void. Simultaneously, 
the constituent portions of nebulous matter, instead of 
moving independently toward their common centre of 
gravity from all points, and revolving round it in various 
planes, as they would at first do, must have had these planes 
more and more merged into a single plane, that became 
less variable as the concentration progressed — became grad- 
ually defined. 

According to the hypothesis, change from indistinct 
characters to distinct ones was repeated in the evolution 
of planets and satellites, and may in them be traced much 
further. A gaseous spheroid is less definitely limited than 
a fluid spheroid, since it is subject to larger and more rapid 
undulations of surface, and to much greater distortions of 



308 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

general form; and, similarly, a liquid spheroid, covered as 
it must be with waves of various magnitudes, is less definite 
than a solid spheroid. The decrease of oblateness that 
goes along with increase of integration brings relative def- 
initeness of other elements. A planet having an axis in- 
clined to the plane of its orbit must, while its form is very 
oblate, have its plane of rotation much disturbed by the 
attraction of external bodies; whereas its approach to a 
spherical form, involving a smaller precessional m< 
involves less marked variations in the direction of its axis. 
With progressing settlement of the space-relations, the 
force-relations simultaneously become more Bettled. 
exact calculations of physical astronomy show as how 
nite these force-relations now arc; while their original in- 
definiteness is implied in the extreme difficulty, if not 
impossibility, of subjecting the nebular hypothesis to 
mathematical treatment. 

§131. From that primitive moll of the Earth 

inferable from geological data — a Btate accounted for bj 
the nebular hypothesis, but inexplicable on any other — the 
transition to its existing Btate has been through 
which the characters became more determinate. B 
being comparatively unstable in surface and contour, a li- 
quid spheroid is Less specific than a - roid in having 
no fixed distribution of parts. Currents of molten matter*, 
though kept to certain genera] - by the conditions 
of equilibrium, cannot, in the a t solid bound] 
be precise or permanent in their directions: all parts must 
be in motion with respect to other parts. 
ficial solidification, even though partial, is ma 
step toward the establishment of definite rela posi- 
tion. In a thin crust, however, frequently ruptured by 
disturbing forces, and moved by every tidal undulation, 
tixity of relative position can be but temporary. Only as 
the crust thickens can there arise distinct and settled 
geographical relations. Observe, too. that when, on i 
face that has cooled to the requisite degree, there begins 
to precipitate the water floating as vapor, the de- 
posits cannot maintain any definiteness either of state or 
place. Falling on a solid envelope not thick enough to 
preserve anything beyond slight variations of level, the 
water must form shallow pools over areas sufficient!] 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 309 

to permit condensation; which areas must pass insensibly 
into others that are too hot for this, and must themselves 
from time to time be so raised in temperature as to drive 
off the water lying on them. With processing refrigera- 
tion, however — with a growing thickness of crust, a con- 
sequent formation of larger elevations and depressions, and 
the precipitation of more atmospheric water — there comes 
nil arrangemeut of parts that is comparatively fixed in both 
time and space ; and the definiteness of state and position 
increases, until there results such a distribution of conti- 
nents and oceans as we now see — a distribution that is not 
only topographically precise, but also in its cliff-marked 
coast-lines presents divisions of land from water more defi- 
nite than could have existed when all the uncovered areas 
were low islands with shelving beaches, over which the 
tide ebbed and flowed to great distances. 

Respecting the characteristics classed as geological, we 
may draw parallel inferences. While the Earth's crust was 
thin, mountain-chains were impossibilities: there could 
not have been long and well-defined axes of elevation, with 
distinct water-sheds and areas of drainage. Moreover, the 
denudation of small islands by small rivers, and by tidal 
streams both feeble and narrow, would produce no clearly 
marked sedimentary strata. Confused and varying masses 
of detritus, such as we now find at the mouths of brooks, 
must have been the prevailing formations. And these 
could give place to distinct strata only as there arose con- 
tinents and oceans, with their great rivers, long coast-lines, 
and wide-spreading marine currents. 

How there must simultaneously have resulted more de- 
finite meteorological characters need not be pointed out in 
detail. That differences of climates and seasons grew re- 
latively decided as the heat of the Sun became distinguish- 
able from the proper heat of the Earth, and that the 
production of more specific conditions in each locality was 
aided by increasing permanence in the distribution of 
lands and seas, are conclusions sufficiently obvious. 

§ 132. Let us turn now to the evidence furnished by or- 
ganic bodies. In place of deductive illustrations like the 
foregoing, we shall here find numerous illustrations which 
have been inductively established, and are therefore less 
open to criticism. The process of mammalian develop- 



310 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

ment, for example, will supply us with numerous proofs 
ready described by embryologists. 

The first change which the ovum of a mammal undergoes 
after continued segmentation has reduced its yelk to a 
mulberry-like mass, is the appearance of a greater definite- 
ness in the peripheral cells of this mass, each of which 
acquires a distinct enveloping membrane. These peripheral 
cells, vaguely distinguished from the internal ones by their 
minuter subdivision, as well as by their greater complete- 
ness, coalesce to form the blastoderm or germinal mem- 
brane. Presently, one portion of this membrane is ren- 
dered unlike the rest by the accumulation of cells still more 
subdivided, which, together, form an opaque roundish 
spot. This area germinativa, as it is called, shades otf 
gradually into the surrounding parts of the blastoderm; 
and the area pellucida, subsequently formed in the midst 
of it, is similarly without precise margin. The "primi- 
tive trace," which makes its appearance in the centre of 
the area pellutida,, and is the rudiment of that vertebrate 
axis which is to be the fundamental characteristic of the 
mature animal, is shown by its name to be at first indefi- 
nite — a mere trace. Beginning as a shallow groove, it 
becomes slowly more pronounced: its Bides -row higher; 
their summits overlap, and at last unite; and so the in- 
definite groove passes into a definite tube, forming the 
vertebral canal. In this vertebral canal the leading divis- 
ions of the brain are at first discernible only as slight 
bulgings; while the vertebras commence as indistinct 
modifications of the tissue bounding the canal. Simul- 
taneously, the outer surface of the blastoderm has been 
differentiating from the inner surface: there has arisen a 
division into the serous and mucous layers — a division at 
the outset indistinct, and traceable only about the germinal 
area, but which insensibly spreads throughout nearly the 
whole germinal membrane, and becomes definite. From 
the mucous layer, the development of the alimentary canal 
proceeds as that of the vertebral canal does from the - 
layer. Originally a simple channel along the under-surface 
of the embryonic mass, the intestine is rendered distinct 
by the bending down, on each side, of ridges which finally 
join to form a tube — the permanent absorbing surface is by 
degrees cut otf from that temporary absorbing surface with 
which it was continuous and uniform. And in an analo- 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 311 

gous manner the entire embryo, which at first lies outspread 
on the yelk-sack, gradually rises up from it, and by the 
infolding of its ventral region becomes a separate mass, 
connected with the yelk-sack only by a narrow duct. 

These changes through which the general structure is 
marked out with slowly increasing precision, are paralleled 
in the evolution of each organ. The heart begins as a 
mere aggregation of cells, of which the inner liquefy to 
form blood, while the outer are transformed into the walls; 
and when thus sketched out the heart is indefinite not 
only as being unlined by limiting membrane, but also as 
being little more than a dilatation of the central blood- 
vessel. By and by the receiving portion of the cavity be- 
comes distinct from the propelling portion. Afterward 
there begins to grow across the ventricle, a septum, which 
is, however, some time before it shuts off the two halves 
from each other; while the later-formed septum of the 
auricle remains incomplete during the whole of foetal life. 
Again, the liver commences by multiplication of certain 
cells in the wall of the intestine. The thickening pro- 
duced by this multiplication " increases so as to form a 
projection upon the exterior of the canal ;" and at the same 
time that the organ grows and becomes distinct from the 
intestine, the channels running through it are transformed 
into ducts having clearly-marked walls. Similarly, certain 
cells of the external coat of the alimentary canal at its 
upper portion accumulate into lumps or buds, from which 
the lungs are developed ; and these, in their general out- 
lines and detailed structure, acquire distinctness step by 
step. 

Changes of this order continue long after birth; and, in 
the human being, are some of them not completed till 
middle life. During youth, most of the articular surfaces of 
the bones remain rough and fissured — the calcareous deposit 
ending irregularly in the surrounding cartilage. But be- 
tween puberty and the age of thirty these articular sur- 
faces are finished off into smooth, hard, sharply-cut " epi- 
physes." Generally, indeed, we may say that increase of 
definiteness continues when there has ceased to be any ap- 
preciable increase of heterogeneity. And there is reason 
to think that those modifications which take place after 
maturity, bringing about old age and death, are modifica- 
tions of this nature ; since they cause rigidity of structure, 



312 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

a consequent restriction of movement and of functional 
pliability, a gradual narrowing of the limits within which 
the vital processes go on, ending in an organic adjustment 
too precise — too narrow in its margin of possible variation 
to permit the requisite adaptation to changes of external 
conditions. 

§ 133. To prove that the Earth's Flora and Fauna, re- 
garded either as wholes or in their separate species, have 
progressed in definiteness, is no more possible than it was 
to prove that they have progressed in heterogeneity: lack 
of facts being an obstacle to the one conclusion as to the 
other. If, however, we allow ourselves to reason from the 
hypothesis, now daily rendered more probable, that every 
species up to the most complex has arisen out of the sim- 
plest through the accumulation of modifications upon 
modifications, just as every individual arises, we shall see 
that there must have been a progress from the indetermi- 
nate to the determinate, both in the particular forms and 
in the groups of forms. 

AVe may set out with the significant fact that the lowest 
organisms (which are analogous in structure to the germs 
of all higher ones) have so little definiteness of character 
that it is difficult, if not impossible, to decide whether 
they are plants or animals. Respecting sundry of them 
there are unsettled disputes between zoologists and bota- 
nists; and it is proposed to group them into a separate 
kingdom, forming a common basis to the animal and 
vegetal kingdoms. Note next that, among the Pr 
extreme indetiniteness of shape is general. In sundry 
shell-less Rhizopods the form is so irregular as to admit of 
no description; and it is neither alike in any two individ- 
uals nor in the same individual at successive moments. By 
aggregation of such creatures are produced, among other 

A 

indefinite bodies, the Sponges — bodies that are indefinite 

in size, in contour, in internal arrangement. As further 
showing how relatively indeterminate are the simplest 
organisms, it maybe mentioned that their structures van- 
greatly "with surrounding conditions — so much so that, 
among the Protozoa and Protophyta, many forms which 
w r ere once classed its distinct species and even as distinct 
genera, are found to be merely varieties of one species. If 
now we call to mind how precise in their attributes arc the 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 313 

highest organisms — how sharply cut their outlines, how 
invariable their proportions, and how comparatively con- 
stant their structures under changed conditions, we cannot 
deny that greater definiteness is one of their characteristics. 
We must admit that if they have been evolved out of lower 
organisms, an increase of definiteness has been an accom- 
paniment of their evolution. 

That, in course of time, species have become more 
sharply marked off from other species, genera from genera, 
and orders from orders, is a conclusion not admitting of a 
more positive establishment than the foregoing; and must, 
indeed, stand or fall with it. If, however, species and 
genera and orders have arisen by " natural selection," then, 
as Mr. Darwin shows, there must have been a tendency 
to divergence, causing the contrasts between groups to be- 
come greater. Disappearance of intermediate forms, less 
fitted for special spheres of existence than the extreme 
forms they connected, must have made the differences 
between the extreme forms decided ; and so, from indis- 
tinct and unstable varieties, must slowly have been pro- 
duced distinct and stable species — an inference which is 
in harmony with what we know respecting races of men 
and races of domestic animals. 

§ 134. The successive phases through which societies 
pass very obviously display the progress from indetermi- 
nate arrangement to determinate arrangement. A wander- 
ing tribe of savages, being fixed neither in its locality nor 
in its internal distribution, is far less definite in the relative 
positions of its parts than a nation. In such a tribe the 
social relations are similarly confused and unsettled. 
Political authority is neither well established nor precise. 
Distinctions of rank are neither clearly marked nor im- 
passable. And save in the different occupations of men 
and women, there are no complete industrial divisions. 
Only in tribes of considerable size, which have enslaved 
other tribes, is the economical differentiation decided. 

Any one of these primitive societies, however, that 
evolves, becomes step by step more specific. Increasing 
in size, consequently ceasing to be so nomadic, and re- 
stricted in its range by neighboring societies, it acquires, 
after prolonged border warfare, a settled territorial bound- 
ary. The distinction between the royal race and the 



314 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

people eventually amounts, in the popular apprehension, 
to a difference of nature. The warrior class attains a 
perfect separation from classes devoted to the cultivation 
of the soil, or other occupations regarded as servile. And 
there arises a priesthood that is denned in its rank, its 
functions, its privileges. This sharpness of definition, 
growing both greater and more variously exemplified us 
societies advance to maturity, is extremest in those that 
have reached their full development or are declining. Of 
ancient Egypt we read that its social divisions were pre- 
cise and its customs rigid. Recent investigations make it 
more +han ever clear that, among the Assyrians and sur- 
rounding peoples, not only were the laws unalterable, but 
even the minor habits, down to those of domestic routine, 
possessed a sacredness which insured their permanence. 
In India, at the present day, the unchangeable distinctions 
of caste, not less than the constancy in modes of dress, 
industrial processes, and religious observances, show us 
how fixed are the arrangements where the antiquity is 
great. Nor does China, with its long-settled political 
organization, its elaborate and precise conventions, and its 
unprogressive literature, fail to exemplify the same truth. 
The successive phases of our own and adjacent societies 
furnish facts somewhat different in kind but similar in 
meaning. Originally, monarchical authority was more 
baronial, and baronial authority more monarchical, than 
afterward. Between modern priests and the priests of old 
times, who, while officially teachers of religion, were also 
warriors, judges, architects, there is a marked difference 
in definitenesa of function. And among the people en- 
gaged in productive occupations, the like contrasts would 
be found to hold; the industrial class has become more 
distinct from the military, and its various divisions from 
one another. A history of our constitution, reminding us 
how the powers of King, Lords, and Commons have been 
gradually settled, would clearly exhibit analogous changes. 
Countless facts bearing the like construction would meet 
ais were we to trace the development of legislation, in the 
successive stages of which we should find statutes gradually 
rendered more specific in their applications to particular 
cases. Even now we see that each new law, beginning 
as a vague proposition, is, in the course of enactment, 
elaborated into specific clauses; and further that only after 



FIPST PRINCIPLES. 315 

its interpretation has been established by judges' decisions 
in courts of justice does it reach its final definiteness. 
From the annals of minor institutions like evidence may 
be gathered. Eeligious, charitable, literary, and all other 
societies, starting with ends and methods roughly sketched 
out and easily modifiable, show us how, by the accumu- 
lation of rules and precedents, the purposes become more 
distinct and the modes of action more restricted, until 
at last decay follows a fixity which admits of no adapta- 
tion to new conditions. Should it be objected that among 
civilized nations there are examples of decreasing definite- 
ness (instance the breaking down of limits between ranks), 
the reply is, that such apparent exceptions are the accom- 
paniments of a social metamorphosis — a change from the 
military or predatory type of social structure to the indus- 
trial or mercantile type, during which the old lines of 
organization are disappearing and the new ones becoming 
more marked. 

§ 135. All organized results of social action, all super- 
organic structures, pass through parallel phases. Being, 
as they are, objective products of subjective processes, they 
must display corresponding changes; and that they do this 
the cases of Language, of Science, of Art, clearly prove. 

Strike out from our sentences everything but nouns and 
verbs, and there stands displayed the vagueness charac- 
terizing undeveloped tongues. When we note how each 
inflection of a verb, or addition by which the case of a 
noun is marked, serves to limit the conditions of action or 
of existence, we see that these constituents of speech enable 
men to communicate their thoughts more precisely. That 
the application of an adjective to a noun or an adverb to 
a verb narrows the class of things or changes indicated, 
implies that the additional word serves to make the propo- 
sition more distinct. And similarly with other parts of 
speech. 

The like effect results from the multiplication of words 
of each order. When the names for objects, and acts, and 
qualities, are but few, the range of each is proportionately 
wide, and its meaning therefore unspecific. The similes 
and metaphors so much used by aboriginal races indirectly 
and imperfectly suggest ideas, which they cannot express 
directly and perfectly from lack of words. Or, to take a 



316 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

case from ordinary life : if we compare the speech of the 
peasant, who, out of his limited vocabulary, can describe 
the contents of the bottle he carries only as " doctor's 
stuff," which he has got for his "sick" wife, with the 
speech of the physician, who tells those educated like him- 
self the particular composition of the medicine, and the 
particular disorder for which he has prescribed it, we have 
vividly brought home to us the precision which language 
gains by the multiplication of terms. 

Again, in the course of its evolution, each tongue ac- 
quires a further accuracy through processes which tix the 
meaning of each word. Intellectual intercoun 
diminishes laxity of expression. By and by dictionaries 
give definitions. Ami eventually, i culti- 

vated, indefinitenesa La not tolerated, either in the terms 
used or in their grammatical combinati 

Once more, languages considered as wholes become 
gradually more sharply marked ell' from one another, and 
from their common parent; as witness, in early tim- 
divergence from the same root of two I nlike 

as Greek and Latin, and in later times the developing 
three Latin dialects into Italian, French, and Span 

£ L36. In his " History of the Inductive S -." I>r. 

Wnewell says that the (.recks failed in physical phil< - 
because their " ideas were not distinct and appropriate to 

the facts." I do not quote this remark for its luminous 
since it would be equally proper to ascribe the indistinct- 
ness and inappropriateness of their ideas to the imp 
tion of their physical philosophy; but I quote it 1- 
it serves as good evidence of the indefinitenesa of primitive 
science. The same work and its fellow on "The Philoso- 
phy of the Inductive Science.-"' supply other evidences 
equally good, because equally independent of any - 
hypothesis as is here to be established Respecting mathe- 
matics, we have the fart that geometrical theorem- _ 
out of empirical methods: and that these theorems, at first 
isolated, did not acquire the clearness which complete 
demonstration gives until they were arranged by E 
into a series of dependent propositions. At a latere. 
the same general truth was exemplified in the pr 
from the "method of exhaustions" and the "method of 
indivisibles" to the " method of limits'* — which is the een- 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 317 

tral idea of the infinitesimal calculus. In early mechanics, 
too, may be retraced a dim perception that action and re- 
action are equal and opposite ; though, for ages after, this 
truth remained unformulated And, similarly, the property 
of inertia, though not distinctly comprehended until Kepler 
lived, was vaguely recognized long previously. " The con- 
ception of statical force" " was never presented in a distinct 
form till the works of Archimedes appeared ;■" and " the 
conception of accelerating force was confused in the mind 
of Kepler and his contemporaries, and did not become clear 
enough for purposes of sound scientific reasoning before the 
succeeding century." To which specific assertions may be 
added the general remark, that " terms which originally, 
and before the laws of motion were fully known, were used 
in a very vague and fluctuating sense, were afterward 
limited and rendered precise." When we turn from ab- 
stract scientific conceptions to the concrete previsions of 
science, of which astronomy furnishes numerous examples, 
a like contrast is visible. The times at which celestial 
phenomena will occur have been predicted with ever-in- 
creasing accuracy. Errors once amounting to days are 
now diminished to seconds. The correspondence between 
the real and supposed forms of orbits has been gradually 
rendered more precise. Originally thought circular, then 
epicyclical, then elliptical, orbits are now ascertained to 
be curves, which always deviate from perfect ellipses, and 
are ever undergoing changes. 

But the general advance of Science in definiteness is 
best shown by the contrast between its qualitative stage 
and its quantitative stage. At first the facts ascertained 
were, that between such and such phenomena some connec- 
tion existed — that the appearances a and b always occurred 
together or in succession; but it was known neither what 
was the nature of the relation between a and b, nor how 
much of a accompanied so much of b. The development 
of Science has in part been the reduction of these vague 
connections to distinct ones. Most relations have been 
classed as mechanical, chemical, thermal, electric, mag- 
netic, etc. ; and we have learnt to infer the amounts of the 
antecedents and consequents from each other with exact- 
ness. Of illustrations, some_ furnished by physics have 
been given, and from other sciences plenty may be added. 
We have positively ascertained the constituents of numer- 



318 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

ous compounds which our ancestors could not analyze, and 
of a far greater number which they never even saw, and 
the combining equivalents of these elements are accurately 
calculated. Physiology shows advance from qualitative to 
quantitative prevision in the weighing and measuring of 
organic products, and of the materials consumed, as well as 
in measurement of functions by the spirometer and the 
sphygmograph. By Pathology it is displayed in the use 
of the statistical method of determining the sources of 
diseases and the effects of treatment. In Botany 
Zoology, the numerical comparisons of Floras and Faunas, 
leading to Bpecific conclusions respecting their sources and 
distributions, illustrate it. And in Sociology, questionable 
as are the conclusions usually drawn from the class 
sum totals of the census, from Board of Trade tables, 
from criminal returns, it must be admitted that these im- 
ply a progress toward W ptiong 
phenomena. 

That an essential characteristic of advancii \ S nee is 
increase in definiteness appears indeed almost a ti 
when we remember that Science may be described as definite 
knowledge, in contradistinction to that indefinite knowl- 
edge possessed by the uncultured. And if, as we cannot 
question, Science has, in the course of ages, been evolved 
out of this indefinite knowledge of the uncultured, then 
the gradual acquirement of that great definiteness which 
now distinguishes it must have been a leading trait in its 
evolution. 

§ 137. The Arts, industrial and esthetic, supply illustra- 
tions perhaps still more striking. Flint implements of 
the kind recently found in certain of the later geologic 
deposits show the extreme want of precision in men's first 
handiworks. Though a great advance on these is seen in 
the tools and weapons of existing savage tribes, yet an in- 
exactness in forms and fittings distinguishes such tools 
and weapons from those of civilized races. In a smaller 
degree, the productions of the less-advanced nations are 
characterized by like defects. A Chinese junk, with all 
its contained furniture and appliances, nowhere presents 
a line that is quite straight, a uniform curve, or a true 
surface. Nor do the utensils and machines of our ancestors 
fail to exhibit a similar inferiority to our own. An 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 319 

antique chair, an old fireplace, a lock of the last century, 
or almost any article of household use that has been pre- 
served for a few generations, proves by contrast how greatly 
the industrial products of our time excel those of the past 
in their accuracy. Since planing-machines have been 
invented it has become possible to produce absolutely 
straight lines, and surfaces so truly level as to be air-tight 
when applied to each other. While in the dividing-engine 
of Troughton, in the micrometer of Whitworth, and in 
microscopes that show fifty thousand divisions to the inch, 
we have an exactness as far exceeding that reached in the 
works of our great-grandfathers as theirs exceeded that 
of the aboriginal celt-makers. 

In the Fine Arts there has been a parallel progress. From 
the rudely-carved and painted idols of savages, through 
the early sculptures characterized by limbs without muscu- 
lar detail, wooden-looking drapery, and faces devoid of 
individuality, up to the later statues of the Greeks or 
some of those now produced, the increased accuracy of 
representation is conspicuous. Compare the mural paint- 
ings of the Egyptians with the paintings of medieval 
Europe, or these with modern paintings, and the more 
precise rendering of the appearances of objects is manifest. 
It is the same with fiction and the drama. In the marvel- 
lous tales current among Eastern nations, in the romantic 
legends of feudal Europe, as well as in the mystery-plays 
and those immediately succeeding them, we see great want 
of correspondence to the realities of life — alike in the 
predominance of supernatural events, in the extremely 
improbable coincidences, and in the vaguely-indicated 
personages. Along with social advance there has been a 
progressive diminution of unnaturalness — -an approach to 
truth of representation. And now, novels and plays are 
applauded in proportion to the fidelity with which they 
exhibit individual characters; improbabilities, like the 
impossibilities which preceded them, are disallowed, and 
there is even an incipient abandonment of those elaborate 
plots which life rarely if ever furnishes. 

§ 138. It would be easy to accumulate evidences of other 
kinds. The progress from myths and legends, extreme in 
their misrepresentations, to a history that has slowly be- 
come, and is still becoming, more accurate ; the establish- 



320 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

ment of settled systematic methods of doing things, instead 
of the indeterminate ways at first pursued — these might be 
enlarged upon in further exemplification of the general 
law. But the basis of induction is already wide enough. 
Proof that all Evolution is from the indefinite to the 
definite, we find to be not less abundant than proof that all 
Evolution is from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous. 

It should, however, be added that this advance in 
definiteness is not a jorimary but a secondary phenomenon — 
is a result incidental on other changes. The transforma- 
tion of a whole that was originally diffused and uniform into 
a concentrated combination of multiform parts, implies 
progressive separation both of the whole from its environ- 
ment and of the parts from one another. "While this is 
going on there must be indistinctness. Only as the whole 
gains density does it become sharply marked off from the 
space or matter lying outside of it, and only - 
separated division draws into a those peripheral 

portions which are at first imperfectly disunited from the 
peripheral portions of neighboring divisions ran it acquire 
any tiling like a precise outline. That is t<» say, the in- 
creasing definitem oncomitant of the increasing 
consolidation, general and local. While the secondary 
redistributions are ever adding to the heterogeneity, the 
primary redistribution, while augmenting the integration, 
is incidentally giving distinctness to the increasingly un- 
like parts as well as to the aggregate of them. 

But though this universal trait of Evolution is a neoc - 
accompaniment of the traits set forth in preceding chap- 
ters, it is not expressed in the words used to describe 
them. It is therefore needful further to modify our 
formula. The more specific idea of Evolution now res 
is — a change from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity 
to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, accompanying the 
dissipation of motion and integration of matter. 



CHAPTER XVII. 

THE LAW OF EVOLUTION CONCLUDED. 

§ 139. The conception of Evolution elaborated in the 
foregoing chapters is still incomplete. True though it is, 
it is not the whole truth. The transformations which 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 321 

all things undergo during the ascending phases of their 
existence we have contemplated under three aspects, and 
by uniting these three aspects as simultaneously pre- 
sented, we have formed an approximate idea of the trans- 
formations. But there are concomitant changes about 
which nothing has yet been said, and which, though less 
conspicuous, are no less essential. 

For thus far we have attended only to the redistribution 
of Matter, neglecting the accompanying redistribution of 
Motion. Distinct or tacit reference has, indeed, repeatedly 
been made to the dissipation of Motion that goes on along 
with the concentration of Matter ; and were all Evolution 
absolutely simple, the total fact would be contained in the 
proposition that as Motion dissipates Matter concentrates. 
But while we have recognized the ultimate redistribution 
of the Motion, we have passed over its proximate redistri- 
bution. Though something has from time to time been 
said about the escaping motion, nothing has been said 
about the motion that does not escape. In proportion as 
Evolution becomes compound — in proportion as an aggre- 
gate retains, for a considerable time, such a quantity of 
motion as permits secondary redistributions of its compo- 
nent matter, there necessarily arise secondary redistribu- 
tions of its retained motion. As fast as the parts are trans- 
formed, there goes on a transformation of the sensible or 
insensible motion possessed by the parts. The parts cannot 
become progressively integrated, either individually or as a 
combination, without their motions, individual or com- 
bined, becoming more integrated. There cannot arise 
among the parts heterogeneities of size, of form, of qual- 
ity, without there also arising heterogeneities in the 
amounts and directions of their motions, or the motions 
of their molecules. And increasing definiteness of the 
parts implies increasing definiteness of their motions. 
In short, the rhythmical actions going on in each aggre- 
gate must differentiate and integrate at the same time that 
the structure does so. 

The general theory of this redistribution of the re- 
tained motion must here be briefly stated. Properly to 
supplement our conception of Evolution under its material 
aspect by a conception of Evolution under its dynamical 
aspect, we have to recognize the source for the integrated 
motions that arise, and to see how their increased multi- 
21 




322 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

formity and clefiniteness are necessitated. If Evolution is 
a passage of matter from a diffused to an aggregated state — 
if while the dispersed units are losing part of the insensi- 
ble motion which kept them dispersed, there arise among 
coherent masses of them any sensible motions with respect 
to one another, then this sensible motion must previously 
have existed in the form of insensible motion among the 
units. If concrete matter arises by the aggregation of 
diffused matter, then concrete motion arises by the aggre- 
gation of diffused motion. That which comes into exist- 
ence as the movement of masses implies the cessation of 
an equivalent molecular movement. While we must leave 
in the shape of hypothesis the belief that the celestial 
motions have thus originated, we may see, as a matter of 
fact, that this is the genesis of all Bensible motions on the 
Earth's surface. As before shown ( ^ 69 ), the denudation of 
lands and deposit of new strata are effected by water in 
the course of its descent to the sea, or during the arrest of 
those undulations produced on it by winds; and, as before 
shown, the elevation of water to the height whence it fell 
is due to solar heat, as is also the genesis of those aerial 
currents which drift it about when evaporate! and agitate 
its surface when condensed. That is to say, the molecular 
motion of the ethereal medium is transformed into the 
motion of gases, thence into the motion of liquids, and 
thenee into the motion of solids — stages in each of which 
a certain amount of molecular motion is lost and an equiv- 
alent motion of masses gained. It is the same with organic 
movements. Certain rays issuing from the Sun enable 
the plant to reduce special elements existing in gaseous 
combination around it to a solid form — enable the plant, 
that is, to grow and carry on its functional changes. And 
since growth, equally with circulation of sap, is a mode of 
sensible motion, while those rays which have been expended 
in generating it consist of insensible motions, we have 
here, too, a transformation of the kind alleged. Animals, 
derived as their forces are. directly or indirectly, from 
plants, carry this transformation a step farther. The 
automatic movements of the viscera, together with the 
voluntary movements of the limbs and body at large, arise 
at the expense of certain molecular movements throughout 
the nervous and muscular tissues; and these originally 
arose at the expense of certain other molecular movements 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 323 

propagated by the Sun to the Earth, so that both the struct- 
ural and functional motions which organic Evolution dis- 
plays are motions of aggregates generated by the arrested 
motions of units. Even with the aggregates of these 
aggregates the same rule holds. For, among associated 
men, the progress is ever toward a merging of individual 
actions in the actions of corporate bodies. While, then, 
during Evolution, the escaping motion becomes, by perpetn 
ually widening dispersion, more disintegrated, the motion 
that is for a time retained becomes more integrated, and 
so, considered dynamically, Evolution is a decrease in the 
relative movements of parts and an increase in the relative 
movements of wholes — using the words parts and wholes 
in their most general senses. The advance is from the 
motions of simple molecules to the motions of compound 
molecules; from molecular motions to the motions of 
masses; and from the motions of smaller masses to the mo- 
tions of larger masses. The accompanying change toward 
greater multiformity among the retained motions takes 
place under the form of an increased variety of rhythms. 
We have already seen that all motion is rhythmical, from 
the infinitesimal vibrations of infinitesimal molecules up 
to those vast oscillations between perihelion and aphelion 
performed by vast celestial bodies. And, as the contrast 
between these extreme cases suggests, a multiplication of 
rhythms must accompany a multiplication in the degrees 
and modes of aggregation,, and in the relations of the 
aggregated masses to incident forces. The degree or 
mode of aggregation will not, indeed, affect the rate or 
extent of rhythm where the incident force increases as the 
aggregate increases, which is the case with gravitation; 
here the only cause of variation in rhythm is difference 
of relation to the incident forces, as we see in a pendulum, 
which, though unaffected in its movements by a change 
in the weight of the bob, alters its rate of oscillation when 
taken to the equator. But in all cases where the incident 
forces do not vary as the masses, every new order of aggre- 
gation initiates a new order of rhythm : witness the con- 
clusion drawn from the recent researches into radiant heat 
and light, that the molecules of different gases have differ- 
ent rates of undulation. So that increased multiformity 
in the arrangement of matter necessarily generates in- 
creased multiformity of rhythm, both through increased 



324 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

variety in the sizes and forms of aggregates, and through 
increased variety in their relations to the forces which 
move them. That these motions, as they become more 
integrated and more heterogeneous, must become more 
definite is a proposition that need not detain us. In 
proportion as any part of an evolving whole segregates and 
consolidates, and in so doing loses the relative mobility of 
its components, its aggregate motion must obviously ac- 
quire distinctness. 

Here, then, to complete our conception of Evolution we 
have to contemplate throughout the Cosmos these meta- 
morphoses of retained motion that accompany the meta- 
morphoses of component matter We may do this with 
comparative brevity, the reader having now become so far 
familiar with the mode of looking at the facts that less 
illustration will suffice. To save space, it will be conven- 
ient to deal with the several aspects of the metamorphoses 
at the same time. 

§ 140. Dispersed matter moving, as we see it in a spiral 
nebula, toward the common centre of gravity, from all 
points at all distances with all degrees of indirectness, must 
carry into the nebulous mass eventually formed innumer- 
able momenta contrasted in their amounts and directions. 
As the integration prog loh parts of these momenta 

asconflict are mutually neutralized and dissipated as heat. 
The outstanding rotatory motion, at first having unlike 
angular velocities at the periphery and at various distances 
from the centre, has its differences of angular velocity 
gradually reduced, advancing toward a filial state, now 
nearly reached by the Sun, in which the angular velocity 
of the whole mass is the same — in which the motion is 
integrated. So, too, with each planet and satellite. 
ress from the motion of a nebulous ring, incoherent and 
admitting of much relative motion within its mass, to the 
motion of a dense spheroid, is progress to a motion that is 
completely integrated. The rotation and the translation 
through space severally become one and indivisible. 
Meanwhile, there goes on that further integration by 
which the motions of all the parts of the Solar System are 
rendered mutually dependent. Locally in each planet and 
its satellites, and generally in the Sun and the planets, we 
have a system of simple and compound rhythms, with 




FIRST PRINCIPLES. 325 

periodic and secular variations, forming together an in- 
tegrated set of movements. 

The matter which, in its original diffused state, had 
motions that were confused, indeterminate, or without 
sharply marked distinctions, has, during the evolution of 
the Solar System, acquired definitely heterogeneous motions. 
The periods of revolution of all the planets and satellites 
are unlike, as are also their times of rotation. Out of 
these definitely heterogeneous motions of a simple kind 
arise others that are complex, but still definite — as those 
produced by the revolutions of satellites compounded with 
the revolutions of their primaries; as those of which pre- 
cession is the result, and as those which are known as 
perturbations. Each additional complexity of structure 
has caused additional complexity of movements, but still 
a definite complexity, as is shown by having calculable re- 
sults. 

§ 141. While the Earth's surface was molten, the cur- 
rents in the voluminous atmosphere surrounding it, mainly 
of ascending heated gases and of descending precipitated 
liquids, must have been local, numerous, indefinite, and 
but little distinguished from one another. But as fast as 
the surface cooled, and solar radiation began to cause ap- 
preciable differences of temperature between the equatorial 
and polar regions, a decided atmospheric circulation from 
poles to equator and from equator to poles must have 
slowly established itself; the vast moving masses of air 
becoming, at last, trade- winds and other such permanent 
definite currents. These integrated motions, once com- 
paratively homogeneous, were rendered heterogeneous as 
great islands and continents arose, to complicate them by 
periodic winds, caused by the varied heating of wide tracts 
of land at different seasons. Rhythmical motions of a 
constant and simple kind were, by increasing multi- 
formity of the Earth's surface, differentiated into an in- 
volved combination of constant and recurrent rhythmical 
motions, joined "with smaller motions that are irregular. 

Parallel changes must have taken place in the motions 
of water. On a thin crust, admitting of but small eleva- 
tions and depressions, and therefore of but small lakes and 
seas, none beyond small local circulations were possible. 
But along with the formation of continents and oceans 



326 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

came the vast movements of water from warm latitudes to 
cold and from cold to warm — movements increasing in 
amount, in definiteness, and in variety of distribution as 
the features of the Earth's surface became larger and more 
contrasted. The like holds with drainage-waters. The 
tricklings of insignificant streams over narrow pieces of 
land were once the only motions of such waters; but as 
fast as wide areas came into existence the motions of many 
tributaries became massed into the motions of great rivers, 
and instead of motions very much alike there arose mo- 
tions considerably varied. 

Nor can we well doubt that the movements in tin* Earth's 
crust itself have presented an analogous progri ss. Small, 
numerous, local, and very much like one another, while 
the crust was thin, the elevations ami subsidences must, 
as the crust thickened, have extended over lar_ 
must have continued for loi me directions, 

and must have been made more unlike in different re- 
gions by local differences of structure in the en 

§ 142. In organisms the advance toward a more 
grated, heterogeneous, and definite distribution of the re- 
tained motion, which accompanies the adv; rard a 

more integrated, heterogeneous, and definite distribution 
of the component matter, is mainly what we understand 

as (lie development of functions. All active functions are 
either sensible movements, as those produced by contractile 
organs, or such insensible movements as those propag 
through the nerves, or such insensible movements 

by which, in secreting organs, molecular rearrangements 
are effected, and new combinations of matter | 
And what we have here to observe is, that during evolution 
functions, like structures, become more consolidated indi- 
vidually, as well as more combined with one another, at the 
same time that they become more multiform and more dis- 
tinct. 

The nutritive juices in animals of low types move hither 
and thither through the tissues quite irregularly, as 
strains and pressures determine; in the absence of a dis- 
tinguishable blood and a developed vascular system, there 
is no definite circulation, But along with the structural 
evolution which establishes a finished apparatus for distrib- 
buting blood, there goes on the functional evolution which 



FIRST PRINCIPLES 327 

establishes large and rapid movements of blood, definite in 
their courses and definitely distinguished as efferent and 
afferent, and that are heterogeneous not simply in their 
directions, but in their characters — being here divided 
into gushes and there continuous. 

Instance, again, the way in which, accompanying the 
structural differentiations and integrations of the aliment- 
ary canal, there arise differentiations and integrations 
both of its mechanical movements and its actions of anon- 
mechanical kind. Along an alimentary canal of a primitive 
type there pass almost uniformly from end to end waves of 
constriction. But in a well-organized alimentary canal the 
waves of constriction are widely unlike at different parts 
in their kinds, strengths, and rapidities. In the mouth 
they become movements of prehension and mastication — 
now occurring in quick succession and now ceasing for 
hours. In the oesophagus these contractions, propulsive 
in their office, and travelling with considerable speed, take 
place at intervals during eating, and then do not take place 
till the next meal. In the stomach another modification 
of this originally uniform action occurs; the muscular con- 
strictions are powerful, and continue during the long 
periods that the stomach contains food. Throughout the 
upper intestines, again, a further, difference shows itself — 
the waves travel along without cessation, but are relatively 
moderate. Finally, in the rectum this rhythm departs in 
another way from the common type; quiescence, lasting for 
many hours, is followed by a series of strong contractions. 
Meanwhile, the essential actions which these movements 
aid have been growing more definitely heterogeneous. 
Secretion and absorption are no longer carried on in much 
the same way from end to end of the tube; but the general 
function divides into various subordinate functions. The 
solvents and ferments furnished by the coats of the canal 
and the appended glands become widely unlike at upper, 
middle, and lower parts of the canal, implying different 
kinds of molecular changes. Here the process is mainly 
secretory, there it is mainly absorbent; while in other 
places, as in the oesophagus, neither secretion nor absorp- 
tion takes place to any appreciable extent. While these 
and other internal motions, sensible and insensible,- are 
being rendered more various, and severally more consoli- 
dated and distinct, there is advancing the integration by 



328 FIRST 1 PRINCIPLES. 

which they are united into local groups of motions and 
a combined system of motions. While the function of 
alimentation subdivides, it is subdivisions become co- 
ordinated, so that muscular and secretory actions go on in 
concert^ and so that excitement of one part of the canal 
sets up excitement of the rest. Moreover, the whole ali- 
mentary function, while it supplies matter for the cir- 
culatory and respiratory functions, becomes bo integrated 
with them that it cannot for a moment go on without 
them. And, as evolution advances, all three of 
fundamental functions fall into greater subordination to 
the nervous functions — depend more and more on the due 
amount of nervous discharge. 

When we trace up the functions of external organs the 
same truth discloses itself. Microscopic creatures are 
moved through the water by oscillations of the cilia 
c6vering their surfaces; and' various Larger f<Tm<, as the 
Ttirbellaria^ progress by ciliary action oversolid surfaces. 
These motions of cilia are, in the first place, severally 
very minute; in the second pi;- are homogeneous; 

and in the third place there is hut little defini 
them individually, or in their joint i . which is 

mostly a mere random change of ph. I > any 

selected point. Contrasting this ciliary action with the 
action of developed locomotive » of whatever kind. 

we see that instead of innumerable small or nnintegrateel 
movements there are a few comparatively large or inte- 
grated movements; that actions all alike are replaci 
actions partially unlike; and that instead of being very 
feebly or almost accidentally coordinated, their coordina- 
tion is such as to render the motions of I whole 
precise, A parallel contrast, less extreme but sufficiently 
decided, is seen when we pass from the lower ty; 
creatures with limbs to the higher types of creatures with 
limbs. The legs o( a Centipede have mot r are 
numerous, small, and homogeneous; and are so little in- 
tegrated that when the creature is divided and subdiv 
fche legs belonging to each part propel that part ind 
dently. Hut in one of the higher Crab, 
the relatively few limbs have motions that are compara- 
tively large in their amounts, that are considerably unlike 
one another, and that are integrated into compound mo- 
tions of tolerable deiiniteness. 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 329 

§ 143. The last illustrations are introductory to illus- 
trations of the kind we class as psychical. They are the 
physiological aspects of the simpler among those functions 
which, under a more special and complex aspect, we distin- 
guish as psychological. The phenomena subjectively known 
as changes in consciousness are objectively known as nervous 
excitations and discharges, which science now interprets 
into modes of motion. Hence, in following up organic 
evolution, the advance of retained motion in integration, 
in heterogeneity, and in deliniteness, may be expected to 
show itself alike in the visible nervo-muscular actions and 
in the correlative mental changes. We may conveniently 
look at the facts as exhibited during individual evolution, 
before looking at them as exhibited in general evolution. 

The progress of a child in speech very completely 
exhibits the transformation. Infantine noises are com- 
paratively homogeneous; alike as being severally long- 
drawn and nearly uniform from end to end, and as being 
constantly repeated with but little variation of quality 
between narrow limits. They are quite uncoordinated — 
there is no integration of them into compound sounds. 
They are inarticulate, or without those definite begin- 
nings and endings characterizing the sounds we call words. 
Progress shows itself first in the multiplication of the 
inarticulate sounds : the extreme vowels are added to the 
medium vowels, and the compound to the simple. Pres- 
ently the movements which form the simpler consonants 
are achieved, and some of the sounds become sharply cut; 
but this definiteness is partial, for, only initial consonants 
being used, the sounds end vaguely. While an approach 
to distinctness thus results, there also results, by combina- 
tion of different consonants with the same vowels, an 
increase of heterogeneity; and, along with the complete 
distinctness which terminal consonants give, arises a 
further great addition to the number of unlike sounds pro- 
duced. The more difficult consonants and the compound 
consonants, imperfectly articulated at first, are by and 
by articulated with precision; and, there comes yet an- 
other multitude of different and definite words — words 
that imply many kinds of vocal movements, severally 
performed with exactness, as well as perfectly integrated 
into complex groups. The subsequent advance to dis- 
syllables and polysyllables, and tc involve combinations of 



330 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

words, shows the still higher degree of integration and 
heterogeneity eventually reached by these organic motions. 
The acts of consciousness correlated with these neuro- 
muscular acts of course go through parallel phases; and 
the advance from childhood to maturity yields daily proof 
that the changes which on their physical side are nerv- 
ous processes, and on their mental side are pi 
thought, become more various, more defined, more coherent. 
At first the intellectual functions are very much alike in 
kind — recognitions and classifications of simple impn - 
alone go on; but in course of time these functions 1 
multiform. Reasoning grows distinguishable, and eventu- 
ally we have conscious induction and deduction: deliberate 
recollection and deliberate imagination are added to sim- 
ple unguided association of ideas; more special mod 
mental action, as those which result in mathematics, 
music, poetry, arise; and within each of these di\ 
the mental processes are ever being further differentiated. 
\n definiteness it is the same. The infant mak< 
observations so inaccurately that it fails to distil ; 
individuals. The child errs continually in its spelling, 
its grammar, its arithmetic. The youth forms inc. 
judgments on the affairs of life. Only with maturity 
comes that precise coordination in the nervous pn 
thai is implied by a good adjustment of thoughts tot 
Lastly, with the integration by which simple mental acta 
are combined into complex mental acts, it is so likewise. 
In the nursery you cannot obtain continuous attention — 
there is inability to form a coherent series of impress 
and there is a parallel inability to unite many 
impressions, even of the same order: witness the way in 
which a child 1 8 remarks on a picture show that it attends 
only to the individual objects represented and never to the 
picture as a whole. But with advancing years it becomes 
possible to understand an involved sentence, to follow long 
trains of reasoning, to hold in one mental grasp numerous 
concurrent circumstances. The like progressive in1 
fcion takes place among the mental changes we distil S 
as feelings; which in a child act singly, producing impul- 
siveness, but in an adult act more in concert, producing a 
comparatively balanced conduct. 

After these illustrations supplied by individual evolu- 
tion, we may deal briefly with those supplied by general 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 331 

evolution, which are analogous to them. A creature of 
very low intelligence, when aware of some large object in 
motion near it, makes a spasmodic movement, causing, it 
may be, a leap or a dart. The perceptions implied are 
relatively simple, homogeneous, and indefinite; the moving 
objects are not distinguished in their kinds as injurious 
or otherwise, as advancing or receding. The actions of 
escape are similarly all of one kind, have no adjustments 
of direction, and may bring the creature nearer the source 
of peril instead of further off. A stage higher, when the 
dart or the leap is away from danger, we see the nervous 
changes so far specialized that there results distinction of 
direction; indicating a greater variety among them, a 
greater coordination or integration of them in each pro- 
cess, and a greater definiteness. In still higher animals 
that discriminate between enemies and not-enemies, as a 
bird that flies from a man but not from a cow, the acts of 
perception have severally become united into more com- 
plex wholes, since cognition of certain differential attri- 
butes is implied ; they have become more multiform, since 
each additional component impression adds to the number 
of possible compounds; and they have, by consequence, 
become more specific in their correspondences with objects 
— more definite. And then in animals so intelligent that 
they identify by sight not species only but individuals of 
a species, the mental changes are yet further distinguished 
in the same three ways. In the course of human evolution 
the law is equally manifested. The thoughts of the sav- 
age are nothing like so heterogeneous in their kinds as 
those of the civilized man, whose complex environment 
presents a multiplicity of new phenomena. His mental 
acts, too, are much less involved — he has no words for 
abstract ideas, and is found to be incapable of integrating 
the elements of such ideas. And in all but simple matters 
there is none of that precision in his thinking which, 
among civilized men, leads to the exact conclusions of 
science. Nor do the emotions fail to exhibit a parallel 
contrast. 

§ 144. How in societies the movements or functions 
produced by the confluence of individual actions increase 
in their amounts, their multiformities, their precision, 
and their combination, scarcely needs insisting upon after 



332 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

what has been pointed out in foregoing chapters. For the 
sake of symmetry of statement, however, a typical ex- 
ample or two may he set down. 

Take the actions devoted to defence or aggression. At 
first the military function, undifferentiated from the rest 
(all men in primitive societies being warriors) is relatively 
homogeneous, is ill-combined, and is indefinite: savages 
making a joint attack severally fight independently, in 
similar ways, and without order. 13ut as societies evolve 
and the military function becomes separate, we see that 
while its scale increases, it progresses in multiformity, in 
definiteness, and in combination. The movements of the 
thousands of soldiers that replace the tens of warriors, are 
divided and re-divided in their kinds — here are bodies that 
manoeuvre and tire artillery, there are battalions that 
fight on foot; and elsewhere are troops that charg 
horseback. Within each of these differentiated func 
there come others, there are distinct duties discharged by 
private-, sergeants, captains, colonels, generals, as also by 
those who constitute the commissariat and those who 
attend to the wounded. The actions that have thus 
become comparatively heterogeneous r al and in 

detail, have simultaneously increased in precision. Accu- 
racy of evolutions is given by perpetual drill; so that in 
battle, men and the regiments formed of them are made 
to take definite positions and perform definite a 
definite times. Once more, there lias gone on that inte- 
gration by which the multiform actions of an army are 
directed to a single end. By a coordinating apparatus 
having the commander-in-chief for its centre, the 
charges, and halts, and retreats are duly concerted ; and 
a hundred thousand individual actions are united under 
one will. 

The progress here so clearly marked is a progress 
traceable throughout social functions at large. Compar- 
ing the rule of a savage chief with that of a civilized gov- 
ernment, aided by its subordinate local governments and 
their officers, down to the police in the streets, we see 
how. as men have advanced from tribes of tens to nations 
of millions, the regulative process lias grown large in 
amount; how, guided by written laws, it has passed from 
vagueness and irregularity to comparative precision; and 
how it has subdivided into processes increasingly multi- 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 333 

form. Or observing bow tbe barter that goes on among 
barbarians differs from our own commercial processes, by 
which a million's worth of commodities is distributed 
daily; by which the relative values of articles immensely 
varied in kinds and qualities are measured, and the sup- 
plies adjusted to the demands; and by which industrial 
activities of all orders are so combined that each depends 
on the rest and aids the rest; we see that the kind of 
action which constitutes trade has become progressively 
more vast, more varied, more definite, and more integrated. 

§ 145. A finished conception of Evolution we thus find 
to be one which includes the redistribution of the retained 
motion, as well as that of the component matter. This 
added element of the conception is scarcely, if at all, less 
important than the other. The movements of the Solar 
System have for us a significance equal to that which the 
sizes, forms, and relative distances of its members possess. 
And of the phenomena presented by an organism, it must 
be admitted that the combined sensible and insensible 
actions we call its life do not yield in interest to its struct- 
ural traits. Leaving out, however, all implied reference 
to the way in which these two orders of facts concern us, 
it is clear that with each redistribution of matter there 
necessarily goes a redistribution of motion ; and that the 
unified knowledge constituting Philosophy must compre- 
hend both aspects of the transformation. 

While, then, we have to contemplate the matter of an 
evolving aggragate as undergoing not progressive inte- 
gration simply, but as simultaneously undergoing various 
secondary redistributions, we have also to contemplate the 
motion of an evolving aggregate, not only as being grad- 
ually dissipated, but as passing through many secondary 
redistributions on the way toward dissipation. As the 
structural complexities that arise during compound evolu- 
tion are incidental to the progress from the extreme of 
diffusion to the extreme of concentration; so the func- 
tional complexities accompanying them are incidental to 
the progress from the greatest quantity of contained motion 
to the least quantity of contained motion. And we have 
to state these concomitants of both transformations, as well 
as their beginnings and ends. 

Our formula, therefore, needs an additional clause. To 



334 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

combine this satisfactorily with the clauses as they stand 
in the last chapter is scarcely practicable; and for con- 
venience of expression it will be best to change their order. 
Doing this, and making the requisite addition, the 
formula finally stands thus: Evolution is an integration 
of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion: during 
which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homo- 
geneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during 
which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transforma- 
tion. 



CHAPTEB XVIII. 

THE INTERPRETATION OF EVOLUTION. 

§ 146. Is tbia law ultimate or derivative? Must we 
rest satisfied with the conclusion that throughout all ■ 

of concrete phenomena such is- the conrse <>f transforma- 
tion? Or is it possible for us to ascertain why roch is the 
course of transformation? May we seek for some all- 
pervading principle which underlies this all-pervading 
process? Can the inductions set forth in the preceding 
four chapters be reduced to deduct i 

Manifestly this community of result implies commu- 
nity of cause. It may be that of such cause D 
can be given, further than that the Unknowable is mani- 
fested to us after this mode. Or it may be that this mode 
of manifestation is reducible to a simpler mode, from 
which these many complex effects follow. Analogy sug- 
gests the latter inference. Just as it was possible to inter- 
pret the empirical generalizations called Kepler 1 
necessary consequences of the law of gravitan 
may be possible to interpret the foregoing empirical 
generalizations as necessary consequences of some deeper 
law. 

Unless we succeed in finding a rnfi<rnahoi this unr 
metamorphosis, we obviously fall short of that completely 
unified knowledge constituting Philosophy. As ti. 
present stand, the several conclusions we have lately 
reached appear to be independent — there is no demon- 
strated connection between increasing definiteness and 
increasing heterogeneity, or between both and increasing 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 335 

integration. Still less evidence is there that these laws 
of the redistribution of matter and motion are necessarily 
correlated with those laws of the direction of motion and 
the rhythm of motion, previously set forth. But until we 
see these now separate truths to be implications of one 
truth, our knowledge remains imperfectly coherent. 

§ 147. The task before us, then, is that of exhibiting 
the phenomena of Evolution in synthetic order. Setting 
out from an established ultimate principle, it has to be 
shown that the course of transformation among all kinds 
of existences cannot but be that which we have seen it to 
be. It has to be shown that the redistribution of matter 
and motion must everywhere take place in those ways, 
and produce those traits, which celestial bodies, organisms, 
societies, alike display. And it has to be shown that this 
universality of process results from the same necessity 
which determines each simplest movement around us, 
down to the accelerated fall of a stone or the recurrent 
beat of a harp-string. 

In other words, the phenomena of Evolution have to be 
deduced from the Persistence of Force. As before said — ■ 
" to this an ultimate analysis brings us down ; and on this 
a rational synthesis must build up." This being the 
ultimate truth which transcends experience by underlying 
it, so furnishing a common basis on which the widest gen- 
eralizations stand, these widest generalizations are to be 
unified by referring them to this common basis. Already 
the truths manifested throughout concrete phenomena of 
all orders, that there is equivalence among transformed 
forces, that motion follows the line of least resistance, and 
that it is universally rhythmic, we have found to be sever- 
ally deducible from the persistence of force; and this affil- 
iation of them on the persistence of force has reduced them 
to a coherent whole. Here we have similarly to affiliate 
the universal traits of Evolution, by showing that, given 
the persistence of force, the redistribution of matter and 
motion necessarily proceeds in such way as to produce 
them ; and by doing this we shall unite them as co-relative 
aspects of one law, at the same time that we unite this 
law with the foregoing simpler laws. 

§ 148. Before proceeding it will be well to set down 
some principles that must be borne in mind. In inter- 






336 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

preting Evolution we shall have to consider, under their 
special forms, the various resolutions of force that accom- 
pany the redistribution of matter and motion. Let us 
glance at such resolutions under their most general forms. 

Any incident force is primarily divisible into its (f 
and non-effective portions. In mechanical impact, the 
entire momentum of a striking body is never communi- 
cated to the body struck: even under those most favorable 
conditions in which the striking body loses all its sensible 
motion, there still remains with it some of the original 
momentum, under the shape of that insensible motion 
produced among its particles by the collision. Of the 
light or heat falling on any mass, a part, more or less 
siderable, is reflected ; and only the remaining part works 
molecular changes in the mass. Next it is to be noted 
that the effective force is itself divisible into the tempo- 
rarily effective and the permanently i The units of 
an aggregate acted on may undergo those rhythmical 
changes of relative position which constitute inci 
vibration, as well as other changes of relative 
which are not from instant to instant neutralized by 
opposite ones. Of these, the first, disappearing in the 
shape of radiating undulations, leave the molecular 
arrangement as it originally was: while the Becond 
(luce to that rearrangement characterizing compound 
Evolution. Yet a further distinction has t<> he made. The 
permanently effective force works out changes of relative 
position of two kinds — the in* nstbh and the s 
The insensible transpositions among the units are those 
constituting molecular changes, including what we call 
chemical composition and decomposition ; and it is these 
which we recognize as the qualitative differences that 
arise in an aggregate. The sensible transpositions are 
such as result when certain of the units, instead of being 
put into different relations with their immediate neigh- 
bors, are carried away from them and deposited elsewhere. 

Concerning these divisions and subdivisions of any 1 
affecting an aggregate, the fact which it chiefly concerns 
us to observe is. that they are complementary to 
other. Of the whole incident force, the effective must bo 
that which remains alter deducting the non-effective. 
The two parts of the effective force must vary ir. \ 
each other: where much of it is temporarily 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 337 

little of it can be permanently effective; and vice versa. 
Lastly, the permanently effective force, being expended in 
working both the insensible rearrangements which consti- 
tute molecular modification, and the sensible rearrange- 
ments which result in structure, must generate of either 
kind an amount that is great or small in proportion as it 
has generated a small or great amount of the other. 



CHx\PTER XIX. 

THE INSTABILITY OF THE HOMOGENEOUS.* 

§ 149. The difficulty of dealing with transformations so 
many-sided as those which all existences have undergone, 
or are undergoing, is such as to make a definite or com- 
plete deductive interpretation seem almost hopeless. So 
to grasp the total process of redistribution of matter and 
motion as to see simultaneously its several necessary 
results in their actual interdependence, is scarcely possible. 
There is, however, a mode of rendering the process as a 
whole tolerably comprehensible. Though the genesis of 
the rearrangement undergone by every evolving aggregate 
is in itself one, it presents to our intelligence several fac- 
tors; and after interpreting the effects of each separately, 
we may, by synthesis of the interpretations, form an ade- 
quate conception. 

On setting out, the proposition which comes first in 
logical order is, that some rearrangement must result; 
and this proposition may be best dealt with under the more 
specific shape, that the condition of homogeneity is a 
condition of unstable equilibrium. 

First, as to the meaning of the terms, respecting which 
some readers may need explanation. The phrase unstable 
equilibrium is one used in mechanics to express a balance 
of forces of such kind that the interference of any further 
force, however minute, will destroy the arrangement pre- 
viously subsisting, and bring about a totally different 
arrangement. Thus, a stick poised on its lower end is in 
unstable equilibrium: however exactly it may be placed in 
a perpendicular position, as soon as it is left to itself it 

* The idea developed in this chapter originally formed part of an article ou 
"Transcendental Physiology," published in 1857. See Essays, pp. 279-290. 

22 



338 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

begins, at first imperceptibly, to lean on one side, and 
with increasing rapidity falls into another attitude. Con- 
versely, a stick suspended from its upper end is in stable 
equilibrium: however much disturbed, it will return to 
the same position. The proposition is, then, that the 
state of homogeneity, like the state of the stick poised on 
its lower end, is one that cannot be maintained. Let us 
take a few illustrations. 

Of mechanical ones the most familiar is that of the 
scales. If they be accurately made, and not clogged by 
dirt or rust, it is impossible to keep a pair of scales per- 
fectly balanced: eventually one scale will descend and the 
other ascend — they will assume a heterogeneous relation. 
Again, if we sprinkle over the surface of a fluid a number 
of equal-sized particles, having an attraction for each other, 
they will, no mutter how uniformly distributed, by and 
by concentrate irregularly into one or more grouj 
it possible to bring a mass of water into a state of perfect 
homogeneity — a state of complete quiee ad exactly 

equal density throughout — yet the radiation of heat from 
neighboring bodies, by affecting differently its different 
parts, would inevitably produce inequalities of density and 
consequent currents, and would BO render it to that extent 
heterogeneous. Take a piece of red-hut matter, and, how- 
ever evenly heated it may at first he, it will quickly 
to be so: the exterior, cooling faster than the interior, 
will become different in temperature from it. And the 
lapse into heterogeneity of temperature, so obvious in this 
extreme case, takes place more or leSB in all eases. The 
action of chemical forces supplies other illustrations. 
Expose a fragment of metal to air or water, and in course 
of time it will be coated with a film of oxide, carbonate 
or other compound: that is, its outer parts will become 
unlike its inner parts. Usually the heterogeneity pro- 
duced by the action of chemical forces on the surfa 
masses is not striking, because the changed portions 
are soon washed away, or otherwise removed. But if this 
is prevented, comparatively complex structures result. 
Quarries of trap-rock contain some striking examples. 
Not unfrequently a piece of trap may be found reduced, 
by the action of the weather, to a number of loosely adher- 
ent coats, like those of an onion. Where the block has 
been quite undisturbed, we may trace the whole ser - 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 339 

these, from the angular, irregular outer one, through 
successively included ones in which the shape becomes 
gradually rounded, ending finally in a spherical nucleus. 
On comparing the original mass of stone with this group 
of concentric coats, each of which differs from the rest in 
form, and probably in the state of decomposition at which 
it has arrived, we get a marked illustration of the multi- 
formity to which, in lapse of time, a uniform body may 
be brought by external chemical action. The instability 
of the homogeneous is equally seen in the changes set up 
throughout the interior of a mass, when it consists of 
units that are not rigidly bound together. The atoms of 
a precipitate never remain separate, and equably dis- 
tributed through the fluid in which they make their 
appearance. They aggregate either into crystalline 
grains, each containing an immense number of atoms, or 
they aggregate into flocculi, each containing a yet larger 
number; and where the mass of fluid is great, and the 
process prolonged, these flocculi do not continue equi- 
distant, but break up into groups. That is to say, there 
is a destruction of the balance at first subsisting among the 
diffused particles, and also of the balance at first subsisting 
among the groups into which these particles unite. Cer- 
tain solutions of non-crystalline substances in highly volatile 
liquids exhibit in the course of half an hour a whole 
series of changes that are set up in the alleged way. If 
for example a little shell-lac varnish (made by dissolving 
shell-lac in coal-naphtha until it is of the consistence of 
cream) be poured on a piece of paper, the surface of the 
varnish will shortly become marked by polygonal divisions, 
which, first appearing round the edge of the mass, spread 
toward its centre. Under a lens these irregular polygons 
of five or more sides are seen to be severally bounded by 
dark lines, on each side of which there are light-colored 
borders. By the addition of matter to their inner edges, 
the borders slowly broaden, and thus encroach on the area 
of the polygons, until at length there remains nothing but 
a dark spot in the centre of each. At the same time the 
boundaries of the polygons become curved, and they end 
by appearing like spherical sac's pressed together; strangely 
simulating (but only simulating) a group of nucleated 
cells. Here a rapid loss of homogeneity is exhibited in 
three ways : first, in the formation of the film, which is 



340 FIRST PRIXCIPLES 

the seat of these changes; second, in the formation of the 
polygonal sections into which this film divides; and third, 
in the contrast that arises between the polygonal sections 
round the edge, where they are small and early formed, 
and those in the centre which are larger and formed 
later. 

The instability thus variously illustrated is obviously 
consequent on the fact that the several parts of any homo- 
geneous aggregation are necessarily exposed to different 
forces — forces that differ either in kind or amount; and 
being exposed to different forces they are of 
differently modified. The relations of outside and inside, 
and of comparative nearness to neighboring sum' 
influence, imply the reception of influences that are unlike 
in quantity or quality, or both; and it follows that unlike 
changes will be produced in the parts thus dissimilarly 
acted upon. 

Vnv like reasons it is manifest that the process must 
repeat itself in each of the subordinate groups of units 
that are differentiated by the modifying Bach of 

these subordinate groups, like the original group, must 
gradually, in obedience to the infiueix i ; upon it, 

lose its balance of parts — musl >m a uniform into 

a multiform state. And so on continuously. Whence 
indeed it is clear that not only must the homogeneous 
lapse into the non-hom be more b 

geneous must tend ever to become less homogeneoi - 
any given whole, instead of boil lltely uniform 

throughout, consist of parts distinguishable from 
other — if each of these parts, while somewhat unlike other 
parts, is uniform within itself; then, each of them being 
in unstable equilibrium, it follows that while the ch 
set up within it must render it multiform, they m 
the same time render the whole more multiform than 
before. The general principle, now to be followed - 
its applications, is thus somewhat more comprehensive 
than the title of the chapter implies. No demurrer to 
the conclusions drawn can be based on the ground that 
perfect homogeneity nowhere exists: since, whether that 
state with which we commence be or be not one of \ 
homogeneity, the process must equally he toward a relative 
heterogeneity. 



FIEST PRINCIPLES. 341 

§ 150. The stars are distributed with a three-fold irregu- 
larity. There is first the marked contrast between the 
plane of the Milky Way and other parts of the heavens, in 
respect of the quantities of stars within given visual 
areas. There are secondary contrasts of like kind in the 
Milky Way itself, which has its thick and thin places; as 
well as throughout the celestial spaces in general, which 
are much more closely strewn in some regions than in 
others. And there is a third order of contrasts produced 
by the aggregation of stars into small clusters. Besides 
this heterogeneity of distribution of the stars in general, 
considered without distinction of kinds, a further such 
heterogeneity is disclosed when they are classified by their 
differences of color, which doubtless answer to differences 
of physical constitution. While the yellow stars are found 
in all parts of the heavens the red and blue stars are not so: 
there are wide regions in which both red and blue stars 
are rare; there are regions in which the blue occur in 
considerable numbers, and there are other regions in which 
the red are comparatively abundant. Yet one more ir- 
regularity of like significance is presented by the nebulae 
^—aggregations of matter which, whatever be their nature, 
most certainly belong to our sidereal system. For the 
nebulae are not dispersed with anything like uniformity, 
but are abundant around the poles of the galactic circle 
and rare in the neighborhood of its plane.' No one will 
expect that anything like a definite interpretation of this 
structure can be given on the hypothesis of evolution, or 
any other hypothesis. The most that can be looked for 
is some reason for thinking that irregularities, not improb- 
ably of these kinds, would occur in the course of Evolution, 
supposing it to have taken place. Any one called on to 
assign such reason might argue that, if the matter of 
which stars and all other celestial bodies consist be 
assumed to have originally existed in a diffused form 
throughout a space far more vast even than that which 
our sidereal system now occupies, the instability of the 
homogeneous would negative its continuance in that state. 
In default of an absolute balance among the forces with 
which the dispersed particles acted on each other (which 
could not exist in any aggregation having limits) he might 
show that motion and consequent changes of distribution 
would necessarily result. The next step in the argument 



342 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

would be that in matter of such extreme tenuity and feeble 
cohesion there would be motion toward local centres of 
gravity, as well as toward the general centre of gravity ; just 
as, to use a humble illustration, the particles of a precipi- 
tate aggregate into flocculi at the same time that they sink 
toward the earth. He might nrge that, in the one c 
in the other, these smallest and earliest local aggregations 
must gradually divide into groups, each concentrating to 
its own centre of gravity — a process which must n 
itself on a larger and larger Bcale. In conformity with 
the law that motion once set up in any direction becomes 
itself a cause of subsequent motion in that direction, he 
might further infer that the heterogeneities thus set up 
would tend ever to become more pronounced. Established 
mechanical principles would justify him in the conclusion 
that the motions of these irregular i \ slightly 

aggregated nebular matter toward their common centre of 
gravity must he severally rendered curvilinear, by the 
resistance of tin- medium from which they were precipi- 
tated; and that, in consequence of the irregularis 
distribution already Bet up, such conflicting curvilinear 
motions must, by composition of forces, end in a rotation 
of the incipient sidereal system. He might without diffi- 
culty show that the resulting centrifugal force must - 
modify the process of g event 

anything like" uniform distribution of the .-tars eventually 
formed — that there must arise a contrast such as \ 
between the galactic circle and the rest of ti; 
He might draw the further not unwarrantable infer 
that differences in the i E local concentrate n would 

probably result from the unlikeness between the pi. 
conditions existing around the general a tation and 

those existing elsewhere. To which he might add, that 
after the formation oi distinct stars, the ever-increasing 
irregularities oi distribution due to continuance of the 
same causes would produce that patchiness which d 
guishes the heavens in both it< larger ami smaller :. 
We need not here, however, commit ourselves to such far- 
reaching speculations. For the purposes of the general 
argument it is needful only to show that any finite mass 
of di if used matter, even though vast enough to form our 
whole sidereal system, could not be in stable equilibrium; 
that, in default of absolute sphericity, absolute uniformity 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 343 

of composition, and absolute symmetry of relation to all 
forces external to it, its concentration must go on with an 
ever-increasing irregularity; and that thus the present 
aspect of the heavens is not, so far as we can judge, incon- 
gruous Avith the hypothesis of a general evolution conse- 
quent on the instability of the homogeneous. 

Descending to that more limited form of the nebular 
hypothesis which regards the solar system as having 
resulted by gradual concentration; and assuming this con- 
centration to have advanced so far as to produce a rotating 
spheroid of nebulous matter; let us consider what further 
consequence the instability of the homogeneous necessitates. 
Having become oblate in figure, unlike in the densities of 
its centre and surface, unlike in their temperatures, and un- 
like in the velocities with which its parts move round their 
common axis, such a mass can no longer be called homo- 
geneous; and therefore any further changes exhibited by 
it as a whole can illustrate the general law, only as being 
changes from a more homogeneous to a less homogeneous 
state. Changes of this kind are to be found in the trans- 
formations of such of its parts as are still homogeneous 
within themselves. If we accept the conclusion of 
Laplace, that the equatorial portion of this rotating and 
contracting spheroid will at successive stages acquire a cen- 
trifugal force great enough to prevent any nearer approach 
to the centre round which it rotates, and will so be left 
behind by the inner parts of the spheroid in its still-con- 
tinued contraction, we shall find, in the fate of the 
detached ring, a fresh exemplification of the, principle we 
are following out. Consisting of gaseous matter, such a 
ring, even if absolutely uniform at the time-of its detach- 
ment, cannot continue so. To maintain its equilibrium 
there must be an almost perfect uniformity in the action 
of all external forces upon it (almost, we must say, because 
the cohesion, even of extremely attenuated matter, might 
suffice to neutralize very minute disturbances) ; and against 
this the probabilities are immense. In the absence of 
equality among" the forces, internal and external, acting 
on such a ring, there must be a point or points at which 
the cohesion of its parts is less than elsewhere — a point or 
points at which rupture will therefore take place. Laplace 
assumed that the ring would rupture at one place only; 
and would then collapse on itself. But this is a more 



344 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

than questionable assumption — such at least I know to be 
the opinion of an authority second to none among those 
now living. So vast a ring, consisting of matter having 
such feeble cohesion, must break up into many parts. 
Nevertheless, it is still inferable, from the instability of 
the homogeneous, that the ultimate result which Laplace 
predicted would take place. For even supposing the 
masses of nebulous matter into which such a ring separated 
were so equal in their sizes and distances as to attract 
each other with exactly equal forces (which is infinitely 
improbable), yet the unequal action of external disturbing 
forces would inevitably destroy their equilibrium — there 
would be one or more points at which adjacent masses 
would begin to part company. Separation, once com- 
menced, would with ever-accelerating Bpeed lead to a group- 
ing of the masses. And obviously a like result would 
eventually take place with the groups thus formed, until 
they at length aggregated into a single D 

Leaving the region of speculative astronomy, let us con- 
sider the Solar System as it at present exists And here it 
will be well, in the first place, to note a fact which may 
be thought at variance with the foregoing argument — 
namely, the still-continued existence of Satin 
and especially of the internal nebulous ring lately dis- 
covered. To the objection that the outer rings maintain 
their equilibrium, the reply is that the comparatively 
great cohesion of liquid or solid substance would suffice to 
prevent any slight tendency to rupture from taking effect 
And that a nebulous ring here still preserves its continuity 
does not really negative the foregoing conclusion; since it 
happens under the quite exceptional influence of those 
symmetrically disposed forces which the external rings 
exercise on it. Here indeed it deserves to be noted, that 
though at first sight the Saturnian system appefl 
variance with the doctrine that a state of homogeneity is 
one of unstable equilibrium, it does in reality furnish a 
curious confirmation of this doctrine. For Saturn 18 
quite concentric with his rings; and it has been proved 
mathematically that were he and his rings concentrically 
situated, they could not remain so: the homogeneous 
relation, being unstable, would gravitate into a hetero- 
geneous one. And this fact serves to remind us of the 
allied one presented throughout the whole Solar > 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 345 

All orbits, whether of planets or satellites, are more or 
less eccentric — none of them are perfect circles; and were 
they perfect circles they would soon become ellipses. 
Mutual perturbations would inevitably generate eccen- 
tricities. That is to say, the homogeneous relations 
would lapse into heterogeneous ones. 

§ 151. Already so many references have been made to 
the gradual formation of a cruSt over the originally incan- 
descent Earth, that it may be thought superfluous again to 
name it. It has not, however, been before considered in 
connection with the general principle under discussion. 
Here then it must be noted as a necessary consequence of 
the instability of the homogeneous. In this cooling down 
and solidification of the Earth's surface, we have one of 
the simplest, as well as one of the most important, 
instances of that change from a uniform to a multiform 
state which occurs in any mass through exposure of its 
different parts to different conditions. To the differentia- 
tion of the Earth's exterior from its interior thus brought 
about, we must add one of the most conspicuous differ- 
entiations which the exterior itself afterward undergoes, 
as being similarly brought about. Were the conditions to 
which the surface of the Earth is exposed alike in all 
directions, there would be no obvious reason why certain 
of its parts should become permanently unlike the rest. 
But being unequally exposed to the chief external centre 
of force — the Sun — its main divisions become unequally 
modified : as the crust thickens and cools, there arises that 
contrast, now so decided, between the polar and equatorial 
regions. 

Along with these most marked physical differentiations 
of the Earth, which are manifestly consequent on the in- 
stability of the homogeneous, there have been going on 
numerous chemical differentiations, admitting of similar 
interpretation. Without raising the question whether, 
as some think, the so-called simple substances are them- 
selves compounded of unknown elements (elements which 
we cannot separate by artificial heat, but which existed 
separately when the heat of the Earth was greater than any 
which we can produce — without raising this question, it 
will suffice the present purpose to show how, in place of 
that comparative homogeneity of the Earth's crust, chemi- 



346 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

cally considered, which must have existed when its temper- 
ature was high, there has arisen, during irs cooling, an 
increasing chemical heterogeneity: each element or com- 
pound, being unable to maintain its homogeneity in 
presence of various surrounding affinities, having fallen 
into heterogeneous combinations. Let us contemplate this 
change somewhat in detail. There is every reason to 
believe that, at an extreme heat, the bodies we call elements 
cannot combine. Even under such heat as can be gener- 
ated artificially, some very strong affinities yield; and the 
great majority of chemical compounds are decomposed at 
much lower temperatures. Whence it seems not improb- 
able that, when the Earth was in its first state of incan- 
descenee, there were no chemical combinations at all. But 
without drawing this inference, let us set out with the un- 
questionable fact that the compounds which can exist at 
the highest temperatures, and which must therefore have 
been the first formed as the Earth cooled, are those of the 
amplest constitutions. The protoxides — including un- 
der that head the alkalies, earths, i 

most fixed compounds known: the majority of them re- 
sisting decomposition by any heat we can 
These, consisting severally of one aJ onent 

element, are combinations of the simplest order — are but 
one degree less homogeneous than the elements them.- 
More heterogeneous than tin- !e by 

heat, and therefore later in the Earth's history, are the 
dentoxides, tritoxides, peroxides, etc.; in which two, 
three, four, or more atoms of oxygen are united with one 
atom of metal or other base. 

heat arc the salts; which present us with compound a 
each made up of live, six, seven, eight, ten. twel 
more atoms, of three, if not more, kinds. Then there 
are the hydrated salts, of a yet greater I .city, 

which undergo partial decomposition at much 1- 
pera tares. After them come the fnrther-compli 
supersalts and double salts, having a stability again de- 
creased; and so throughout. After makii _ i un- 
important qualifications demanded by peculiar affinil 
believe no chemist will deny it to be a general law of these 
inorganic combinations that, other thii 
bility decreases as the complexity increases. And then 
when we pass to the compounds that make up org 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 347 

bodies, we find this general law still further exemplified: 
we find much greater complexity and much less stability. 
An atom of albumen, for instance, consists of 482 ultimate 
atoms of five different kinds. Fibrine, still more intricate 
in constitution, contains in each atom 298 atoms of car- 
bon, 49 of nitrogen, 2 of sulphur, 228 of hydrogen, and 
92 of oxygen — in all, 660 atoms, or, more strictly speak- 
ing, equivalents. And these two substances are so un- 
stable as to decompose at quite moderate temperatures; 
as that to which the outside of a joint of roast meat is 
exposed. Possibly it will be objected that some inorganic 
compounds, as phosphuretted hydrogen and chloride of 
nitrogen, are more decomposable than most organic com- 
pounds. This is true. But the admission may be made 
without damage to the argument. The proposition is not 
that all simple combinations are more fixed than all com- 
plex ones. To establish our inference it is necessary only 
to show that, as an average fact, the simple combinations 
can exist at a higher temperature than the complex ones. 
And this is wholly beyond question. Thus it is manifest 
that the present chemical heterogeneity of the Earth's 
surface has arisen by degrees as the decrease of heat has 
permitted; and that it has shown itself in three forms — 
first, in the multiplication of chemical compounds; sec- 
ond, in the greater number of different elements contained 
in the more modern of these compounds; and third, in the 
higher and more varied multiples in which these more 
numerous elements combine. 

Without specifying them, it will suffice just to name 
the meteorologic processes eventually set up in the Earth's 
atmosphere, as further illustrating the alleged law. They 
equally display that destruction of a homogeneous state 
which results from unequal exposure to incident forces. 

§ 152. Take a mass of unorganized but organ izable mat- 
ter — either the body of one of the lowest living forms, 
or the germ of one of the higher. Consider its circum- 
stances. Either it is immersed in water or air, or it is 
contained within a parent organism. Wherever placed, 
however, its outer and inner parts stand differently relat- 
ed to surrounding agencies — nutriment, oxygen, and the 
various stimuli. But this is not all. Whether it lies qui- 
escent at the bottom of the water or on the leaf of a plant ; 



348 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

whether it moves through the water preserving some defi- 
nite attitude; or whether it is in the inside of an adult; 
it equally results that certain parts of its surface are more 
exposed to surrounding agencies than other parts — in some 
cases more exposed to light, heat, or oxygen, and in others 
to the maternal tissues and their contents. Hence must 
follow the destruction of its original equilibrium. This 
may take place in one of two ways. Either the disturbing 
forces may be such as to overbalance the affinities of the 
organic elements, in which case there result those changes 
which are known as decomposition, or, as is ordinarily the 
case, such changes arc induced as do not destroy the or- 
ganic compounds, bnt only modify them; the parte 
exposed to the modifying forces being most modified. To 
elucidate this, suppose we take a few a 

Note first what appear to be exceptions. Certain mi- 
nute animal forms present us cither with no appreciable 
differentiations or with differentiati t<> be 

made but with great difficulty. In the Rhizopods, the 
substance of the jelly-like body remains throughout life 
unorganized, even t«» the extent of having no limiting 
membrane; as is proved by the fact that the thread-like 
processes protruded by the mass coal 

other. Whether or not the nearly allied Amaba, of which 
the less numerous and more bulky pr< ases - . 

lias, as lately alleged, something like a cell-wall and a nu- 
cleus it is dear that the distinction of parts is very 
slight; since particles of food pass bodily into the inside 
through any part of the periphery, and since when the 
creature is crushed to pieces, each piece behai 
whole did. Now these cases, in which there is eitlh 
contrast of structure between exterior and interior or very 
little, though seemingly opposed to the above inference, 
are really very significant evidences of its truth, 
what is the peculiarity of this division of the I 
Its members undergo perpetual and irregular chan_ 
form — they show no persistent relation of parts. What 
lately formed a portion of the interior is now protruded, 
and, as a temporary limb, is attached to some object it 
happens to touch. What is now a part of the surface will 
presently be drawn, along with the atom of nutriment 
sticking to it, into the centre of the mass. Either the 
relations of inner and outer have no permanent t 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 349 

or they are very slightly marked. But by the hypothesis, 
it is only because of their unlike positions with respect to 
modifying forces, that the originally like units of a living 
mass become unlike. We must therefore expect no estab- 
lished differentiation of parts in creatures which exhibit 
no established differences of position in their parts, and 
we must expect extremely little differentiation of parts 
where the differences of position are but little determined 
— which is just what we find. This negative evidence is 
borne out by positive evidence. When we turn from these 
proteiform specks of living jelly to organisms having an 
unchanging distribution of substance, we find differences 
of tissue corresponding to differences of relative position. 
In all the higher Protozoa, as also in the Protophyta, we 
meet with a fundamental differentiation into celi-mem- 
brane and cell-contents; answering to that fundamental 
contrast of conditions implied by the terms outside and 
inside. On passing from what are roughly classed as uni- 
cellular organisms to the lowest of those which consist of 
aggregated cells, we equally observe the connection between 
structural differences and differences of circumstances. 
Negatively, we see that in the sponge, permeated throughout 
by currents of sea-Water, the indefiniteness of organization 
corresponds with the absence of definite unlikeness of condi- 
tions: the peripheral and central portions are as little con- 
trasted in structure as in exposure to surrounding agencies. 
While positively we see that in a form like the Thalassi- 
colla, which, though equally humble, maintains its outer and 
inner parts in permanently unlike circumstances, there 
is displayed a rude structure obviously subordinated to the 
primary relations of centre and surface; in all its many 
and important varieties, the parts exhibit a more or less 
concentric arrangement. 

After this primary modification, by which the outer 
tissues are differentiated from the inner, the next in order 
of constancy and importance is that by which some part 
of the outer tissues is differentiated from the rest; and 
this corresponds with the almost universal fact that some 
part of the outer tissues is more exposed to certain environ- 
ing influences than the rest. Here, as before, the appar- 
ent exceptions are extremely significant. Some of the 
lowest vegetal organisms, as the Hematococci and Protococci, 
evenly imbedded in a mass of mucus, or dispersed through 



350 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

the Arctic snow, display no differentiations of surface; 
the several parts of their surfaces being subjected to no 
definite contrasts of conditions, ciliated spheres such as 
the Volvox have no parts of their periphery unlike other 
parts, and it is not to be expected that they should have, 
since, as they revolve in all directions, they do not, in 
traversing the water, permanently expose any part to spec- 
ial conditions. But when we come to organisms that are 
either fixed, or while moving preserve definite attitudes, 
we no longer find uniformity of surface. The most gen- 
eral fact which can be asserte t with respect to the structures 
of plants and animals is, that however much alike in 
shape and texture the various parts of the exterior may at 
first be, they acquire unlikenessea corresponding to the 
unlikcnesses of their relations to surrounding agencies. 
The ciliated germ of a Zoophyte, which, (hiring its loco- 
motive stage, is distinguishable only into outer and inner 
tissues, no sooner becomes fixed, than its upper end begins 
to assume a different structure from its lower. The 
shaped gemma of the Marc/iatitia, originally alike on both 
surfaces, and falling at random with either side upper- 
most, immediately begin to develop rootlets on the under 
Bide, and stomata on the upper side: a fact proving 1". 
question that this primary differentiation is determined 
by this fundamental contrast of eonditi 

Of course, in the germs of higher organisms, the meta- 
morphoses immediately due to the instability of the homo- 
geneous are soon masked by those due to the assumption 
of the hereditary type. Such early changes, however, as 
are common to ail classes of organisms, and so cannot be 
ascribed to heredity, entirely conform to the hypothesis. 
A germ which has undergone no developmental modifica- 
tions eonsists of a spheroidal group of homogeneous cells. 
Universally, the first step in its evolution is the estab- 
lishment of a difference between some of the peripheral 
cells and the cells which form the interior — some of the 
peripheral cells, after repeated spontaneous fission.-. 
lesce into a membrane, and by continuance of the process 
this membrane spreads until it speedily invests the entire 
mass, as in mammals, or, as in birds, stops short of that 
for some time. Here we have two significant facts. The 
first is, that the primary unlikeness arises between the ex- 
terior and the interior. The second is, that the change 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 351 

which thus initiates development does not take place 
simultaneously over the whole exterior; but commences at 
one place, and gradually involves the rest. Now these 
facts are juist those which might be inferred from the in- 
stability of the homogeneous. The surface must, more 
than any other part, become unlike the centre, because it 
is most dissimilarly conditioned; and all parts of the sur- 
face cannot simultaneously exhibit this differentiation, be- 
cause they cannot be exposed to the incident forces with 
absolute uniformity. One other general fact of like im- 
plication remains. Whatever be the extent of this peri- 
pheral layer of cells, or blastoderm as it is called, it pres- 
ently divides into two layers — the serous and mucous; 
or, as they liave been otherwise called, the ectoderm and 
the endoderm The first of these is formed from that por- 
tion of the hyer which lies in contact with surrounding 
agents, and tie second of them is formed from that por- 
tion of the layer which lies in contact with the contained 
mass of yelk. That is to say, after the primary differen- 
tiation, more or less extensive, of surface from centre, 
the resulting superficial portion undergoes a secondary 
differentiation into inner and outer parts — a differentiation 
which is clearly of the same order with the preceding, and 
answers to the next most marked contrast of conditions. 

But, as already hinted, this principle, understood in 
the simple form here presented, supplies no key to the 
detailed phenomena of organic development. It fails en- 
tirely to exphin generic and specific peculiarities, and in- 
deed leaves us equally in the dark respecting those more 
important distinctions by which families and orders are 
marked out. Why two ova, similarly exposed in the same 
pool, should become the one a fish, and the other a reptile, 
it cannot tell us. That from two different eggs, placed 
under the same hen, should respectively come forth a 
duckling and a chicken, is a fact not to be accounted for 
on the hypothesis above developed. We have here no al- 
ternative but to fall back upon the unexplained principle 
of hereditary transmission. The capacity possessed by an 
unorganized germ of unfolding into a complex adult, 
which repeats ancestral traits in the minutest details, 
and that even when it has been placed in conditions unlike 
those of its ancestors, is a capacity we cannot at present 
understand. That a microscopic portion of seemingly 






353 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

structureless matter should embody an influence rf such 
kind that the resulting man will in fifty years after be- 
come gouty or insane, is a truth which would be incredible 
were it not daily illustrated. Should it however turn out, 
as we shall hereafter find reason for suspecting, mat these 
complex differentiations which adults exhibit are them- 
selves the slowly accumulated and transmitted results of a 
process like that seen in the first changes of me germ, it 
will follow that even those embryonic changes due to he- 
reditary influence are remote consequences of the alleged 
law. Should it be shown that the slight liodincations 
wrought during life on each adult, and bequeathed to off- 
spring along with all like preceding modincations. are 
themselves unlikenesses of parts that are produced by un- 
likenesses of conditions, then it will follow mat the mod- 
ifications displayed in the coarse of embryonic development 
are partly direct consequences of the instability of the 
homogeneous, and partly indin oe 3 of it To 

give reasons for entertaining this hypothesis, however, is 
not needl'id for the justification of the position here taken. 
It is enough that the mi tenons differentiations 

which incipient organisms universally displ 
to the most marked differences of condil bich their 

parts are Bubject. It is enough that the habitual coi 
between outside and inside, which we /Iv-v is produced 
in inorganic masses by unlikeness of ex; i incident 

forces, is strictly paralleled by the first contrast that makes 
its appearance in all organic mai 

It remains to point oat that, in t;. ttage of oi 

isms constituting a species, the principle enunciated is 
equally traceable. We have abundant materials for the 
induction that each species will not remain uniform, but 
is ever becoming to some extent multiform, and th< 
ground for the deduction that this lapse from hoi 
to heterogeneity is caused by the subjection of its men 
to unlike sets of circumstances. The fact that in 
species, animal and vegetal, the individuals ire never 
quite alike, joined with the fact that there is in every 
species a tendency to the production of din\ 
enough to constitute varieties, form a sufficiently wide 
basis for the induction; while the dedu irmed 

by the familiar experience that varieties are most numer- 
ous and decided where, as among cultivated plants and 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 353 

domestic animals, the conditions of life depart from the 
original ones most widely and in the most numerous ways. 
Whether we regard " natural selection" as wholly, or only 
in part, the agency through which varieties are established, 
matters not to the general conclusion. For as the survival 
of any variety proves its constitution to be in harmony 
with a certain aggregate of surrounding forces — as the 
multiplication of a variety and the usurpation by it of an 
area previously occupied by some other part of the species, 
implies different effects produced by such aggregate of 
forces on the two, it is clear that this aggregate of forces 
is the real cause of the differentiation — it is clear that if 
the variety supplants the original species in some localities 
but not in others, it does so because the aggregate of 
forces in the one locality is unlike that in the other — it is 
clear that the lapse of the species from a state of homo- 
geneity to a state of heterogeneity arises from the exposure 
of its different parts to different aggregates of forces. 

§ 153. Among mental phenomena it is difficult to estab- 
lish the alleged law without an analysis too extensive for 
the occasion. To show satisfactorily how states of con- 
sciousness, originally homogeneous, become heterogeneous 
through differences in the changes wrought by different 
forces, would require us carefully to trace out the organi- 
zation of early experiences. Were this done it would be- 
come manifest that the development of intelligence is, 
under one of its chief aspects, a dividing into separate 
classes the unlike things previously confounded together 
in one class — a formation of sub-classes and sub-sub-classes, 
until the once confused aggregate of objects known is re- 
solved into an aggregate which unites extreme heterogeneity 
among its multiplied groups with complete homogeneity 
among the members of each group. If, for example, we 
followed, through ascending grades of creatures, the gen- 
esis of that vast structure of knowledge acquired by sight, 
we should find that in the first stage, where eyes suffice for 
nothing beyond the discrimination of light from darkness, 
the only possible classifications of objects seen must be 
those based on the manner in which light is obstructed, 
and the degree in which it is obstructed. We should find 
that, by such undeveloped visual organs, the shadows tra- 
versing the rudimentary retina would be merely distin- 
23 



354 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

guished into those of the stationary objects which the 
creature passed during its own movements, and those of 
the moving objects which came near the creature while it 
was at rest; and that so the extremely general classifica- 
tion of visible things into stationary and moving would 
be the earliest formed. We should find that whereas the 
simplest eyes are not fitted to distinguish between an ob- 
struction of light caused by a small object close to, and an 
obstruction caused by a large object at some distance, eyes 
a little more developed must be competent to such a dis- 
tinction; whence must result a vague differentiation of 
the class of moving objects into the nearer and the more 
remote. AVe should find that such further improvements 
in vision as those which make possible a better estimation 
of distances by adjustment of the optic axes, and those 
which, through enlargement and subdivision of the retina, 
make possible the discrimination of shapes, must have the 
effects of giving greater definitenesa to the classes already 
formed, and of subdividing these into smaller <•'. 
consisting of objects leas unlike. And we should rind that 
each additional refinement of the perceptive organs must 
similarly lead to a multiplication of divisions and a sharp- 
ening of the limits of each division. In every infant 
might be traced the analogous transformation of a con- 
fused aggregate of impressions of Bnrronnding objects, 
not recognized as differing in their distan b, and 

shapes, into separate classes of objects unlike each other 
in these and various other respects. And in the one 
as in the other, it might be shown that the change from 
this first indefinite, incoherent, and comparatively homo- 
geneous consciousness to a definite, coherent, and hetero- 
geneous one, is due to differences in the actions of inci- 
dent forces on the organism. These brief indications of 
what might be shown, did space permit, must here suffice. 
Probably they will give adequate clew to an argument by 
which each reader may satisfy himself that the cours 
mental evolution offers no exception to the general law. 
In further aid of such an argument, I will here add an 
illustration that is comprehensible apart from the p 
of mental evolution as a whole. 

It has been remarked (I am told by Coleridge, though I 
have been unable to find the passage) that with the ad- 
vance of language, words which were originally alike in 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 355 

their meanings acquire nnlike meanings — -a change which 
he expresses by the formidable word " desynonymization." 
Among indigenous words this loss of equivalence cannot 
be clearly shown; because in them the divergencies of 
meaning began before the dawn of literature. But among 
words that have been coined, or adopted from other lan- 
guages, since the writing of books commenced, it is de- 
monstrable. In the old divines miscreant is used in its ety- 
mological sense of unbeliever; but in modern speech it has 
entirely lost this sense. Similarly with evil-doer and male- 
factor: exactly synonymous as these are by derivation, they 
are no longer synonymous by usage: by a malefactor we now 
understand a convicted criminal, which is far from being the 
acceptation of evil-doer. The verb produce bears in Euclid 
its primary meaning — to prolong, or draw out; but the 
now largely developed meanings of produce have little in 
common with the meanings of prolong, or draw out. In 
the Church of England liturgy, an odd effect results from 
the occurrence of prevent in its original sense — to come be- 
fore, instead of its modern specialized sense — to come before 
ivith the effect of arresting. But the most conclusive cases 
are those in which the contrasted words consist of the 
same parts differently combined; as in go under and under- 
go. We go under a tree, and we undergo a pain. But 
though, if analytically considered, the meanings of these 
expressions would be the same were the words transposed, 
habit has so far modified their meaning that we could not 
without absurdity speak of undergoing a tree and going 
under a pain. Countless such instances might be brought 
to show that between two words which are originally of 
like force an equilibrium cannot be maintained. Unless 
they are daily used in exactly equal degrees, in exactly 
similar relations (against which there are infinite prob- 
abilities), there necessarily arises a habit of associating 
one rather than the other with particular acts or objects. 
Such a habit, once commenced, becomes confirmed, and 
gradually their homogeneity of meaning disappears. In 
each individual we may see the tendency which inevitably 
leads to this result. A certain vocabulary and a certain 
set of 'phrases distinguish the speech of each person: each 
person habitually uses certain words in places where other 
words are habitually used by other persons; and there is a 
continual recurrence of favorite expressions. This inabil- 



356 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

ity to maintain a balance in the use of verbal symbols which 
characterizes every man characterizes, by consequence, 
aggregates of men, and the desynonymization of words is 
the ultimate effect. 

Should any difficulty be felt in understanding how these 
mental changes exemplify a law of physical transformations 
that are wrought by physical forces, it will disappear on 
contemplating acts of mind as nervous functions. It will 
be seen that each loss of equilibrium above instanced is a 
loss of functional equality between some two elements of 
the nervous system. And it will be seen that, as in other 
cases, this loss of functional equality is due to differences 
in the incidence of for 

§ 154. Masses of men. in common with all other m; 
show a Like proclivity similarly caused. Small combina- 
tions and large societies equally mani md in the 
one, as in the other, both governmental and industrial 
differentiations are initiated by it Let us glance at the 
facts under these two heads. 

A business partnership, balanced as the authority 
its members may theoretically be, practically I 
union in which the authority of one partner is tacitly 
recognized as greater than that of the other or others. 
Though the shareholders have given equal powers to the 
directors of their company, inequalities of power sr.cn arise 
among them, and usually the supremacy of some one dii 
grows so marked that his decisions determine the course 
which the board takes. Nor in associations for political, 
charitable, literary, or other purposes do we fail to find a 
like process of division into dominant and subordinate 
parties, each having its leader, its members of less influ- 
ence, and its mass of uninlluential members. These minor 
instances in which unorganized groups of men. standing 
in homogeneous relations, may be watched gradually 
iag into organized groups of men standing in heterogene- 
ous relations, give us the key to social inequalities, 
barons and civilized communities are alike characterized 
by separation into classes, as well as by separation of each 
class into more important and less important units; and 
this structure is manifestly the gradually consolidated re- 
sult of a process like that daily exemplified in trading and 
other combinations, So long as men are constituted to 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 357 

act on one another, either by physical force or by force of 
character, the struggles for supremacy must finally be de- 
cided in favor of some one, and the difference once com- 
menced must tend to become ever more marked. Its 
unstable equilibrium being destroyed, the uniform must 
gravitate with increasing rapidity into the multiform. 
And so supremacy and subordination must establish them- 
selves, as we see they do, throughout the whole structure 
of a society, from the great class-divisions pervading its 
entire body, down to village cliques, and even down to 
every posse of school-boys. Probably it will be objected 
that such changes result, not from the homogeneity of the 
original aggregations, but from their non-homogeneity — 
from certain slight differences existing among their units 
at the outset. This is doubtless the proximate cause. In 
strictness, such changes must be regarded as transformations 
of the relatively homogeneous into - the relatively hetero- 
geneous. But it is abundantly clear that an aggregation 
of men, absolutely alike in their endowments, would event- 
ually undergo a srimilar transformation. For in the absence 
of perfect uniformity in the lives severally led by them — 
in their occupations, physical conditions, domestic rela- 
tions, and trains of thought and feeling — there must arise 
differences among them; and these must finally initiate 
social differentiations. Even inequalities of health caused 
by accidents must, by entailing inequalities of physical 
and mental power, disturb the exact balance of mutual 
influences among the units, and the balance once dis- 
turbed, must inevitably be lost. Whence, indeed, besides 
seeing that a body of men absolutely homogeneous in their 
governmental relations must, like all other homogeneous 
bodies, become heterogeneous, we also see that it must do 
this from the same ultimate cause — unequal exposure of 
its parts to incident forces. 

The first industrial divisions of societies are much more 
obviously due to unlikenesses of external circumstances. 
Such divisions are absent until such unlikenesses are es- 
tablished. Nomadic tribes do not permanently expose any 
groups of their members to special local conditions ; nor 
does a stationary tribe, when occupying only a small area, 
maintain from generation to generation marked contrasts 
in the local conditions of its members, and' in such tribes 
there are no decided economical differentiations. But a 



358 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

community which, growing populous, has overspread a large 
tract, and has become so far settled that its members live 
and die in their respective districts, keeps its several sec- 
tions in different physical circumstance.-; and then they 
no longer remain alike in their occupations. Those who 
live dispersed continue to hunt or cultivate the earth; 
those who spread to the sea-shore fall into maritime occu- 
pations; while the inhabitants of some spot chosen, per- 
haps for its centrality, as one of periodical assemblage, 
become traders, and a town springs up. Each of these 
classes undergoes a modification of character consequent on 
its function, and better fitting it to its function. Later 
in the process of social evolution the.-- local adaptations are 
greatly multiplied. "A result of differences in ^< »il and 
climate is that the rural inhabitants in different parts of the 
kingdom have their occupations partially specialised, and 
become respectively distinguished as chiefly producing 
cattle, or sheep, or wheat, or oats, or hops, or cider. 1' - 
pie living where coal-fields are discovered are transformed 
into colliers; Cornishmen take to mining because 4 
wall is metalliferous; and the iron-manufacture is the 
dominant industry where iron-stone is plentiful. Liver- 
pool has assumed the office of importing cotton, in i 
quence of its proximity to the district where cotton goods 
are made, and for analogous reasons Hull has become the 
chief port at which Foreign wools are brought in. 
in the establishment of breweries, of dye-works, of - 
quarries, of brick-yards, we may a one truth. So 

that, both in general and in detail, the specializati 
the social organisms which characterize Beparate districts 
primarily depend on local circumstances. Those divisions 
of Labor, which under another aspect were interpreted as 
due to the setting up of motion in the directions <.f least 
resistance (S 80), are here interpreted as due to differences 
in the incident forces, and the two interpretations are 
quite consistent with each other. For that which in 
case determines the direction of least resistance is the 
distribution of the forces to be overcome; and hence im- 
likenesses of distribution in separate localities entails uu- 
likenesses in the course of human action in those localities 
— entails industrial differentiations. 

§ 155. It has still to be shown that this general truth is 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 359 

demonstrable a priori. We have to prove specifically that 
the instability of the homogeneous is a corollary from the 
persistence of force. Already this has been tacitly implied 
by assigning unlikeness in the exposure of its parts to sur- 
rounding agencies, as the reason why a uniform mass loses 
its uniformity. But here it will be proper to expand this 
tacit implication into definite proof. 

On striking a mass of matter with such force as either 
to indent it or make it fly to pieces, we see both that the 
blow affects differently its different parts, and that the 
differences are consequent on the unlike relations of its 
parts to the force impressed. The part with which the 
striking body comes in contact, receiving the whole of 
the communicated momentum, is driven in toward the 
centre of the mass. It thus compresses and tends to dis- 
place the more centrally situated portions of the mass. 
These, however, cannot be compressed or thrust out of 
their places without pressing on all surrounding portions. 
And when the blow is violent enough to fracture the mass, 
we see, in the radial dispersion of its fragments, that the 
original momentum, in being distributed throughout it, 
has been divided into numerous minor momenta, unlike 
in their directions. AVe see that these directions are de- 
termined by the positions of the parts with respect to each 
other, and with respect to the point of impact. We see 
that the parts are differently affected by the disruptive 
force, because they are differently related to it in their 
directions and attachments — that the effects, being the 
joint products of the cause and the conditions, cannot be 
alike in parts which are differently conditioned. A body 
on which radiant heat is falling exemplifies this truth 
still more clearly. Taking the simplest case (that of a 
sphere), we see that while the part nearest to the radiating 
centre receives the rays at right angles, the rays strike the 
other parts of the exposed side at all angles from 90° down 
to 0°. Again, the molecular vibrations propagated through 
the mass from the surface which receives the heat must 
proceed inward at angles differing for each point. Fur- 
ther, the interior parts of the sphere affected by the vibra- 
tions proceeding from all points of the heated side must 
be dissimilarly affected in proportion as their positions are 
dissimilar. So that whether they be on the recipient area, 
in the middle, or at the remote side, the constituent atoms 



360 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

are all thrown into states of vibration more or less unlike 
each other. 

But now, what is the ultimate meaning of the conclusion 
that a uniform force produces different changes through- 
out a uniform mass, because the parts of the mass stand in 
different relations to the force? Fully to understand this, 
we must contemplate each part as simultaneously subject 
to other forces — those of gravitation, of cohesion, of mo- 
lecular motion, etc. The effect wrought by an additional 
force must be a resultant of it and the forces already in 
action. If the forces already in action on two parts of any- 
aggregate are different in their directions, the effects pro- 
duced oh these two parts by like forces must be different 
in their directions. Why must they be different? They 
must be different because such nnlikeness as exists between 
the two sets of factors is made by the presence in the one 
of some specially directed force that is not present in the 
other; and that this force will produce an effect render- 
ing the total result in the one case unlike that in the other, 
is a necessary corollary from the persistence of I 
Still more manifest does it become that the dissimilarly 
placed parts of any ag must be dissimilarly mod- 

ified by an incident force, when we remember that the 
quantities of the incident force to which they are severally 
subject are not equal, as above Bupposed; but are nearly 
always very unequal. The outer parts e usu- 

ally alone exposed to chemical actions, and not only are 
their inner parts shielded from the affinities of ex- 
elements, but such affinities are brought to bear unequally 
on their surfaces; since chemical action sets up currents 
through the medium in which it takes place, and a 
to the various parts of the surface unequal guantil 
the active agent. Again, the amounts of any external ra- 
diant force which the different parts of an :e re- 
ceive are widely contrasted: we have the contrast 
the quantity falling on the side next the radiating centre, 
and the quantity, or rather no quantity, falling on ti 
posite side: we have contrasts in quantities ed In- 
differently placed areas on the exposed side, and we have 
endless contrasts between the quantities received by the 
various parts of the interior. Similarly when mechanical 
force is expended on any aggregate, either by collision, con- 
tinued pressure, or tension, the amounts of strain distrib- 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 361 

uted throughout the mass are manifestly unlike for unlike 
positions. But to say the different parts of an aggregate 
receive different quantities of any incident force, is to say 
that their states are modified by it in different degrees — is 
to say that if they were before homogeneous in their rela- 
tions they must be rendered to a proportionate extent 
heterogeneous; since, force being persistent, the different 
quantities of it falling on the different parts must work 
in them different quantities of effect — different changes. 
Yet one more kindred deduction is required to complete 
the argument. We may, by parallel reasoning, reach the 
conclusion that, even apart from the action of any external 
force, the equilibrium of a homogeneous aggregate must 
be destroyed by the unequal actions of its parts on each 
other. That mutual influence which produces aggregation 
(not to mention other mutual influences) must work differ- 
ent effects on the different parts; since they are severally 
exposed to it in unlike- amounts and directions. This will 
be clearly seen on remembering that the portions of which 
the whole is made up may be severally regarded as minor 
wholes; that on each of these minor wholes, the action of 
the entire aggregate then becomes an external incident 
force; that such external incident force must, as above 
shown, work unlike changes in the parts of any such minor 
wholes; and that if the minor wholes are severally thus 
rendered heterogeneous, the entire aggregate is rendered 
heterogeneous. 

The instability of the homogeneous is thus deducible 
from that primordial truth which underlies our intelli- 
gence. One stable homogeneity only is hypothetically 
possible. If centres of force, absolutely uniform in their 
powers, were diffused with absolute uniformity through 
unlimited space, they would remain in equilibrium. This, 
however, though a verbally intelligible supposition, is one 
that cannot be represented in thought; since unlimited 
space is inconceivable. But all finite forms of the homo- 
geneous — all forms of it which we can know or conceive, 
must inevitably lapse into heterogeneity. In three several 
ways does the persistence of force necessitate this. Set- 
ting external agencies aside, each unit of a homogeneous 
whole must be differently affected from any of the rest by 
the aggregate action of the rest upon it. The resultant 
force exercised by the aggregate on each unit, being in 



362 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

no two cases alike in both amount and direction, and 
usually not in either, any incident force, even if uniform 
in amount and direction, cannot produce like effects on 
the units. And the various positions of the parts in re- 
lation to any incident force preventing them from receiv- 
ing it in uniform amounts and directions, a further differ- 
ence in the effects wrought on them is inevitably produced. 
One further remark is needed. To the conclusion that 
the changes with which Evolution commences are thus ne- 
cessitated, remains to be added the conclusion that these 
changes must continue The Absolutely homogeneous most 
lose its equilibrium; and the relatively homogeneous must 
lapse into the relatively less homogeneous. That which is 
true of any total mass is true of the parte into which it 
segregates. The uniformity of each such part must as 
inevitably be lost in multiformity, as was that of the orig- 
inal whole; and for like reasons. And thus the continued 
changes which characterize Evolution, in so far as they are 
constituted by the Lapse of the homogeneous into the het- 
erogeneous, and of the less heterogeneous into the more 
heterogeneous, are necessary conveniences of the persistence 
of force. 



CHAPTEB XX. 

THE MULTIPLICATION of EFFECTS. 

£ 156. To the cause of increasing complexity set forth 

in the last chapter, we have in this chapter to add another. 
Though secondary in order of time, it is scarcely secondary 
in order of importance. Even in the absence of the cause 
already assigned, it would necessitate a change from the 
homogeneous to the heterogeneous; and joined with it, it 
makes this change both more rapid and more involved. 
To come in sight of it, we have but to pursue a step fur- 
ther that conflict between force and matter already delin- 
eated. Let us do this. 

When a uniform aggregate is subject to a uniform force, 
we have seen that its constituents, being differently condi- 
tioned, are differently modified. But while we have con- 
templated the various parts of the aggregate as thus under- 
going unlike changes, we have not yet contemplated the 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 363 

unlike changes simultaneously produced on the various 
parts of the incident force. These must be as numerous 
and important as the others. Action and reaction being 
equal and opposite, it follows that in differentiating the 
parts on which it falls in unlike ways, the incident force 
must itself be correspondingly differentiated. Instead of 
being as before a uniform force, it must thereafter be a 
multiform force — a group of dissimilar forces. A few 
illustrations will make this truth manifest. 

A single force is divided by conflict with matter into' 
forces that widely diverge. In the case lately cited, of a 
body shattered by violent collision, besides the change of 
the homogeneous mass into a heterogeneous group of 
scattered fragments, there is a change of the homogeneous 
momentum into a group of momenta, heterogeneous in 
both amounts and directions. Similarly with the forces 
we know as light and heat. After the dispersion of these 
by a radiating body toward all points, they are redispersed 
toward all points by the bodies on which they fall. Of 
the Sun's rays, issuing from him on every side, some few 
strike the Moon. These being reflected at all angles from 
the Moon's surface, some few of them strike the Earth. 
By a like process the few which reach the Earth are again 
diffused through surrounding space. And on each occa- 
sion such portions of the rays as are absorbed instead of re- 
flected undergo refractions that equally destroy their 
parallelism. More than this is true. By conflict with 
matter, a uniform force is in part changed into forces 
differing in their directions, and in part it is changed into 
forces differing in their kinds. When one body is struck 
against another, that which we usually regard as the effect 
is a change of position or motion in one or both bodies. 
But a moment's thought shows that this is a very incom- 
plete view of the matter. Besides the visible mechanical 
result, sound is produced ; or, to speak accurately, a "vibra- 
tion in one or both bodies, and in the surrounding air: 
and under some circumstances we call this the effect. 
Moreover, the air has not simply been made to vibrate, 
but has had currents raised in it by the transit of the bod- 
ies. Further, if there is not that great structural change 
which we call fracture, there is a disarrangement of the 
particles of the two bodies around their point of collision, 
amounting in some cases to a visible condensation. Yet 



364 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

more, this condensation is accompanied by disengagement 
of heat. In some cases a spark — that is, light — result.-, 
from the incandescence of a portion struck off; and occa- 
sionally this incandescence is associated with chemical com- 
bination. Thus, by the original mechanical force expended 
in the collision, at least five, and often more, different 
kinds of forces have been produced. Take, again, the 
lighting of a candle. Primarily, this is a chemical 
change consequent on a rise of temperature. The process 
of combination having once been set going by extraneous 
heat, there is a continued formation of carbonic acid, 
water, etc. — in itself a result more complex than tl 
traneous heat that first caused it. But along with this 
process of combination th( re is a production of heat; there 
is a production of light; there is an ascending colui 
hot gases generated ; there are car: :ied in the 

surrounding air. Nor does the sition of one force 

into many forces end here. Each of the BeYeraT changes 
worked becomes the parent of further changes. The 
bonic acid formed will by ami by combine with - 
or under the influence of sunshine give up its carbon to 
the leaf of a plant. The water will modify the hygrometrio 
state »>f the air around, or, if the can-cut of hot _ 
taming it come against a ly, will be condensed, 

altering the temperature, and perhaps the chemical - 
of the surface it covers. The heat given out melts the 
subjacent tallow, and expands whatever it warms. The 
light, falling on various Bubstanoes, calls forth from them 
reactions by which it is modified, and so divers colors are 
produced. Similarly even with th 'ions, 

which may be traced out into ever-multiplying ramifica- 
tions, until they become too minute to 1 iated. 
Universally, then, the effect is more complex than the 
cause. Whether the aggregate on which it falls be i. 
geneous or otherwise, an incident force is transform* 
the Conflict into a number of forces that differ in their 
amounts, or directions, or kinds; or in all the- 
And of this group of variously modi tied forces, each ul- 
timately undergoes a like transformation. 

Let us now mark how the process of evolution is fur- 
thered by this multiplication of effects. An incident force 
decomposed by the reactions of a body into a group of un- 
like forces — a uniform force thus reduced to a multiform 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 365 

force — becomes the cause of a secondary increase of multi- 
formity in the body which decomposes it. In the last 
chapter we saw that the several parts of an aggregate are 
differently modified by any incident force. It has just 
been shown that by the reactions of the differently mod- 
ified parts the incident force itself must be divided into 
differently modified parts. Here it remains to point out 
that each differentiated division of the aggregate thus be- 
comes a centre from which a differentiated division of the 
original force is again diffused. And since unlike forces 
must produce unlike results, each of these differentiated 
forces must produce, throughout the aggregate, a further 
series of differentiations. This secondary cause of the 
change from homogeneity to heterogeneity obviously 
becomes more potent in proportion as the heterogeneity 
increases. When the parts into which any evolving 
whole has segregated itself have diverged widely in na- 
ture, they will necessarily react very diversely on any in- 
cident force — they will divide an incident force into 
so many strongly contrasted groups of forces. And each 
of them, becoming the centre of a quite distinct set of 
influences, must add to the number of distinct secondary 
changes wrought throughout the aggregate. Yet another 
corollary must be added. The number of unlike parts of 
which an aggregate consists, as well as the degree of their 
unlikeness, is an important factor in the process. Every 
additional specialized division is an additional centre of 
specialized forces. If a uniform whole, in being itself 
made multiform by an incident force, makes the incident 
force multiform ; if a whole consisting of two unlike sec- 
tions divides an incident force into two unlike groups of 
multiform forces; it is clear that each new unlike section 
must be a further source of complication among the forces 
at work throughout the mass — a further source of hetero- 
geneity. The multiplication of effects must proceed in 
geometrical progression. Each stage of evolution must 
initiate a higher stage. 

§ 157. The force of aggregation acting on irregular 
masses of rare matter, diffused through a resisting me- 
dium, will not cause such masses to move in straight lines to 
their common centre of gravity, but, as before said, each 
will take a curvilinear path, directed to one or other side 



366 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

of the centre of gravity. All of them being differently 
conditioned, gravitation will impress on each a motion 
differing in direction, in velocity, and in the degree of its 
curvature — uniform aggregative force will be differentiated 
into multiform momenta. The process thus commenced 
must go on till it produces a single mass of nebulous mat- 
ter, and these independent curvilinear motions must result 
in a movement of this mass round its axis; a simultaneous 
condensation and rotation in which we see how two effects 
of the aggregative force, at first but slightly divergent, 
become at last widely differentiated. A gradual increase 
of oblateness in this revolving spheroid must take place 
through the joint action of these two forces, as the bulk 
diminishes ami the rotation grows more rapid, and this we 
may set down as a third effect. The genesis of heat, 
which must accompany augmentation of density, is a con- 
sequence of yet another order — a consequence by no means 
simple, since the various parts of the mass, being variously 
condensed, must he variously heated. Acting throughout 
a gaseous Bpheroid, of which the partB are unlike in their 
temperatures, the forces of tion and rotation must 

work a further scries of changes; they must set up circu- 
lating currents, both general and local. At a later 
light as well as heat will be generated. Thus without 
dwelling on the likelihood of chemical combinations and 
electric disturbances, it is sufficiently manifest that, sup- 
posing matter to have originally existed in a diffused state, 
the once uniform force which caused its aggregation must 
have become gradually divided into different forces, and 
that each further stage of complication in the resulting 
aggregate must have initiated further subdivisions of this 
force — a further multiplication of increasing the 

pre v i o u s bete n >ge Deity, 

This section of the argument may, however, be ade- 
quately sustained, without having recourse to any such 
hypothetical illustrations as the foregoing. The astro- 
nomical attributes of the Earth will even alone suffice our 
purpose. Consider first the effects of its momentum round 
its axis. There is the oblateness of its form: there is the 
alternation of day and night; there are certain constant 
marine currents; and there are certain constant aerial 
currents. Consider next the secondary Beries 
quenees due to the divergence of the Earth's plane of ro- 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 367 

tation from the plane of its orbit. The many differences 
of the seasons, both simultaneous and successive, which per- 
vade its surface, are thus caused. External attraction 
acting on this rotating oblate spheroid with inclined axis 
produces the motion called nutation, and that slower and 
larger one from which follows the precession of the equi- 
noxes, with its several sequences. And then by this same 
force are generated the tides, aqueous and atmospheric. 

Perhaps, however, the simplest way of showing the mul- 
tiplication of effects among phenomena of this order 
will be to set down the influences of any member of the 
Solar System on the rest. A planet directly produces in 
neighboring planets certain appreciable perturbations, 
complicating those otherwise produced in them, and in 
the remoter planets it directly produces certain less visible 
perturbations. Here is a first series of effects. But each 
of the perturbed placets is itself a source of perturbations 
— each directly affects all the others. Hence, planet A 
having drawn planet B out of the position it would have 
occupied in A's absence, the perturbations which B causes 
are different from what they would else have been, and 
similarly with C, D, E, etc. Here, then, is a secondary 
series of effects: far more numerous though far smaller in 
their amounts. As these indirect perturbations must to 
some extent modify the movements of each planet, there 
results from them a tertiary series, and so on continually. 
Thus the force exercised by any planet works a different 
effect on each of the rest, this different effect is from each 
as a centre partially broken up into minor different effects 
on the rest, and so on m ever-multiplying and diminishing 
waves throughout the entire system. 

§ 158. If the Earth was formed by the concentration of 
diffused matter, it must at first have been incandescent, 
and whether the nebular hypothesis be accepted or not, 
this original incandescence of the Earth must now be re- 
garded as inductively established — or, if not established, 
at least rendered so probable that it is a generally admitted 
geological doctrine. Several results of the gradual cooling 
of the Earth, as the formation of a crust, the solidification 
of sublimed elements, the precipitation of water, etc., have 
been already noticed, and I here again refer to them merely 
to point out that they are simultaneous effects of the one 



368 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

cause, diminishing heat. Let us now, however, observe 
the multiplied changes afterward arising from the contin- 
uance of this one cause. The Earth, falling in temper- 
ature, must contract. Hence the solid crust at any time 
existing is presently too large for the shrinking nucleus, 
and being unable to support itself, inevitably follows the 
nucleus. But a spheroidal envelope cannot sink down 
into contact with a smaller internal spheroid, without dis- 
ruption; it will run into wrinkles, as the rind of an apple 
does when the bulk of its interior decreases from evapora- 
tion. As the cooling prog ind the envelope thick- 
ens, the ridge3 consequent on these contractions must 
become greater, rising ultimately into hills and mountains, 
and the later systems of mountains thus produced must 
not only be higher, as we find them to be, bat they must 
be longer, as we also find them to be. Thus, leaving out 
of view other modifying forces, we see what immense het- 
erogeneity of surface arises from the one cause, I 
heat — a heterogeneity which the telescope bdows as to be 
paralleled on the .Moon, where aqueous and atmospheric 
agencies have been absent. But we have yet to notice an- 
other kind of heterogeneity of surface, similarly and 
simultaneously caused. While the Earth's crust wa& 
thin, the ridges produced by its contraction must not only 
have been small, but the tracts between them must have 
rested with comparative smoothness on the subjacent liq- 
uid spheroid, and the water in those arctic and antarctic 
regions where it first condensed must have been evenly 
distributed. But as fast as the crust grew thicker and 
gained corresponding strength, thi lines of fracture from 
time to time caused in it necessarily occurred at greater 
distances apart; the intermediate surfaces followed the 
contracting nucleus with lees uniformity, and there con- 
sequently resulted larger areas of land and water. If any 
one, after wrapping an orange in wet tissue-paper, and ob- 
serving both how small are the wrinkles and how evenly 
the intervening spaces lie on the surface of the orange, 
will then wrap it in thick cartridge-paper, and note both 
the greater height of the ridges and the larger spaces 
throughout which the paper does not touch the orange, lie 
will realize the fact that as the Earth's solid envelope 
thickened, the areas of elevation and depression became 
greater. In place of islands more or less homogeneously 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 369 

scattered over an all-embracing sea, there must have grad- 
ually arisen heterogeneous arrangements of continent and 
ocean, such as we now know. This double change in the 
extent and in the elevation of the lands involved yet 
another species of heterogeneity — that of coast-line. A 
tolerably even surface raised oat of the ocean will have a 
simple, regulai sea-margin ; but a surface varied by table- 
lands and intersected by mountain-chains will, when 
raised out of the ocean, have an outline extremely irreg- 
ular, alike in its leading features and in its details. Thus 
endless is the accumulation of geological and geographical 
results slowly brought about by this one cause — the escape 
of the Earth's primitive heat. 

"When we pass from the agency which geologists term 
igneous, to aqueous and atmospheric agencies, we see a 
like ever-growing complication of effects. The denuding 
actions of air and water have, from the beginning, been 
modif}dng every exposed surface, everywhere working 
many different changes. As already shown (§ 69) the 
original source of those gaseous and fluid motions which 
effect denudation is the solar heat. The transformation 
of this into various modes of force, according to the nature 
and condition of the matter on which it falls, is the first 
stage of complication. The sun's rays, striking at all. an- 
gles a sphere, that from moment to moment presents and 
withdraws different parts of its surface, and each of them 
for a different time daily throughout the year, would pro- 
duce a considerable variety of changes even were the sphere 
uniform. But falling as they do on a sphere surrounded 
by an atmosphere in some parts of which wide areas of 
clouds are suspended, and which here unveils vast tracts 
of sea, there of level land, there of mountains, there of 
snow and ice, they initiate in its several parts countless 
different movements. Currents of air of all sizes, direc- 
tions, velocities, and temperatures, are set up; as are also 
marine currents similarly contrasted in their characters. 
In this region the surface is giving off water in the state 
of vapor; in that, dew is being precipitated, and in the 
other rain is descending — differences that arise from the 
ever-changing ratio between the absorption and radiation 
of heat in each place. At one hour, a rapid fall in tem- 
perature leads to the formation of ice, with an accompany- 
ing expansion throughout the moist bodies frozen ; while 
24 



370 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

at another, a thaw unlocks the dislocated fragments of 
these bodies. And then, passing to a second stage of com- 
plication, we see that the many kinds of motion directly 
or indirectly caused by the sun's rays severally produce re- 
sults that vary with the conditions. Oxidation, drought, 
wind, frost, rain, glaciers, rivers, waves, and other denud- 
ing agents effect disintegrations that are determined in 
their amounts and qualities by local circumstances. Act- 
ing upon a tract of granite, such agents here work scarcely 
an appreciable effect; there cause exfoliations of the sur- 
face, and a resulting heap of debris and boulders, and 
elsewhere, after decomposing the feldspar into a white 
clay, carry away this with the accompanying quartz and 
mica, and deposit them in separate beds, tluviatile and 
marine. When the exposed land consists of several unlike 
formations, sedimentary and igneous, changea proportion- 
ably more heterogeneous are wrought. The formations 
being disintegrate in different degrees, there follows an 
increased irregularity of surface. The arras drained by 
different rivers being differently constituted, these ri 
carry down to the sea unlike combinations of ingredients, 
and so sundry new strata of distinct composition ar 
And here indeed we may see very simply illustrated the 
truth, that the heterogeneity of the effects increases in a 
geometrical progression with the heterogeneity of the. ob- 
ject acted upon. A continent of complex structure, | 
senting many strata irregularly distributed, raised to 
various levels, tilted up at all angles, must, under the 
same denuding agencies, give origin to immensely multi- 
plied results; each district must he peculiarly modir. 
each river must carry down a distinct kind of detritus; 
each deposit must be differently distributed by the entan- 
gled currents, tidal and other, which wash the contorted 
shores, and every additional complication of surface must 
be the cause of more than one additional consequence. But 
not to dwell on these, let us. for the fuller elucidation of 
this truth in relation to the inorganic world, consider what 
would presently follow from some extensive cosmical revo- 
lution — say the subsidence of Central America. The 
immediate results of the disturbance would themselves be 
sufficiently complex. Besides the numberless dislocations 
of strata, the ejections of igneous matter, the propagation 
of earthquake vibrations thousands of miles around, the 






FIRST PRINCIPLES. 371 

loud explosions, and the escape of gases, there would be 
the rush of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans to supply the 
vacant space, the subsequent recoil of enormous waves, 
which would traverse both these oceans and produce myr- 
iads of changes along their shores, the corresponding at- 
mospheric waves complicated by the currents surrounding 
each volcanic vent, and the electrical discharges with 
which such disturbances are accompanied. But these 
temporary effects would be insignificant compared with the 
permanent ones. The complex currents of the Atlantic 
and Pacific would be altered in directions and amounts. 
The distribution of heat achieved by these currents would 
be different from what it is. The arrangement of the 
isothermal lines, not only on the neighboring continents, 
but even throughout Europe, would be changed. The 
tides would flow differently from what they do now. There 
would be more or less modification of the winds in their 
periods, strengths, directions, qualities. Rain would fall 
scarcely anywhere at the same times and in the same quan- 
tities as at present. In short, the meteorological conditions 
thousands of miles off, on all sides, would be more or less 
revolutionized. In these many changes, each of which 
comprehends countless minor ones, the reader will see the 
immense heterogeneity of the results wrought out by one 
force, when that force expends itself on a previously com- 
plicated area, and he will readily draw the corollary that 
from the beginning the complication has advanced at an 
increasing rate. 

§ 159. We have next to trace throughout organic evo- 
lution this same all-pervading principle. And here, 
where the transformation of the homogeneous into the 
heterogeneous was first observed, the production of many 
changes by one cause is least easy to demonstrate. The 
development of a seed into a plant, or an ovum into an 
animal, is so gradual, while the forces which determine 
it are so involved, and at the same time so unobtrusive, 
that it is difficult to detect the multiplication of effects 
which is elsewhere so obvious. Nevertheless, by indirect 
evidence we may establish our proposition, spite of the 
lack of direct evidence. 

Observe, first, how numerous are the changes which any 
marked stimulus works on an adult organism — a human 



372 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

being, for instance. An alarming sound or sight, besides 
impressions on the organs of sense and the nerves, may 
produce a start, a scream, a distortion of the face, a trem- 
bling consequent on general muscular relaxation, a burst of 
perspiration, an excited action of the heart, a rush of blood 
to the brain, followed possibly by arrest of the heart's 
action and by syncope, and, if the system be feeble, an ill- 
ness with its long train of complicated symptoms n i 
in. Similarly in cases of disease. A minute portion of 
the small-pox virus introduced into the system will, in a 

severe case, e;m>e during the I 

skin, accelerated pulse, furred tonf - of appetite, 

thirst, epigastric uneasiness, vomiting, headache, pains in 
the hack and limbs, muscular weal onvulsiom 

lirium, etc ; in thi _ •. cutaneous eruption, itch- 

ing, tingling, sore throat, swelled fauces, salivation, 
cough, hoarseness, dyspnoea, etc.; and in the third - 
(edematous inflammations, pneumonia, pleurisy, diarrhoea, 
inflammation of the brain, ophthalmia, erysip 
each of which enumerated Bympton 
complex. Medicin . tter air. might in 

like maiiiu r be instanci >1 a- pr< ducii g multiple 
Now it }\(c<\< only t<» consider that the manj s - thus 

wrought by ob on an adult organism must be par- 

tially paralleled in an embryo-6 - d how 

here also the production of mi 

source of increasing heterogeneity. ernal heat and 

other agencies which determine the first t-< -m }»1 i 
tlu' germ will, by acting on these, >u|eii: 
complications* on il higher and more numerous 

ones, and ntinually; each org 

serving, by its actions and reactions on the rest, to i: 
new complexities. The first pulsations of the foetal heart 
must simultaneously aid the unfolding ery part 

The growth o( each tissue, I g from the 

proportions of elements, must modify the constitute 
the blood, ami s*> must modify the nutrition of all the other 
tissues. The distributive actions, implying as they do a 
certain waste, necessitate an addition to the bio. 
effete matters, which must influence the rest of tie 
tern, and perhaps, as some think, initiate the formation 
of excretory organs. The nervous conn* stahlished 

among the viscera must further multiply their mutual in- 






FIRST PRINCIPLES. 373 

fluences. And so with every modification of structure — 
every additional part and every alteration in the ratios of 
parts. Still stronger becomes the proof when we call to 
mind the fact, that the same germ may be evolved into 
different forms according to circumstances. Thus, during 
its earlier stages, every embryo is sexless — becomes either 
male or female as the balance of forces acting on it deter- 
mines. Again, it is well known that the larva of a work- 
ing-bee will develop into a queen -bee, if, before a certain 
period, its food be changed to that on which the larvas 
of queen-bees are fed. Even more remarkable is the case 
of certain entozoa. The ovum of a tape-worm, getting 
into the intestine of one animal, unfolds into the form of 
its parent; but if carried into other parts of the system, 
or into the intestine of some unlike animal, it becomes one 
of the sac-like creatures, called by naturalists Cysticerci, or 
Ccemtri, or Echinococci — creatures so extremely different 
from the tape-worm in aspect and structure, that only 
after careful investigations have they been proved to have 
the same origin. All which instances imply that each 
advance in embryonic complication results from the action 
of incident forces on the complication previously ex- 
isting. Indeed, the now accepted doctrine of epigenesis 
necessitates the conclusion that organic evolution proceeds 
after this manner. For since it is proved that no germ, 
animal or vegetal, contains the slightest rudiment, trace, 
or indication of the future organism — since the microscope 
has shown us that the first process set up in every fertilized 
germ is a process of repeated spontaneous fissions, ending 
in the production of a mass of cells, not one of which ex- 
hibits any special character; there seems no alternative 
but to conclude that the partial organization at any mo- 
ment subsisting in a growing embryo is transformed by 
the agencies acting on it into the succeeding phase of or- 
ganization, and this into the next, until, through ever- 
increasing complexities, the ultimate form is reached. 
Thus, though the subtlety of the forces and the slowness 
of the metamorphosis prevent us from directly tracing 
the genesis of many changes by one cause, throughout the 
successive stages which every embryo passes through; yet, 
indirectly, we have strong evidence that this is a source of 
increasing heterogeneity. We have marked how multi- 
tudinous are the effects which a single agency may gener- 



374 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

ate in an adult organism; that a like multiplication of 
effects must happen in the unfolding organism, we have 
inferred from sundry illustrative cases; further, it has 
been pointed out that the ability which like germs have 
to originate unlike forms implies that the successive 
transformations result from the new changes superinduced 
on previous changes,. and we have seen that, structureless 
as every germ originally is, the development of an organ- 
ism out of it is otherwise incomprehensible. Doubtless 
we are still in the dark respecting those mysterious prop- 
erties which make the germ, when subject to tit influ- 
ences, undergo the special changes beginning this series 
of transformations. All here contended is, that given a 
germ possessing these mysterious properties, the evolution 
of an organism from it depends, in part, on that multipli- 
cation of effects which we have seen to be a cause of evolu- 
tion in general, so far as we have yet traced it. 

When, leaving the development of single plants and 
animals, we pass to that of the Earth's flora and fauna, the 
course of the argument again becomes clear and simple. 
Though, as before admitted, the fragmentary facts Palaeon- 
tology has accumulated do not clearly warrant us in saying 
that, in the lapse of geologic time, there have been evolved 
more heterogeneous organisms, and more heterogeneous 
assemblages of organisms; yet we .-hall now see that there 
must ever have been a tendency toward these results. 
We shall find that the production of many effects by one 
cause, which, as already shown, has been all along h. 
ing the physical heterogeneity of the Earth, has further 
necessitated an increasing heterogeneity in its flora and 
fauna, individually and collectively. An illustration will 
make this clear. Suppose that by a series of apnea 
occurring, as they are now known to do, at long intervals, 
the East Indian Archipelago were to be raised into a 
continent, and a chain of mountains formed along the axis 
of elevation. By the first of these upheavals, the plants 
and animals inhabiting Borneo, Sumatra, New Guinea, 
and the rest, would be subjected to slightly modified sets 
of conditions. The climate in general would be altered in 
temperature, in humidity, and in its periodical variations; 
while the local differences would be multiplied. These 
modifications would affect, perhaps inappreciably, the en- 
tire flora and fauna of the region. The change of level 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 375 

would produce additional modifications, varying in differ- 
ent species, and also in different members of the same 
species, according to their distance from the axis of eleva- 
tion. Plants, growing only on the sea-shore in special 
localities, might become extinct. Others, living only in 
swamps of a certain humidity, would, if they survived at 
all, probably undergo visible changes of appearance. 
While more marked alterations would occur in some of the 
plants that spread over the lands newly raised above the 
sea. The animals and insects living on these modified 
plants would themselves be in some degree modified by 
change of food, as well as by change of climate, and the 
modification would be more marked where, from the dwin- 
dling or disappearance of one kind of plant, an allied kind 
was eaten. In the lapse of the many generations arising 
before the next upheaval, the sensible or insensible alter- 
ations thus produced in each species would become organ- 
ized — in all the races that survived there would be a more 
or less complete adaptation to the new conditions. The 
next upheaval would superinduce further organic changes, 
implying wider divergences from the primary forms, and 
so repeatedly. Now, however, let it be observed that this 
revolution would not be a substitution of a thousand 
modified species for the thousand original species; but in 
place of the thousand original species there would arise 
several thousand species, or varieties, or changed forms. 
Each species being distributed over an area of some extent, 
and tending continually to colonize the new area exposed, 
its different members would be subject to different sets of 
changes. Plants and animals migrating toward the equa- 
tor would not be affected in the same way with others mi- 
grating from it. Those which spread toward the new 
shores would undergo changes unlike the changes under- 
gone by those which spread, into the mountains. Thus, 
each original race of organisms would become the root from 
which diverged several races, differing more or less from 
it and from each other, and while some of these might 
subsequently disappear, probably more than one would 
survive in the next geologic period ; the very dispersion it- 
self increasing the chances of survival. Not only would 
there be certain modifications thus caused by changes of 
physical conditions and food ; but also in some cases other 
modifications caused by changes of habit. The fauna of 



376 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

each island, peopling, step by step, the newly raised tracts, 
would eventually come in contact with the faunas of other 
islands, and some members of these other faunas would be 
unlike any creatures before seen. Herbivores meeting 
with new beasts of prey would, in some cases, be led into 
modes of defence or escape differing from those previously 
used, and simultaneously the beasts of prey would modify 
their modes of pursuit and attack. \Ve know that when 
circumstances demand it, such changes of habit do take 
place in animals, and we know that if the new habits be- 
come the dominant one-, they must eventually in some 
degree alter the organization. Observe now, however, a 
further consequence. There must arise not simply a 
tendency toward the differentiation of each race of o 
isms into several races; but also a tendency to the 
sional production of a somewhat higher organism. Taken 
in the mass, these divergent varieties, which have been 
caused by fresh physical conditions and habits of life will 
exhibit alterations quite indefinite in kind and ci 
and alterations that do not necessarily 
vance. Probably in m - the modified type will be 

not appreciably more \w original 

one. Hut it must new and then occur that s<':ae di 
of a species, falling into circumstances which give it rather 
more complex experiences, and demand actions somewhat 
more involved, will have certain of its organs further dif- 
ferentiated in proportionately small degrees — will bf 
slightly more heterogeneous. Bence, there will from time 
to time arise an increased heterogeneity both of the Earth's 
flora and fauna, and of individual races included in them. 
Omitting detailed explanations, and allowing for the qual- 
ifications which cannot here be specified, it is sufiiciently 
clear that geological mutations have all along tended to 
complicate the forms of life, whether r _ 
or collectively. That multiplication of effects which has 
been a part-cause of the transformation of thi - crust 

from the simple into the complex, has simultaneously led 
to a parallel transformation of the Life upon its surf 

*H:ul this paragraph, first published in the Westminster ;. 957, been 

written after the appearance of v..-. Darwin's « ork on 

it would doubtless have been Otherwise expressed. Referen.ee would have been 
made to the process of "natural selection,* 1 as greatly facilitating thedifferenti- 
acions described. As it is. however, 1 prefer to let the pas s 1 in its 
original shape: partly because it seems Co me that tk a 
conditions would produce divergent varieties or species, apart from the in- 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 377 

The deduction here drawn from the established truths 
of geology and the general laws of life gains immensely 
in weight on finding it to be in harmony with an induc- 
tion drawn from direct experience. Just that divergence 
of many races from one race, which we inferred must have 
been continually occurring during geologic time, we know 
to have occurred during the pre-historic periods, in man 
and domestic animals. And just that multiplication of 
effects which we concluded must have been instrumental 
to the first, we see has in a great measure wrought the last. 
Single causes, as famine, pressure of population, war, have 
periodically led to further dispersions of mankind and of 
dependent creatures; each such dispersion initiating new 
modifications, new varieties of type. Whether all the 
human races be or be not derived from one stock, philol- 
ogy makes it clear that whole groups of races, now easily 
distinguishable from each other, were originally one race 
— that the diffusion of one race into different climates and 
conditions of existence has produced many altered forms 
of it. Similarly with domestic animals. Though in some 
cases (as that of dogs) community of origin will perhaps be 
disputed, yet in other cases (as that of the sheep or the 
cattle of our own country) it will not be questioned that 
local differences of climate, food, and treatment have 
transformed one original breed into numerous breeds, now 
become so far distinct as to produce unstable hybrids. 
Moreover, through the complication of effects flowing from 
single causes, we here find, what we before inferred, not 
only an increase of general heterogeneity, but also of spe- 
cial heterogeneity. While of the divergent, divisions and 
subdivisions of the human race many have undergone 
changes not constituting an advance, others have become 
decidedly more heterogeneous. The civilized European 
departs more widely from the vertebrate archetype than 
does the savage. 

§ 160. A sensation does not expend itself in arousing 
some single state of consciousness; but the state of con- 
fluence of "natural selection" (though in less numerous ways as well as less 
rapidly) ; and partly because I conceive that in the absence of these successive 
changes of conditions, " natural selection" would effect comparatively little. 
Let me add that though these positions are not enunciated in " The Origin of 
Species," yet a common friend gives me reason to think that Mr. Darwin 
would coincide in them ; if he did not indeed consider them as tacitly implied 
in his work. 



378 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

sciousness aroused is made up of various represented sen- 
sations connected by co-existence, or sequence with the 
presented sensation. And that, in proportion as the grade 
of intelligence is high, the number of ideas suggested is 
great, may be readily inferred. Let us, however, look at 
the proof that here, too, each change is the parent of many 
changes, and that the multiplication increases in propor- 
tion as the area affected is complex. 

Were some hitherto unknown bird, driven say by stress 
of weather from the remote north, to make its appearance 
on our shores, it would excite no speculation in the sheep 
or cattle amid which it slighted: a perception of it as a 
creature like those constantly flying about would be the 
sole interruption of that dull current of consciousness which 
accompanies grazing and rumination. The cow-herd, by 
whom we may suppose the exhausted bird to be presently 
caught, would probably gaze at it with some slight curios- 
ity, as being unlike am he had before seen — would note 
its most conspicuous markings, and vaguely ponder on the 
questions, where it came from, and h<»\v it came. The 
village bird-sturler would have suggested to him by the 
sight of it sundry forms to which it bore a little resem- 
blance, would receive from it more numerous and more 
specilic impressions respecting structure and plumage, 
would be reminded of various instances of birds brought 
by storms from foreign parts — would tell who found them, 
who stuffed them, who bought them. Supposing the un- 
known bird taken to a naturalist of the old school, inter- 
ested only in externals (one of those described by the late 
Edward Forbes as examining animals as though they were 
merely skins filled with straw), it would excite in him a 
more involved series of mental changes; there would be 
an elaborate examination of the feathers, a noting of all 
their technical distinctions, with a reduction of then 
ceptions to certain equivalent written symbols: reasons for 
referring the new form to a particular family, order, and 
genus would be sought out and written down; commu- 
nications with the secretary oi r editor of 
some journal, would follow, ami probably there would be 
not a few thoughts about the addition of the it to the 
describer's name, to form the name of the species. Lastly, 
in the mind of a comparative anatomist, such a new spe- 
cies, should it happen to have any marked internal peculi- 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 379 

arity, might produce additional sets of changes — might 
very possibly suggest modified views respecting the rela- 
tionships of the division to which it belonged, or, perhaps, 
alter his conceptions of the homologies and developments 
of certain organs; and the conclusions drawn might not 
improbably enter as elements into still wider inquiries 
concerning the origin of organic forms. 

From ideas let us turn to emotions. In a young child, 
a father's anger produces little else than vague fear — a dis- 
agreeable sense of impending evil, taking various shapes of 
physical suffering or deprivation of pleasures. In elder 
children, the same harsh words will arouse additional feel- 
ings; sometimes a sense of shame, of penitence, or of sor- 
row for having offended; at other times, a sense of injus- 
tice, and a consequent anger. In the wife, yet a further 
range of feelings may come into existence- -perhaps wounded 
aifection, perhaps self-pity for ill-usage, perhaps contempt 
for groundless irritability, perhaps sympathy for some 
suffering which the irritability indicates, perhaps anxiety 
about an unknown misfortune which she thinks has pro- 
duced it. Nor are we without evidence that among adults 
the like differences of development are accompanied by 
like differences in the number of emotions that are aroused, 
in combination or rapid succession — the lower natures be- 
ing characterized by that impulsiveness which results from 
the uncontrolled action of a few feelings, and the higher 
natures being characterized by the simultaneous action of 
many secondary feelings, modifying those first awakened. 

Possibly it will be objected that the illustrations here 
given are drawn from the functional changes of the ner- 
vous system, not from its structural changes, and that what 
is proved among the first does not necessarily hold among 
the last. This must be admitted. Those, however, who 
recognize the truth that the structural changes are the 
slowly accumulated results of the functional changes will 
readily draw the corollary, that a part-cause of the evolu- 
tion of the nervous system, as of other evolution, is this 
multiplication of effects which becomes ever greater as the 
development becomes higher. 

§ 161. If the advance of Man toward greater heteroge- 
neity in both body and mind is in part traceable to the 
production of many effects by one cause, still more clearly 



380 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

may the advance of Society toward greater heterogeneity 
be so explained. Consider the growth of an industrial 
organization. When, as must occasionally happen, some 
individual of a tried displays unusual aptitude for making 
an article of general use (a weapon, for instance) which was 
before made by each man for himself, there arises a ten- 
dency toward the differentiation of that individual into a 
maker of weapons. His companions (warriors and hunters 
all of them) severally wish to have the best weapons that 
can be made, and are therefore certain to offer strong in- 
ducements to this skilled individual to make weapoj 
them. lie, on the other hand, having both an unusual 
faculty, and an unusual liking for making weapons (the 
capacity and the desire for any occupation being com- 
monly associated), is predisposed to fullil these commisc 
on the offer of adequate reward ; especially i ve of 

distinction La also gratified. This first specialization of 
function, once commenced, tends ever t • more de- 

cided. On the side of the weapon-maker, continued prac- 
tice gives increased skill — increased superiority to his prod- 
ucts. On the side of his cli< Q of pn 
entails decreased skill. Thus the influences that determine 
this division of labor groi - r in both way-, this 
social movement tends ever to become more decided in 
the direction in which it was first Bet up, and the incip- 
ient heterogeneity is, on the averag a s, likely to 
become permanent for that generation, if no longer. v 
a process, besides differential] 

parts, the one monopolising, or almost monopolizing, the 
performance of a certain function, and the other having 
lost the habit, and in some measure the power, of perform- 
ing that function, has a tendency t<> initiate other differ- 
entiations. The advance described implies the intn 
tion of barter; the maker of weapons has, on each 
to be paid in such other articles as he agT ke in 

exchange. Now lie will not habitually take in excl 
one kind of article, but many kinds. He does not 
mats only, or skins, or fishing-gear; but he wants all : 
and on each occasion will bargain for the particular things 
he most needs. What follows? If among the memb 
the tribe there exist any slight differences of skill in the 
manufacture of these various things, as there are almost 
sure to do, the weapon-maker will take from each one the 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 381 

thing which that one excels in making ; he will exchange 
for mats with him whose mats are superior, and will bar- 
gain for the fishing-gear of whoever has the best. But he 
who has bartered away his mats or his fishing-gear must 
make other mats or fishing-gear for himself, and in so do- 
ing must, in some degree, further develop his aptitude. 
Thus it results that the small specialties of faculty pos- 
sessed by various members of the tribe will tend to grow 
more decided. If such transactions are from time to 
time repeated, these specializations may become appreci- 
able. And whether or not there ensue distinct differen- 
tiations of other individuals into makers of particular 
articles, it is clear that incipient differentiations take 
place throughout the tribe: the one original cause pro- 
duces not only the first dual effect, but a number of second- 
ary dual effects, like in kind but minor in degree. This 
process, of which traces may be seen among groups of 
school-boys, cannot well produce a lasting distribution of 
functions in an unsettled tribe ; but where there grows up 
a fixed and multiplying community, such differentiations 
become permanent, and increase with each generation. An 
addition to the number of citizens, involving a greater 
demand for every commodity, intensifies the functional 
activity of each specialized person or class, and this ren- 
ders the specialization more definite where it already ex- 
ists, and establishes it where it is but nascent. By increas- 
ing the pressure on the means of subsistence, a larger 
population again augments these results; since every in- 
dividual is forced more and more to confine himself to that 
which he can do best, and by which he can gain most. 
And this industrial progress, by aiding future production, 
opens the way for further growth of population, which 
reacts as before. Presently, under the same stimuli, new 
occupations arise. Competing workers, severally aiming 
to produce improved articles, occasionally discover better 
processes or better materials. In weapons and cutting- 
tools, the substitution of bronze for stone entails on him 
who first makes it a great increase of demand — so great 
an increase that he presently finds all his time occupied in 
making the bronze for the articles he sells, and is obliged 
to depute the fashioning of these articles to others, and 
eventually the making of bronze, thus gradually differen- 
tiated from a pre-existing occupation, becomes an occupa- 



382 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

tion by itself. But now mark the ramified changes which 
follow this change. Bronze soon replaces stone, not only 
in the articles it was first used for, but in many others, 
and so affects the manufacture of them. Further, it 
affects the processes which such improved utensils subserve, 
and the resulting products — modifies buildings, carvings, 
dress, personal decorations. Yet again, it sets going sun- 
dry manufactures which were before impossible, from lack 
of a material fit for the requisite tools. And' all these 
changes react on the people — increase their manipulative 
skill, their intelligence, their comfort — reline their habits 
and tastes. 

It is out of the question here to follow through its 
cessive complications this increasing soda] heterogeneity 
that results from the production of man. y one 

cause. But leaving the intermediate | aJ de- 

velopment, l'-t ttion from it* 

phase. To trace r, in its mani- 

fold applications to mining, navigation, and manufactures, 
would carry as into unmanageable detail. I -ofine 

ourselves to t 1 .- latest embodiment of steam-power — the 
locomotive engine. This, as the proximal' -four 

railway system, has ch le face of the country, the 

course of trade, and the habits of the | 
first, the complies of changes that pr< 

making of every railway-- >nal arrangements, 

the meetings, the registrati the par- 

liamentary survey, the Lithographed plans, the txx 
reference, the local de ic appli< 

to Parliament, the pae ittee, 

the Bret, second, and third res ach of which brief 

heads indi aultiplici e fur- 

ther development of sundry occupations (as those of en- 
gineers, surveyors lithographers, parliamentary agents, 
share-brokers) and the creation of sundry others 
of traffic-takers, reference-tab msider, next, the 

yet more marked changes implied in railway eonstri. 
— the cuttings, embanking*, tunnelling*, diversions of 
roads; the building of bridges and stations; the laying 
down of ballast, sleepers, and rails; the making of engines, 
tenders, carriages, and wagons; which processes, acting 
upon numerous trades, increase the importation of timber, 
the quarrying of stone, the manufacture of iron, the min- 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 383 

ing of coal, the burning of bricks; institute a variety of 
special manufactures weekly advertised in the Railway 
Times, and call into being some new classes of workers, 
drivers, stokers, cleaners, plate-layers, etc., etc. Then 
come the changes, more numerous and involved stilly 
which railways in action produce on the community at 
large. The organization of every business is more or less 
modified; ease of communication makes it better to do 
directly what was before done by proxy; agencies are es- 
tablished where previously they would not have paid; 
goods are obtained from the remote wholesale houses in- 
stead of near retail ones, and commodities are used which 
distance once rendered inaccessible. The rapidity and 
small cost of carriage tend to specialize more than ever 
the industries of different districts — to confine each man- 
ufacture to the parts in which, from local advantages, it 
can be best carried on. Economical distribution equalizes 
prices, and also, on the average, lowers prices; thus bring- 
ing divers articles within the means of those before unable 
to buy them, and so increasing their comforts and im- 
proving their habits. At the same time the practice of 
travelling is immensely extended. Classes who before 
could not afford it take annual trips to the sea; visit their 
distant relations; make tours, and so we are benefited in 
body, feelings, and intellect. The more prompt trans- 
mission of letters and of news produces further changes- 
makes the pulse of the nation faster. Yet more, there 
arises a wide dissemination of cheap literature through 
railway book-stalls, and of advertisements in railway car- 
riages, both of them aiding ulterior progress. And the 
innumerable changes here briefly indicated are consequent 
on the invention of the locomotive engine. The social 
organism has been rendered more heterogeneous, in virtue 
of the many new occupations introduced, and the many 
old ones further specialized ; prices in all places have been 
altered ; each trader has, more or less, modified his way of 
doing business, and every person has been affected in his 
actions, thoughts, emotions. 

The only further fact demanding notice, is, that we 
here see more clearly than ever, that in proportion as the 
area over which any influence extends becomes heteroge- 
neous, the results are in a yet higher degree multiplied in 
number and kind. While among the primitive tribes to 



384 FIRST PRINCIPLES 

whom it was first known caoutchouc caused bat few- 
changes, among ourselves the changes have been so many 
and varied that the history of them occupies a volume. 
Upon the small, homogeneous community inhabiting one 
of the Hebrides, the electric telegraph would produce, 
were it used, scarcely any results, but in England the re- 
sults it produces are multitudinous. 

Space permitting, the synthesis might here be pursued 
in relation to all the subtler products of social life. It 
might be shown how, in Science, an advance of one division 
presently advances other divisions — how Astronomy has 
been immensely forwarded by discoveries in Optics, while 
other optica] discoveries have initiated Microscopic Anat- 
omy, and greatly aided the growth of Physiology — how 
Chemistry has indirectly increased our know! _ Elec- 
tricity, Magnetism, Biology, tricity has 
reacted on Chemistry and Magnetism, developed our views 
of Light and Heat, and die sundry laws of nervous 
acti«.n. In Literature ; truth might be exhibited in 
the still-multiplying forms of periodical publications that 
have descended from the first newspaper, and which have 
severally acted and reacted on other forms of literature and 
on each other; or in the bias given by each book of power to 
various subsequent bonks. The influence which a new 
school <»f Painting (as that of the pre-Raffae] 
on other schools; the hints which all kinds of pictorial art 
are deriving from Photography; the complex f new 
critical doctrines — might severally be dwelt < n as displaying 
the like multiplication of effects. But it would need 
tax the reader's patience to detail, in their many ramifi- 
cations, these various changes, here 1- W involved 
and subtle as to be followed with some difficulty. 

s, 162. After the argument which closed the last chap- 
ter, a parallel one seems here scarcely required. For sym- 
metry's sake, however, it will be proper briefly to point out 
how the multiplication of effects, like the instability of 
the homogeneous, is a corollary from the persistei. 
force. 

Tilings which we call different are things which react in 
different ways; and we can know them as different only by 
the differences in their reactions. When we distinguish 
bodies as hard and soft, rough and smooth, we simply mean 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 385 

that certain like muscular forces expended on them are fol- 
lowed by unlike sets of sensations — unlike reactive forces. 
Objects that are classed as red, blue, yellow, etc., are objects 
that decompose light in strongly contrasted ways; that is, 
we know contrasts of color as contrasts in the changes pro- 
duced in a uniform incident force. Manifestly, any two 
things which do not work unequal effects on consciousness, 
either by unequally opposing our own energies or by im- 
pressing our senses with unequally modified forms of cer- 
tain external energies, cannot be distinguished by us. 
Hence the proposition that the different parts of any whole 
must react differently on a uniform incident force, and 
must so reduce it to a group of multiform forces, is in es- 
sence a truism. A further step will reduce this truism 
to its lowest terms. 

When, from unlikeness between the effects they produce 
on consciousness, we predicate unlikeness between two ob- 
jects, what is our warrant? and what do we mean by the 
unlikeness objectively considered? Our warrant is the 
persistence of force. Some kind or amount of change has 
been wrought in us by the one which has not been wrought 
by the other. This change we ascribe to some force exer- 
cised by the one which the other has not exercised. And 
we have no alternative but to do this or to assert that the 
change had no antecedent; which is to deny the persistence 
of force. Whence it is farther manifest that what we re- 
gard as the objective unlikeness is the presence in the one 
of some force, or set of forces, not present in the other — ■ 
something in the kinds or amounts or directions of the 
constituent forces of the one, which those of the other do 
not parallel. But now if things or parts of things which 
we call different are those of which the constituent forces 
differ in one or more respects, what must happen to any 
like forces, or any uniform force, falling on them? Such 
like forces, or parts of a uniform force, must be differently 
modified. The force which is present in the one and not 
in the other must be an element in the conflict — must 
produce its equivalent reaction, and must so affect the 
total reaction. To say otherwise is to say that this differ- 
ential force will produce no effect, which is to say that 
force is not persistent. 

I need not develop this corollary further. It manifestly 
follows that a uniform force, falling on a uniform aggre- 
25 



386 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

gate, must undergo dispersion: that falling on an aggre- 
gate made up of unlike parts, it must undergo dispersion 
from each part, as well as qualitative differentiations; that 
in proportion as the parts are unlike, these qualitative 
differentiations must be marked; that in proportion to the 
numter of the parts, they must be numerous; that the 
secondary forces so produced must undergo further trans- 
formations while working equivalent transformations in 
the parts that change them, and similarly with the force? 
they generate. Thus the conclusions that a part-cause of 
Evolution is the multiplication of effects, and that this 
increases in geometrical progn - the heterogeneity 

becomes greater, are Dot only to hi- established inductively, 
but are deducible from the deepest of all truths. 



OHAPTEB XXI. 

SEGREGATION. 

vH^. The general interpretation ol Evolution ig 
from being completed in the preceding chapters. We 
must contemplate its changes under yet and:, 
before we can form a definite conception <>f the pi 
constituted by them. Though the laws forth 

furnish a key to the rear .ution 

exhibits, in so far as it is an advance from the uniform 
to the multiform: they furnish no key to this ream 
ment in so far as it is an advance from the indefin 
the definite. On studying the actions and rea 
everywhere going on, we ha I it to follow inevi 

from a certain primordial truth, that the homogeneous 
must lapse into the heterogeneous, and that the hefe 
neous must become more heter \ it we ha* 

discovered why the differently affected parts simple 

whole become clearly marked off from each other at the same 
time that they become unlike. Thus far no reason lias 
been assigned why there should not ordinarily 
chaotic heterogeneity in place of that orderly heti 
neity displayed in Evolution. It still remains to find out 
the cause of that local integration which accompanies 
local differentiation — that gradually completed segregation 
of like units into a group, distinctly separated from 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 387 

neighboring groups which are severally made up of other 
kinds of units. The rationale will be conveniently intro- 
duced by a few instances in which we may watch this seg- 
regative process taking place. 

When toward the end of September the trees are gain- 
ing their autumn colors, and we are hoping shortly to see 
a further change increasing still more the beauty of the 
landscape, we are not uncommonly disappointed by the oc- 
currence of an equinoctial gale. Out of the mixed mass 
of foliage on each branch, the strong current of air carries 
away the decaying and brightly tinted leaves, but fails to 
detach those which are still green. And while these last, 
frayed and seared by long-continued beatings against each 
other, and the twigs around them, give a sombre color to 
the woods, the red and yellow and orange leaves are col- 
lected together in ditches and behind walls and in corners 
where eddies allow them to settle. That is to say, by the 
action of that uniform force which the wind exerts on 
both kinds, the dying leaves are picked out from among 
their still living companions and gathered in places by them- 
selves. Again, the separation of particles of different 
sizes, as dust and sand from pebbles, may be similarly 
effected, as we see on every road in March. And from the 
days of Homer downward, the power of currents of air, 
natural and artificial, to part from one another units of 
unlike specific gravities, has been habitually utilized in 
the winnowing of chaff from wheat. In every river we 
see how the mixed materials carried down are separately 
deposited — how in rapids the bottom gives rest to nothing 
but boulders and pebbles; how where the current is not 
so strong, sand is let fall, and how in still other places there 
is a sediment of mud. This selective action of moving 
water is commonly applied in the arts to obtain masses of 
particles of different degrees of fineness. Emery, for ex- 
ample, after being ground is carried by a slow current 
through successive compartments, in the first of which the 
largest grains subside ; in the second of which the grains 
that reach the bottom before the water has escaped are 
somewhat smaller; in the third smaller still ; until in the 
last there are deposited only those finest particles which 
fall so slowly through the water that they have not pre- 
viously been able to reach the bottom. And in a way that 
is different though equally significant, this segregative effect 



388 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

of water in motion is exemplified in the carrying away of 
soluble from insoluble matters — an application of it hourly 
made in every laboratory. The effects of the uniform 
forces which aerial and aqueous currents exercise are par- 
alleled by those of uniform forces of other orders. Elec- 
tric attraction will separate small bodies from large, or Light 
bodies from heavy. By magnetism, grains of iron may be 
selected from among other grains; as by the Sheffield 
grinder whose magnetized gauze mask filters out the 
dust which his wheel gives off, from the stone-dust that 
accompanies it. And how the affinity of any agent acting 
differently on the components of a given body enabl 
to take away some component and leave the rest behind, 
is shown in almost every chemical experiment. 

What now is the general truth lure variously presented? 
How are t . and countless similar on 

be expressed in terms that embrace them all? I:. 
case we see in action a force which may be regarded as 
simple or uniform — fluid motion in a certain direction at 
a certain velocity; electric or magnetic attraction of a 
given amount; chemical affinity of a particular Itin 
rather, in strictness, the acting force is compound) 
one of these ami certain other uniform fore rota- 

tion, etc. In each case we have an up of 

unlike units — either atoms of different substances com- 
bined or intimately mingled, or fragments of the same 
Bubstance of different >ixcs, or other constituent par; 
are unlike in their specific gravities, shapes, or other at- 
tributes. And in each alike units, or groups 
of units, of which the aggregal . are, under the 
influence of some resultant discriminate!? 
on them all, separated from each other — b _ 1 into 
minor aggregates, each consisting of units that are severally 
like each other and unlike those vi the other minor I . 
gates. Such being the common aspect of these eh. 
let us look for the common interpretation of them. 

In the chapter on M The Instability of the Homogene- 
ous," it was shown that a uniform force falling on any 
aggregate produces unlike modifications in its different 
parts — turns the uniform into the multiform and the 
multiform into the more multiform. The transformation 
thus wrought consists of either insensible or sensible 
changes of relative position among the units, or of both — 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 389 

either of those molecular rearrangements which we call 
chemical, or of those larger transpositions which are dis- 
tinguished as mechanical, or of the two united. Such 
portion of the permanently effective force as reaches each 
different part, or differently conditioned part, may be ex- 
pended in modifying the mutual relations of its constitu- 
ents; or it may be expended in moving the part to another 
place; or it may be expended partially in the first and 
partially in the second. Hence so much of the perma- 
nently effective force as does not work the one kind of 
effect must work the other kind. It is manifest that if 
of the permanently effective force which falls on some com- 
pound unit of an aggregate, little, if any, is absorbed in 
rearranging the ultimate components of such compound 
unit, much or the whole must show itself in motion of 
such compound unit to some other place in the aggregate, 
and conversely, if little or none of this force is absorbed 
in generating mechanical transposition, much or the whole 
must go to produce molecular alterations. What now 
must follow from this? In cases where none or only part 
of the force generates chemical redistributions, what ph} 7 s- 
ical redistributions must be generated? Parts that are 
similar to each other will be similarly acted on by the 
force, and will similarly react on it. Parts that are dis- 
similar will be dissimilarly acted on by the force, and will 
dissimilarly react on it. Hence the permanently effective 
incident force, when wholly or partially transformed into 
mechanical motion of the units, will produce like motions 
in units that are alike, and unlike motions in units that 
are unlike. If then, in an aggregate containing two or 
more orders of mixed units, those of the same order will 
be moved in the same way, and in a way that differs from 
that in which units of other orders are moved, the respec- 
tive orders must segregate. A group of like things on 
which are impressed motions that are alike in amount 
and direction must be transferred as a group to another 
place, and if they are mingled with some group of other 
things, on which the motions impressed are like each 
other, but unlike those of the first group in amount or 
direction or both, these other things must be transferred 
as a group to some other place — the mixed units must 
undergo a simultaneous selection and separation. 

In further elucidation of this process, it will be well 



390 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

here to set down a few instances in which we may see that, 
other things equal, the definiteness of the separation is in 
proportion to the definiteness of the difference between 
the units. Take a handful of any pounded substance, con- 
taining fragments of all sizes, and let it fall to the ground 
while a gentle breeze is blowing. The large fragments 
will be collected together on the ground almost immediately 
under the hand; somewhat smaller fragments will be car- 
ried a little to the leeward; still smaller ones a 1 i tt I 
ther; and those minute particles which we call dust will 
be drifted a long way before they reach the earth: that is, 
the integration is indefinite where the difference among the 
fragments is indefinite, though the divergence is gi 
where the difference is greatest. ]\\ again, the handful 
be made up of quite distinct orders of units — asp 
coarse sand, and dust — these will, under like condit 

vregated with comparative definiteness: the pebbled 
will drop almost vertically; the sand will fall in an in- 
clined direction, and deposit itself within a tolerably cir- 
cumscribed spa.e beyond 1 b; while the dust will 
be blown almost horizontally t<» a great did 
in which another kind of f - into play will still 
better illustrate this truth. Through amixt 
soluble and insoluble substances, I 

late. There will in the first place be a indistinct parting 
of the Bubstanoes that are the m< - atrasted in 

their relations to the acting forces; the soluble will be 
carried away; the insoluble will remain behind. Further, 
some separation, though a Less definite one. will 
among the soluble substances; since the first part of the 
current will remove the most soluble substances in the 
largest amounts, and after these have been all dissolved, the 
current Mill still continue to bring out the remaini] g 
soluble substances. Even the undissolved matters will have 
simultaneously undergone a certain segregation; for the 
percolating fluid will carry down the minute fragments 
from among the large ones, and will deposit those of small 
specific gravity in one place, and those of great specific 
gravity in another. To complete the elucidation we must 
glance at the obverse fact, namely, that mixed units which 
"differ but slightly are moved in but slightly different ways 
by incident forces, and can therefore be separated only by 
such adjustments of the incident forces as allow slight 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 391 

differences to become appreciable factors in the result. 
This truth is made manifest by antithesis in the instances 
just given; but it may be made much more manifest by 
a few such instances as those which chemical analysis sup- 
plies in abundance. The parting of alcohol from water by 
distillation is a good one. Here we have atoms consisting 
of oxygen and hydrogen mingled with atoms consisting of 
oxygen, hydrogen, and carbon. The two orders of atoms 
have a considerable similarity of nature; they similarly 
maintain a fluid form at ordinary temperatures; they 
similarly become gaseous more and more rapidly as the 
temperature is raised, and they boil at points not very 
far apart. Now this comparative likeness of the atoms is 
accompanied by difficulty in segregating them. If the 
mixed fluid is unduly heated, much water distils over 
with the alcohol ; it is only within a narrow range of tem- 
perature that the one set of atoms are driven off rather 
than the others, and even then not a few of the others ac- 
company them. The most interesting and instructive ex- 
ample, however, is furnished by certain phenomena of 
crystallization. When several salts that have little anal- 
ogy of constitution are dissolved in the same body of 
water, they are separated without much trouble by crystalli- 
zation; their respective units moved toward each other, as 
physicists suppose, by polar forces, segregate into crystals 
of their respective kinds. The crystals of each salt do, 
indeed, usually contain certain small amounts of the other 
salts present in the solution — especially when the crystal- 
lization has been rapid; but from these other salts they 
are severally freed by repeated re-solutions and crystalli- 
zations. Mark now, however, that the reverse is the case 
when the salts contained in the same body of water are 
chemically homologous. The nitrates of baryta and lead, 
or the sulphates of zinc, soda, and magnesia, unite in the 
same crystals; nor will they crystallize separately if these 
crystals be dissolved afresh, and afresh crystallized, even 
with great care. On seeking the cause of this anomaly, 
chemists found that such salts were isomorphous — that 
their atoms, though not chemically identical, were identi- 
cal in the proportions of acid, base, and water, composing 
them, and in their crystalline forms; whence it was in- 
ferred that their atoms are nearly alike in structure. 
Thus is clearly illustrated the truth that units of unlike 



392 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

kinds are selected out and separated with a readiness pro- 
portionate to the degree of their unlikeness, In the first 
case we see that being dissimilar in their forms, but similar 
in so far as they are soluble in water of a certain temper- 
ature, the atoms segregate, though imperfectly. In the 
second case we see that the atoms, having not only the 
likeness implied by solubility in the same menstruum, but 
also a great likeness of structure, do not segregate — are 
sorted and parted from each other only under quite special 
conditions, and then very incompletely. That is, the in- 
cident force of mutual polarity impresses unlike m< 
on the mixed units in proportion as they are unlike, and 
therefore, in proportion as they arc unlike, tends to de- 
posit them in separate pla 

There is a converse cause of segregation which it is 
needless here to treat of with equal fulness. If different 
units acted on by the same force must be differently 
moved, so, too, must units of the same kind be differently 
moved by different forces. Supposing some group of 
units forming part of a h< 
unitedly exposed to a force that is unlike in a 
direction to the force acting on the rest of the i _ 
then this group of units will separate from the 
vided that, of the for ting on it, there remains 

any portion not dissipated in molecular vibrations 
absorbed in producing molecular rearrangements. 
all that has been said above, tiiis proposition needs no 
defence. 

Before ending our preliminary exposition, a comple- 
mentary truth must be specified, namely, that mixed forces 
are segregated by the reaction of uniform matters, just as 
mixed matters are segregated by the action of uniform 
forces. Of this truth a complete and sufficient illustra- 
tion is furnished by the dispersion of refracted light. A 
beam of light, made up of ethereal undulations of differ- 
ent orders, is not uniformly deflected by a homogeneous 
refracting body: but the different orders of undulations it 
contains arc deflected at different angles; the result being 
that these different orders of undulations are aepaj 
and integrated, and so produce what we know as the colors 
of the spectrum. A segregation of another kind occurs 
when rays of light traverse an obstructing medium. Those 
rays which consist of comparatively short undulations are 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 393 

absorbed before those which consist of comparatively long 
ones, and the red rays, which consist of the longest undu- 
lations, alone penetrate when the obstruction is very great. 
How, conversely, there is produced a separation of like 
forces by the reaction of unlike matters, is also made 
manifest by the phenomena of refraction; since adjacent 
and parallel beams of light, falling on and passing through 
unlike substances, are made to diverge. 

§ 164. On the assumption of their nebular origin stars 
and planets exemplify that cause of material segregation 
last assigned — the action of unlike forces on like units. 

In a preceding chapter (§ 150) we saw that if matter 
ever existed in a diffused form it could not continue uni- 
formly distributed, but must break up into masses. It 
was shown that in the absence of a perfect balance of 
mutual attractions among atoms dispersed through un- 
limited space, there must arise breaches of continuity 
throughout the aggregate formed by them, and a concen- 
tration of it toward centres of dominant attraction. 
Where any such breach of continuity occurs, and the 
atoms that were before adjacent separate from each other, 
they do so in consequence of a difference in the forces to 
which they are respectively subject. The atoms on the 
one side of the breach are exposed to a certain surplus 
attraction in the direction in which they begin to move, 
and those on the other to a surplus attraction in the op- 
posite direction. That is, the adjacent groups of like 
units are exposed to unlike resultant forces, and accord- 
ingly separate and integrate. 

The formation and detachment of a nebulous ring illus- 
trates the same general principle. To conclude, as Laplace 
did, that the equatorial portion of a rotating nebulous 
spheroid will, during concentration, acquire a centrifugal 
force sufficient to prevent it from following the rest of the 
contracting mass, is to conclude that such portions will 
remain behind as are in common subject to a certain 
differential force. The line of division between the ring 
and the spheroid must be a line inside of which the ag- 
gregative force is greater than the force resisting aggre- 
gation, and outside of which the force resisting aggregation 
is greater than the aggregative force. Hence the alleged 
process conforms to the law that among like units, exposed 



394 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

to unlike forces, the similarly conditioned part from the 
dissimilarly conditioned. 

§ 165. Those geologic changes usually classed as aque- 
ous display under numerous formst he segregation of un- 
like units by a uniform incident force. On sea-shores 
the waves are ever sorting out and separating the mixed 
materials against which they break. From each mass of 
fallen cliff the rising and ebbing tide carries away all those 
particles which are so small as to remain long suspended 
in the water; and, at some distance from shore, deposits 
them in the shape of fine sediment. Large particles, 
sinking with comparative rapidity, are accumulated into 
beds of sand near low-water mark. The coarse grit and 
small pebbles collect together on the incline up which the 
breakers rush. And on the top lie the larger stones and 
boulders. Still more specific segregations may occasionally 
be observed. Flat pebbles, produced by the breaking 
down of laminated rock, are sometimes separately collected 
in one part of a shingle bank. On this shore the <; 
is wholly of mud: on that it is wholly of sand. Here we 
find a sheltered cove filled with small pebbles almi 
one size, and there, in a curved bay one end <»f which is 
more exposed than the other, we see a progressive v.. 
in the massiveness of the stones as we walk from th< 
exposed to the more exposed end. Trace the hist' 
each geologic deposit, and we are quickly led down to the 
fact that mixed fragments of matter, differing in their 
sizes or weights, are, when exposed to the momentum and 
friction of water, joined with the attraction of the Earth, 
selected from each other, and united into groups of com- 
paratively like fragments. And we see that, other things 
equal, the separation is definite in proportion as the differ- 
ences of the units are marked. After they have been 
formed sedimentary strata exhibit segregations of another 
kind. The fiints and the nodules of iron pyrites that are 
found in chalk, as well as the silieious concretions which 
occasionally occur in limestone, can be interpreted only as 
aggregations of atoms of si lex or sulpha ret of iron, orig- 
inally diffused almost uniformly through the deposit, but 
gradually collected round certain centres, notwithstanding 
the solid or semi-solid state of the surrounding matter. 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 395 

What is called bog iron-ore supplies the conditions and 
the result in still more obvious correlation. 

Among igneous changes we do not find so many exam- 
ples of the process described. When distinguishing sim- 
ple and compound evolution, it was pointed out (§ 102) 
that an excessive quantity of contained molecular motion 
prevents permanence in those secondary redistributions 
which make evolution compound. Nevertheless, geological 
phenomena of this order are not barren of illustrations. 
Where the mixed matters composing the Earth's crust 
have been raised to a very high temperature, segregation 
habitally takes place as the temperature diminishes. Sun- 
dry of the substances that escape in a gaseous form from 
volcanoes sublime into crystals on coming against cool 
surfaces, and solidifying as these substances do, at differ- 
ent temperatures, they are deposited at different parts of 
the crevices through which they are emitted together. 
The best illustration, however, is furnished by the changes 
that occur during the slow cooling of igneous rock. 
When, through one of the fractures from time to time 
made in the solid shell which forms the Earth's crust, a 
portion of the molten nucleus is extruded, and when this 
is cooled with comparative rapidity, through free radiation 
and contact with cold masses, it forms a substance known 
as trap or basalt — a substance that is uniform in texture, 
though made up of various ingredients. But when, not 
escaping through the superficial strata, such a portion of 
the molten nucleus is slowly cooled, it becomes what we 
know as granite; the mingled particles of quartz, feldspar, 
and mica, being kept for a long time in a fluid and semi- 
fluid state — a state of comparative mobility — undergo these 
changes of position which the forces impressed on them 
by their fellow-units necessitate. Having time in which 
to generate the requisite motions of the atoms, the differ- 
ential forces arising from mutual polarity segregate the 
quartz, feldspar, and mica into crystals. How completely 
this is dependent on the long-continued agitation of the 
mixed particles, and consequent long-continued mobility 
by small differential forces, is proved by the fact that in 
granite dykes the crystals in the centre of the mass, where 
the fluidity or semi-fluidity continued for a longer time, 
are much larger than those at the sides, where contact with 



396 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

the neighboring rock caused more rapid cooling and solid- 
ification. 

§ 166. The actions going on throughout an organism 
are so involved and subtle that we cannot expect to ident- 
ify the particular forces by which particular segregations 
are effected. Among the few instances admitting of toler- 
ably definite interpretation, the best are those in which 
mechanical pressures and tensions are the agencies at work. 
We shall discover several on studying the bony frame of 
the higher animals. 

The vertebra] column of a man is subject, as a whole, 
to certain general strains — the weight of the body, together 
with the reactions involved by nil considerable muscular 
efforts, and in conformity with this, it has become 
gated as a whole. At the same time, being exposed to 
different forces in the course of those lateral bendings which 
the movements necessitate, it< parts retain a certain sep- 
arateness. And it* we trace up the development of the 
vertebral column from its primitive a cartilaginous 

cord in the lowest lisle that, throughout, it main- 

tains an integration corresponding to the unity of the 
incident forces, joined with a divisn n 
responding to tin- variety incident 3, Each 

segment, considered apart, exemplifies the truth mor 
ply. A vertebra is not a sh g 

central mass with sundry appi : nd in 

rudimentary types of vertebra -1 these appen< quite 

separated from the central mass, and. indeed, exist I 
it makes its appearance. But the* - si indepei 
bones, constituting a primitive spinal segment, are subject 
to a certain aggregate of forces which agree more than 
they differ: as the fulcrum to a group of muscles habitually 
acting together, they perpetually und _ stain rea 
in common. And accordingly \ at in the coi 

development they gradually coah - . Still clearer is the il- 
lustration furnished by spinal segments that 
together where they are together exposed to £ 
inant strain. The sacrum consists of a group of vert 
firmly united. In the ostrich and its congeners there are 
from seventeen to twenty sacral vertebrae, and 1 8 
ing continent with each other, these are confluent with the 
iliac bones, which run on each side of them. If now we 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 397 

assume these vertebrae to have been originally separate as 
they still are in the embryo bird, and if we consider the 
mechanical conditions to which they must in such case have 
been exposed, we shall see that their union results in the 
alleged way. For through these vertebrae the entire weight 
of the body is transferred to the legs : the legs support the 
pelvic arch; the pelvic arch supports the sacrum; and to 
the sacrum is articulated the rest of the spine, with all the 
limbs and organs attached to it. Hence, if separate, the sa- 
cral vertebrae must be held firmly together by strongly 
contracted muscles ; and must, by implication, be prevented 
from partaking in those lateral movements which the other 
vertebras undergo — they must be subject to a common 
strain, while they are preserved from strains which would 
affect them differently; and so they fulfil the conditions 
under which segregation occurs. But the cases in which 
cause and effect are brought into the most obvious relation 
are supplied by the limbs. The metacarpal bones (those 
which in man support the palm of the hand) are separate 
from each other in the majority of mammalia; the separate 
actions of the toes entailing on them slight amounts of sep- 
arate movements. This is not so, however, in the ox-tribe 
and the horse-tribe. In the ox-tribe, only the middle 
metacarpals (third and fourth) are developed; and these, 
attaining massive proportions, coalesce to form the cannon 
bone. In the horse-tribe, the segregation is what we may 
distinguish as indirect: the second and fourth metacarpals 
are present only as rudiments united to the sides of the 
third, while the third is immensely developed; thus form- 
ing a cannon bone which differs from that of the ox in 
being a single cylinder, instead of two cylinders fused to- 
gether. The metatarsus in these quadrupeds exhibits par- 
allel changes. Now each of these metamorphoses occurs 
where the different bones grouped together have no longer 
any different functions, but retain only a common function. 
The feet of oxen and horses are used solely for locomotion 
— are not put, like those of unguiculate mammals, to pur- 
poses which involve some relative movements of the meta- 
carpals. Thus there directly or indirectly results a single 
mass of bone where the incident Horce is single. And for 
the inference that these facts have a causal connection, we 
find confirmation throughout the entire class of birds ; in the 
wings and legs of which like segregations are found under 



398 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

like conditions. While this sheet is passing through the 
press, a fact illustrating this general truth in a yet more 
remarkable manner has been mentioned to me by Prof. 
Huxley, who kindly allows me to make use of it while still 
unpublished by him. The Glyptodon, an extinct mammal 
found fossilized in South America, has long been known as 
a large uncouth creature allied to the armadillo, hot hav- 
ing a massive dermal armor consisting of polygonal plates 
closely fitted tcgether so as to make a vast box, inclosing 
the body in such way as effectually to prevent it from 
being bent, laterally or vertically, in the slightest degree. 
This bony box, which must have weighed several hundred- 
weight, was supported on the Bpinoi f the ver- 
tebra?, and on the adjacent bones of the pelvic and tho- 
racic arches. And the significant fact now to he noted is, 
that here, where the trunk vertebra: 1 were together e\ 
to the pressure of this heavy dermal armor, at the same 
time that, by its rigidity, they were preserved from all 
relative movements, the entire series of them were united 
into one solid, continuous bone. 

The formation and maintenance of a B 
as an assemblage of similar organisms, is interpretabie 
in an analogous way. We have already seen that in .-<• far 
as the members of a species are subject to differ* 
incident forces, they are differentiated, or divided into 
varieties. And here it remains to add that in so far as 
they are Bubject to lik I incident forces, they are 

rated, or reduced to, and kept in, the state of a uni- 
form aggregate. Pot by the process of " natural select 
there is a continual purification of each species from those 
individuals which depart from the common type in ways 
that unlit them for the conditions of their - 
Consequently, there is a continual leaving behind of those 
individuals which are in all respects tit for the conditions 
of their existence, and are therefore very nearly alike. 
The circumstances to which any species i- exposed ] > 
as we before saw. an involved combination of incident 
forces, and the members of the species having mixed with 
them some that differ more than usual from the a 
structure required for meeting these force-, it results that 
these forces are constantly separating such divergent indi- 
viduals from the rest, and so preserving the uniformity of 
the rest — keeping up its integrity as a species. Just as the 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 399 

changing autumn leaves are picked out by the wind from 
among the green ones around them, or just as, to use Prof. 
Huxley's simile, the smaller fragments pass through the 
sieve while the larger are kept back, so the uniform inci- 
dence of external forces affects the members of a group of 
organisms similarly in proportions as they are similar, and 
differently in proportion as they are different, and thus is 
ever segregating the like by parting the unlike from them. 
Whether these separated members are killed off, as mostly 
happens, or whether, as otherwise happens, they survive and 
multiply into a distinct variety, in consequence of their 
fitness to certain partially unlike conditions, matters not to 
the argument. The one case conforms to the law, that the 
unlike units of an aggregate are sorted into their kinds and 
parted when uniformly subject to the same incident forces; 
and the other to the converse law, that the like units of an 
aggregate are parted and separately grouped when subject 
to different incident forces. And on consulting Mr. Dar- 
win's remarks on divergence of character, it will be seen 
that the segregations thus caused tend ever to become more 
definite. 

§ 167. Mental evolution, under one of its leading aspects, 
we found to consist in the formation of groups of like ob- 
jects and like relations — a differentiation of the various 
things originally confounded together in one assemblage, 
and an integration of each separate order of things into a 
separate group (§ 153). Here it remains to point out that 
while unlikeness in the incident forces is the cause of such 
differentiations, likeness in the incident forces is the cause 
of such integrations. For what is the process through which 
classifications are established? At first, in common with the 
uninitiated, the botanist recognizes only such conventional 
divisions as those which agriculture has established — dis- 
tinguishes a few vegetables and cereals, and groups the rest 
together into the one miscellaneous aggregate of wild plants. 
How do these wild plants become grouped in his mind into 
orders, genera, and species? Each plant he examines yields 
him a certain complex impression. Every now and then he 
picks up a plant like one before seen; and the recognition 
of it is the production in him of a like connected group of 
sensations, by a like connected group of attributes. That 
is to say, there is produced throughout the nerves con- 



400 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

cerned a combined set of changes, similar to a combined 
set of changes before produced. Considered analytically, 
each such combined set of changes i- a combined set of 
molecular modifications wrought in the affected part of the 
organism. On every repetition of the impression, a like 
combined set of molecular modifications is superposed on the 
previous ones, and makes them greater: thus generating an 
internal idea corresponding to these similar external ol 
Meanwhile, another kind of plant produces in the brain of 
the botanist another Bet of combined cha molecular 

modifications — a set which dues not agree with and d< 
the one we have 1- sidering, but disag a ith it; 

and by repetition of such there is generated a different idea 
answering to a different species. What now is the nature 
of this process expressed In general terms? On the one 
hand there are the like and unlike things from which sev- 
erally emanate the groups of forces by which we perceive 
them. On the other hand, there are ti 
and percipient centres, through which, in the com 
observation, these groups of for< In pj 

through these organs i ipient centres, the 

like groups of forces ar< separated from the 

unlike groups of forces; and each such - 
forces, parted in this way from others, answ< an ex- 

ternal genus or species, constiti ;>ness 

■which we call our idea of the genus <>r species. We before 
saw that as will as a separation of mixed matters by the same 
\o\w\ there is a separation of mixed forces by the same 
matter; ami here we may further Bee that the unlike I 
so separated work unlike structural changes in tl. 
gregate that separates them— structural changes each of 
which thus represents, and is equivalent to, the inte_ 
series of motions that has produced it. 

By a parallel process the connections of coexistence and 
sequence among impressions become sorted into kinds and 
grouped simultaneously with the irnpr* 
When two phenomena that have been experienced in a 
given order are repeated in the same order, those nerves 
which before were affected by the transition are again af- 
fected; and such molecular modification as they re 
from the first motion propagated through them, is incr a 
by this second motion along the same rout . such 

motion works a structural alteration, which, in conformity 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 401 

with the general law set forth in Chapter IX., involves 
a diminution of the resistance to all such motions that 
afterward occur. The segregation of these successive 
motions (or more strictly, the permanently effective por- 
tions of them expended in overcoming resistance) thus 
becomes the cause of, and the measure of, the mental con- 
nection between the impressions which the phenomena 
produce. Meanwhile, phenomena that are recognized as 
different from these, being phenomena that therefore affect 
different nervous elements, will have their connections sev- 
erally represented by motions along'other routes; and along 
each of these other routes the nervous discharges will sev- 
erally take place with a readiness proportionate to the fre- 
quency with which experience repeats the connection of 
phenomena. The classification of relations must hence go 
on pari passu with the classification of the related things. 
In common with the mixed sensations received from the 
external world, the mixed relations it presents cannot be 
impressed on the organism without more or less segrega- 
tion of them resulting. And through this continuous 
sorting and grouping together of changes or motions, which 
constitutes nervous function, there is gradually wrought 
that sorting and grouping together of matter, which con- 
stitutes nervous structure. 

§ 168. In social evolution, the collecting together of the 
like and the separation of the unlike, by incident forces, 
is primarily displayed in the same manner as we saw it to 
be among groups of inferior creatures. The human races 
tend to differentiate and integrate, as do races of other liv- 
ing forms. Of the forces which effect and maintain the 
segregations of mankind may first be named those external 
ones which we class as physical conditions. The climate 
and food that are favorable to an indigenous people are 
more or less detrimental to a people of different bodily con- 
stitution, coming from a remote part of the Earth. In 
tropical regions the northern races cannot permanently 
exist : if not killed off in the first generation, they are so 
in the second; and, as in India, can maintain their footing 
only by the artificial process of continous immigration 
and emigration. That is to say, the external forces acting 
equally on the inhabitants of a given locality tend to 
expel all who are not of a certain type, and so to keep up 
26 



402 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

the integration of those who are of that type. Though 
elsewhere, as among European nations, we see a certain 
amount of permanent intermixture otherwise brought 
about, we still see that this takes place between races of 
not very different types, that are naturalized to not very 
different conditions. The other forces conspiring to pro- 
duce these national segregations are those mental ones 
which show themselves in the affinities of men for others 
like themselves. Emigrants usually desire to get back 
among their own people; and where their desire does not 
take effect, it is only because the restraining ties are too 
great. Units of one society who are obliged to reside in 
another, very generally form colonies in the midst of that 
other — small societies of their own. Races which have been 
artificially severed show strong tendencies to reunite. 
Now though these segregations that result from the mutual 
affinities of kindred men do not seem interpretabie as il- 
lustrations of the general principle above enunciated, they 
really are thus interpretabie. When treating of the direc- 
tion of motion (§ 80), it was Bhown that the actions per- 
formed by men for the satisfaction of their wants were 
always motions along Lines of least resistance. The 
ings characterizing a member of a given race are feelings 
which get complete satisfaction only among other members 
of that race — a satisfaction partly derived from sympathy 
with those having like feelings, but mainly derived from 
the adapted social conditions which grow op where such 
feelings prevail. When, therefore, a ( itizen of any nation 
is, as we see, attracted toward others of li is nation, the 
rationale is. that certain agencies which we call desires 
move him in the direction of least resistance Human 
motions, like all other motions, being determined by the 
distribution of forces, it follows that such segregations of 
races as are not produced by incident external fore- 
produced by forces which the units of the races exercise 
on each other. 

During the development of each society we see aualogous 
segregations caused in analogous ways. A few of them 
result from minor natural affinities; but those most im- 
portant ones which constitute political and industrial or- 
ganization result from the union of men in whom similar- 
ities have been produced by education — using education in 
its widest sense, as comprehending all processes by which 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 403 

citizens are moulded to special functions. Men brought 
up to bodily labor are men who have had wrought in them 
a certain likeness — a likeness which, in respect of their 
powers of action, obscures and subordinates their natural 
differences. Those trained to brain-work have acquired 
a certain other community of character which makes 
them, as social units, more like each other than like those 
trained to manual occupations. And there arise class- 
segregations answering to these superinduced likenesses. 
Much more definite segregations take place among the 
much more definitely assimilated members of any class who 
are brought up to the same calling. Even where the neces- 
sities of their work forbid concentration in one locality, 
as among artisans happens with masons and bricklayers 
and, among traders happens with the retail distributors, 
and among professionals happens with the medical men; 
there are not wanting Operative Builders' Unions, and 
Grocers' Societies, and Medical Associations, to show that 
these artificially assimilated citizens become integrated as 
much as the conditions permit. And where, as among the 
manufacturing classes, the functions discharged do not re- 
quire the dispersion of the citizens thus artificially assimi- 
lated, there is a progressive aggregation of them in special 
localities, and a consequent increase in the definiteness of 
the industrial divisions. If now we seek the causes of these 
segregations, considered as results of force and motion, we 
find ourselves brought to the same general principle as be- 
fore. This likeness generated in any class or subclass by 
training is an aptitude acquired by its members for satisfy- 
ing their wants in like ways. That is, the occupation to 
which each man has been brought up has become to him, 
in common with those similarly brought up, a line of least 
resistance. Hence under that pressure which determines 
all men to activity, these similarly modified social units are 
similarly affected, and tend to take similar courses. If 
then there be any locality which, either by its physical 
peculiarities or by peculiarities wrought on it during 
social evolution, is rendered a place where a certain 
kind of industrial action meets with less resistance than 
elsewhere, it follows from the. law of direction of mo- 
tion that those social units who have been moulded to 
this kind of industrial action will move toward this 
place, or become integrated there. If, for instance, the 



404 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

proximity of coal and iron mines to a navigable river 
gives to Glasgow a certain advantage in the building 
of iron ships — if the total labor required to produce 
the same vessel, and get its equivalent in food and 
clothing, is less there than elsewhere, a concentration of 
iron-ship builders is produced at Glasgow: either by keep- 
ing there the population born to iron-ship building, or by 
immigration of those elsewhere engaged in it, or by both 
— a concentration that would be still more marked did not 
other districts offer counterbalancing facilities. The prin- 
ciple equally holds where the occupation is mercantile in- 
stead of manufacturing. Stock-brokers cli gether 
in the city, beeau.se the amount of effort i -rally 
gone through by them in discharging their functions and 
obtaining their profits 18 less there than in other localities. 
A place of exchange having once been established, bee 
a place where the resistance to he- overcome by each is less 
than elsewhere; and the pursuit of the course of leas 
sistance by each involves their aggregation around this 
place. 

Of course, with units so complicated as those which 
constitute a society, and with forces so involved as 
which move them, the resulting selection parations 

must be far more entangled, or far less definite, than those 
we have hitherto considered. But though there may be 
pointed out many anomalies which at G 1 in- 

consistent with the alleged law, a clos r >n a that 

they are but subtler illustrations of it. For men's like- 
nesses being of various kinds, lead t<» various ord\ 
regation. 'There are likenesses of disposition, lik* I 
of taste, likenesses produced by intellectual culture, like- 
nesses, thai result from class-training, lik litical 
feeling; and it needs but l<» glance round at the caste-di- 
visions, the associations for philanthropic, scientific, and 
artistic purposes, the religious parties and social cliques, 
to see that some species of likeness among the component 
members of each body determines their union. Now the 
different segregative processes by traversing one another, 
and often by their indirect antagonism, more or le€ 
one another's effects, and prevent any one differentiated 
class from completely integrating. Heme the anomalies 
referred to. But if this cause of incompleteness be duly 
borne in mind, social segregations .\ill be seen to conform 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 405 

entirely to the same principle as all other segregations. 
Analysis will show that either by external incident forces, 
or by what we may in a sense regard as mutual polarity, 
there are ever being produced in society segregations of 
those units which have either a natural likeness or a likeness 
generated by training. 

§ 169. Can the general truth thus variously illustrated 
be deduced from the persistence of force, in common with 
foregoing ones? Probably the exposition at the beginning 
of the chapter will have led most readers to conclude that 
it can be so deduced. 

The abstract propositions involved are these: First, 
that like units, subject to a uniform force capable of pro- 
ducing motion in them, will be moved to like degrees in 
the same direction. Second, that like units, if exposed to 
unlike forces capable of producing motion in them, will be 
differently moved — moved either in different directions or 
to different degrees in the same direction. Third, that 
unlike units, if acted on by a uniform force capable of 
producing motion in them, will be differently moved — 
moved either in different directions or to different de- 
grees in the same direction. Fourth, that the incident 
forces themselves must be affected in analogous ways: 
like forces falling en like units must be similarly modi- 
fied by the conflict; unlike forces falling on like units 
must be dissimilarly modified; and like forces falling 
on unlike units must be dissimilarly modified. These 
propositions admit of reduction to a still more abstract 
form. They all of them amount to this: that in the 
actions and reactions of force and matter an unlikeness 
in either of the factors necessitates an unlikeness- in the 
effects; and that in the absence of unlikeness in either of 
the factors the effects must be alike. 

When thus generalized, the immediate dependence of 
these propositions on the persistence of force becomes 
obvious. Any two forces that are not alike are forces 
which differ either in their amounts or directions or both; 
and by what mathematicians call the resolution of forces 
it may be proved that this difference is constituted by the 
presence in the one of some force not present in the other. 
Similarly, any two units or portions of matter which are 
unlike in size, weight, form, or other attribute can be 



406 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

known by us as unlike only though some unlikeness in the 
forces they impress on our consciousness ; hence this unlike- 
ness also is constituted by the presence in the one of some 
force or forces not present in the other. Such being the 
common nature of these unlikenesses, what is the inevitable 
corollary? Any unlikeness in the incident forces, where 
the things acted on are alike, must generate a difference 
between the effects; since otherwiset he differential force 
produces no effect, and force is not persistent. Any unlike- 
ness in the things acted on, where the incident forces are 
alike, must generate a difference between the effects; since 
otherwise the differential force, whereby these things are 
made unlike, produces no effect, and force is not persistent. 
While, conversely, if the forces acting and the things acted 
on arc alike, the effects must be alike; since other? 
differential effect can be produced without a differential 
cause, and force is not persistent. 

Tims these general truths being nee* ssary implications 
of the persistence of force, all the redistributions above 
traced out as characterizing evolution in its various phases 
are also implications of the persistence of force. Such 
tions of the permanently effective forces acting on ai 
gregate as produce sensible motions in its parts cannot 
but work the segregations which we see take pis 
the mixed units making up such aggregate, those of the 
same kind have like motions impressed en them by a uni- 
form force, while units of another kind are moved by this 
uniform force in ways more or less unlike the Wl 
which those of the first kind are moved, the two kinds 
must separate and integrate. If the units are alike and 
the forces unlike, a division of the differently affected units 
is equally necessitated. Thus there inevitably arises the 
demarcated grouping which we everywhere see. By virtue 
of this segregation that grows ever more decided while there 
remains any possibility of increasing it. the change 
uniformity to multiformity is accompanied by a cl 
from indistinctness in the relations of parts to distil) 
in the relations of parts. As we before saw that the trans- 
formation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous is 
inferable from that ultimate truth which transcends proof, 
so we here see that from this same truth is inferable the 
transformation of an indefinite homogeneity into a definite 
heterogeneity. 




CHAPTER XXII. 

EQUILIBRATION. 

§ 70. And now toward what do these changes tend? 
Will they go on forever, or will there be an end to them? 
Can things increase in heterogeneity through all future 
time, or must there be a degree which the differentiation 
and integration of Matter and Motion cannot pass? Is 
it possible for this universal metamorphosis to proceed in 
the same general course indefinitely, or does it work toward 
some ultimate state, admitting no further modification of 
like kind? The last of these alternative conclusions is 
that to which we are inevitably driven. Whether we watch 
concrete processes, or whether we consider the question in 
the abstract, we are alike taught that Evolution has an 
impassable limit. 

The redistributions of matter that go on around us are 
ever being brought to conclusions by the dissipation of the 
motions which effect them. The rolling stone parts with 
portions of its momentum to the things it strikes, and 
finally comes to rest, as do also, in like manner, the various 
things it has struck. Descending from the clouds and 
trickling over the Earth's surface till it gathers into brooks 
and rivers, water, still running toward a lower level, is at 
last arrested by the resistance of other water that has 
reached the lowest level. In the lake or sea thus formed, 
every agitation raised by a wind or the immersion of a 
solid body propagates itself around in waves that diminish 
as they widen, and gradually become lost to observation 
in motions communicated to the atmosphere and the 
matter on the shores. The impulse given by a player to 
the harp-string is transformed through its vibration 
into aerial pulses; and these, spreading on all sides, and 
weakening as they spread, soon cease to be perceptible and 
finally die away in generating thermal undulations that ra- 
diate into space. Equally in the cinder that falls out of the 
fire, and in the vast masses of molten lava ejected by a vol- 
cano, we see that the molecular agitation known to us as 
heat disperses itself by radiation; so that, however great its 
amount, it inevitably sinks at last to the same degree as 




408 FIRST PRIXCIPLES. 

that existing in surrounding bodies. And if the actions 
observed be electrical or chemical, we still find that they 
work themselves out in producing sensible or insensible 
movements, that are dissipated as before, until quiescence 
is eventually reached. The proximate rationale of the 
process exhibited under these several forms lies in the fact 
dwelt on when treating of the Multiplication of Effects, 
that motions are ever being decomposed into divergent 
motions, and these into redivergent motions. The rolling 
stone sends off the stones it hits in directions differing more 
or less from its own; and they do the like with the things 
they hit. Move water or air, and the movement is quickly 
resolved into radiating movements. The heat produced 
by pressure in a given direction, diffuses itself by undula- 
tions in all directions; and so do the light and electrieity 
similarly generated. That is to say, these motions under- 
go division and subdivision; and by continuance of this 
process without limit, they are, though ne^erlost, gradually 
reduced to insensible motions. 

In all eases, then, there is a progress t«»ward equilibration. 
That universal coexistence of antagonist forces which, as 
we before saw. necessitates the universality of rhythm, and 
which, as we before saw. necessitates the decomposition of 
every force into divergent forces, at the same time neces- 
sitates the ultimate establishment of a balance. Every 
motion being motion under resistance is continually suffer- 
ing deductions; and these unceasing deductions finally re- 
sult in the cessation of the motion. 

The general truth thus illustrated under its simplest 
aspect we must now look at under those more complex 
aspects it usually presents throughout Nature. In nearly 
all cases, the motion of an aggregate is compound; and the 
equilibration of each of its components, being carried on 
independently, docs not affect the rest. The ship's bell 
that has ceased to vibrate still continues those vertical and 
lateral oscillations caused by the ocean-swell. The water of 
the smooth stream, on whose surface have died away the un- 
dulations caused by the rising fish, moves as fast as before 
onward to the sea. The arrested bullet travels with undi- 
minished speed round the Earth's axis. And were the 
rotation of the Earth destroyed, there would not be implied 
any diminution of the Earth's movement with respect to the 
Sun and other external bodies. So that in every case, what 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 409 

we regard as equilibration is a disappearance of some one or 
more of the many movements which a body possesses, while 
its other movements continue as before. That this process 
may be duly realized and the state of things toward which 
it tends fully understood, it will be well here to cite a case 
in which we may watch this successive equilibration of 
combined movements more completely than we can do in 
those above instanced. Our end will best be served, not by 
the most imposing, but by the most familiar example. 
Let us take that of the spinning top. When the string 
which has been wrapped round a top's axis is violently 
drawn off, and the top falls on to the table, it usually happens 
that, besides the rapid rotation, two other movements are 
given to it. A slight horizontal momentum, unavoidably 
impressed on it when leaving the handle, carries it away 
bodily from the place on which it drops; and in conse- 
quence of its axis being more or less inclined, it falls 
into a certain oscillation, described by the expressive 
though inelegant word " wabbling. " These two subordi- 
nate motions, variable in their proportions to each other 
and to the chief motion, are commonly soon brought to a 
close by separate processes of equilibration. The momen- 
tum which carries the top bodily along the table, resicted 
somewhat by the air, but mainly by the irregularities of 
the surface, shortly disappears; and the top thereafter 
continues to spin on one spot. Meanwhile, in consequence 
of that opposition which the axial momentum of a rotating 
body makes to any change in the plane of rotation (so beauti- 
fully exhibited by the gyroscope), the " wabbling" dimin- 
ishes, and like the other is quickly ended. These minor 
motions having been dissipated, the rotatory motion, in- 
terfered with only by atmospheric resistance and the 
friction of the pivot, continues some time with such uni- 
formity that the top appears stationary : there being thus 
temporarily established a condition which the French 
mathematicians have termed equilibrium mobile. It is true 
that, when the axial velocity sinks below a certain point, 
new motions commence, and increase till the top falls; 
but these are merely incidental to a case in which the 
centre of gravity is above the point of support. Were the 
top, having an axis of steel, to be suspended from a sur- 
face adequately magnetized, all the phenomena described 
would be displayed, and the moving equilibrium, having 



410 • FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

been once arrived at, would continue until the top became 
motionless, without any further change of position. Xow 
the facts which it behooves us here to observe are these. 
First, that the various motions which an aggregate pos- 
sesses are separately equilibrated: those which are smallest, 
or which meet with the greatest resistance, or both, dis- 
appearing tirst, and leaving at last that which is greatest. 
or meets with least resistance, or both. Second, that when 
the aggregate has a movement of its parts with respect to 
each other, which encounters but little external resistance, 
there is apt to be established an equilibrium mobile. 
Third, that this moving equilibrium eventually lapses 
into complete equilibrium. 

Fully to comprehend the process of equilibration is not 
easy, since we have simultaneously to contemplate various 
phases of it. The best course will be to glance separately 
at what we may conveniently regard as its four different 
orders. The first order includes the comparatively simple 
motions, as those of projectiles, which are not prolonged 
enough to exhibit their rhythmical character; bat which, 
being quickly divided and subdivided into motions com- 
municated to other portions of matter, are presently dis- 
sipated in the rhythm of ethereal undulations. In the 
second order, comprehending the various kinds of vibra- 
tion or oscillation as usually witnessed, the motion is 
up in generating a tension which, having become equal to 
it or momentarily equilibrated with it, thereupon produces 
amotion in the opposite direction, that is subsequently 
equilibrated in like manner: thus causing a visible 
rhythm that is, however, soon lost in invisible rhythms. 
The third order of equilibration, not hitherto noticed, ob- 
tains in those aggregates which continually receive as 

do a 

much motion as they expend. The steam engine (and 
especially that kind which feeds its own furnace and boiler) 
supplies an example. Here the force from moment to 
moment dissipated in overcoming the resistance of the 
machinery driven is from moment to moment replaced 
from the fuel: and the balance of the two is maintained 
by a raising or lowering of the expenditure according to 
the variation of the supply : each increase or decrease in the 
quantity of steam resulting in a rise or fall of the en- 
gine's movement, such as brings it to a balance with the 
increased or decreased resistance. This, which we may fitly 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 411 

call the dependent moving equilibrium, should be specially 
noted; since it is one that we shall commonly meet with 
throughout various phases of Evolution. The equilibration 
to be distinguished as of the fourth order is the independent 
or perfect moving equilibrium. This we see illustrated in 
the rhythmical motions of the Solar System ; which, being 
resisted only by a medium of inappreciable density, un- 
dergo no sensible diminution in such periods of time as 
we can measure. 

All these kinds of equilibration may, however, from the 
highest point of view, be regarded as different modes of 
one kind. For in every case the balance arrived at is 
relative, and not absolute — is a cessation of the motion of 
some particular body in relation to a certain point or 
points, involving neither the disappearance of the relative 
motion lost, which is simply transformed into other mo- 
tions, nor a. diminution of the body's motions with respect 
to other points. Thus understanding equilibration, it 
manifestly includes that equilibrium mobile, which at first 
sight seems of another nature. For any system of bodies 
exhibiting, like those of the Solar S} T stem, a combination 
of balanced rhythms, has this peculiarity: that though 
the constituents of the system have relative movements, 
the system as a whole has no movement. The centre of 
gravity of the entire group remains fixed. Whatever 
quantity of motion any member of it has in any direction 
is from moment to moment counterbalanced by an equiva- 
lent motion in some other part of the group in an opposite 
direction ; and so the aggregate matter of the group is in 
a state of rest. Whence it follows that the arrival at a 
state of moving equilibrium is the disappearance of some 
movement which the aggregate had in relation to external 
things, and a continuance of those movements only which 
the different parts of the aggregate have in relation to each 
other. Thus generalizing the process, it becomes clear that 
all forms of equilibration are intrinsically the same; since, 
in every aggregate, it is the centre of gravity only that 
loses its motion: the constituents always retaining some 
motion with respect to each other — the motion of mole- 
cules if none else. Every equilibrium commonly regarded 
as absolute is in one sense a moving equilibrium ; because 
along with a motionless state of the whole there is always 
some relative movement of its insensible parts. And, 



412 m FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

conversely, every moving equilibrium may be in one sense 
regarded as absolute; because the relative movements of 
its sensible parts are accompanied by a motionless state of 
the whole. 

Something has still to be added before closing these some- 
what too elaborate preliminaries. The reader must now 
especially note two leading truths brought out by the fore- 
going exposition: the one concerning the ultimate, or 
rather the penultimate, state of motion which the pro- 
cesses described tend to bring about: the other concern- 
ing the concomitant distribution of matter. This penul- 
timate state of motion is the moving equilibrium, which, as 
we have seen, tends to arise in an aggregate having compound 
motions, as a transitional state on the way toward complete 
equilibrium. Throughout Evolution of all kinds, there is 
a continual approximation to, and more or lese complete 
maintenance of, this moving equilibrium. As in the 
Solar System there has been established an independent 
moving equilibrium — an equilibrium such that the relative 
motions of the constituent parts are continually so counter- 
balanced by opposite motions, that the mean state of the 
whole aggregate never varies — bo is it, though in a less 
tinct manner, with each form of dependent moving equi- 
librium. The state of things exhibited in the cycl 
terrestrial changes, in the balanced functions of organic 
bodies that have readied their adult forms, and in the 
acting and reacting pi i' fully developed societies, 

is similarly one characterized by compensating oscillations. 
The involved combination of rhythms seen in each of these 
cases has an average condition which remains practically 
constant, during the deviations ever taking place on opposite 
sides of it. And the fact which we have here particularly 
to observe is that, as a corollary from the general law of 
equilibration above set forth, the evolution of every ag- 
gregate must go on until this equilibrium mobile is estab- 
lished; since, as we have seen, an excess of force which 
the aggregate possesses in any direction must eventually 
be expended in overcoming resistances to change in that 
direction, leaving behind only those movements which 
compensate each other, and so form a moving equilibrium. 
Respecting the structural state simultaneously reached, it 
must obviously be one presenting an arrangement of forces 
that counterbalance all the forces to which the aggregate 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 413 

is subject. So long as there remains a residual force in 
any direction, be it excess of a force exercised by the ag- 
gregate on its environment, or of a force exercised by its 
environment on the aggregate, equilibrium does not exist; 
and therefore the redistribution of matter must continue. 
Whence it follows that the limit of heterogeneity toward 
which every aggregate progresses is the formation of as 
many specializations and combinations of parts as there 
are specialized and combined forces to be met. 

§ 171. Those successively changed forms which, if the 
nebular hypothesis be granted, must have arisen during 
the evolution of the Solar System, were so many transitional 
kinds of moving equilibrium, severally giving place to 
more permanent kinds on the way toward complete equili- 
bration. Thus the assumption of an oblate spheroidical 
figure by condensing nebulous matter was the assumption 
of a temporary and partial moving equilibrium among the 
component parts — a moving equilibrium that must have 
slowly grown more settled, as local conflicting movements 
were dissipated. In the formation and detachment of 
the nebulous rings, which, according to this hypothesis, 
from time to time took place, we have instances of pro- 
gressive equilibration ending in the establishment of a 
complete moving equilibrium. For the genesis of each 
such ring implies a perfect balancing of that aggregative 
force which the whole spheroid exercises on its equatorial 
portion, by that centrifugal force which the equatorial 
portion has acquired during previous concentration: so 
long as these two forces are not equal, the equatorial por- 
tion follows the contracting mass, but as soon as the second 
force has increased up to an equality with the first, the 
equatorial portion can follow no further, and remains be- 
hind. While, however, the resulting ring, regarded as a 
whole connected by forces with external wholes, has reached 
a state of moving equilibrium, its parts are not balanced 
with respect to each other. As we before saw (§ 150) the 
probabilities against the maintenance of an annular form 
by nebulous matter are immense : from the instability of 
the homogeneous, it is inferable that nebulous matter so 
distributed must break up into portions; and eventually 
concentrate into a single mass. That is to say, the ring 
must progress toward a moving equilibrium of a more com- 



414 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

plete kind, during the dissipation of that motion which 
maintained its particles in a diffused form: leaving at 
length a planetary body, attended perhaps by a group of 
minor bodies, severally having residuary relative motions 
that are no longer resisted by sensible media; and there is 
thus constituted an equilibrium mobile that is all but ab- 
solutely perfect.* 

Hypothesis aside, the principle of equilibration is still 
perpetually illustrated in those minor changes of state 
which the Solar System is undergoing. Each planet, sat- 
ellite, and comet exhibits to us at its aphelion a momen- 
tary equilibrium between that force which urges it further 
away from its primary, and that force which retards its 
retreat; since the retreat goes on until the last of these 
forces exactly counterpoises the first. In like manner at 
perihelion a converse equilibrium is momentarily i 
fished. The variation of each orbit in size, in eccentricity, 
and in the position of its plane, has similarly a limit at 
which the forces producing change in one direction are 
equalled by those antagonizing it; and an opposite limit at 
which an opposite arrest takes place. Meanwhile, each of 
these simple perturbations, as well as each of the complex 
ones resulting from their combination, exhibits, besides 
the temporary equilibration at each of its extremes, a cer- 
tain general equilibration of compensating deviations on 
either side of a mean state. That the moving equilibrium 
thus constituted tends, in the course of indefinite time, to 
lapse into a complete equilibrium, by the gradual dec 
of planetary motions and eventual integration of all the 
separate masses composing the Solar System, is a belief 
suggested by certain observed cometary retardations, and 
entertained by some of high authority. The received 

* Sir David Brewster lias recently l>een citing with approval a calculation by 
31. Babinet, to the effect that, on the hypothesis of nebular genesis 
of the Sun. when it filled the Eartli*s orbit, must have tak< - to ro- 

tate; and that therefore the by] not be true. This calculation of M. 

Babinet may pair off with that of 31. Couue. * ho. contrariv 
of this rotation agree very nearly with the Earth's period of revolution round 
the Sun: for if M. Oomte's calculation involved & petitio principii, that of M. 
Babinet is manifestly based on two assumptions, both of which are gratuitous, 
and one of them totally inconsistent with the doctrine to be tested. He has evi- 
dently proceeded on the current supposition respecting the Sun's internal den- 
sity, which is not proved, and from which there are reasons fc 
and he has evidently taken for granted that all parts of the nebulous spheroid, 
when it rilled the Earth's orbit, bad the same angular velocity: whereas 
is implied in the nebular hypothesis, rationally understood) this spheroid 
resulted from the concentration or" far more widely dif r, the angu- 

lar velocity of its equatorial portion would obviously be immensely g 
than that of its central portion. 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 415 

opinion that the appreciable diminution in the period of 
Encke's comet implies a loss of momentum caused by re- 
sistance of the ethereal medium commits astronomers who 
hold it to the conclusion that this same resistance must 
cause a loss of planetary motions — a loss which, infini- 
tesimal though it may be in such periods as we can measure, 
will, if indefinitely continued, bring these motions to a close. 
Even should there be, as Sir John Herschel suggests, a ro- 
tation of the ethereal medium in the same direction with the 
planets, this arrest, though immensely postponed, would 
not be absolutely prevented. Such an eventuality, how- 
ever, must in any case be so inconceivably remote as to 
have no other than a speculative interest for us. It is re- 
ferred to here, simply as illustrating the still-continued 
tendency toward complete equilibrium, through the still- 
continued dissipation of sensible motion, or transforma- 
tion of it into insensible motion. 

But there is another species of equilibration going on in 
the Solar System with which we are more nearly con- 
cerned — the equilibration of that molecular motion known 
as heat. The tacit assumption hitherto current, that the 
Sun can continue to give off an undiminished amount of 
light and heat through all future time, is fast being aban- 
doned. Involving as it does, under a disguise, the con- 
ception of power produced out of nothing, it is of the 
same order as the belief that misleads perpetual-motion 
schemers. The spreading recognition of the truth that 
force is persistent, and that consequently whatever force 
is manifested under one shape must previously have existed 
under another shape, is carrying with it a recognition of 
the truth that the force known to us in solar radiations 
is the changed form of some other force of which the Sun 
is the seat; and that by the gradual dissipation of these 
radiations into space this other force is being slowly ex- 
hausted. The aggregative force by which the Sun's sub- 
stance is drawn to his centre of gravity is the only one 
which established physical laws warrant us in suspecting 
to be the correlate of the forces thus emanating from him: 
the only source of a known kind that can be assigned for 
the insensible motions constituting solar light and heat 
is the sensible motion which disappears during the progress- 
ing concentration of the Sun's substance. We therefore 
saw it to be a corollary from the nebular hypothesis that 



410 FIRST PRINCIPLES, 

there is such a progressing concentration of the Sun's sab- 
stance. And here remains to be added the further corol- 
lary, that, just as in the case of the smaller members of the 
Solar System, the heat generated by concentration, long 
ago in great part radiated into space, has left only a cen- 
tral residue that now escapes but slowly; so in the case of 
that immensely larger mass forming the Sun. the immensely 
greater quantity of heat generated and still in pro 
rapid diffusion must, as the concentration approaches its 
limit, diminish in amount, and eventually leave only an 
inappreciable internal remnant. With or without the ac- 
companiment of that hypothesis of nebular condensation, 
when' . see, it naturally follows, the doctrine that 

tl Son is | .dually losing his heat has now gaine-i 
siderable curri I calculations have been made, both 

■ling the amount of beat and light already radiated, 
spared with the amount that remains, and respecting 
the period during which active radiation is likely to con- 
tinue. Prof. Helmholtz estimates that since the time 
when, according to the nebular hypothesis, 
composing the S 5 the orbit of Nep- 

tune, there h; . by the gm :isible 

in, an amount of heat 4">4 times as great as that « 
tlie Sun .-till has t<> give out. He also makes an approx- 
imate estimate of the rate at which this remain _ 
is being diffused : - that a diminution of the S 

diameter to l n would produce he 

the present rate, for more than an; in 

words, that a tion of yg-.W^.innr °f n ^ s diameter 

Buffia - rate the amount and heat annually 

emitted; and that thus, at the present rate of expenditure, 
the Sun's diameter will diminish by something like 
the lapse of the next million years.* Of coi -•• con- 

clusions are not : - red as more than rod 

proximations to the truth. Until quite recently, we have 
been totally ignorant of the Sun's chemical composition; 
and even now have obtained but a superficial know 
of it. We know nothing of his internal structure: 
it is quite possible (probable, I believe) that the assump- 
tions respecting central density, made in the foreg g - 

* Set? paper "On the Inter-action of Natural Forces, " by ProC. Helmholtx. 
translated by Prof. Tyudall. and published in the Philosophical Magazine* 
supplement to Vol. XI. , fourth series. 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 417 

timates, are wrong. But no uncertainty in the data on 
which these calculations proceed, and no consequent error 
in the inferred rate at which the Sun is expending his re- 
serve of force, militates against the general proposition 
that this reserve of force is being expended, and must in 
time be exhausted. Though the residue of undiffused 
motion in the Sun may be much greater than is above 
concluded ; though the rate of radiation cannot, as as- 
sumed, continue at a uniform rate, but must eventually go 
on with slowly decreasing rapidity ; and though the period 
at which the Sun will cease to afford us adequate light and 
heat is very possibly far more distant than above implied ; 
yet such a period must some time be reached, and this is 
all which it here concerns us to observe. 

Thus while the Solar System, if evolved from diffused 
matter, has illustrated the law of equilibration in the es- 
tablishment of a complete moving equilibrium; and while, 
as at present constituted, it illustrates the law of equili- 
bration in the balancing of all its movements; it also illus- 
trates this law in the processes which astronomers and 
physicists infer are still going on. That motion of masses 
produced during Evolution, is being slowly rediffused in 
molecular motion of the ethereal medium; both through 
the progressive integration of each mass and the resistance 
to its motion through space. Infinitely remote as may be 
the state when all the motions of masses shall be trans- 
formed into molecular motion, and all the molecular 
motion equilibrated, yet such a state of complete integra- 
tion and complete equilibration is that toward which the 
changes now going on throughout the Solar System inevi- 
tably tend. 

§ 172. A spherical figure is the one which can alone 
equilibrate the forces of mutally gravitating atoms. If 
the aggregate of such atoms has a rotatory motion, the form 
of equilibrium becomes a spheroid of greater or less oblate- 
ness, according to the rate of rotation ; and it has been 
ascertained that the Earth is an oblate spheroid, diverging 
just as much from sphericity as is requisite to counter- 
balance the centrifugal force consequent on its velocity 
round its axis. That is to say, during the evolution of the 
Earth, there has been reached a complete equilibrium of 
those forces which affect its general outline. The only 
27 



418 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

other process of equilibration which the earth as a whole 
can exhibit is the loss of its axial motion; and that any 
such loss is going on we have no direct evidence. It has 
been contended, however, by Prof. Ilelmholtz, that inap- 
preciable as may be its effect within known periods of time, 
the friction of the tidal wave must be slowly diminishing 
the Earth's rotatory motion, and must eventually dee 
it. Now though it seems an oversight to say thai 
Earth's rotation can thus be destroyed, since the extreme 
eifect, to be reached only in infinite time by such a pi 
would be an extension of the Earth's day to the length of 
a lunation, yet it seems clear that this friction of the tidal 
wave is a real canse of decreasing rotation. Slow as its 
action is, we must recognize it a.- exemplifying, nndi 
other form, the universal progress toward equilibrium. 

It is needless to point out, in detail, how those move- 
ments which the Sun's rays generate in the air and water 
oil the Earth's surface, and through them in the Earth's 
solid substance,* one and all teach the same general truth. 
Evidently the winds and waves and ell as the 

denudations and depositions they ( rpetually illus- 

trate ou a grand Bcale, and in endless modes, thai gradual 
dissipation of motions described in the first Bection; and 
the consequent tendency toward a balanced distribution 
of forces. Each of tl sible mol ed di- 

rectly or indirectly by integration of ti: mo- 

tions communicated from the Sun, becomes, as we have 
seen, divided and subdivided into mo- a and less 

sensible: until it is finally reduced to insensible motions, 
and radiated from the Earth in the shape of thermal un- 
dulations. In their totality, these com; ements of 
aerial, liquid, and solid matter on the Earth's crust 
stitute a dependent moving equilibrium. As we before 
saw, there is traceable throughout them an involved 
bination of rhythms. The unceasing circulation 
from the ocean to the land, and from the land back : 
ocean, is a type of these various compensa 
which, in the midst of all the irregularities pi 

* Until I recently consulted his 'Our lines of Astronomy" on another q : 
I was not aware that so tar back as 1883 Sir John Herschel had enunciated the 
doctrine that "the sun's ravs are the ultimate source of almost every motion 

which takes place on the surface of the earth."" He expressly inch. 
geologic, meteerolocie. and vital a also those which we produce 

by the combustion of coal. The late George Stephenson appears to have been 
wrongly credited with this last idea. 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 419 

their mutual interferences, maintain an average. And in 
this, as in other equilibrations of the third order, we see 
that the power from moment to moment in course of dissi- 
pation is from moment to moment renewed from without: 
the rises and falls in the supply being balanced by rises 
and falls in the expenditure ; as witness the correspondence 
between the magnetic variations and the cycle of the solar 
spots. But the fact it chiefly concerns us to observe is, 
that this process must go on bringing things ever nearer to 
complete rest. These mechanical movements, meteorologic 
and geologic, which are continually being equilibrated, 
both temporarily by counter-movements and permanently 
by the dissipation of such movements and counter-move- 
ments, will slowly diminish as the quantity of force re- 
ceived from the Sun diminishes. As the insensible motions 
propagated to us from the centre of our system become 
feebler, the sensible motions here produced by them must 
decrease ; and at that remote period when the solar heat 
has ceased to be appreciable, there will no longer be any 
appreciable redistributions of matter on the surface of our 
planet. 

Thus, from the highest point of view, all terrestrial 
changes are incidents in the course of cosmical equilibra- 
tion. It was before pointed out (§ 69) that of the incessant 
alterations which the Earth's crust and atmosphere under- 
go, those which are not due to the still-progressing motion 
of the Earth's substance toward its centre of gravity are 
due to the still-progressing motion of the Sun's substance 
toward its centre of gravity. Here it is to be remarked 
that this continuance of integration in the Earth and in 
the Sun is a continuance of that transformation of sensible 
motion into insensible motion which we have seen ends in 
equilibration; and that the arrival in each case at the ex- 
treme of integration is the arrival at a state in which no 
more sensible motion remains to be transformed into insen- 
sible motion — a state in which the forces producing inte- 
gration and the forces opposing integration have become 
equal. 

§ 173. Every living body exhibits, in a fourfold form, 
the process we are tracing out — exhibits it from moment 
to moment in the balancing of mechanical forces; from 
hour to hour in the balancing of functions; from year to 



420 FIRST PRIXCIPLES. 

year in the changes of state that compensate changes of 
condition ; and finally in the complete arrest of vital move- 
ments at death. Let ua consider the facts under these heads. 
The sensible motion constituting each visible action of 
an organism is soon brought to a close by some adverse 
force within or without the organism. "When the arm is 
raised, the motion given to it is antagonized partly by 
gravity and partly by the internal resistances consequent 
on structure; and its motion, thus suffering continual de- 
duction, ends when the arm has reached a position at 
which the forces are equilibrated. The limits of each 
systole and diastole of the heart severally show us a moment- 
ary equilibrium between muscular strains that produce 
opposite movements; and each gush of blood requires to be 
immediately followed by another, because the rapid dissi- 
pation of its momentum would otherwise soon bring the 
mass of circulating fluid to a stand. Afl much in the ac- 
tions and react ions going on among the internal organs, as in 
the mechanical balancing of the whole body, there is at every 
instant a prog: [uilibration of the motions at every 

instant produced. Viewed in their i id as form- 

ing a series, the organic functions constitute a dependent 
moving equilibrium — a moving equilibrium, of which the 
motive power is ever being dissipated through the 8] 
equilibrations just exemplified, and is ever being re:. 
by the taking in of additional motive power. Food is a 
store of force which continually adds momentum of 

the vital actions, as much as is continually deducted 
them by the forces overcome. All the functional move- 
ments thus maintained ar . n, rhythmical 
(8 85) ; by their union compound rhythms of various lengths 
and complexities are produced; and in these simp;. 
compound rhythms the process of equilibratioi 
being exemplified at each extreme of every rhythm, is - 
in the habitual preservation of a eon-rant mean, and in the 
re-establishment of that mean when accidental causes have 
produced divergence from it. When, for instance, I 
is a great expenditure of motion through muscular activity, 
there arises a reactive demand on those stores of latent 
motion which are laid up in the form of consumable matter 
throughout the tissues: increased respiration and inc: 
rapidity of circulation are instrumental to an extra g 
offeree that counterbalances the extra dissipation of force. 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 421 

This unusual transformation of molecular motion into sen- 
sible motion is presently followed by an unusual absorption 
of food — the source of molecular motion ; and in proportion 
as there has been a prolonged draft upon the spare capital 
of the system is there a tendency to a prolonged rest, dur- 
ing which that spare capital is replaced. If the deviation 
from the ordinary course of the functions has been so great 
as to derange them, as when violent exertion produces loss 
of appetite and loss of sleep, an equilibration is still event- 
ually effected. Providing the disturbance is not such as 
to overturn the balance of the functions and destroy life 
(in which case a complete equilibration is suddenly ef- 
fected), the ordinary balance is by-and-by re-established: 
the returning appetite is keen in proportion as the waste 
has been large; while sleep, sound and prolonged, makes 
up for previous wakefulness. Not even in those extreme 
cases where some excess has wrought a derangement that 
is never wholly rectified is there an exception to the gen- 
eral law ; for in such cases the cycle of the functions is, after 
a time, equilibrated about a new mean state, which thence- 
forth becomes the normal state of the individual. Thus, 
among the involved rhythmical changes constituting or- 
ganic life, any disturbing force that works an excess of 
change in some direction is gradually diminished and 
finally neutralized by antagonistic forces, which thereupon 
work a compensating change in the opposite direction, and 
so, after more or less of oscillation, restore the medium 
condition. And this process it is which constitutes what 
physicians call the vis medicatrix natures. The third form 
of equilibration displayed by organic bodies is a necessary 
sequence of that just illustrated. When through a change 
of habit or circumstance an organism is permanently subject 
to some new influence, or a different amount of an old in- 
fluence, there arises, after more or less disturbance of the 
organic rhythms, a balancing of them around the new 
average condition produced by this additional influence. 
As temporary divergences of the organic rhythms are 
counteracted by temporary divergences of a reverse kind, 
so there is an equilibration of their permanent divergences 
by the genesis of opposing divergences that are equally 
permanent. If the quantity of motion to be habitually 
generated by a muscle becomes greater than before, its 
nutrition becomes greater than before. If the expenditure 



422 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

of the muscle bears to its nutrition a greater ratio than 
expenditure bears to nutrition in other parts of the system, 
the excess of nutrition becomes such that the muscle grows. 
And the cessation of its growth is the establishment of a 
balance between the daily waste and the daily repair — the 
daily expenditure of force, and the amount of latent force 
daily added. The like must manifestly be the case with 
all organic modifications consequent on change of climate 
or food. This is a conclusion which we may safely draw 
without knowing the special rearrangements that effect 
the equilibration. If we see that a different mode of life 
is followed, after a period of functional derangement, by 
some altered condition of the system — if we see that this 
altered condition, becoming by-and-by established, con- 
tinues without further change, we have no alternative but 
to say that the new forces brought to bear on the system 
have been compensated by the opposing forces they have 
evoked. And this is the interpretation of the process 
which we call adaptation. Finally, each organism illus- 
trates the law in the ensemble of its life. At the outset it 
daily absorbs under the form of food an amount of force 
greater than it daily exi)cnds; and the surplus is daily 
equilibrated by growth. As maturity is approached, this 
surplus diminishes; and in the perfect organism, the day's 
absorption of potential motion balances the day's expendi- 
ture of actual motion. That is to say, during adult life, 
there is continuously exhibited an equilibration of the 
third order. Eventually, the daily ginning to out- 

balance the daily gain, there results a diminishing amount 
of functional action; the organic rhythms extend less and 
less widely on each side of the medium state; and there 
finally results that complete equilibration which we call 
death. 

The ultimate structural state accompanying that ulti- 
mate functional state toward which an organism tends, 
both individually and as a species, may be deduced from 
one of the propositions set down in the opening section of 
this chapter. We saw that the limit of heterogeneity is 
arrived at whenever the equilibration of any aggregate be- 
comes complete — that the redistribution of matter can 
continue so long only as there continues any motion unbal- 
anced. Whence we found it to follow that the final struc- 
tural arrangements must be such as will meet all the forces 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 423 

acti on the aggregate, by equivalent antagonist forces. 
What is the implication in the case of organic aggregates, 
the equilibrium of which is a moving one? We have seen 
that the maintenance of such a moving equilibrium re- 
quires the habitual genesis of internal forces corresponding 
in number, directions, and amounts to the external inci- 
dent forces — as many inner functions, single or combined, 
as there are single or combined outer actions to be met. 
But functions are the correlatives of organs ; amounts of 
functions are, other things equal, the correlatives of sizes 
of organs; and combinations of functions the correlatives 
of connections of organs. Hence the structural complexity 
accompanying functional equilibration is definable as one 
in which there are as many specialized parts as are capable, 
separately and jointly, of counteracting the separate and 
joint forces amid which the organism exists. And this is 
the limit of organic heterogeneity, to which man has ap- 
proached more nearly than any other creature. 

Groups of organisms display this universal tendency to- 
ward a balance very obviously. In § 85, every species of 
plant and animal was shown to be perpetually undergoing 
a rhythmical variation in number — now from abundance 
of food and absence of enemies rising above its average; 
and then by a consequent scarcity of food and abundance 
of enemies being depressed below its average. And here 
we have to observe that there is thus maintained an equili- 
brium between the sum of those forces which result in the 
increase of each race, and the sum of those forces which 
result in its decrease. Either limit of variation is a point 
at which the one set of forces, before in excess of the other, 
is counterbalanced by it. And amid these oscillations pro- 
duced by their conflict lies that average number of the 
species at which its expansive tendency is in equilibrium 
with surrounding repressive tendencies. Nor can it be 
questioned that this balancing cf the preservative and de- 
structive forces which we see going on in every race must 
necessarily go on, since increase cf number cannot but 
continue until increase of mortality stops it, and decrease 
of number cannot but continue until it is either arrested by 
fertility or extinguishes the race entirely. 

§ 174. The equilibrations of those nervous actions which 
constitute what we know as mental life may be classified 



424 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

in like manner with those which constitute what we dis- 
tinguish as bodily life. We may deal with them in the 
same order. 

Each pulse of nervous force from moment to moment 
generated (and it was shown in § 86 that nervous currents 
are not continuous but rhythmical) is met by counteract- 
ing forces, in overcoming which it is dispersed and equili- 
brated. When tracing out the correlation and equivalence 
of forces, we saw that each sensation and emotion, or rather 
such part of it as remains after the excitation of associated 
ideas and feelings, is expended in working bodily changes 
— contractions of the involuntary muscles, the voluntary 
muscles, or both; as also in a certain stimulation of secret- 
ing organs. That the movements thus initiated are ever 
being brought to a close by the opposing forces they evoke 
was pointed out above; and here it is to be observed that 
the like holds with the nervous changes thus initiated. 
Various facts prove that the arousing of a thought or feel- 
ing alwavs involves the overcoming of a certain resistance: 
instance the fact that where the association of mental states 
has not been frequeut, a sensible effort is needed to call up 
the one after the other; instance the fact that during ner- 
vous prostration there is a comparative inability to think 
— the ideas will not follow one another with the habitual 
rapidity; instance the converse fact that at times of un- 
usual energy, natural or artificial, the friction of thought 
becomes relatively small, and more numerous, more remote, 
or more difficult connections of ideas are formed. That 
is to say, the wave of nervous energy each instant gen- 
erated propagates itself throughout body and brain, along 
those channels which the conditions at the instant render 
lines of least resistance; and spreading widely in propor- 
tion to its amount, ends only when it is equilibrated by 
the resistances it everywhere meets. If we contemplate 
mental actions as extending over hours and days we d> 
equilibrations analogous to those hourly and daily 
lished among the bodily functions. In the one case as in 
the other, there are rhythms which exhibit a balancing of 
opposing forces at each extreme, and the maintenance of a 
certain general balance. This is seen in the daily alterna- 
tion of mental activity and mental rest — the forces 
pended during the one being compensated by the forces 
acquired during the other. It is also seen in the recurring 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 425 

rise and fall of each desire: each desire reaching a certain 
intensity is equilibrated either by expenditure of the force 
it embodies, in the desired actions, or, less completely, in the 
imagination of such actions: the process ending in that sa- 
tiety, or that comparative quiescence, forming the opposite 
limit of the rhythm. And it is further manifest under a 
twofold form, on occasions of intense joy or grief : each par- 
oxysm of passion, expressing itself in vehement bodily 
actions, presently reaches an extreme whence the counteract- 
ing forces produce a return to a condition of- moderate 
excitement; and the successive paroxysms, finally diminish- 
ing in intensity, end in a mental equilibrium either like 
that before existing, or partially differing from it in its 
medium state. Bat the species of mental equilibration to 
be more especially noted is that shown in the establishment 
of a correspondence between relations among our states of 
consciousness and relations in the external world. Each 
outer connection of phenomena which we are capable of 
perceiving generates, through accumulated experiences, an 
inner connection of mental states; and the result toward 
which this process tends is the formation of a mental connec- 
tion having_a relative strength that answers to the relative 
constancy of the physical connection represented. In con- 
formity with the general law that motion pursues the line of 
least resistance, and that, other things equal, aline once 
taken by motion is made a line that will be more readily pur- 
sued by future motion ; we have seen that the ease with which 
nervous impressions follow one another is, other things 
equal, great in proportion to the number of times they have 
been repeated together in experience. Hence, corresponding 
to such an invariable relation as that between the resistance 
of an object and some extension possessed by it, there arises 
an indissoluble connection in consciousness; and this con- 
nection, being as absolute internally as the answering one 
is externally, undergoes no further change — the inner re- 
lation is in perfect equilibrium with the outer relation. 
Conversely, it hence happens that to such uncertain rela- 
tions of phenomena as that between clouds and rain, there 
arise relations of ideas of alike uncertainty; and if, under 
given aspects of the sky, the tendencies to infer fair or 
foul weather correspond to the frequencies with which fair 
or foul weather follow such aspects, the accumulation of 
experiences has balanced the mental sequences and the phys- 






426 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

ical sequences. When it is remembered that between these 
extremes there are countless orders of external connections 
having different degrees of constancy, and that during the 
evolution of intelligence there arise answering internal as- 
sociations having different degrees of cohesion, it will be 
seen that there is a progress toward equilibrium between 
the relations of thought and the relations of things. This 
equilibration can end only when each relation of things 
has generated in us a relation of thought, such that on the 
occurrence of the conditions the relation in thought arises 
as certainly as the relation in things. Supposing this state 
to be reached (which, however, it can be only in infinite 
time), experience will cease to produce any further mental 
evolution — there will have been reached a perfect corre- 
spondence between ideas and facts; and the intellectual 
adaptation of man to his circumstances will be complete. 
The like general truths are exhibited in the process of moral 
adaptation; which is a continual approach to equilibrium 
between the emotions and the kinds of conduct neces- 
sitated by surrounding conditions. The connections of 
feelings and actions are determined in the same way as the 
connections of ideas: just as repeating the association of 
two ideas facilitates the excitement of the one by the 
other, so does each discharge of feeling into action render 
the subsequent discharge of such feeling into such action 
more easy. Hence it happens that if an individual is 
placed permanently in conditions which demand more 
action of a special kind than has before been requisite or 
than is natural to him — if the pressure of the painful feel- 
ings which these conditions entail when disregarded 
impels him to perform this action to a greater extent — if 
by every more frequent or more lengthened performance of 
it under such pressure the resistance is somewhat dimin- 
ished; then, clearly, there is an advance toward a balance 
between the demand for this kind of action and the supply 
of it. Either in himself, or in his descendants continuing 
to live under these conditions, enforced repetition must 
eventually bring about a state in which this mode of direct- 
ing the energies will be no more repugnant than the various 
other modes previously natural to the race. Hence the 
limit toward which emotional modification perpetually 
tends, and to which it must approach indefinitely near 
(though it can absolutely reach it only in infinite time), is 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 427 

a combination of desires that correspond to all the different 
orders of activity which the circumstances of life call for : — 
desires severally proportionate in strength to the needs 
for these orders of activity, and severally satisfied by these 
orders of activity. In what we distinguish as acquired 
habits, and in the moral differences of races and nations 
produced by habits that are maintained through successive 
generations, we have countless illustrations of this progres- 
sive adaptation, which can cease only with the establish- 
ment of a complete equilibrium between constitution and 
conditions. 

Possibly some will fail to see how the equilibrations de- 
scribed in this section can be classed with those preceding 
them, and will be inclined to say that what are here set 
down as facts are but analogies. Nevertheless such equili- 
brations are as truly physical as the rest. To show this 
fully would require a more detailed analysis than can now 
be entered on. For the present it must suffice to point out, 
as before (§ 71), that what we know subjectively as states 
of consciousness are, objectively, modes of force ; that so 
much feeling is the correlate of so much motion; that the 
performance of any bodily action is the transformation of a 
certain amount of feeling into its equivalent amount of 
motion; that this bodily action is met by forces which it 
is expended in overcoming; and that the necessity for the 
frequent repetition of this action implies the frequent re- 
currence of forces to be so overcome. Hence the existence 
in any individual of an emotional stimulus that is in equili- 
brium with certain external requirements is literally the 
habitual production of a certain specialized portion of ner- 
vous energy, equivalent in amount to a certain order of 
external resistances that are habitually met. And thus the 
ultimats etate, forming the limit toward which Evolution 
carries us, is one in which the kinds and quantities of 
mental energy daily generated and transformed into motions 
are equivalent to, or in equilibrium with, the various orders 
and degrees of surrounding forces which antagonize such 
motions. 

§ 175. Each society, taken as a whole, displays the process 
of equilibration in the continuous adjustment of its popu- 
lation to its means of subsistence. A tribe of men living 
on wild animals and fruits is manifestly, like every tribe 



428 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

of inferior creatures, always oscillating about that average 
number which the locality can support. Though by arti- 
ficial production, and by successive improvements in arti- 
ficial production, a superior race continually alters the limit 
which external conditions put to population, yet there is 
ever a checking of population at the temporary limit 
reached. It is true that where the limit is being so rapidly 
changed as among ourselves, there is no actual stoppage : 
there is only a rhythmical variation in the rate of increase. 
But in noting the causes of this rhythmical variation — in 
watching how, during periods of abundance, the proportion 
of marriages increases, and how it decreases during periods 
of scarcity, it will be seen that the expansive force pro- 
duces unusual advance whene\er the repressive force dimin- 
ishes, and vice versa; and thus there is as near a balancing 
of the two as the changing conditions permit. 

The internal actions constituting Bocial functions 
emplify the general principle no less clearly. Supply and 
demand are continually being adjusted throughout all in- 
dustrial processes; ami this equilibration is intcrpretable 
Id the same way as preceding ones. The production and 
distribution of a commodity is the expression of a certain 
aggregate of forces causing special kind< and anion 
motion. The price of this commodity is the measu 
a certain other aggregate of forces expended by the laborer 
who purchases it, in other kinds and amounts of m> 
And the variations of price represent a rhythmical balanc- 
ing of these forces. Every rise or fall in the rate of in- 
terest, or change in the value of a particular security, 
implies a conflict of forces in which some, becoming tem- 
porarily predominant, cause a movement that is presently 
arrested or equilibrated by the increase of opposing 1 
and amid these daily ami hourly oscillations lies a more 
slowly varying medium into which the value ever tends to 
settle, and would settle but for the constant addition of 
new influences. As in the individual organism so in the 
social organism, functional equilibrations generate struc- 
tural equilibrations. When on the workers in any trade 
there comes an increased demand, and when in return for 
the increased supply there is given to them an amount of 
other commodities larger than was before habitual — when, 
consequently, the resistances overcome by them in sustain- 
ing life are less than the resistances overcome by other 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 429 

workers, there results a flow of other workers into this 
trade. This flow continues until the extra demand is met, 
and the wages so far fall again that the total resistance 
overcome in obtaining a given amount of produce is as 
great in this newly adopted occupation as in the occupa- 
tions whence it drew recruits. The occurrence of motion 
along lines of least resistance was before shown to necessi- 
tate the growth of population in those places where the 
labor required for self- maintenance is the smallest; and 
here we further see that those engaged in any such advan- 
tageous locality, or advantageous business, must multiply 
till there arises an approximate balance between this lo- 
cality or business and others accessible to the same citizens. 
In determining the career of every youth, we see an 
estimation by parents of the respective advantages offered 
by all that are available, and a choice of the one which 
promises best; and through the consequent influx into 
trades that are at the time most profitable, and the with- 
holding of recruits from overstocked trades, there is in- 
sured a general equipoise between the power of each social 
organ and the function it has to perform. 

The various industrial actions and reactions thus con- 
tinually alternating constitute a dependent moving equi- 
librium like that which is maintained among the functions 
of an individual organism. And this dependent moving 
equilibrium parallels those already contemplated, in its 
tendency to become more complete. During early stages 
of social evolution, while yet the resources of the locality 
inhabited are unexplored and the arts of production un- 
developed, there is never anything more than a temporary 
and partial balancing of such actions, under the form of 
acceleration or retardation of growth. But when a society 
approaches the maturity of that type on which it is organ- 
ized, the various industrial activities settle down into a com- 
paratively constant state. Moreover, it is observable that 
advance in organization, as well as advance in growth, is 
conducive to a better equilibrium of industrial functions. 
While the diffusion of mercantile information is slow, and 
the means of transport deficient, the adjustment of supply 
to demand is extremely imperfect: great overproduction 
of each commodity, followed by great underproduction, 
constitute a rhythm having extremes that depart very 
widely from the mean state in which demand and supply 



430 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

are equilibrated. But when good roads are made, and 
there is a rapid diffusion of printed or written intelligence, 
and still more when railways and telegraphs come into ex- 
istence — when the periodical fairs of early days lapse into 
weekly markets, and these into daily markets — there is 
gradually produced a better balance of production and 
consumption. Extra demand is much more quickly 
followed by augmented supply; and the rapid oscillations 
of price within narrow limits on either side of a compara- 
tively uniform mean indicate a near approach to equilib- 
rium. Evidently this industrial progress has for its limit 
that which Mr. Mill has called " the stationary state." 
When population shall have become dense over all habitable 
parts of the globe, when the resources of every region have 
been fully explored, and when the productive parts admit 
of no further improvements, there must result an almost 
complete balance, both between the fertility and mortality 
of each society, and between its producing and consuming 
activities. Each society will exhibit only minor deviations 
from its average number, and the rhythm of its industrial 
functions will go on from day to day and year to year with 
comparatively insignificant perturbations. This limit, 
however, though we are inevitably advancing toward it, 
is indefinitely remote, and can never indeed be absolutely 
reached. The peopling of the Earth up to the point sup- 
posed cannot take pla<-e by simple spreading. In the 
future, as in the past, the process will be carried on rhyth- 
mically, by waves of emigration from new and higher centres 
of civilization successively arising, and by the supplanting 
of inferior races by the superior races they beget; and the 
process so carried on must be extremely slow. Nor does it 
seem to me that such an equilibration will, as Mr. Mill sug- 
gests, leave scope for further mental culture and moral 
progress; but rather that the approximation to it must be 
simultaneous with the approximation to complete equi- 
librium between man's nature and the conditions of his 
existence. 

One other kind of social equilibration has still to be 
considered — that which results in the establishment of 
governmental institutions, and which becomes complete as 
these institutions fall into harmony with the desires of the 
people. There is a demand and supply in political atfairs 
as in industrial affairs; and in the one case as in the other, 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 431 

the antagonist forces produce a rhythm which, at first ex- 
treme in its oscillations, slowly settles down into a moving 
equilibrium of comparative regularity. Those aggressive 
impulses inherited from the pre-social state — 'those ten- 
dencies to seek self-satisfaction regardless of injury to 
other beings, which are essential to a predatory life, con- 
stitute an anti-social force, tending ever to cause conflict 
and eventual separation of citizens. Contrariwise, those 
desires whose ends can be achieved only by union, as well 
as- those sentiments which find satisfaction through inter- 
course with fellow-men, and those resulting in what we 
call loyalty, are forces tending to keep the units of a 
society together. On the one hand, there is in each citi- 
zen more or less of resistance against all restraints imposed 
on his actions by other citizens : a resistance which, tend- 
ing continually to widen each individual's sphere of action, 
and reciprocally to limit the spheres of action of other 
individuals, constitutes a repulsive force mutually exer- 
cised by the members of a social aggregate. On the other 
hand, the general sympathy of man for man, and the more 
special sympathy of each variety of man for others of the 
same variety, together with sundry allied feelings which 
the social state gratifies, act as an attractive force, tending 
ever to keep united those who have a common ancestry. 
And since the resistances to be overcome in satisfying the 
totality of their desires when living separately are greater 
than the resistances to be overcome in satisfying the 
totality of their desires when living together, there is a 
residuary force that prevents their separation. Like all 
other opposing forces, those exerted by citizens on each 
other are ever producing alternating movements, which, 
at first extreme, undergo a gradual diminution on the way 
to ultimate equilibrium. In small, undeveloped societies, 
marked rhythms result from these conflicting tendencies. 
A tribe whose members have held together for a generation 
or two, reaches a size at which it will not hold together; 
and on the occurrence of some event causing unusual an- 
tagonism among its members, divides. Each primitive 
nation, depending largely for its continued union on the 
character of its chief, exhibits wide oscillations between an 
extreme in which the subjects are under rigid restraint, 
and an extreme in which the restraint is not enough to 
prevent disorder. In more advanced nations of like type, 



432 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

we always find violent actions and reactions of the same 
essential nature — "despotism tempered by assassination," 
characterizing a political state in which unbearable repres- 
sion from time to time brings about a bursting of all bonds. 
In this familiar fact, that a period of tyranny is followed 
by a period of license and vice versa, we see how these 
opposing forces are ever equilibrating each other; and we 
also see, in the tendency of such movements and counter- 
movements to become more moderate, how the equilibra- 
tion progresses toward completeness. The conflicts between 
Conservatism (which stands for the restraints of society 
over the individual) and Reform (which stands for the lib- 
erty of the individual against society) fall within slowly 
approximating limits; so that the temporary predominance 
of either produces a Less marked deviation from the me- 
dium Btate. This process, now so far advanced among 
ourselves that the oscillations are comparatively unobtru- 
sive, must go on till the balance between the an tag 
forces approaches indefinitely near pei 
we have already seen, the adaptation of man's nature to 
the condition.- of his existence cannot cease until the in- 
ternal forces which we knew as feelings are in equilibrium 
with the externa] forces they encounter. And the i 
lishment of this equilibrium is the arrival at a state of 
human nature and social organization, such that the in- 
dividual has no desires but those which may I 
without exceeding his proper sphere of action, while 
society maintains no restraints but those which the in- 
dividual voluntarily respects. The progressive extension 
of the liberty of citizens, and the reciprocal removal of 
political restrictions, are the steps by which we advance 
toward this state. And the ultimate abolition of ail limits 
to the freedom of each, save those imposed by the like 
freedom of all, must result from the complete equilibration 
between man's desires and the conduct necessitated by 
surrounding conditions. 

0\' course in this case, as in the preceding ones, there 
is thus involved a limit to the increase of heterogen 
A few pages back, we reached the conclusion that each 
advance in mental evolution is the establishment of some 
further internal action, corresponding to some furth< 
ternal action — some additional connection of idea 
feelings, answering to tome before unknown or unan- 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 433 

tagonized connection of phenomena. We inferred that 
each such new function, involving some new modification 
of structure, implies an increase of heterogeneity; and 
that thus increase of heterogeneity must go on, while 
there remain any outer relations affecting the organism 
which are unbalanced by inner relations. Whence we saw 
it to follow that increase of heterogeneity can come to an 
end only as equilibration is completed. Evidently the 
like must simultaneously take place with society. Each 
increment of heterogeneity in the individual must directly 
or indirectly involve, as cause or consequence, some incre- 
ment of heterogeneity in the arrangements of the aggre- 
gate of individuals. And the limit to social complexity 
can be arrived at only with the establishment of the equi- 
librium, just described, between social and individual 
forces. 

§ 176. Here presents itself a final question, which has 
probably been taking a more or less distinct shape in the 
minds of many while reading this chapter. " If Evolution 
of every kind is an increase in complexity of structure 
and function that is incidental to the universal process of 
equilibration, and if equilibration must end in complete 
rest, what is the fate toward which all things tend? If 
the Solar System is slowly dissipating its forces — if the Sun 
is losing his heat at a rate which will tell in millions of 
years — if with diminution of the Sun's radiations there 
must go on a diminution in the activity of geologic and 
meteorologic processes as well as in the quantity of vegetal 
and animal existence — if Man and Society are similarly 
dependent on this supply of force that is gradually coming 
to an end, are we not manifestly progressing toward 
omnipresent death?" 

That such a state must be the outcome of the processes 
everywhere going on seems beyond doubt. Whether any 
ulterior process may reverse these changes, and initiate 
anew life, is a question to be considered hereafter. For 
the present it must suffice that the proximate end of all 
the transformations we have traced is a state of quies- 
cence. This admits of a priori proof. It will soon become 
apparent that the law of equilibration, not less than the 
preceding general laws, is deducible from the persistence 
of force. 
28 



434 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

We have Been (§74) that phenomena are interpretable 
only as the results of universally coexistent forces of at- 
traction and repulsion. These universally coexistent 
forces of attraction and repulsion are, indeed, the com- 
plementary aspects of that absolutely persistent force which 
is the ultimate datum of consciousness. Just in the 
way that the equality of action and reaction is a corollary 
from the persistence of force, dure their inequality would 
imply the disappearance of the differential force into 
nothing or its appearance out of noth • e cannot 

become conscious of an attractive force without becoming 
simultaneously conscious of an equal andopp nlsive 

force. For every experience of a muscular tension (under 
which form alone we can immediately know an attractive 
force) presupposes an equivalent r sistanoe 

shown in the counterbalancing of the body 

against neighboring objects, or in that i o of force 

which gives motion t" the body, or in both — a i 
which we cannot conceive ;;- other than equal to the ten- 
sion, without conceiving force to have 
disappeared, and bo denying the persistence i 

ry correlation ■ inahilir . 

fore pointed out, of interpreting any phenomena save in 
terms of these correlatives — an inability shown alike in 
the compulsion we are under to think of the statical I 
which tangible matter displays, as due t«> the attraction and 
repulsion of its atoms, and in the compulsion we are under 
to think of dynamical fort - I through 

regarding space as tilled with atoms similarly end< 
Thus from the existence of a >rever un- 

changeable in quantity there follows, as a \. orol- 

lary, the coextensive existence - ins of 

force — forms under which the conditions of our 
ness oblige us to represent that absolute force which tran- 
scends our knowlet 

But the forces of attraction and repulsion being univer- 
sally coexistent, it follows, I - shown, that all m 
is motion under resistance. Units of matter, solid, liquid, 
aeriform, or ethereal, tilling tl which any moving 
body traverses, offer to such body the resistan - [uent 
on their cohesion, or their inertia, or both. In other words, 
the denser or rarer medium which occupies the places 
from moment to moment passed through by such moving 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 435 

body having to be expelled from them, as much motion is 
abstracted from the moving body as is given to the me- 
dium in expelling it from these places. This being the 
condition under which all motion occurs, two corollaries 
result. The first is, that the deductions perpetually made 
by the communication of motion to the resisting medium 
cannot but bring the motion of the body to an end in a 
longer or shorter time. The second is, that the motion of 
the body cannot cease until these deductions destroy it. 
In other words, movement must continue till equilibration 
takes place; and equilibration must eventually take place. 
Both these are manifest deductions from the persistence 
of force. To say that the whole or part of a body's motion 
can disappear, save by transfer to something which resists 
its motion, is to say that the whole or part of its motion 
can disappear without effect ; which is to deny the per- 
sistence of force. Conversely, to say that the medium 
traversed can be moved out of the body's path, without 
deducting from the body's motion, is to say that motion 
of the medium can arise out of nothing; which is to deny 
the persistence of force. Hence this primordial truth is 
our immediate warrant for the conclusions, thafr- the 
changes which Evolution presents cannot end until equili- 
brium is reached; and that equilibrium must at last be 
reached. 

Equally necessary, because equally deducible from this 
same truth that transcends proof, are the foregoing pro- 
positions respecting the establishment and maintenance of 
moving equilibria, under their several aspects. It follows 
from the persistence of force, that the various motions 
possessed by any aggregate, either as a whole or among its 
parts, must be severally dissipated by the resistances they 
severally encounter ; and that thus, such of them as are 
least in amount, or meet with greatest opposition, or both, 
will be brought to a close while the others continue. 
Hence in every diversely moving aggregate there results a 
comparatively early dissipation of motions which are 
smaller and much resisted, followed by long continuance 
of the larger and less-resisted motions; and so there arise 
dependent and independent moving equilibria. Hence 
also may be inferred the tendency to conservation of such 
moving equilibria. For the new motion given to the 
parts of a moving equilibrium by a disturbing force must 



43G FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

either be of such kind and amount that it cannot be dis- 
sipated before the pre-existing motions, in which ca.se it 
brings the moving equilibrium to an end; or else it must 
be of such kind and amount that it can be dissipated be- 
fore the pre-existing motions, in which case the moving 
equilibrium is re-established. 

Thus from the persistence of force follow not only the 
various direct and indirect equilibrations going on around, 
together with that cosmical equilibration which brings 
Evolution under all its forms to a close; but also those lea 
manifest equilibrations shown in the readjustments of mov- 
ing equilibria that have been disturbed. By this ultimate 
principle is provable the tendency of every organism, dis- 
ordered by some unusual influence, to return to a balai 
state. To it also may be traced the capacity, possessed in 
a slight degree by individuals, and in a greater d< 
species, of becoming adapted to new cirenmsts And 

not Less does it afford a basis for the inference that there 
is a gradual advance toward harmony between mi 
mental nature and the conditions of his existence. After 
finding that from it are dedncible the various characteris- 
tics of Evolution, we finally draw from it a warrant for the 
belief that Evolution can end only in the establishment of 
the greatest perfection and the most complete happi 



OHAPTEB XXIII. 

DISSOLUTION. 

§ 177. When, in Chapter XII.. we glanced at the 
cycle of changes through which every existence paSE 
its progress from the imperceptible to the perceptible and 
again from the perceptible to the imperceptible — when 
these opposite redistributions of matter and motion were 
severally distinguished as Evolution and Dissolution; the 
natures of the two. and the conditions under which they 
respectively occur, were specified in general terms. Since 
then, we have contemplated the phenomena of Evolution 
in detail, and have followed them out to those sta: - 
equilibrium in which they all end. To complete the argu- 
ment we must now contemplate, somewhat more in detail 
than before, the complementary phenomena of Dissolution 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 437 

Not, indeed, that we need dwell long on Dissolution, 
which has none of those various and interesting aspects 
which Evolution presents; but something more must be 
said than has yet been said. 

It was shown that neither of these two antagonist pro- 
cesses ever goes on absolutely unqualified by the others; 
and that a change toward either is a differential result of 
the conflict between them. An evolving aggregate, while 
on the average losing motion and integrating, is always, 
in one way or other, receiving some motion and to that 
extent disintegrating; and after the integrative changes 
have ceased to predominate, the reception of motion, 
though perpetually checked by its dissipation, constantly 
tends to produce a reverse transformation, and eventually 
does produce it. When Evolution has run its course — when 
the aggregate has at length parted with its excess of 
motion and habitually receives as much from its environ- 
ment as it habitually loses — when it has reached that equi- 
librium in which its changes end ; it thereafter remains 
subject to all actions in its environment which may increase 
the quantity of motion it contains, and which in the lapse 
of time are sure, either slowly or suddenly, to give its 
parts such excess of motion as will cause disintegration. 
According as its equilibrium is a very unstable or a very 
stable one, its dissolution may come quickly or may be in- 
definitely delayed — may occur in a few days or may be 
postponed for millions of years. But exposed as it is to 
the contingencies not simply of its immediate neighbor- 
hood but of a Universe everywhere in motion, the period 
must at last come when, either alone or in company with 
surrounding aggregates, it has its parts dispersed. 

The process of dissolution so caused we have here to look 
at as it takes place in aggregates of different orders. The 
course of change being the reverse of that hitherto traced 
we may properly take the illustrations of it in the reverse 
order — beginning with the most complex and ending with 
the most simple. 

§ 178. Eegarding the evolution of a society as at once 
an increase in the number of individuals integrated into 
a corporate body, an increase in the masses and varieties of 
the parts into which this corporate body divides as well as 
of the actions called their functions, and an increase in 



438 FIRST PRIXCIPLES. 

the degree of combination among these masses and their 
functions, we shall see that social dissolution conforms to 
the general law in being, materially considered, a disin- 
tegration, and, dynamically considered, a decrease in the 
movements of wholes and an increase in the movemt 
parts; while it further conforms to the general law in being 
caused by an excess of motion in some way or other re- 
ceived from without. 

It is obvious that the social dissolution which follows the 
3sion of another nation, and which, as history shows 
apt to occur when social evolutoo has ended and de- 
cay has begun, is, under its . the incidence 
of a new external moti tunes hap- 
tbe conquered society is eolation is 
literally a cessation of th< - rate movements which 
the society, both in its army and in its industrial b 
ted. and a tapes into individual or uncon 
movements — the motion of units replaces the motion of 
ma- 
lt cannot be an . either, that when plague or 
famine at home, or a revolution abroad, gives to any 
society an unusual >h"<-k tfa r or incipient 
dissolution, there results a 

ments and an increase of disintegrated m< b. As 

the disorder progresses, the political i 
combined und< i innient ined: 

there arise the antagonistic i of riot or r 

Simultaneously, the industrial and commercial pr< 
that were co-ordinated throughout the whole body ] 
are broken up, and only the Local, or small, trading tran- 
sactions continue. And each furtl rganizing 
change diminishes the joint ope: - by which 
satisfy their wants, and leaves them to satisfy their i 
so far as they can, by separate 0] 

which such disint liable : up in a 

society that has evolved to the limit of its 
reached a state of moving equilibrium, a good i: 
is furnished by Japan. The finished fabric into which its 
people had organized themselves maintained I 
constant state so long as it was preserved from fresh exter- 
nal forces. But as soon as it received an impact from 
European civilization, partly by armed n, partly 

by commercial impulse, partly by the influence of : 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 439 

this fabric began to fall to pieces. There is now in pro- 
gress a political dissolution. Probably a political reorgan- 
ization will follow; but, be this as it may, the change thus 
far produced by an outer action is a change toward dis- 
solution — a change from integrated motions to disinte- 
grated motions. 

Even where a society that has developed into the highest 
form permitted by the characters of its units begins there- 
after to dwindle and decay, the progressive dissolution is 
still essentially of the same nature. Decline of numbers 
is, in such case, brought about partly by emigration ; for 
a society having the fixed structure in which evolution 
ends is necessarily one that will not yield and modify 
under pressure of population: so long as its structure will 
yield and modify, it is still evolving. Hence the surplus 
population continually produced, not held together by an 
organization that adapts itself to an augmenting number, 
is continually dispersed : the influences brought to bear on 
the citizens by other societies cause their detachment, 
and there is an increase in the uncombined motions of 
units instead of an increase of combined motions. Grad- 
ually as rigidity becomes greater, and the society becomes 
still less capable of being remoulded into the form required 
for successful competition with growing and more plastic 
societies, the number of citizens who can live within its 
unyielding framework becomes positively smaller. Hence 
it dwindles both through continued emigration and 
through the diminished multiplication that follows in- 
nutrition. And this further dwindling or dissolution, 
caused by the number of those who die becoming greater 
than the number of those who survive long enough to rear 
offspring, is similarly a decrease in the total quantity of 
combined motion and an increase in the quantity of un- 
combined motion — as we shall presently see when we come 
to deal with individual dissolution. 

Considering, then, that social aggregates differ so much 
from aggregates of other ki ds, formed as they are of units 
held together loosely and indirectly, in such variable ways 
by such complex forces, the process of dissolution among 
them conforms to the general law quite as clearly as could 
be expected. 

§ 179. When from these super-organic aggregates we 



440 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

descend to organic aggregates, the truth that Dissolution 
is a disintegration of matter, caused by the reception of 
additional motion from without, becomes easily demon- 
strable. "We will look first at the transformation and 
afterward at its cause. 

Death, or that final equilibration which precedes disso- 
lution, is the bringing to a close of all those conspicuous 
integrated motions that arose during evolution. The 
impulsions of the body from place to place first cease; pres- 
ently the limbs cannot be stirred; later still the respiratory 
actions stop; finally the heart becomes stationary, and, 
with it, the circulating fluids. That is, the transforma- 
tion of molecular motion into the motion of masses comes 
to an cud; and each of these motions of masses, as it ends, 
disappears into molecular motions. What next takes 
place? We cannot say that there is any further trans- 
formation of sensible movements into insensible move- 
ments; for sensible movements no longer exist. Neverthe- 
less, the process of decay involves an increase of insensible 
movements; since these are far greater in the gases gene- 
rated by decomposition than they are in the fluid- 
matters out of which the gases arise. Each of the com- 
plex chemical units composing an organic body post 
a rhythmic motion in which its many component units 
jointly partake. When decomposition breaks up these 
complex molecules, and their constituents assume gi 
forms, there is, besides that increase of motion implied by 
the diffusion, a resolution of such motions as the aggregate 
molecules possessed into motions of their constituent 
molecules. So that in organic dissolution Me have, first, 
an end put to that transformation of the motion of units 
into the motion of aggregates, which constitutes evolution, 
dynamically considered ; and we have also, though in a 
subtler sense, a transformation of the motion of aggregates 
into the motion of units. Still it is not thus shown that 
organic dissolution fully answers to the general definition 
of dissolution — the absorption of motion and concomitant 
disintegration of matter. The disintegration of matter 
is, indeed, conspicuous enough, but the absorption of 
motion is not conspicuous. True, the fact that motion 
has been absorbed may be inferred from the fact that the 
particles previously integrated into a solid mass, occupying 
a small space, have most of them moved away from one 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 441 

another and now occupy a great space; for the motion im- 
plied by this transposition must have been obtained from 
somewhere. But its source is not obvious. A little 
search, however, will bring us to its derivation. 

At a temperature below the freezing point of water, 
decomposition of organic matter does not take place — the 
integrated motions of the highly integrated molecules are 
not resolved -into the disintegrated motions of their com- 
ponent molecules. Dead bodies kept at this temperature 
for an indefinitely long period are prevented from decom- 
posing for an indefinitely long period : witness the frozen 
carcasses of Mammoths — Elephants of a species long ago 
extinct — that are found imbedded in the ice at the mouths 
of Siberian rivers; and which, though they have been 
there for many thousand of years, have flesh so fresh that, 
when at length exposed, it is devoured by wolves. What 
now is the meaning of such exceptional preservations? A 
body kept below freezing point is a body which receives 
very little heat by radiation or conduction; and the recep- 
tion of but little heat is the reception of but little molecu- 
lar motion. That is to say, in an environment which 
does not furnish it with molecular motion passing a certain 
amount, an organic body does not undergo dissolution. 
Confirmatory evidence is yielded by the variations in rate 
of dissolution which accompany variations of temperature^ 
All know that in cool weather the organic substances used 
in our households keep longer, as we say, than in hot 
weather. Equally certain, if less familiar, is the fact that 
in tropical climates decay proceeds much more rapidly 
than in temperate climates. Thus, in proportion as the 
molecular motion of surrounding matter is great, the dead 
organism receives an abundant supply of motion to replace 
the motion continually taken up by the dispersing mole- 
cules of the gases into which it is being disintegrated. 
The still quicker decompositions produced by exposure to 
artificially raised temperatures afford further proofs; as 
instance those which occur in cooking. The charred sur- 
faces of parts that have been much heated show us that 
the molecular motion absorbed has served to dissipate in 
gaseous forms all the elements but the carbon. 
The nature and cause of Dissolution are thus clearly dis- 
played by the aggregates which so clearly display the na- 
ture and cause of Evolution. One of these aggregates 



442 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

being composed of that peculiar matter to which a large 
quantity of constitutional motion gives great plasticity, 
and the ability to evolve into a highly compound form 
(§ 103), we see that after evolution has ceased a very mod- 
erate amount of molecular motion, added to that already 
locked up in its peculiar matter, suffices to cause dissolu- 
tion. Though at death there is reached a .stable equilib- 
rium among the sensible i 3, which make 
up the body, yet, as the insensible units or molecules of 
which these organs consist arc in unstable equilibrium, 
small incident forces suffice to overthrow them, and hence 
disintegration proceeds rapidly. 

§ 180. Most inorganic having arrived at 

dense forms in which comparatively little motion i3 re- 
tained, remain Long without marked chang h has 
lost so much motion in passing from the disintegrated to 
the integrated state that much motion mu Fen to 
it to cause resumption of the disintegrated :id an 
immense time may elapse before there occur in tl 
vironment changes great enough to communicate to it the 
requisite quantity of motion. We will look firsl 
exceptional inorganic i - which r< tain much mo- 
tion, and therefore readily undi solution. 

Among these are the liquids and volatile solids which 
dissipate under ordinary conditions — water that evapo- 
rates, carbonate of ammonia that wastes away by the dis- 
persion of its molecules. In all such - 
sorbed; and always the dissolution is rapid in proportion 
as the quantity of heat or motion which the a 
mass receives from its environment 

the eases in which the molecules of a highly integrated or 
solid aggregate are dispersed among the molecules of a 
less integrated or liquid aggregate, as inaqr tions. 

One evidence that - ration of matter has for its 

concomitant the absorption of motion is that solubl< 
stances dissolve the more quickly the hotter the water: 
supposing always that no elective affinity - into play. 

Another and still more conclusive evidence is, that when 
crystals oi a given temperature are placed in wa1 
same temperature, the pi\ solution is accompanied 

by a fall of temperature — Often a very great one. Omitt- 
ing instances in which some chemical action takes place 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 443 

between the salt and the water, it is a uniform law that 
the motion which disperses the molecules of the salt 
through the water is at the expense of the molecular 
motion possessed by the water. 

Masses of sediment accumulated into strata, afterward 
compressed by many thousands of feet of superincumbent 
strata, and reduced in course of time to a solid state, may 
remain for millions of years unchanged; but in subse- 
quent millions of years they are inevitably exposed to dis- 
integrating actions. Eaised along with other such masses 
into a continent, denuded and exposed to rain, frost, and 
the grinding actions of glaciers, they have their particles 
gradually separated, carried away, and widely dispersed. 
Or when, as otherwise happens, the encroaching sea 
reaches them, the undermined cliffs which they form fall 
from time to time, breaking into fragments of all sizes; 
the waves, rolling about the small pieces, and in storms 
turning over and knocking together the larger blocks, re- 
duce them to boulders and pebbles, and at last to sand and 
mud. Even if portions of the disintegrated strata accu- 
mulate into shingle banks, which afterward become solidi- 
fied, the. process of dissolution, arrested though it may be 
for some enormous geologic period, is finally resumed. As 
many a shore shows us, the conglomerate itself is sooner 
or later subject to the like processes, and its cemented 
masses of heterogeneous components, lying on the beach, 
are broken up and worn away by impact and attrition — 
that is, by communicated mechanical motion. 

When not thus effected, the disintegration is effected 
by communicated molecular motion. The consolidated 
stratum, located in some area of subsidence, and brought 
down nearer and nearer to the regions occupied by molten 
matter, comes eventually to have its particles brought to a 
plastic state by heat, or finally melted down into liquid. 
Whatever may be its subsequent transformations, the 
transformation then exhibited by it is an absorption of 
motion and disintegration of matter. 

Be it simple or compound, small or large, a crystal or a 
mountain chain, every inorganic aggregate on the Earth 
thus, at some time or other, undergoes a reversal of those 
changes undergone during its evolution. Not that it 
usually passes back completely from the perceptible into 
the imperceptible, as organic aggregates do in great part, 



444 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

if not wholly. But still its disintegration and dispersion 
carry it some distance on the way toward the impercepti- 
ble; and there are reasons for thinking that its arrival 
there is but delayed. At a period immeasurably remote, 
every such inorganic aggregate, along with all undissipated 
remnants of organic aggregates, must be reduced to a state 
of gaseous diffusion, and so complete the cycle of its 
changes. 

§ 181. For the Earth as a whole, when it has gone 
through the entire series of its ascending transformations, 
must remain, like all .smaller aggregates, exposed to the 
contingencies of its environment; and in the eon. 
those ceaseless changes in progress tJiroiighout a Universe 
of which all parts are in motion, must, at some period be- 
yond the utmost strctdi of imagination, he subject to 
forces sufficient to cause its complete disintegration. Let 
us glance at the forces competent to disintegrate it. 

In his essay on " The Interaction of Natural Foi 
Professor Helmholtz states the thermal equivalent of the 
Earth's movement through space, as calculated on the 
now received datum of Mr. Joule. " If our Earth," he 
says, "were by a sudden shock brought to rest in her 
— which is not to he feared in the existing arrangement of 
our system — by such a shock a quantity of heat would be 
generated equal to that produced by the combustion of 
fourteen such Earths of Bolid coal. Making the most un- 
favorable assumption i - capacity for heat, that is, 
placing it equal to that of water, the mass of the Earth 
would thereby be heated 11,200 degrees; ft would there- 
fore be quite fused, and for the most part reduced to 
vapor. If then the Earth, after having been thus brought 
to rest, should fall into the Sun, which of course would be 
the case, the quantity of heat developed by the e 
would be four hundred times greater." Now though this 
calculation seems to be nothing to the purpose, sir. 
Earth is not likely to be suddenly arrested in its orbit and 
not likely therefore suddenly to fall into the Sun: yet, as 
before pointed out (£ 171), there is a force at work which 
it is held must at last bring the Earth into the Sun. This 
force is the resistance of the ethereal medium. From 
ethereal resistance is inferred a retardation of all moving 
bodies in the Solar System — a retardation which certain 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 445 

astronomers contend even now shows its effects in the rela- 
tive nearness to one another of the orbits of the older 
planets. If, then, retardation is going on, there must 
come a time, no matter how remote, when the slowly di- 
minishing orbit of the Earth will end in the Sun; and 
though the quantity of molar motion to be then trans- 
formed into molecular motion will not be so great as that 
which the calculation of Helmholtz supposes, it will be 
great enough to reduce the substance of the Earth to a 
gaseous state. 

This dissolution of the Earth, and, at intervals, of every 
other planet, is not, however, a dissolution of the Solar 
System. Viewed in their ensemble, all the changes ex- 
hibited throughout the Solar System are incidents accom- 
panying the integration of the entire matter composing 
it; the local integration of which each planet is the scene 
completing itself long before the general integration is 
complete. But each secondary mass, having gone through 
its evolution and reached a state of equilibrium among its 
parts, thereafter continues in its extinct state, until by the 
still progressing general integration it is brought into the 
central mass. And though each such union of a secondary 
mass with the central mass, implying transformation of 
molar motion into molecular motion, causes partial diffu- 
sion of the total mass formed, and adds to the quantity of 
motion that has to be dispersed in the shape of light and 
heat — yet it does but postpone the period at which the 
total mass must become completely integrated, and its 
excess of contained motion radiated into space. 

* § 182. Here we come to the question raised at the close 
of the last chapter — does Evolution as a whole, like Evolu- 
tion in detail, advance toward complete quiescence? Is 
that motionless state called death, which ends Evolution 
in organic bodies, typical of the universal death in which 
Evolution at large must end? And have we thus to con- 
template, as the outcome of things, a boundless space hold- 
ing here and" there extinct suns, fated to remain for ever 
without further change? 

To so speculative an inquiry, none but a speculative 

♦Though this chapter is new. this section, and the one following it, are not 
new In the first edition they were included in the final section of the fore- 
going chapter. While substantially the same as before, the argument has been 
iu some places abbreviated ana in other places enforced by additional matter. 



I 



446 FIRST PBIXCIPLES. 

answer is to be expected. Such answer as may be ven- 
tured must be taken less as a positive answer than as a 
demurrer to the conclusion that the proximate result must 
be the ultimate result. If, pushing to its extreme the ar- 
gument that Evolution must come to a close in complete 
equilibrium or rest, the reader suggests that, for aught 
which appears to the contrary, the Universal Death thus 
implied will continue indefinitely, it is legitimate to point 
out how, on carrying the argument still further, we are led 
to infer a subsequent Universal Life. Let us see what may 
be assigned as grounds for inferring this. 

It has been already shown that all equilibration, so far 
as we can trace it, is relative. The dissipation of a 
body's motion by c >inmunhation of it to surrounding 
matter, solid, liquid, . and ethereal, brings the 

body to a fixed ] in relation to the matter that 

abstracts its motion. Bnt all its other motions continue. 
Further, this motion, the disappearance of which can.- 
ative equilibration, is not Lost but simply transferred. 
Whether it i- directly transformed into insensible motion, 
as happens in the ease of the Sun, or whetl i the 

sensible motio] \ on around i lirectly trans- 

formed into smaller sensible motions, and these into still 
smaller, until they become ins - not. In 

every instance the ultimate result is that whatever n. 
of masses is lost reapp bion pervading 

space. Thus the qui 

Whether after the completion of all the relative equilibra- 
tions which bring Evolution to a close, tin-re remain any 
furthes equilibrations to be effected? Whether there are 
any other moti< a - - that mi 

formed into molecular motion? Ami if there 
other motions, what must be the consequence when the 
molecular motion generated by their transformation is 
added to that which already ex - 

To the first of tl -ions the answer is, that there 

(A) remain motions which are undiminished by all the 
relative equilibrations we have considered: namely, the 
motions of translation possessed by those vast mass 
matter called stars — remote suns that are probably, like 
our own, surrounded by circling groups of planets. The 
belief that the stars are fixed has long since been ; 
doned ; observation has proved many of them to have sensi- 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 447 

blc proper motion?. Moreover, it has been ascertained by 
measurement that in relation to the stars nearest to us, 
our own star travels at the rate of about half a million 
miles per day; and if, as is admitted to be not improbable, 
our own star is moving in the same direction with adjacent 
stars, its absolute velocity may be, and most likely is, im- 
mensely greater than this. Now no such changes as those 
taking place within the Solar System, even when carried to 
the extent of integrating the whole of its matter into one 
mass, and diffusing all its relative motions in an insensi- 
ble form through space, can affect these sidereal motions. 
Hence, there appear no alternative but to infer that they 
must remain to be equilibrated by some subsequent pro- 
cess. 

The next question that arises is: To what law do 
sidereal motions conform? And to this question Astron- 
omy replies — the law of gravitation. The movements of 
binary stars have proved this. The periodic times of sun- 
dry binary stars have been calculated on the assumption 
that their revolutions are determined by a force like that 
which regulates the revolutions of planets and satellites ; 
and the subsequent performances of their revolutions in 
the predicted periods have verified the assumption. If, 
then, these remote bodies are centres of gravitation — if we 
infer that all other stars are centres of gravitation, as we 
may fairly do — and if we draw the unavoidable corollary, 
that the gravitative force, which so conspicuously affects 
stars. that are near one another, also affects remote stars, we 
must conclude that all the members of our Sidereal System 
gravitate, individually and collectively. 

But if these widely dispersed moving masses mutually 
gravitate, what must happen? There appears but one 
tenable answer. They cannot preserve their present ar- 
rangement; the irregular distribution of our Sidereal 
System being such as to render even a temporary moving 
equilibrium impossible. If the stars are centres of an at- 
tractive force that varies inversely as the square of the dis- 
tance, there is no escape from the inference that the 
structure of our galaxy is undergoing change, and must 
continue to undergo change. 

Thus, in the absence of tenable alternatives, we are 
brought to the positions: 1, that the stars are in motion; 
2, that they move in conformity with the law of gravita- 




448 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

tion; 3, that, distributed as they are, they cannot move 
in conformity with the law of gravitation without under- 
going rearrangement. If now we ask the nature of this 
rearrangement, we find ourselves obliged to infer a pro- 
gressive concentration. Stars at present dispersed must 
become locally aggregated; existing aggregations (except- 
ing, perhaps, the globular clusters) must grow more dense; 
and aggregations must coalesce with one another. That 
integration has been progressing throughout past eras we 
found to be indicated by the structure of the heavens, in 
general and in detail; and of the extent to which it has 
in some places already gone, remarkable instances are 
furnished by the Magellanic clouds — two closely packed 
agglomerations, not, indeed, of single stars only, but of 
single Btars, of du -ular and irregular, of nebula 1 , 

and of diffused nebulosity. That these have been formed 

by mutual gravitation of pai widely scattered, there 

is evidence in the barrenness of the surrounding celestial 
Bpaces; the nubecula minor, especially, being seated, as 
Humboldt says, in "a kind of starless desert. " 

What must be t lie limit of Buch concentrations? The 
mutual attraction of tv when it so far predominates 

over other attractions as to cause approximate 
certainly ends in the formation of a binary star: since the 
motions generated by other attractions prevent the two 
stars from moving in Btraight lines to their common centre 
of gravity. B small eh .having also cer- 

tain proper motio mutual attraction may 

lead, net to complete union, but to the formation of 
binary clusters. As the pro ess continues, b< n 
the duster.- become larger, they mU8t move more dir 
toward each other, thus forming clusters of inert 

While, therefore, during the earlier 
concentration the probabilities are tmmene rt the 

actual contact of these mutually gravitating masses; it is 
tolerably manifest that, as tiie concentration inc. 
collision must become probable and ultimately certain. 
This is an inference not lacking the support of high au- 
thority. Sir John Uersehel. treating of those numerous 
and variously aggregated clusters of stars revealed by the 
telescope, and citing with apparent approval his father's 
opinion that the more diffused and irregular of these are 
" globular clusters in a less advanced state of oond 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 449 

tion," subsequently remarks, that "among a crowd of solid 
bodies of whatever size, animated by independent and 
partially opposing impulses, motions opposite to each other 
must produce collision, destruction of velocity, and sub- 
sidence or near approach toward the centre of preponderant 
attraction; while those which conspire, or which remain 
outstanding after such conflicts, must ultimately give rise 
to circulation of a permanent character." Now what is 
here alleged of these minor clusters cannot be denied of 
larger clusters; and thus the above-inferred process of 
concentration appears certain to bring about an increas- 
ingly frequent integration of masses. 

We have next to consider the consequences of the ac- 
companying loss of velocity. The sensible motion which 
disappears cannot be destroyed, but must be transformed 
into insensible motion. \ What will be the eifect of this 
insensible motion? Already we have seen that were the 
Earth arrested, dissipation of its substance would result. 
And if so relatively small a momentum as that acquired by 
the Earth in falling to the Sun, would be equivalent to a 
molecular motion sufficient to reduce the earth to gases of 
extreme rarity, what must be the molecular motion gen- 
erated by the mutually arrested momenta of two stars, 
that have moved to their common centre of gravity 
through spaces immeasurably greater? There seems no 
alternative but to conclude that it would be great enough 
to reduce the matter of the stars to an almost inconceivable 
tenuity — a tenuity like that which we ascribe to nebular 
matter. Such being the immediate effect, what would be 
the ulterior effect? Sir John Herschel, in the passage 
above quoted, describing the collisions that must arise in 
a concentrating group of stars, adds that those stars 
" which remain outstanding after such conflicts must ulti- 
mately give rise to circulation of a permanent character." 
The problem, however, is here dealt with purely as a 
mechanical one: the assumption being that the mutually 
arrested masses will continue as masses— an assumption to 
which no objection appeared at the time when Sir John 
Herschel wrote this passage ; since the correlation of forces 
was not then recognized. But obliged as we now are to 
conclude that stars moving at the high velocities acquired 
during concentration will, by mutual arrest, be dissipated 
into gases, the problem becomes different ; and a different 
29 



450 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

inference seems unavoidable. For the diffused matter 
produced by such conflicts must form a resisting medium, 
occupying that central region of the cluster through which 
its members from time to time pass in describing their or- 
bits — a resisting medium which they cannot move thi 
without having their velocities diminished. Every ad- 
ditional collision, by augmenting this resisting medium, 
and making the losses of velocity greater, mnst aid in pre- 
venting the establishment of that equilibrium which would 
else arise; and so mnst conspire to produce more frequent 
collisions. And the nebulous i thus formed, pres- 

ently enveloping the who] by continuing 

to shorten the gyrations of the moving masses, entail an 

asingly active integration and reactive disio 
of them, until they are all i I. Whether this 

cess compl* ;' independently in different parts of our 

Sidereal System; or whether it comph : only by 

aggregating the whole matter of our Sidereal S; 
whether, as b& unlikely, local integrations and dis- 

integrations run their courses while the general in: 
tioh i- going on. ai 

In any case the conclusion I ■ n is. that the in: 

tion must continue until the conditions which bring about 
disintegration are reached; and that there must then en- 
sue a diffusion that an ■ preceding concentration. 
Tlii-. Indeed, is the conclusion which presents itseli 
deduction from the ] - con- 
centrating to a common centre of gravity eventually reach 
it, then the quantities of motion they have acquired must 
suffice to carry them away again to those remote regions 
whence they started. And since, by the conditions of the 
case, they cannot return to these remote regions in the 
shape of concrete masses, they must return in the aha] 
diffused mi Action and reaction b .1 and op- 
posite, the momentum producing dispersion must 
great as the momentum acquired by j 
spread over the same quantity of i must cans 
equivalent distribution through space, whatever be the 
form of the matter. One condition., however, essential. to 
the literal fulfilment of this result, must 
namely, that the quantity of molecular motion radiated 
into space by each star in the course of its formation from 
diffused matter, shall either not escape from our Sidereal 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 451 

System or shall be compensated by an equal quantity of 
molecular motion radiated from other parts of space into 
our Sidereal System. In other words, if we set out with 
that amount of molecular motion implied by the existence 
of the matter of our Sidereal System in a nebulous form, 
then it follows from the persistence of force, that if this 
matter undergoes the redistribution constituting Evolu- 
tion, the quantity of molecular motion given out during 
the integration of each mass, plus the quantity of molecular 
motion given out during the integration of all the masses, 
must suffice again to reduce it to the same nebulous form. 
Here, indeed, we arrive at a barrier to our reasonings, 
since we cannot know whether this condition is or is not 
fulfilled. If the ether which fills the interspaces of our 
Sidereal System has a limit somewhere beyond the outer- 
most stars, then it is inferable that motion is not lost by 
radiation beyond this limit; and if so, the original degree 
of diffusion may be resumed. Or supposing the ethereal 
medium to have no such limit, yet, on the hypothesis of 
an unlimited space, containing, at certain intervals, 
Sidereal Systems like our own, it may be that the quantity 
of molecular motion radiated into the region occupied by 
our Sidereal System is equal to that which our Sidereal 
System radiates; in which case, the quantity of motion 
possessed by it remaining undiminished, it may continue 
during unlimited time its alternate concentrations and 
diffusions. But if, on the other hand, throughout bound- 
less space filled with ether, there exist no other Sidereal 
Systems subject to like changes, or if such other Sidereal 
Systems exist at more than a certain average distance from 
one another, then it seems an unavoidable conclusion that 
the quantity of motion possessed must diminish by 
radiation; and that so, on each successive resumption of 
the nebulous form, the matter of our Sidereal System will 
occupy a less space, until it reaches either a state in which 
its concentrations and diffusions are relatively small, or a 
state of complete aggregation and rest. Since, however, 
we have no evidence showing the existence or non-existence 
of Sidereal Systems throughout remote space, and since, 
even had we such evidence, a legitimate conclusion could 
not be drawn from premises of which one element (un- 
limited space) is inconceivable — we must be forever with- 
out answer to this transcendent question. 



452 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

But confining ourselves to the proximate and not neces- 
sarily insoluble question, we find reason for thinking that 
after the completion of those various equilibrations which 
bring to a close all the forms of Evolution we have con- 
templated, there must continue an equilibration of a far 
wider kind. When that integration everywhere in pro- 
gress throughout our Solar System has reached its climax, 
there will remain to be effected the immeasurably greater 
integration of our Solar System with other such systems. 
There must then reappear in molecular motion what is lost 
in the motion of masses; and the inevitable transformation 
of this motion of masses into molecular motion cannot 
take place without reducing the masses to a nebulous form. 

§ 183. Thus we are led to the conclusion that the en- 
tire process of things, as displayed in the aggregate of the 
risible Universe, is analogous to the entire process of things 
as displayed in the smallest aggregates. 

.Motion as well as Matter being fixed in quantity, it would 
seem that the change in the distribution of Matter which 
Motion effects, coming to a limit in whichever direction it 
is carried, the indestructible Motion thereupon necessitates 
a reverse distribution. Apparently, the universal', 
existent forces of attraction and repulsion, which, a- we 
have seen, necessitate rhythm in all minor changes 
throughout the Universe, also necessitate rhythm in the 
totality of its changes — produce now an immeasurable 
period during which the attractive forces predominating 
cause universal concentration, and then an immeasurable 
period during which the repulsive forces predominating 
cause universal diffusion — alternate eras of Evolution and 
Dissolution. And thus there is suggested the conception 
of a past during which there have been successive Evolu- 
tions analogous to that which is now going on; and a 
future during which successive other such Evolutions may 
go on — ever the same in principle but never the same in 
concrete result. 



CHAPTER XXIV. 

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION". 

§ 184. At the close of a work like this, it is more than 
usually needful to contemplate as a whole that which the 
successive chapters have presented in parts. A coherent 
knowledge implies something more than the establishment 
of connections ; we must not rest after seeing how each 
minor group of truths falls into its place within some 
major group, and how all the major groups fit together. 
It is requisite that we should retire a space, and, looking 
at the entire structure from a distance at which details 
are lost to view, observe its general character. 

Something more than recapitulation — something more 
even than an organized restatement, will come within the 
scope of the chapter. We shall find that in their ensemble 
the general truths reached exhibit, under certain aspects, 
a oneness not hitherto observed. 

There is, too, a special reason for noting how the various 
divisions and subdivisions of the argument consolidate; 
namely, that the theory at large thereby obtains a final 
illustration. The reduction of the generalizations that 
have been set forth to a completely integrated state exem- 
plifies once more the process of Evolution, and strength- 
ens still further the general fabric of conclusions. 

§ 185. Here, indeed, we find ourselves brought round 
unexpectedly, and very significantly, to the truth with 
which we set out, and with which our resurvey must com- 
mence. For this integrated form of knowledge is the 
form which, apart from the doctrine of Evolution, we 
decided to be the highest form. 

When we inquired what constitutes Philosophy — when 
we compared men's various conceptions of Philosophy, so 
that, eliminating the elements in which they differed, we 
might see in what they agreed — we found in them all the 
tacit implication that Philosophy is completely unified 
knowledge, and apart from the proposed methods by which 
unification is to be effected, we traced in every case the 



454 FIRST PRIXCIPLES. 

belief that unification is possible, and that the end of Phil- 
osophy is the achievement of it. 

Accepting this conclusion, we went on to consider the 
data with which Philosophy must set out. Fundamental 
propositions, or propositions not deducible from deeper 
ones, can be established only by showing the complete 
congruity of all the results reached through the assumption 
of them; and, premising that they were assumed till so 
established, we took as our data those organized components 
of our intelligence without which there cannot go on the 
mental processes implied by philosophizing. 

From the specification of these we passed to certain 
primary truths: "The Indestructibility of Matt 
Continuity of Motion," and "The I ice of F< 

of which the hist is ultimate and the others derivative. 
Having previously Been that our exi r and 

motion arc resolvable into expei rce, we further 

saw the truths that Blatter and Motion are un 
in quantity, to be implications of the truth 
unchangeable in quantity. This we discovered is the truth 
by derivation from which all other truths 

Tiie first of the truths which presented itself to 
proved was "The Persistence of tic- mong 

Fore This, which is ordinarily called Uniform • 

Law, we found to he i sary implication of the fact 

that Force can neither arise out of nothing nor lapse into 
nothing. 

The deduction next drawn was. that forces which - 
to he lost are transformed into their equivalents of other 
forces; or. conversely, that forces which become mai 
do so by disappearance of pre- j equivalent i 

Of those truths we found illustrations in the motions of the 
heavenly bodies, in the chfl Q over the Earth's 

surface, and in all organic and sup 

It turned out to be the same with the law that ei 
thing moves along the line of leas: r the line 

of greatest traction, or their resultant. Among move- 
ments of all orders, from those of stars down to tl: 
nervous discharges and commercial currents, it was shown 
both that this is so. and that, given the Peraisten 
Force, it must be 

So, too, we saw it to be with "The Rhythm of Motion." 
All motion alternates — be it the motion of planets in their 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 455 

orbits or ethereal molecules in their undulations — be it the 
cadence of speech or the rises and falls of prices; and, as 
before, it became manifest that, Force being persistent, 
this perpetual reversal of Motion between limits is inevita- 
ble. 

§ 186. These truths holding of all existences were rec- 
ognized as of the kind required to constitute what we dis- 
tinguished as Philosophy. But, on considering them, we 
perceived that as they stand they do not form anything like 
a Philosophy; and that a Philosophy cannot be formed by 
any number of such truths separately known. Each such 
truth expresses the general law of some one factor by which 
phenomena, as we habitually experience them, are pro- 
duced ; or, at most, expresses the law of co-operation of 
some two factors. But knowing what are the elements of 
a process is not knowing how these elements combine to 
effect it. That which alone can unify knowledge must be 
the law of co-operation of all the factors — a law expressing 
simultaneously the complex antecedents and the complex 
consequents which any phenomenon as a whole presents. 

A further inference was that Philosophy, as we under- 
stand it, must not unify separate concrete phenomena 
only, and must not stop short with unifying separate classes 
of concrete phenomena; but must unify all concrete 
phenomena. If the law of operation of each factor holds 
true throughout the Cosmos, so, too, must the law of their 
co-operation. And hence in comprehending the Cosmos 
as conforming to this law of co-operation must consist 
that highest unification which Philosophy seeks. 

Descending from this abstract statement to a concrete 
one, we saw that the law sought must be the law of the 
continuous redistribution of Matter and Motion. The 
changes everywhere going on, from those which are slowly 
altering the structure of our galaxy down to these which 
constitute a chemical decomposition, are changes in the 
relative positions of component parts, and everywhere 
necessarily imply that along with a new arrangement of 
Matter there has arisen a new arrangement of Motion. 
Hence we may be certain, a priori, that there must be a 
law of the concomitant redistribution of Matter and Mo- 
tion, which holds of every change; and which, by thus 
unifying all changes, must be the basis of a Philosophy. 






456 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

In commencing our search for this universal law of 
redistribution we contemplated from another point of 
view the problem of Philosophy, and saw that it-j solution 
could not but be of the nature indicated. It was shown 
that a Philosophy stands self-convicted of inadequacy, if 
it does not formulate the whole series of changes | 
through by every existence in its passage from the imper- 
ceptible to the perceptible and again from the perceptible 
to the imperceptible. If it begins its explanations with 
existences that already have concrete forms, or leaves oif 
while they still retain concrete forms — then, manifestly, 
they had preceding histories, or will have succeeding his- 
tories, or both, of which no account is given. And as 
such preceding and succeeding histories are subje< 
possible knowledge, a Philosophy which says nothing about 
them falls short of the required unification. Whence we 
saw it to follow that the formula sought, equally applicable 
to existences taken singly and in their totality, must be 
applicable to the whole history of each and to the whole 
history of all. 

By these considerations we were brought within view of 
the formula. For if it had to comprehend the entire 
progress from the imperceptible to the perceptible 
from the perceptible to the imperceptible, and if it was 
also to express the continuous redistribution of Matter and 
Motion — then, obviously, it could be no other than one 
defining the opposite | of concentration and diffu- 

sion in terms of Matter and Motion. And if BO, it must 
be a statement of the truth that the concentration of 
Matter implies the dissipation of Motion, and that, con- 
versely, the absorption of Motion implies the dilTusion of 
Matter. 

Such, in fact, we found to be the law of the entire cycle 
of changes passed through by every existence — I - 
motion and consequent integration, eventually follow* 
gain of motion and consequent disintegration. And we 
saw that besides applying to the whole history of each ex- 
istence, it applies to each detail of the history. Both 
processes are going on at every instant, but always there 
is a differential result in favor of the first or the second. 
And every change, even though it be only a transpos 
of parts, inevitably advances the one process or the other. 

Evolution and Dissolution, as we name these opposite 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 457 

transformations, though thus truly defined in their most 
general characters, are but incompletely defined ; or rather, 
while the definition of Dissolution is sufficient, the defini- 
tion of Evolution is extremely insufficient. Evolution is 
always an integration of Matter and dissipation of Motion ; 
but it is in most cases much more than this. The primary 
redistribution of Matter and Motion is usually accompa- 
nied by secondary redistributions. 

Distinguishing the different kinds of Evolution so pro- 
duced as simple and compound, we went on to consider 
under what conditions the secondary redistributions which 
make Evolution compound take place. We found that a 
concentrating aggregate which loses its contained motion 
rapidly, or integrates quickly, exhibits only simple Evolu- 
tion; but in proportion as its largeness or the peculiar 
constitution of its components hinders the dissipation of 
its motion, its parts, while undergoing that primary redis- 
tribution which results in integration, undergo secondary 
redistributions producing more or less complexity. 

§ 187. From this conception of Evolution and Dissolu- 
tion as together making up the entire process through 
which things pass, and from this conception of Evolution 
as dividing into simple and compound, we went on to con- 
sider the law of Evolution as exhibited among all orders 
of existences, in general and in detail. 

The integration of Matter and concomitant dissipation 
of Motion was traced not in each whole only, but in the 
parts into which each whole divides. By the aggregate 
Solar System, as well as by each planet and satellite, pro- 
gressive concentration has been and is still being exempli- 
fied. In each organism that general incorporation of dis- 
persed materials which causes growth is accompanied by 
local incorporations, forming what we call organs. Every 
society, while it displays the aggregative process by its in- 
creasing mass of population, displays it also by the rise of 
dense masses in special parts of its area. And, in all cases, 
along with these direct integrations there go the indirect 
integrations by which p&rts are made mutually dependent. 

From this primary redistribution we were led on to con- 
sider the secondary redistributions, by inquiring how there 
came to be a formation of parts during the formation of a 
whole. It turned out that there is habitually a passage 



458 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

from homogeneity to heterogeneity, along with the passage 
from diffusion to concentration. While the matter com- 
posing the Solar System has been assuming a denser form, 
it has changed from unity to variety of distribution. 
Solidification of the Earth has been accompanied by a 
progress from comparative uniformity to extreme multi- 
formity. In the course of its advance from a germ to a 
mass of relatively great bulk, every plant and animal also 
advances from simplicity to complexity. The increase of 
a society in numbers and consolidation has for its con- 
comitant an increased heterogeneity both of its political 
and its industrial organization. And the like holds of all 
super-organic products — Language, Science, Art, and Lit- 
erature. 

But we saw that these secondary redistributions are not 
thus completely expressed. At the same time that the 
parts into which each whole is resolved become more un- 
like one another, they also become more sharply marked 
off. The result of the secondary redistributions is therefore 
to change an indehnte homogeneity into a definite hetero- 
geneity. This additional trait also we found to be trace- 
able in evolving aggregates of all orders. Further consid- 
eration, however, made it apparent that the increasing 
deriniteness which goes along with increasing heterogeneity 
is not an independent trait; but that it results from the 
integration which progresses in each of the differentiating 
parts, while it progresses in the whole they form. 

Further, it was pointed out that in all evolutions, in- 
organic, organic, and super-organic, this change in the 
arrangement of Matter is accompanied by a parallel change 
in the arrangement of Motion: every increase in structural 
complexity involving a corresponding increase in func- 
tional complexity. It was shown that along with the in- 
tegration of molecules into masses, there arises an integra- 
tion of molecular motion into the motion of masses; and 
that as fast as there results variety in the sizes and forms 
of aggregates and their relations to incident forces, there 
also results variety in their movements. 

The transformation thus contemplated under separate 
aspects being in itself but one transformation, it became 
needful to unite these separate aspects into a single con- 
ception — to regard the primary and secondary redistri- 
butions as simultaneously working their various effects. 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 459 

Everywhere the change from a confused simplicity to a 
distinct complexity, in the distribution of both matter and 
motion, is incidental to the consolidation of the matter and 
the loss of its motion. Hence the redistribution of the 
matter and of its retained motion is from a diffused, uni- 
form, and indeterminate arrangement, to a concentrated, 
multiform, and determinate arrangement. 

§ 188. We come now to one of the additions that may 
be made to the general argument while summing it up. 
Here is the fit occasion for observing a higher degree of 
unity in the foregoing inductions, than we observed while 
making them. 

The law of Evolution has been thus far contemplated as 
holding true of each order of existences, considered as a 
separate order. But the induction as so presented falls 
short of that completeness which it gains when we con- 
template these several orders of existences as forming to- 
gether one natural whole. While we think of Evolution as 
divided into astronomic, geologic, biologic, psychologic, 
sociologic, etc., it may seem to a certain extent a coinci- 
dence that the same law of metamorphosis holds through- 
out all its divisions. But when we recognize these divisions 
as mere conventional groupings, made to facilitate the ar- 
rangement and acquisition of knowledge — when we regard 
the different existences with which they severally deal as 
component parts of one Cosmos — we see at once that there 
are not several kinds of Evolution having certain traits in 
common, but one Evolution going on everywhere after the 
same manner. We have repeatedly observed that while 
any whole is evolving, there is always going on an evolution 
of the parts into which it divides itself; but we have not 
observed that this equally holds of the totality of things, as 
made up of parts within parts from the greatest down to 
the smallest. We know that while a physically-cohering 
aggregate like the human body is getting larger and tak- 
ing on its general shape, each of its organs is doing the 
same; that while each organ is growing and becoming un- 
like others, there is going on a differentiation and integra- 
tion of its component tissues and vessels; and that even 
the components of these components are severally increas- 
ing and passing into more definitely heterogeneous struc- 
tures. But we have not duly remarked that, setting out 



460 FIRST PRIXCIPLES. 






with the human body as a minute part, and ascending from 
it to greater parts, this simultaneity of transformation is 
equally manifest; that while each individual is developing, 
the society of which he is an insignificant unit is develop- 
ing too; that while the aggregate mass forming a society 
is becoming more definitely heterogeneous, so likewise is 
that total aggregate, the Earth of which the society is an 
inappreciable portion; that while the Earth, which in bulk 
is not a millionth of the Solar System, progresses toward 
its concentrated and complex structure, the Solar System 
similarly progresses; and that even its transformations are 
but those of a scarcely appreciable portion of our Sidereal 
System, which has at the same time been going through 
parallel changes. 

So understood, Evolution becomes not one in principle 
only, but one in fact. There are not many metamorphoses 
similarly carried on ; but there is a single metamorphosis 
universally progressing, wherever the reverse metamor- 
phosis has not set in. In any locality, great or small 
throughout space, where the occupying matter acquil 
appreciable individuality, or distinguishablenesB from other 
matter, there Evoluti< q; or rather, the acquire- 

ment of this appreciable individuality is the eomn 
ment of Evolution. And this holds uniformly, regardless 
of the size of the aggregate, regardless of its inclusion in 
other aggregates, and regardless of the wider evolutions 
within which its own is comprehended. 

£ lso. After making them, we saw that the inductions 
which, taken together, establish the law of Evolution, do 
not, so long as they remained inductions, form coherent 
parts of that whole rightly named Philosophy; nor does 
even the foregoing passage of these inductions from ag 
ment into identity suffice to produce the unity sought. 
For, as was pointed out at the time, to unify the truths 
thus reached with other truths, it is requisite to deduce 
them from the Persistence of Force. Our next step. : 
fore, was to show why, Force being persistent, the trans- 
formation which Evolution shows us necessarily results. 

The first conclusion arrived at was, that any finite homo- 
geneous aggregate must inevitably lose its homogeneity, 
through the unequal exposure of its parts to incident 
forces. It was pointed out that the production of diversi- 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 461 

ties of structure by diverse forces, and forces acting under 
diverse conditions, has been illustrated in astronomic 
evolution ; and that a like connection of cause and effect 
is seen in the large and small modifications undergone by 
our globe. The early changes of organic germs supplied 
further evidence that unlikenesses of structure follow un- 
likenesses of relations to surrounding agencies — evidence 
enforced by the tendency of the differently placed members 
of each species to diverge into varieties. And we found 
that the contrasts, political and industrial, which arise 
between the parts of societies, serve to illustrate the same 
principle. The instability of the homogeneous thus 
everywhere exemplified we also saw holds in each of the 
distinguishable parts into which any uniform whole lapses, 
and that so the less heterogeneous tends continually to be- 
come more heterogeneous. 

A further step in the inquiry disclosed a secondary cause 
of increasing multiformity. Every differentiated part is 
not simply a seat of further differentiations but also a 
parent of further differentiations: since in growing unlike 
other parts it becomes a centre of unlike reactions on in- 
cident forces, and by so adding to the diversity of forces 
at work adds to the diversity of effects produced. This 
multiplication of effects proved to be similarly traceable 
throughout all Nature — in the actions and reactions that 
go on throughout the Solar System, in the never-ceasing 
geologic complications, in the involved symptoms produced 
in organisms by disturbing influences, in the many 
thoughts and feelings generated by single impressions, 
and in the ever-ramifying results of each new agency 
brought to bear on a society. To which was added the 
corollary, confirmed by abundant facts, that the multipli- 
cation of effects advances in a geometrical progression 
along with advanc : ng heterogeneity. 

Completely to interpret the structural changes constitut- 
ing Evolution, there remained to assign a reason for that 
increasingly distinct demarcation of parts which accom- 
panies the production of differences among parts. This 
reason we discovered to be the segregation of mixed units 
under the action of forces capable of moving them. We 
saw that when unlike incident forces have made the parts 
of an aggregate unlike in the natures of their component 
units, there necessarily arises a tendency to separation of 



462 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

the dissimilar units from one another, and to a clustering 
of those units which are similar. This cause of the local 
integrations that accompany local differentiations turned 
out to be likewise exemplified by all kinds of Evolution — 
by the formation of celestial bodies, by the moulding of 
the Earth's crust, by organic modifications, by the estab- 
lishment of mental distinctions, by the genesis of social 
divisions. 

At length, to the query whether these processes have 
any limit, there came the answer that they must end in 
equilibrium. That continual division and subdivision of 
forces which changes the uniform into the multiform and 
the multiform into the more multiform, is a pra 
which forces arc perpetually dissipated; and dissipation of 
them, continuing as long as there remain any 
balanced by opposing forces, must end in rest. It was 
shown that when, as happens in arious 

orders, many movements arc L r <>inL; en together, the earlier 
dispersion of the smaller and more resisted movements 
establishes moving equilibria of different kinds, forming 
transitional Btages on the way t<» complete equilibrium. 
And further inquiry made it apparent that for th< 
reason these moving equilibria have certain self-conserving 
powers, shown in the neutralization of perturbatioi 
the adjustment to new conditions. This general principle 
of equilibration, like the preceding general principles, was 
traced throughout all forms of Evoluti< i oomio, 

geologic, biologic, mental, and soeial. A\a\ our concluding 
inference was thai the penultimate stagi 
in which the extremest multiformity and mplex 

moving equilibrium are established, mi B implying 

the highest conceivable state of humanity. 

But the l'aet which it here chiefly concerns us to remem- 
ber is, that each of these laws oi the redistribution of 
.Matter and Motion was found to be a derivative law— a 
law deducible from the fundamental law. The Persistence 
of Force being granted, there follow as inevitable inferences 
"The Instability of the Homogeneous" and " The Multipli- 
cation of Effects," while *' Segregation" and "Equilibration" 
also become corollaries. And thus discovering that the 
processes of change formulated under these tit) - 
many different aspects of one transformation, determined 
by an ultimate necessity, we arrive at a complete unitiea- 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 463 

tion of them — a synthesis in which Evolution in general 
and in detail becomes known as an implication of the law 
that transcends proof. Moreover, in becoming thus unified 
with one another, the complex truths of Evolution become 
simultaneously unified with those simpler truths shown to 
have a like affiliation — the equivalence of transformed 
forces, the movement of every mass and molecule along its 
line of least resistance, and the limitation of its motion by 
rhythm. Which further unification brings us to a con- 
ception of the entire plexus of changes presented by each 
concrete phenomenon, and by the aggregate of concrete 
phenomena, as a manifestation of one fundamental fact — 
a fact shown alike in the total change and in all the sep- 
arate changes composing it. 

§ 190. Finally we turned to contemplate, as exhibited 
throughout Nature, that process of Dissolution which forms 
the complement cf Evolution, and which inevitably, at 
some time or other, undoes what Evolution has done. 

Quickly following the arrest of Evolution in aggregates 
that are unstable, and following it at periods often long 
delayed but reached at last in the stable aggregates around 
us, we saw that even to the vast aggregate of which all 
these are parts — even to the Earth as a whole — Dissolution 
must eventually arrive. Nay, we even saw grounds for the 
belief that the far vaster masses dispersed at almost im- 
measureable intervals through space will, at a time beyond 
the reach of finite imagination, share the same fate, and 
that so universal Evolution will be followed by universal 
Dissolution — a conclusion which, like those preceding it, 
we saw to be deducible from the Persistence of Force. 

It may be added that in so unifying the phenomena of 
Dissolution with those of Evolution as being manifestations 
of the same ultimate law under opposite conditions, Ave 
also unify the phenomena represented by the existing Uni- 
verse with the like phenomena that have preceded them 
and will succeed them — so far, at least, as such unification 
is possible to our limited intelligences. For if, as we saw 
reason to think, there is an alteration of Evolution and 
Dissolution in the totality of things — if, as we are obliged 
to infer from the Persistence of Force, the arrival at either 
limit of this vast rhythm brings about the conditions 
under which a counter-movement commences — if we are 






464 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

hence compelled to entertain the conception of Evolutions 
that have filled an immeasurable past and Evolutions that 
will fill an immeasurable future, we can no longer con- 
template the visible creation as having a definite beginning 
or end, or as being isolated. It becomes unified with all 
existence before and after; and the Force which the Uni- 
verse presents falls into the same category with its Space 
and Time, as admitting of no limitation in thought. 

§ 191. So rounding off the argument, we find its result 
brought into complete coalescence with the conclusion 
reached in Part I., where, independently of any inquiry 
like the foregoing, we dealt with the relation between the 
Knowable and the Unknowable. 

It was there shown by analysis of both our religions 
our scientific ideas that, while knowledge of the cause which 
produces effects on our consciousness Lb impossible, the ex- 
istence of a cause for these effects is a datum of conscious' 
hess. We saw that the belief in a Power of which no limit 
in Time or Space can he conceived i- that fundan 
element in Religion which survives all its ch form. 

We saw that all Philosophies avowedly <>r tacitly recognized 
this same ultimate truth; that while the Relativist rightly 
repudiates those definite assertions which the Absolutist 
makes respecting existence transcending perception, he is 
yet at last compelled to unite with him in predicti] [ 
istence transcending perception. And this inexpugnable 
consciousness, in which Religion and Philosophy are at one 
with Common Sense, proved to be likewise that on which 
all exact Science is based. We found that subjective 
Science can give no account of those conditioned mo 
being which constitute consciousness, without postulating 
unconditioned being. And we found that objective Science 
can give no account of the world which we know us exter- 
nal, without regarding its changes of form as manifesta- 
tions of something that continues constant under all forms. 
This is also the implication to which we are now led 
by our completed synthesis. The recognition of a per- 
sistent Force, ever changing its manifestations but un- 
changed in quantity throughout all past time and all 
future time, is that which we find alone makes possible 
each concrete interpretation, and at last unities all concrete 
interpretations. Not, indeed, that this coincidence adds 



FIRST- PRINCIPLES. 465 

to the strength of the argument as a logical structure. 
Our synthesis has proceeded by taking for granted at every 
step this ultimate truth, and the ultimate truth cannot, 
therefore, be regarded as in any sense an outcome of the 
synthesis. Nevertheless, the coincidence yields a verifica- 
tion, For when treating of the data of Philosophy, it was 
pointed out that we cannot take even a first step without 
making assumptions, and that the only course is to proceed 
with them as provisional, until they are proved true by the 
congruity of all the results reached. This congruity we 
here see to be perfect and all-embracing — holding through- 
out that entire structure of definite consciousness of re- 
lations which we call Knowledge, and harmonizing with it 
that indefinite consciousness of existence transcending re- 
lations which forms the essence of Eeligion. 

§ 192. Toward some result of this order, inquiry, 
scientific, metaphysical, and theological, has been, and still 
is, manifestly advancing. The coalescence of polytheistic 
conceptions into the monotheistic conception, and the re- 
duction of the monotheistic conception to a more and more 
general form in which personal superintendence becomes 
merged in universal immanence, clearly shows this advance. 
It is equally shown in the fading away of old theories 
about " essences," "potentialities," "occult virtues," etc; 
in the abandonment of such doctrines as those of " Platonic 
Ideas," " Pre-established Harmonies," and the like; and in 
the tendency toward the identification of being as present 
to us in consciousness with being as otherwise conditioned 
beyond consciousness. Still more conspicuous is it in the 
progress of Science, which from the beginning has been 
grouping isolated facts under laws, uniting special laws 
under more general laws, and so reaching on to laws of 
higher and higher generality, until the conception of uni- 
versal laws has become familiar to it. 

Unification being thus the characteristic of developing 
thought of all kinds, and eventual arrival at unity being 
fairly inferable, there arises yet a further support to our 
conclusion. Since, unless there is some other and higher 
unity, the unity we have reached must be that toward 
which developing thought tends; and that there is any 
other and higher unity is scarcely supposable. Having 
grouped the changes which all orders of existences display 
30 



466 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

into inductions; having merged these inductions into a 
single induction; having interpreted this induction deduc- 
tively; having seen that the ultimate truth from which it 
is deduced is one transcending proof; it .seems, to say the 
least, very improbable that there can be established a fun- 
damentally different way of unifying that entire proc< 
things which Philosophy has to interpret. That the fore- 
going accumulated verifications are all illusive, or that an 
opposing doctrine can show a greater accumulation of veri- 
fications, is not easy to conceive. 

Let no one suppose that any such implied degree of trust- 
worthiness is alleged of the varions minor propositions 
brought in illustration of the general argument. Such an 
assumption would be BO manifestly absurd that it - 
scarcely needful to disclaim it. Hut the truth of the 
trine as a whole is unaffected by errors in the details of its 
presentation. If it can be shown that the 
Force is not a datum <»f consciousness; or if it can be 
shown that the several laws of force «cified ;r • 

corollaries from it: or it' it can be shown that, given these 
laws, the redistributiou of Matter and M<»ti<»n does not 
necessarily proceed as described; then, indeed, it will be 
shown that the theory of Evolution has not the high war- 
rant here claimed for it. Hut nothing short of this 
shake the general conclusions arrived at. 

£ 193. If these conclusions be accepted — if it be ag 
that the phenomena going on everywhere are parts of the 
genera] process oi Evolution, save where they are p 
the reverse process of Dissolution, then we may infer that 
all phenomena receive their complete interpretation only 
when recognized as parts of these processes. When 
follows that the limit toward which Knov advancing 

must be reached when the formulae of these pn 
so applied as to yield a total and specific interpretation of 
each phenomenon in its entirety, as we'll as of phenomena 
in general. 

The partially unified knowledge distinguished as Science 
does not yet include such total interpretations. Either, 
as in the more complex sciences, the prog 
clusively inductive; or. as in the simpler science-. 
deductions are concerned with the component phenomena; 
and at present there is scarcely a consciousness that the 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 467 

ultimate task is the deductive interpretation of phenomena 
in their state of composition. The Abstract Sciences, deal- 
ing with the forms under which phenomena are presented, 
and the Abstract-Concrete Sciences, dealing with the fac- 
tors by which phenomena are produced, are, philosophi- 
cally considered, the handmaids of the Concrete Sciences, 
which deal with the produced phenomena as existing in all 
their natural complexity. The laws of the forms and the 
laws of the factors having been ascertained, there then 
comes the business of ascertaining the laws of the products, 
as determined by the interaction of the co-operative factors. 
Given the Persistence of Force, and given the various de- 
rivative laws of Force, and there has to be shown not only 
how the actual existences of the inorganic world necessarily 
exhibit the traits they do, but how there necessarily result 
the more numerous and involved traits exhibited by organic 
and super-organic existences — how an organism is evolved; 
what is the genesis of human intelligence; whence social 
progress arises. 

It is evident that this development of Knowledge into 
an organized aggregate of direct and indirect deductions 
from the Persistence of Force can be achieved only in the 
remote future ; and, indeed, cannot be completely achieved 
even then. Scientific progress is progress in that equili- 
bration of thought and things which we saw is going on, 
and must continue to go on, but which cannot arrive at 
perfection in any finite period. Still, though Science can 
never be entirely reduced to this form, and though only at 
a far distant time can it be brought nearly to this form, 
much may even now be done in the way of approximation. 

Of course, what may now be done can be done but very 
imperfectly by any single individual. No one can possess 
that encyclopedic information required for rightly organ- 
izing even the truths already established. Nevertheless, 
as progress is effected by increments — as all organization, 
beginning in faint and blurred outlines, is completed by 
successive modifications and additions, advantage may ac- 
crue from an attempt, however rude, to reduce the facts 
now accumulated — or rather certain classes of them — to 
something like co-ordination. Such must be the plea for 
the several volumes which are to succeed this; dealing 
with the respective divisions of what we distinguished at 
the outset as Special Philosophy. 



468 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

§ 194. A few closing words must be said, concerning 
the general bearings of the doctrines that are now to be 
further developed. Before proceeding to interpret the 
detailed phenomena of Life, and Mind, and Society, in 
terms of Matter, Motion, and Force, the reader must be re- 
minded in what sense the interpretations are to be accepted. 

It is true that their purely relative character has been 
repeatedly insisted upon; but the liability to misinterpre- 
tation is so great that, notwithstanding all evidence to the 
contrary, there will probably have arisen, in not a few 
minds, the conviction that the solutions which have been 
given, along with those to be derived from them, are • 
tially materialistic. Having, throughout life, constantly 
heard the charge of materialism made against those who 
ascribed the more involved phenomena toag - like those 

which produce the simplest phenomena, most persons have 
acquired repugnance to such modes of interpretation; and 
the universal application of them, even though it is 
premised that the solutions they give can be but relative, 
will probably rouse more or less of the habitual feeling. 
Such an attitude of mind, however, is significant, D 
much of a reverence for the Unknown ( an ir- 

reverence for those familiar forms in which the Unknown 
Cause is manifested to us. Men who have not risen above 
that vulgar conception which unites with Matter tie 
temptuous epithets " gross" ami " brute," may naturally feel 
dismay at the proposal to reduce the phenomena of Life, 
of Mind, ami of Society, to a level with those which they 
think so degraded. But whoever remembers that the forms 
of existence which the uncultivated speak of with so much 
scorn are shown by the man of science to be the more 
marvellous in their attributes the more they are ir 
gated, and are also proved to be in their ultimate natures 
absolutely incomprehensible — as absolutely incomprehen- 
sible as sensation, or the conscious something which per- 
ceives it — whoever clearly recognizes this truth will see 
that the course proposed does not imply a degradation of 
the so-called higher, but an elevation of the so-called lower. 
Perceiving, as he will, that the Materialist and Spiritualist 
controversy is a mere war of words, in which the disputants 
are equally absurd — each thinking he understands that 
which it is impossible for any man to understand — hi 
perceive how utterly groundless is the fear referred to. 



FIRST PRINCIPLES. 469 

Being fully convinced that whatever nomenclature is used 
the ultimate mystery must remain the same, he will be as 
ready to formulate all phenomena in terms of Matter, Mo- 
tion, and Force, as in any other terms; and will rather 
indeed anticipate, that only in a doctrine which recognizes 
the Unknown Cause as co-extensive with all orders of 
phenomena can there be a consistent Eeligion or a consist- 
ent Philosophy. 

Though it is impossible to prevent misrepresentations, 
especially when the questions involved are of a kind that 
excite so much animus, yet to guard against them as far as 
may be, it will be well to make a succinct and emphatic 
re-statement of the Philosophico-Religious doctrine which 
pervades the foregoing pages. Over and over again it has 
been shown in various ways that the deepest truths we can 
reach are simply statements of the widest uniformities in 
our experience of the relations of matter, motion, and 
force ; and that Matter, Motion, and Force are but symbols 
of the Unknown Reality. A Power of which the nature 
remains forever inconceivable, and to which no limits in 
Time or Space can be imagined, works in us certain effects. 
These effects have certain likenesses of kind, the most gen- 
eral of which we class together under the names of Matter, 
Motion, and Force; and between these effects there are 
likenesses of connection, the most constant of which we 
class as laws of the highest certainty. Analysis reduces 
the several kinds of effect to one kind of effect ; and these 
several kinds of uniformity to one kind of uniformity. 
And the highest achievement of Science is the interpre- 
tation of all orders of phenomena, as differently conditioned 
manifestations of this one kind of effect, under differently 
conditioned modes of this one kind of uniformity. But 
when Science has done this, it has done nothing more than 
systematize our experience ; and has in no degree extended 
the limits of our experience. We can say no more than 
before, whether the uniformities are as absolutely necessary, 
as they have become to our thought relatively necessary. 
The utmost possibility for us is an interpretation of the 
process of things as it presents itself to our limited con- 
sciousness; but how this process is related to the actual 
process we are unable to conceive, much less to know. 
Similarly, it must be remembered, that while the connection 
between the phenomenal order and the ontological order is 



470 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

forever inscrutable, so is the connection between the con- 
ditioned forms of being and the unconditioned form of be- 
ing forever inscrutable. The interpretation of all phe- 
nomena in terms of Matter, Motion, and Force is nothing 
more than the reduction of our complex symbols of thought 
to the simplest symbols; and when the equation has been 
brought to its lowest terms the symbols remain symbols 
still. Hence the reasonings contained in the foregoing 
pages afford no support to either of the antagonist hy- 
potheses respecting the ultimate nature of things. Their 
implications are no more materialistic than they are spir- 
itualistic; and no more spiritualistic than they are ma- 
terialistic. Any argument which is apparently furnished 
to either hypothesis is neutralized by a< good an argument 
furnished to the other. The Material!- j it to be a 

necessary deduction from the law of correlation, that what 
exists in wmsciousness under the form of feeling is trans- 
formable into an equivalent of mechanical motion, and by 
consequence into equivalents of all the other forces which 
matter exhibits, may consider it therefore demonstrated 
that the phenomena of consciousness are material phe- 
nomena. But the Spiritualist, setting out with the same 
data, may argue with equal C that if the forces 

displayed by matter are cognizable only under tlie shape of 
those equivalent amounts oi consciousness which they pro- 
duce, it is to he inferred that these -. when existing 
out of consciousness, are of the same intrinsic nature as 
when existing in consciousness; and that so is justified the 
spiritualistic conception (^ the external world, as consisting 
of something essentially identical with what we call mind. 
Manifestly, the establishment of correlation and equiva- 
lence between the forces of the outer and the inner worlds 
may be used to assimilate either to the other, according 
as we set out with one or other term. But he who rightly 
interprets the doctrine contained in this work will see that 
neither of these terms can be taken as ultimate. He will 
see that though the relation of subject and i nders 
necessary to us these antithetical conceptions of Spirit and 
Matter, the one is no less than the other to I led as 
but a sign of the Unknown Reality which underlies both. 



APPENDIX 



DEALING WITH CERTAIN CRITICISMS. 

One way of estimating the validity of a critic's judgments is 
that of studying his mental peculiarities as generally displayed. 
If he betrays idiosyncrasies of thought in his writings at large 
it may be inferred that these idiosyncrasies possibly, if not 
probably, give a character to the verdicts he -passes upon the 
productions of others. I am led to make this remark by consid- 
ering the probable connection between Professor Tait's habit of 
mind as otherwise shown, and as shown in the opinion he has 
tacitly expressed respecting the formula of Evolution. 

Daily carrying on experimental researches, Professor Tait is 
profoundly impressed with the supreme value of the experi- 
mental method ; and has reached the conviction that by it 
alone can any physical knowledge be gained. Though he calls 
the ultimate truths of physics " axioms, " yet, not very consist- 
ently, he alleges that, only by observation and experiment can 
these "axioms" be known as such. Passing over this incon- 
sistency, however, we have here to note the implied proposition 
that, where no observation or experiment is possible, no physical 
truth can be established ; and, indeed, that in the absence of 
any possibility of experiment or observation there is no basis 
for any physical belief at all. Now " The Unseen Universe, " a 
work written by him in conjunction with Professor Balfour- 
Stewart, contains an elaborate argument concerning the rela- 
tions between the universe which is visible to us and an invisi- 
ble Universe. This argument carried on in pursuance of 
physical laws established by converse with the Universe we 
know, extends them to the Universe we do not know — the law 
of the Conservation of Energy, for example, being regarded as 
common to the two, and the principle of Continuity, which is 
traced among perceptible phenomena, being assumed to hold 
likewise of the imperceptible. On the strength of these reason- 
ings, conclusions are drawn which are considered as at least 
probable ; support is found for certain theological beliefs. 
Now, clearly, the relation between the seen and the unseen 
Universes cannot be the subject of any observation or experi- 
ment ; since by the definition of it one term of the relation is 
absent. If we have, then, no warrant for asserting a physical 
axiom save as a generalization of results of experiments — if, 
consequently, where no observation or experiment is possible, 



472 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

reasoning after physical methods can have no place : then there 
can be no basis for any conclusion respecting the physical rela- 
tions of the seen and the UDseen Universes. Not so, however, 
concludes Professor Tait He thinks that while no validity can 
be claimed for our judgments respecting perceived forces, save 
as experimentally justified, some validity can be claimed for 
our judgments respecting unperceived forces, where no experi- 
mental justification is possible. 

The peculiarity thus exhibited in Professor Tait's general 
thinking is exhibited also in some of his thinking on those 
special topics with which he is directly concerned as a pr 
of physics. An instance was given by Professor Clerk-Maxwell 
when reviewing, in Nature, far July 3, 1 S T!». the new edition 
(1879) of Thomson and Tait's "Treatise on Natural Philosophy." 
Professor Clerk-Maxwell writes. 

Aprain at p. 2^. the capacity of the student is called upon to accept the 
following statemenl . 

".Matter has an innate power <>f resisting external influences. <<» that 
body, as far a> it can. remains at real or moves uniformly in a straight line." 

Is it a fact that •■matter" has any power, either innate or acquired, of re- 
sisting external Influent 

And to Professor Clerk-Maxwell's question thus put, the answer 
of one not having a like mental peculiarity with Professor Tait 
must surely b< — No. 

But the most remarkable example of Professor Tait's mode of 
thought, as exhibited in his own department, is contained in a 
lecture which he gave at Glasgow when the British Association 
last met there i see Nature, September 21, 1876) — a Lecture s 
for the purpose of dispelling certain erroneous conception- 1 I 
commonly entertained. Asking how the word force u is to be 
correctly used," he says 

"Here we cannot hut consult Newton The sense in which he uses the word 
'force.* and therefore the sense in which we must continue t<> use it if we 
desire to avoid intellectual confusion, will appear clearly from a brief con- 
sideration of his simple statement of the laws of motion The first of these 
laws is Every body continues in its state of rest or of unit m in a 

straight tine except m so far ks it it compelled b$ impressed forces fa cKangs 
that state 

Thus Professor Tait quotes, and fully approves, that conception 
of force which regards it as something which changes the state 
of a body. Later on in the course of his lecture, after variously 
setting forth his views of how force is rightly to be conceived 
he says, "Force is the rate at which an agent does work per 
unit of length " Now let us compare these two definiti 
force It is first, on the authority of Newton, emphatically in- 
dorsed, said to be that which changes the state of a body Then 
it is said to be the rate at which an agent does work doing 
work being equivalent to changing a body's state)- In the one 
case, therefore, force itself is the agent which does the work or 
changes the state . in the other case force is the rate at which 
some other agent does the work or changes the state How are 
these statements to be reconciled".' Otherwise put. the difficulty 
stands thus ; force is that which changes the state of a body ; 



APPENDIX. 473 

force is a rate, and a rate is a relation (as between time and 
distance, interest and capital) ; therefore a relation changes the 
state of a body. A relation is no longer a nexus among phe- 
nomena, but becomes a producer of phenomena, Whether Pro- 
fessor Tait succeeded in dispelling "the wide spread ignorance 
as to some of the most important elementary principles of phys- 
ics" — whether his audience went away with clear ideas of the 
"much-abused and misunderstood term" force, the report does 
not tell us. 

Let us pass now from these illustrations of Professor Tait's 
judgment as exhibited in his special department to the consid- 
eration of his judgment on a wider question here before us — 
the formula of Evolution In Nature for July 17, 1879, while 
reviewing Sir Edmund Beckett's "Origin of the Laws of Nat- 
ure, " and praising it, he says of the author : 

' l He follows in fact, in his own way. the hint given by a great mathematician 
(Kirkman) who made the following exquisite translation of a well-known 
definition: Evolution is a change from an indefinite, incoherent, homogene- 
ity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity through continuous differentiations 
and integrations.* 

"''[Translation into plain English. 1 Evolution is a change from a nohowish. 
untalkaboutable, all-alikeness, to a somehowish and in-general-talkaboutable 
not-all -alikeness- by continuous somethingelseifications. and sticktogethera 
tions. ' ' 

Professor Tait, proceeding then to quote from Sir Edmund 
Beckett's book passages in which, as he thinks, there is a kin 
dred tearing off of disguises from the expressions used by other 
authors, winds up by saying: "When the purposely vague 
statements of the materialists and agnostics are thus stripped of 
the tinsel of high-flown and unintelligible language, the eye of 
the thoughtless who have accepted them on authority ( ! ) are 
at last opened, and they are ready to exclaim with Titania, 
' Methinks I was enamoured of an ass. ' " And that Mr. Kirkman 
similarly believes that his travesty proves the formula of Evolu- 
tion to be meaningless is shown by the sentence which follows 
it — "Can any man show that my translation is unfair? " 

One would have thought that Mr. Kirkman and Professor 
Tait, however narrowly they limited themselves to their special 
lines of inquiry, could hardly have avoided observing that in 
proportion as scientific terms express wider generalities they 
necessarily lose that vividness of suggestion which words of 
concrete meanings have, and therefore, to the uninitiated, seem 
vague, or even empty. If Professor Tait enunciated to a rustic 
the physical axiom, "Action and reaction are equal and oppo- 
site," the rustic might not improbably fail to form any corre- 
sponding idea ; and he might, if his self-confidence were akin 
to that of Mr. Kirkman, conclude that where he saw no meaning 

* A conscientious critic usually consults the latest edition of the work he 
criticises, so that the author may have the benefit of any corrections or alter- 
ations he has made. Apparently Mr Kirkman does not think such a pre- 
caution needful. Publishing in 1876 his "Philosophy with Assumptions 1 ' 
from which the above passage is taken, he quotes from the first editions of 
•'First Principles" published in 1862: though in the edition of 1867, and all sub- 
sequent ones, the definition is, in expression, considerably modified— two of 
the leading words being no longer used. 






474 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

there could be no meaning. Further, if after the axiom had 
been brought partially within his comprehension by an example 
he were to laugh at the learned words used, and propose to say 
instead, "Shoving and back shoving are one as strong as the 
other," it would possibly be held by Professor Tait that this 
way of putting it is hardly satisfactory. If he thought it worth 
while to enlighten the rustic, he might perhaps point out to him 
that his statement did not include all the facts— that not only 
shoving and back-shoving, but also pulling and back-pulling, 
are one as strong as the other Supposing the rustic were not 
too conceited, he might eventually be taught that the abstract, 
and to him seemingly vague, formula, "Action and reaction are 
equal and opposite," was chosen because by no words of a more 
specific kind could be expressed the truth in its entirety Pro- 
fessor Tait, however, and Mr. Kirkmau. though the p! 
and mathematical terms they daily employ are so highly ab- 
stract as to prove meaningless to those who are unfamiliar with 
the concrete facts covered by them, seem not to have drawn 
any general inference from this habitual experience For bad 
they done so they must have been aware that a formula e. 
ing all order of changes in their general course— astronomic, 
geologic, biologic, psychologic, sociologic— could not i 
be framed in any other than words of the highest abstrai 
Perhaps there may come the rejoinder that they do not believe 
any such universal formula is possible. Perhaps they will say 
that the on going of things a> shown in our planetary - 
has nothing in common with the i of things which has 

brought the Faith's crust to its present Btate, and that this has 
nothing in common with the on -going oi things which the 
growths and actions of living bodies show us; although, con- 
sidering that the laws of molar motion and the laws of molecu- 
lar action are proved to bold true of them all. it requires 
considerable courage to assert that the modes of co-operation of 
the physical forces in these several regions of phenomena pre 
sent no traits in common But unless they allege that ti 
one law for the redistribution of matter and motion in the 
heavens, and another law for the redistribution of matt 
motion in the Earth's inorganic masses, and another law for its 
organic masses— unless they assert that the transformation 
everywhere in progress follows here one method and there an- 
other, they must admit that the proposition which ex] 
the general course o^ the transformation can i\o it only in terms 
remote in the extremest degree from words suggesting definite 
objects and actions. 

After noting the unconsciousness thus betrayed by Mr. Kirk- 
man and Professor Tait. that the expression of highly abstract 
truths necessitates highly abstract words, we may go on to note 
a scarce! v less remarkable anomaly of thought shown by them. 
Mr. Kirkman appears to think, and Professor Tait apparently 
agrees with him in thinking, that when one of these al - 
words coined from Greek or Latin roots is transformed into an 
uncouth looking combination of equivalents of Saxon, or ratiier 
old English, origin, what they regard as its misleading glamour 






APPENDIX. 475 

is thereby dissipated and its meaninglessness made manifest. 
We may conveniently observe the nature of Mr. Kirkman's 
belief by listening to an imaginary addition to that address 
before the Literary and Philosophical Society of Liverpool, in 
which he first set forth the leading ideas of his volume ; and 
we may fitly, in this imaginary addition, adopt the manner in 
which he delights. 

" Observe, gentlemen, " we may suppose him saying, " I have 
here the yolk of an egg. The evolutionists, using their jargon, 
say that one of its characters is 'homogeneity;' and if you do 
not examine your thoughts perhaps you may think that the 
word conveys some idea. But now, if I translate it into plain 
English, and say that one of the characters of this yolk is 'all- 
alikeness, ' you at once perceive how nonsensical is their state- 
ment. You see that the substance of the yolk is not all- alike, 
and that therefore all-alikeness cannot be one of its attributes. 
Similarly with the other pretentious term, ' heterogeneity, ' 
which, according to them, describes the state things are brought 
to by what they call evolution. It is mere empty sound, as is 
manifest if I do but transform it as I did the other, and say 
instead 'not-all-alikeness.' For, on showing you this chick 
into which the yolk of the egg turns, you will see that 'not-all- 
alikeness' is a character which cannot be claimed for it. How 
can any one say that the parts of the chick are not-all-alike? 
Again, in their blatant language we are told that evolution is 
carried on by continuous 'differentiations;' and they would 
have us believe that this word expresses some fact. But if we 
put instead of it 'somethingelseifications' the delusion they try 
to practise on us becomes clear. How can they say that while 
the parts have been forming themselves the heart has been be- 
comiug something else than the stomach, and the leg something 
else than the wing, and the head something else than the tail? 
The like manifestly • happens when for 'integrations' we read 
'sticktogetherations.' What sense the term might seem to 
have becomes obvious nonsense when the substituted word is 
used ; for nobody dares assert that the parts of the chick stick 
together, any more than do the parts of the yolk. I need 
hardly show you that now when I take a portion of the yolk 
between my fingers and pull, and now when I take any part of 
the chick, as the leg, and pull, the first resists just as much as 
the last — the last does not stick together any more than the first ; 
so that there has been no progress in 'sticktogetherations. ' And 
thus, gentlemen, you perceive that these big words which, to 
the disgrace of the Royal Society, appear even in papers pub- 
lished by it, are mere empty bladders, which these would-be 
philosophers use to buoy up their ridiculous doctrines." 

There is a further curious mental trait exhibited by Mr. Kirk- 
man, and which Professor Tait appears to have in common 
with him. Very truly it has been remarked that there is a 
great difference between disclosing the absurdities contained in 
a thing and piling absurdities upon it ; and a remark to be 
added is that some minds appear incapable of distinguishing 
between intrinsic absurdity and extrinsic absurdity. The case 




476 FIRST PRIXCIPLES. 

before us illustrates this remark, and at the same time shows us 
how analytical faculties of one kind may be constantly exer- 
cised without strengthening analytical faculties of another kind 
— how mathematical analysis may be daily practised without 
any skill in psychological analysis being acquired. For if these 
gentlemen had analyzed their own thoughts to an^ purpose 
they would have known that incongruous juxtapositions may, 
by association of ideas, suggest characters that do not at all 
belong to the things juxtaposed. Did Mr. Kirkman ever observe 
the result of putting a bonnet on a nude statue? If he ever did, 
and if he then reasoned after the manner exemplified above, he 
doubtless concluded that tin- obscene effect belonged intrinsically 
to the statue, and only required the addition of the bonnet to 
make it conspicuous. The alternative conclusion, however. 
which perhaps most will draw, is that not in the statue 
was there anything of an obscene suggestion, but that this effect 
was purely adventitious. The bonnet, connected in daily 
rience with Living women, calling up the thought of a living 
woman, with tin- head dressed, but otherwise naked. Similarly 
though, by clothing an idea in words which excite a feel 
the ludicrous by their oddity, any one may associate th 
ing of the ludicrous with the idea itself, yet he does not thereby 
make the idea LudiCTOUS ; and if he thinks he does, he show's 

that he has n >t practised introspection to much par] 

By way of a Lesson in mental discipline it may be not unin- 
structive here to note a curious kinship of opinion !»• 
these two mathematicians and two litterateurs. At first 
it appears strange that men whose Lives are passed in stud 
absolutely scientific as those which Professor Tail and Mr Kirk- 
man pursue should, in their judgmenta on the formula of evo- 
lution, be at one with two men of exclusively literary cultun — 
a North American Reviewer and Mr. Matthew Arnold. In the 
North American Review, voL 120, page 208, a critic, after quot- 
ing the formula of Evolution, says : "This may be all true, but 
it seems at best rather the blank form for a universe than any- 
thing: corresponding t<> the actual world about us." On which 
the comment may be that one who had studied celestial me- 
chanics as much as the reviewer has studied the general 
of transformations might similarly have remarked that ti 
inula, "Bodies attract » ne another directly as their I 
inversely as the squares of their distances, " w but a 

blank form for solar systems and sidereal clusters. With this 
parenthetical comment I pass to the fact above hinted, that Mr. 
Matthew Arnold obviously coincides with the review 
mate of the formula. In Chapter V. of his work. "God and 
the Bible," when preparing the way for a criticism on German 
theologians as losing themselves in words, he quotes a saying 
from Homer. This he introduces by remarking that it "is not 
at all a grand one. We are almost ashamed to quote it to 
readers who may have come fresh from the last number of the 
North American Review, and from the great sentence there 
quoted as summing up Mr Herbert Spencers theory of evolu- 
tion — 'Evolution is, etc.' Homer's poor little saying comes not 



APPENDIX. 477 

in such formidable shape. It is only this : 'Wide is the range 
of words ! words may make this way or that way. ' " And then he 
proceeds with his reflections upon German logomachies. All 
.of which makes it manifest that, going out of his way, as he 
does, to quote this formula from the North American Review, 
he intends tacitly to indicate his agreement in the reviewer's 
estimate of it. 

That these two men of letters, like the two mathematicians, 
are unable to frame ideas answering to the words in which 
evolution at large is expressed, seems manifest. In all four the 
verbal symbols used call up either no images, or images of the 
vaguest kinds, which, grouped together, form but the most 
shadowy thoughts. If, now, we ask what is the common trait 
in the education and pursuits of all four, we see it to be lack 
of familiarity with those complex processes of change which 
the concrete sciences bring before us. The men of letters, in 
their early days dieted on grammars and lexicons, and in their 
later days occupied with belles lettres, Biography, and a History 
made up mainly of personalities, are by their education and 
course of life left almost without scientific ideas of a definite kind. 
The universality of physical causation, the interpretation of all 
things in terms of a never-ceasing redistribution of matter and 
motion, is naturally to them an idea utterly alien. The mathe- 
matician, too, and the mathematical physicist, occupied exclu- 
sively with the phenomena of number, space, and time, or, in 
dealing with forces, dealing with them in the abstract, carry 
on their researches in such ways as may, and often do, leave 
them quite unconscious of the traits exhibited by the general 
transformations which things, individually and in their totality, 
undergo. In a chapter on "Discipline," in the "Study of Soci- 
ology, " I have commented upon the uses of the several groups 
of Sciences — Abstract, Abstract-Concrete, and Concrete — in culti- 
vating different powers of mind ; and have argued that while 
for complete preparation the discipline of each group of sciences 
is indispensable, the discipline of any one group alone, or any 
two groups, leaves certain defects of judgment. Especially have 
I contrasted the analytical habit of thought which study of the 
Abstract and Abstract- Concrete Sciences produces, with the syn- 
thetical habit of thought produced by study of the Concrete 
Sciences. And I have exemplified the defects of judgment to 
which the analytical habit unqualified by the synthetical habit 
leads. Here we meet with a striking illustration. Scientific 
culture, of the analytical kind, almost as much as absence of 
scientific culture, leaves the mind bare of those ideas with 
which the Concrete Sciences deal. Exclusive familiarity with 
the forms and factors of phenomena no more fits men for deal- 
ing with the products in their totalities than does mere literary 
study. 

An objection made to the formula of evolution by a sympa- 
thetic critic, Mr. T. E. Cliffe Leslie, calls for notice. It is urged 
in a spirit widely different from that displayed by Mr. Kirkman 
and his applauder, Professor Tait ; and it has an apparent justifi- 



478 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

cation. Indeed, many readers who before accepted tbe formula 
of Evolution in full will, after reading Mr. Cliffe Leslie's com- 
ments, agree with him in thinking that it is to be taken with 
the qualifications he points out We shall rind, however, that 
a clearer apprehension of the meanings of the words used, and 
a clearer apprehension of the formula in its totality, excludes 
the criticisms Mr. Leslie makes. 

In the first place he dissociates from one another those traits 
of Evolution which I have associated, and which I have alleged 
to be true only when associated. He (motes me as saying that 
a change from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous character- 
izes all evolution ; and he puts this at the outset of his criticism 
as though I made this change the primary characteristic. But 
if he will refer to "First Principles, 1 ' Part II. Chap. 14 (in the 
second and subsequent editions) he will find it shown that 
under its primary aspect Evolution ki is a change from a lean 
coherent form to a more coherent form, consequent on the dis- 
sipation of motion and integration of matter " The next chap- 
ter contains proofs that the change from homogeneity to hetero- 
geneity is a secondary change, which, when conditions allow, 
accompanies the change from the incoherent to the coherent 
At the beginning of the chapter alter that, come the Bent 
"But now. do.'s this generalization express the whole truth? 
Does it include everything essentially characterizing Evolution 
and exclude everything else ... A critical examination of 
the facts will show that it does neither "' And the chapter then 
goes on to show that the change is from an incoherent 

homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity. Further qual- 
ifications contained in a succeediDg chapter bring the formula 
to this final form. "Evolution is an integration of matter and 
concomitant dissipation of motion, during which the matter 
passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, 
coherent heterogeneity . and during which the retained motion 
undergoes a parallel transformati 

Now, if these various traits of the process of Evolution are 
kept simultaneously in view it will be si en that most of Mr. 
Cliffe Leslie's objections fail to apply. He 

"The movement of language, law. and political and civil union, i- 
most part in an opposite direction. In a savage country like Africa 
is in a perpetual tlux. and new dial up with every swarm r 

parent hive. In the civilized world the unilicatioii of language is rapidly 
proceeding. " 

Here two different ideas are involved — the evolution of a lan- 
guage considered singly, and the evolution of lazujua ; 

ered as an aggregate. Nothing which he says implies that any 
one Language becomes, during its evolution. le>s heterogeneous 
The disappearance of dialects is not a | ward the 

homogeneity of a language, but is the una! triumph of one 
variety of a language over the other varieties, and the extinc 
tion of them . the conquering variety meanwhile becoming 
within itself more heterogeneous This, too, is the process which 
Mr. Leslie refers to as likely to end in an extinction of the Celtic 
languages. Advance toward homogeneity would l»e shown if 



APPENDIX. 479 

the various languages in Europe, having been previously unlike, 
were, while still existing, to become gradually more like. But 
the supplanting of one by another, or of some by others, no 
more implies any tendency of languages to become alike than 
does the supplanting of species, genera, orders, and classes of 
animals one by another during the evolution of life imply the 
tendency of organisms to assimilate in their natures. Even if 
the most heterogeneous creature, Man, should overrun the Earth 
and extirpate the greater part of its other inhabitants, it would 
not imply any tendency toward homogeneity in the proper 
sense. It would remain true that organisms tend perpetually 
toward heterogeneity, individually and as an assemblage. Of 
course if all kinds but one were destroyed they could no longer 
display this tendency. Display of it would be limited to the 
remaining kind, which would continue as now to show it in 
the formation of local varieties, becoming gradually more di- 
vergent ; and the like is true of languages. 

In the next case Mr. Leslie identifies progressing unification 
with advance toward homogeneity. His words are ; 

"Already Europe has nearly consolidateditself into a Heptarchy, the number 
of states into which England itself was once divided ; and the result of the 
American War exemplifies the prevalence of the forces tending to homogene- 
ity over those tending to heterogeneity. " 

To this the reply is that these cases exemplify rather the preva- 
lence of the forces which change the incoherent into the cohe- 
rent, which effects integration. That is, they exemplify Evolu- 
tion under its primary aspect. In the "Principles of Sociology," 
Part II. Chap. 3, Mr. Leslie will find numerous kindred cases 
brought in illustration of this law of Evolution. To which add 
that such integrations bring after them greater heterogeneity, 
not greater homogeneity. The divisions of the Heptarchy were 
societies substantially like one another in their structures and 
activities : but the parts of the nation which correspond to them 
have been differentiated into parts carrying on varieties of oc- 
cupations with entailed unlikeness of structures — here purely 
agricultural, there manufacturing ; here predominantly given 
to coal mining and iron smelting, there to weaving ; here dis- 
tinguished by scattered villages, there by clusters of large towns. 
Again, it is alleged that an increasing homogeneity is shown 
in fashion. " Once every rank, profession, and district had a 
distinctive garb ; now all such distinctions, save with the priest 
and the soldier, have almost disappeared among men." But 
while, for a reason to be presently pointed out, there has oc- 
curred a change which has abolished one order of differences, 
differences of another order, far more multitudinous, have 
arisen. Nothing is more striking than the extreme heterogene- 
ity of dress at the present day. As Mr. Leslie alleges, the dresses 
of those forming each class were once all alike. Now no two 
dresses are alike. Within the vague limits of the current fashion 
the degree of variety in women's costumes is infinite ; and even 
men's costumes, though having average resemblances, diverge 
from one another in colors, materials, and detailed forms in 
innumerable ways. 



480 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

Other instances given by Mr. Leslie concern the organizations 
for carrying on production and distribution. He argues that 

"In the industrial world a generation ago a constant movement toward a 
differentiation of employments and functions appeared; now some marked 
tendencies to their amalgamation have begun to disclose themselves. Joint 
Stock Companies have almost effaced all real division of labor in the wide re- 
gion of trade within their operation. " 

Here, as before, Mr. Leslie represents amalgamation as equivalent 
to increase of homogeneity ; whereas amalgamation is but an- 
other name for integration, which is the primary process in 
evolution, and which may. and does, go along with increasing 
heterogeneity in the amalgamated tilings. It cannot be said 
that a Joint Stock Banking Company, with its proprietory and 
directors in addition to its officers, contains fewer unlike parts 
than does a private Banking establishment. The contrary must 
be said. A Railway Company has far more numerous function- 
aries, with different duties, than had the one. or the many, 
coaching establishments it replaced. And then, apart from the 
fact that the larger aggregate of co-operators who, as a Company, 
carry on, say, a process of manufacture, is more complex as 
as more expensive, there is the fact, here chiefly to be I 
that the entire assemblage of industrial structures is, by the 
addition of these new structures, made more heterogeneous than 
before. Had all the smaller manufacturing establishment 
ried on by individuals or firms been destroyed, the contrary 
might have been alleged; but, as it is, wesee that in addition 
to all the old forms there have come these new forms, making 
the totality of them more multiform than before. Mr. Leslie 
further illustrates his interpretation by saying. 

"Many of the (nines for Bale In a village huckster's shop were formerly the 
subjects of distant Dranches of business in a large town : now the ■ 
which scores <>t' different retailers dealt are :'.ll to be had in great establish' 
ments in Now York. Paris, and London, which sometimes buy direct from the 
producers, thus also eliminating the wholesale deal 

Replies akin to the preceding ones are readily made. The first 
is that wholesale dealers have not been at present eliminated, 
and cannot he so long as the ordinary shopkeepers survive, at 

they will certainly do. In the smaller places, forming th« 
majority of places, these vast establishments cannot exist ; and 
in them shopkeepers carrying on business a- at present will 
continue to necessitate wholesale dealers. Even in large places 
the same thing will hold. It is only people of a certain 
able to pay ready money ami willing to go great distal 
purchase, who frequent these large establishments Those who 
live from hand to mouth, and those who prefer to buy at adja- 
cent places, will maintain a certain proportion of shops and the 
wholesale distributing organization needed for them Again, 
we have to note that one of these great stores, such as "White- 
ley's or Shoolbred's. does not within itself display any advance 
toward homogeneity or de -specialisation ; for it is made up of 
many separate departments, with their separate heads. carrying on 
business substantially separate— all superintended by one owner. 
It is nothing but an aggregate of shops under one roof, instead 



APPENDIX. 481 

of under the many roofs covering the side of a street ; and ex- 
hibits just as much heterogeneity as the shops do when arranged 
in line instead of massed together. That which it really illus- 
trates is a new form of integration, which is the primary evo- 
lutionary process. And then, lastly, comes the fact that the 
distributing organization of the country, considered as a whole, 
is by the addition of these establishments made more heteroge- 
neous than before. All the old types of trading concerns con- 
tinue to exist; and here are new types added, making the entire 
assemblage of them more varied. 

From these objections made by Mr. Leslie, which I have 
endeavored to show result from misapprehensions, I pass to two 
others which are to be met by taking account of certain com- 
plicating tacts liable to be overlooked. Mr. Leslie remarks that 

"In the early stages of social progress, again, a differentiation takes place, 
as Mr. Spencer has observed, between political and industrial functions, 
which fall to distinct classes; now a man is a merchant in the morning and a 
legislator at night: in mercantile business one year, arid the next perhaps 
head of the Navy, like Mr. Goschen or Mr. W. H. Smith." 

Nothing contained in this volume explains the seeming anomaly 
here exemplified ; but any one who turns to a chapter in the 
second part of the w ' Principles of Sociology, " entitled " Social 
Types and Metamorphoses, " will there find a clew to the expla- 
nation of it, and will see that it is a phenomenon consequent 
on the progressing dissolution of one type and evolution of 
another. The doctrine of Evolution, currently regarded as re- 
ferring only to the development of species, is erroneously 
supposed to imply some intrinsic proclivity in every species 
toward a higher form ; and similarly a majority of readers 
make the erroneous assumption that the transformation which 
constitutes Evolution in its wider sense implies an intrinsic 
tendency to go through those changes which the formula of 
Evolution expresses. But all who have fully grasped the argu- 
ment of this work will see that the process of Evolution is not 
necessary, but depends on conditions, and that the prevalence 
of it in the Universe arouud is consequent on the prevalence of 
these conditions — the frequent occurrence of Dissolution showing 
us that where the conditions are not maintained the reverse 
process is quite as readily gone through. Bearing in mind this 
truth, we shall be prepared to find that the progress of a social 
organism toward more heterogeneous and more definite struct- 
ures of a certain type continues only as long as the actions 
which produce these effects continue in play. We shall expect 
that if these actions cease the progressing transformation will 
cease. We shall infer that the particular structures which have 
been formed by the activities carried on will not grow more 
heterogeneous and more definite, and that if other orders of 
activities, imptying other sets of forces, commence, answering 
structures of another kind will begin to make their appearance, 
to grow more heterogeneous and definite, and to replace the 
first. And it will be manifest that while the transition is going 
on — while the first structures are dissolving and the second 
evolving — there must be a mixture of structures causing appa- 
31 



482 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

rent confusion of traits. Just as during the metamorphoses of 
an animal which, having during its earlier existence led one 
kind of life, has to develop structures fitting it for another kind 
of life, there must occur a blurring of the old organization 
while the new organization is becoming distinct, leading to 
transitory anomalies of structure ; so, during the metamor] 
undergone by a society, in which the militant activities and 
structures are dwindling while the industrial are growing, the 
old and new arrangements must be mingled in a perplexing 
way. On reading the chapter in the " Principle tology* 

which I have named. Mr. Leslie will see that the above facts 
referred to by him are interpretable as consequent on the transi- 
tion from that type of regulative orgai ization proper to militant 
life, to that type of regulative organization proper t<» industrial 
life, and that so long as these two modes of life, utterly alien 
in their natures, have to be jointly carried cm there will con- 
tinue this jumbling of the regulat ms they respectively 
require. 

'flic second of the obj< 1 a- needing 

otherwise dealt with than by further explanation <<f the formula 
of evolution, concerns the increase of likeni developing 

systems of Civil Paw — in proof of which increase oi likent 
Leslie quotes Sir Henry Maine to the effect that "all laws, how- 
ever dissimilar in their infancy, tend to resemble each other in 
their maturity*' — the implication t<> which Mr. Leslie draws 
attention being that in respect of their 1. 
not more heterogeneous but more hoi: Now. i 

in their details systems of Law will. 1 think, be found to acquire 
as they evolve an increasing number <i' diffei a m one 
another, yet in their cardinal traits it is probably true that 
they usually approximate. 1 low far this militates against the 
formula of Evolution we shall best Bee by first considering the 
analogy furnished by animal organisms. Low down in the 
animal kingdom there are simple molluscs with but rudim< 
nervous systems — a ganglion <>r two. and a b w fibn - 
ing from this low type we have the great sub-kingdom < 
tuted by the higher Ettcllusca, and the .>rill g 
constituted by the Vertebrate. As these two types evolv< 
nervous systems develop, and though in the highest mem! 
the two they remain otherwise unlike, yet they approxim 
so far that each acquires great nervous centres. The 
cephalopods have clustered ganglia which simulate 1 
Compare, again, the MoUusca and the Articulate in 
their vascular systems. Fundamentally unlib 
originally, and remaining unlike as they do throughout many 
successive stages of ascent in these two sub-fe 
nevertheless are made similar in the highest forms of both by 
each having a central propelling organ — a heart. Now. in 
these ami in some cases which the external organs furnish 
as the remarkable resemblances Evolution has produced between 
the eyes of the highest Mollusca ami those of the Vertebrate, it 
may be said that there is implied a change toward homog< i 
No zoologist, however, would admit that the&o facts ready cou- 



APPENDIX. 483 

flict with the general law of organic Evolution. As already 
explained, the tendency to progress from homogeneity to hetero- 
geneity is not intrinsic but extrinsic. Structures become 
unlike in consequence of unlike exposures to incident forces. 
This is so with organisms as wholes, which, as they multiply 
and spread, are ever falling into new sets of conditions ; arid it 
is so with the parts of each organism. These pass from primi- 
tive likeness into unlikeness, as fast as the mode of life places 
them in different relations to actions — primarily external, and 
secondarily internal ; and with each successive change in mode 
of life new un liken esses are superposed. One of the implica- 
tions is that if in organisms otherwise different there arise like 
sets of conditions, to which certain parts are subject, such parts 
will tend toward likeness ; and this is what happens with their 
nervous and vascular systems. Duly to co-ordinate the actions 
of all parts of an active organism there requires a controlling 
apparatus, and the conditions to be fulfilled for perfect co-ordi- 
nation are conditions common to all active organisms. Hence, 
in proportion as fulfilment approaches completeness in the 
highest organisms, however otherwise unlike their types are, 
this apparatus acquires in all of them certain common characters 
— especially extreme centralization. Similarly w T ith the appa- 
ratus for distributing nutriment. The relatively high activity 
accompanying superior organization implies great w^aste ; great 
waste implies active circulation of blood ; active circulation of 
blood implies efficient propulsion ; so that a heart becomes a 
common need for highly evolved creatures, however otherwise 
unlike their structures may be. Thus is it too with societies. 
As they evolve there arise certain conditions to be fulfilled for 
the maintenance of social life, and in proportion as the social 
life becomes high these conditions need to be more effectually 
fulfilled. A legal code expresses one set of these conditions. It 
formulates certain regulative principles to which the conduct of 
citizens must conform that social activities may be harmoni- 
ously carried on. And these regulative principles being in 
essentials the same everywhere, it results that systems of Law 
acquire certain general similarities as the most developed social 
life is approached. 

These special replies to Mr. Leslie's objections are, however, 
but introductory to the general reply, which w 7 ould be, I think, 
adequate even in their absence. Mr. Leslie's method is that of 
taking detached groups of social phenomena, as those of lan- 
guage, of fashion, of trade, and arguing (though, as I have 
sought to show, not effectually) that their later transformations 
do not harmonize with the alleged general law of Evolution. 
But the real question is not whether we find advance to a more 
definite coherent heterogeneity in these taken separately, but 
whether we find this advance in the structures and actions of 
the entire society. Even were it true that the law does not 
hold in certain orders of social processes and products, it would 
not follow that it does not hold of social processes and products 
in their totality. The law is a law of the transformation of 
aggregates, and must be tested by the entire assemblages of 



484 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

phenomena which the aggregates present. Omitting societies 
iu states of decay and dissolution, which exhibit the converse 
change, and contemplating only societies which are growing, 
Mr. Leslie will, I think, scarcely allege of any one of them that 
its structures and functions do not. taken altogether, exhibit 
increasing heterogeneity. And if instead of taking each society 
as an aggregate he takes the entire aggregate of societies which 
the Earth supports, from primitive hordes up to highly civilized 
nations, he will scarcely deny that this entire aggregate has 
been becoming more various in the forms of societies it in- 
cludes, and is still becoming more various. 

Criticism would be greatly diminished in bulk if there were 
excluded from it all that part devoted to disproving statements 
which have not been made, and were this course pursued the 
work "On Mr. Spencers Formula of Evolution." by Malcolm 
Guthrie, would disappear bodily. It is little else than a mis- 
statement of certain fundamental views of mine, and then an 
elaborate refutation of the views as mis-stated. 

Let me first show by brief extracts from - First Principles" 
what these views are. In a chapter on "Ultimate Scientific 
Ideas, " after showing how the hypothesis that matter oo 
of solid atoms eoiiimits us to alternative impossibiliti 
thought, I have shown how the hypothesis of B — ovich, that 
matter consists of centres of force without extension, is un- 
thinkable. In the course of the argument I have pointed oat 
that though Boscovich's hypothesis cannot be realised in 
thought, yet. on the other hand, the hypothesis of extended 
atoms itself implies an imaginary Beparanleness of each atom 
into parts, and again of these into parts, and so on without 
limit until unextended centres of force are readied — tip 
Bciousness of force b< bag that which alone perpetually en. 
And I have ended by saying that "Matter then, in it.-- ultimate 
nature, is as absolutely incomprehensible as E and Time" 

In the second part of the work, in chapters treating of -The 
Indestructibility of Matter," "The Continuity of Motion," and 
"The Persistence of Force, " I have at some Length elal 
the view that Force is the ultimate component of thought into 
which our conceptions of external existences are resolvable 
Summing up the first of these chapters I have said. "Thus. then, 
by the indestructibility of matter, we really mean the inde- 
structibility of the force with which matter affects OS." At the 
close oi' the second of these chapters I have argued that " the 
continuity of motion, as well as the indestructibility of matter. 
is really known to us in terms of force" . . . "that which defies 
suppression in thought is really the force which the motion 
indicates." And then, in the third chapter, having shown how 
the truths that matter is indestructible and motion continuous 
can be known to us only as corollaries from the truth that force 
is persistent— that force is that "out of which our conception 
of Matter and Motion are built" — I have gone on to say that 
"by the Persistence of Force we really mean the persistence of 
some Power which transcends our knowledge and conception." 



APPENDIX. 485 

Throughout all which arguments the implication is that I hold 
Matter and Motion to be conditioned manifestations of this un- 
known Power. Being aware of the perversity of critics, I have, 
in the " Summary and Conclusion, " again endeavored to bar out 
misinterpretations. Here is one of the sentences it contains . 

"Over and over again it has been shown in various ways, that the deepest 
truths we can reach are simply statements of the widest uniformities in our 
experience of the relations of Matter, Motion, and Force ; and that Matter, 
Motion, and Force are but symbols of the Unknown Reality. A Power of 
which the nature remains for ever inconceivable, and to which no limits in 
Time or Space can be imagined, works in us certain effects. These effects 
have certain likenesses of kind, the most general of which we class together 
under the names of Matter, Motion, and Force. " 

In which sentences it is distinctly stated that I have throughout 
regarded Matter under the form present to consciousness as a 
symbol — a certain conditioned effect wrought in us by the Un- 
known Power ; and I have gone on to say that " the interpretation 
of all phenomena in terms of Matter, Motion, and Force is noth- 
ing more than the reduction of our complex symbols of thought 
to the simplest symbols ; and when the equation has been 
brought to its lowest terms the symbols remain symbols still. " 

It will scarcely be believed, and yet it is true, that notwith- 
standing all this Mr. Guthrie ascribes to me the vulgar concep- 
tions of Matter and Motion, argues as though I really think they 
are in themselves what they seem to our consciousness, and 
proceeds to criticise my views on this assumption. He ignores 
the conspicuous fact that Matter and Motion are both regarded 
by me as modes of manifestation of Force, and that Force, as we 
are conscious of it when by our own efforts we produce changes, 
is the correlative of that Universal Power which transcends con- 
sciousness. And then he ends the criticisms forming the second 
part of his work by saying, " If this is not materialistic I do 
not know what is. " He does not do this by inadvertence, 
though there would be little excuse even then ; but he does it 
deliberately and with his eyes open. His next chapter begins : 

" It will have been observed that in the preceding part of this criticism I 
have employed the term 'matter in motion ! and have avoided the use of the 
word 'force', although it appears so prominently in the pages of Mr. Spencer's 
work. This has not been accidental, but by design, indicating as it does one 
of my main criticisms of Mr. Spencer. 

" I can logically take up one of two positions. The first recognizes matter, 
whose properties are merely those of extension . which are capable of being 
described in terms of geometry and arithmetic. I can also recognize as the 
sole active properties of matter its modes and rates of motion— the motion, 
that is to say, of ultimate units, atoms, molecules, or masses, also capable of 
measurement. 

"The second position recognizes matter and its activity or activities— matter 
as endowed with force or forces. ' ' 

Thus it will be observed that, having avowedly dealt with Mat- 
ter and Motion as modes of Force, I am " by design" criticised as 
though I had not so dealt with them. Having distinctly said 
what I mean by Matter and Motion, I am practically told that 
I shall not mean that, but shall mean what Mr. Guthrie means ; 
and shall be dealt with accordingly. And then, further, it will 
be observed that of the two positions which Mr. Guthrie lays 



486 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

down as possible, and proceeds to argue upon as alternative, 
one or other of which I must accept, both speak of Matter and 
units of Matter as though actually existing under the forms 
thought by us; and the last, speaking of "matter as endowed 
with force or forces." implies that, whether in mass or in units. 
Matter is a space-occupying something which is in the one case 
inert and the other case made active by force with which it is 
'"endowed" — force which i> added to the inert something. Spite 
of all the pains I have taken to show that I regard Matter as 
itself a localized manifestation of Force — spite Of all the evidence 
that our idea of a unit of Matter, or atom, i^ regarded by me 
simply as a symbol which the form of our thought obligee 
use. but which we cannot suppose answers to the reality with- 
out committing ourselves to alternative impossibilities of 
thought, I am debited with the belief that Matter actual: 

"of space-occupying units, having shape and measure- 
ment." Though I have repeatedly made it clear that our ideal 
of Matter, Motion, and i but the .v. >/. z. with which 

we work our equations and formulate the various relations 
among phenomena in such way as to express their order in 
terms of ./•, //. and .-.—though I have shown that tin- realiti 
which X, //, and Z stand cannot be conceived by tuallv 

existing thus or thus without committing oui alternative 

absurdities, ye! questions are put implying that I must hold 
one <>r other hypothesis concerning these actual existences, ami 
1 am supposed to be involved in all the difficulties which 

Another work devoted to the refutation of my views ii 
of Professor Birks — "Modern Physical Fatalism and the Doc- 
trine of Evolution, including an examination of Mr 11 - 
cer's First Principles " Having dealt with the work of Mr. 
Guthrie, I cannot pass by that of Professor Birks without 
ing the BUSpiciOB that I find some difficulty in dealing with it. 
Indeed, 1 do find a difficultv— a difficulty illustrated In- that 
found in disentangling a skein of silk which ha- been pulled 
about by a child for half an hour. And just as the p 
a bystander would fail were he asked to look on until by unrav- 
elling the tangled skein its continuity was pi would the 
reader's attention be exhansti tided one tenth 
part of the meshes and knots into which Professor Bhrkf 
twisted my statements. 

Abundant warrant for this assertion is furnished by the very 
first paragraph succeeding the one in winch 1 Birks 

announces that he is about to take u First Princi epre- 

sentative of the "fatalistic theory ■ In this paragraph he 
represents me as asserting that ultimate religious idea- are 
"incapable of being conceived " He further says that ultimate 
scientific ideas are by me "pronounced equally inconceivable." 
Now any clearheaded reader who accepted Professor Birks' 
version of my views would be led to debit me with the al - 
ity of saying that certain things which are put together in 
consciousness 'ideas) cannot be put together in 
(conceived) To conceive is to frame in thought and as 



APPENDIX. 487 

idea is framed in thought it is nonsense to say of any idea that 
it cannot be conceived — nonsense which I have nowhere uttered. 
My statement is that " Ultimate Scientific Ideas, then, are all 
representative of realities that cannot be comprehended ;" and 
the like is alleged of ultimate religious ideas. The things 
which I say cannot be comprehended or conceived are not the 
ideas, but the realities beyond consciousness for which the ideas 
in consciousness stand. In Professor Birks' statement, how- 
ever, inconceivableness of the realities is transformed into 
inconceivableness of the answering ideas ! Further, at the end 
of this first paragraph which deals with me, I am represented 
as teaching that religion " is equivalent to Nescience or Igno- 
rance alone. " This statement is as far removed from the truth 
as the others. I have argued at considerable length and in such 
various ways that I thought it impossible to misunderstand me, 
that though the Power universally manifest to us through phe- 
nomena, alike in the surrounding world and in ourselves — the 
Power •' in which we live and move and have our being" — is, 
and must ever remain, inscrutable, yet that the existence of 
this Inscrutable Power is the most certain of all truths. I have 
contended that while to the intellectual consciousness this 
Power, though unknowable in nature, must ever be present as 
existing, it must be to the emotional consciousness an object to 
the sentiment we call religious ; since, in substance, if not in 
form, it answers to the creating and sustaining Power toward 
which the religious sentiment is in other cases drawn out Yet, 
though in the most emphatic way I have represented this un- 
known and unknowable Power as the object-matter of religion, 
Professor Birks represents me as saying that the unknowable- 
ness of it is the object-matter of religion ! Though I hold that 
an Ultimate Being, known with absolute certainty as existing, 
but of whose nature we are in ignorance, is the sphere for 
religious feeling, he says I hold that the ignorance alone is the 
sphere for religious feeling ! 

When in the first sixteen lines specifically treating of my 
views these three cases occur, it may be imagined what an intri- 
cate plexus of misrepresentations, misunderstandings, and per- 
versions fills the three hundred and odd pages forming the 
volume. Especially may it be anticipated that the metaphysical 
discussions, occupying five chapters, *are so confused that it is 
next to impossible to deal with them. I must limit myself to 
giving a sample or two from this part of the work — one of them 
illustrating Professor Birks' critical fairness and the other his 
philosophic capacity. 

In his chapter on "The Reality of Matter" he says (page 111) : 
"The sense of reality in things around us, Mr. Spencer has truly 
said, is one which no metaphysical criticisms can shake in 
the least ;" and the rest of the paragraph is devoted to enlarging 
upon this proposition. The next paragraph begins, " ' Perma- 
nent possibilities of sensation' is merely an ingenious phrase to 
disguise and conceal a self-contradiction" — sundry antagonistic 
criticisms upon this phrase being appended. And then the 
opening words of the paragraph which succeeds are quoted from 



488 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

" First Principles. "' Now, since the refutation of my views is 
the aim of the work, and since both the preceding and succeed- 
ing passages specifically refer to my work, and since no other 
name is mentioned, every reader not otherwise better instructed 
will conclude that as a matter of course the phrase "permanent 
possibilities of sensation 1 ' is miDe. and that the criticisms upon 
it tell against me. Even were there evidence that this phrase 
"permanent possibilities of sensation, *' expressed or harmonized 
with a doctrine entertained by me , yet as the phrase is not 
mine the quoting it as mine would have been a literary misde- 
meanor. What then must be said of it when, instead of stand- 
ing for any view of mine, it stands for an opposite view? Mr. 
Mills' expression, quoted by Professor Birks as though it were 
my expression, belongs to a theory of knowledge entirely at 
variance with that set forth and every where implied in "First 
Principles, " and a theory which, where the occasion was fit. 
I have persistently combated (see ** Principles of Psychology," 
Part VII., "General Analysis") And yet Professor Birks tac- 
itly makes me responsible for the incongruities which i 
from uniting this theory with the opposed theory 

From this sample of critical truthfulness let us pass now to a 
sample of critical acumen. 

In arguing against Hamilton and Mansell in §26 I have said: 
"It is rigorously impossible t<> conceive that our knowledg 
knowledge of appearances only, without ;»t the same time con- 
ceiving a Reality of which they art- appearances; for appearance 
without reality is unthinkable.*' On page 121 of his work Pro- 
fessor Birks. quoting the last five words of this sentence, con- 
tinues, "This is true, when once the conception <>f distance has 
been gained by actual experience *' And he then proceeds to 
comment upon visual impressions, illusive and other. Again, 
on page 135, when criticising my argument concerning ti. 
destructibility of matter, Professor Birks bays 

""Hatter, as knowable is declared to be not the unseen realitv. but tl 
sil>l<> appearances, or phenomenal matter alone. Phenomenal matter, it 
appears from daily and hourly experience appears and disappears | 

and is new-created continually Th^ cloud vanishes the star set- 

mist blots it out. the drop evaporates, the ship melts into the ye 
the candle is burnt away and comes to an end. The substance may 
another form, but the phenomenon or appearance is gone. . Thus, by 

the theory, of Matter, the Noumenon we know- uorhinsr, and therefore cannot 
know that it is indestructible Of Matter, the Phenomenon, we may know 
much And one main thine we know of it. proved by hourly expert 
that it both may be ami continually is destroyed For an appearance is de- 
stroyed and perishes, when it ceases to appear.' 

In which sentences, as in all accompanying sentences covering 
several pages, the implication is that Professor Birks identities 
appearance in the philosophical sense with appearance in the 
popular sense' Everywhere his expressions and arguments 
make manifest the fact that Professor Birks thinks the meaning 
of phenomenon in metaphysical discussion is no wider than 
that implied by its derivation— something visible' Sounds, 
smells, tastes are in his view not phenomena, nor are touches, 
pressures, tensions And hence it results that since when a 



APPENDIX. 489 

pound of salt is dissolved in water it ceases to be visible, its 
existence, phenomenally considered, ends — its continued power 
of affecting our senses by its weight to the same extent as before 
the solution not being considered as a phenomenal manifesta- 
tion of its existence ! 

In § 46, when commenting on the mental confusion which 
metaphysical discussions often produce, I have ascribed this in 
part to the misleading connotations of the words "appearance" 
and "phenomenon," and after illustrating this have said : 

" So that the implication of uncertainty has infected the very word appear 
ance. Hence, Philosophy, by giving it an extended meaning, leads us to think 
of all our senses as deceiving us in the same way that the eyes do ; and so makes 
us feel ourselves floating in a world of phantasms. Had phenomenon and ap- 

fearance no such misleading associations, little, if any, of this mental con- 
cision would result. Or did we in place of them use the term effect, which is 
equally applicable to all impressions produced on consciousness through any 
of the senses, and which carries with it in thought the necessary correlative 
cause, with which it is equally real, we should be in little danger of falling 
into the insanities of idealism. ' ' 

This caution was intended for the general reader. That it might 
be needed by one who should undertake to deal with the work 
critically never occurred to me. Not only, however, does it 
seem that Professor Birks (who quotes the last three words of 
the paragraph) needs such a caution, but it further seems that 
the caution is thrown away upon him. For just those misin- 
terpretations of the words above pointed out are the misinter- 
pretations he makes. After this I shall, I think, be absolved 
from examining further his metaphysical criticisms. 

Of his criticisms upon various of the physical doctrines which 
this work contains I will notice two only — the one because I 
wish to repudiate a view which, spite of abundant evidence to 
the contrary, he ascribes to me, and the other because, based as 
his statement is on a fact which he misinterprets, it is desirable 
to give the right interpretation of it On page 188, Professor 
Birks says 

"The Essence of the doctrine held by Mr. Grove, Dr. Tyndall, and Mr. Spencer, 
and which the last has made the foundation of his whole theory of Physical 
Fatalism, is that there is, every moment, an unchanging total of Force, 
which never varies in amount, while it incessantly changes its form. The 
Force, then, which persists, must be a present existence. But Potential 
Energy is nothing of the kind. It is the sum of trillions of trillions of future 
possibilities of force, raging through trillions of trillions of different future 
intervals of time. " 

Now the tacit implication here is that I accept the doctrine 
of Potential Energy. The men of science named, with many 
others who might be added, hold that the total quantity of force 
remains constant. Against these it is urged that energy in 
becoming potential ceases to exist, and that therefore the doc- 
trine is untrue. And being represented as holding this doctrine 
in common with them, I am said to have based my general 
fabric of conclusions upon, a fallacy. In the first place I have 
to ask on what authority Professor Birks assumes that I hold 
the doctrine of Potential Energy in the way in which it is held 
by those named? And in the second place I have to ask how it 
happens that Professor Birks, elaborately criticising my views 



490 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

step by step, deliberately ignores the passages in which I have 
repudiated this doctrine? In the chapter on '"The Continuity 
of Motion"' I have, at considerable length, given reasons for 
regarding the conception of Potential Energy as an illegitimate 
one, and have distinctly stated that I am at issue with scientific 
friends on the matter. Devoting, as Professor Birks doe-, his 
chapter entitled " The Transformation of Force and Motion" to 
the incongruities which result when the doctrine of the Persis- 
tence of Force is joined with the doctrine of Potential Energy, 
as commonly received, it was doubtless convenient to assume, 
spite of the direct evidence to the contrary, that I accept this 
doctrine and am implicated in all the consequences. But there 
can be but one opinion respecting the honesty of making the 
assumption. Let me add that my rejection of this doctrine is 
not without other warrant than my own. Since the issue of 
the last edition of this work, containing the | i have 

referred to, Mr. .lames Croll, no mean authority as a mathema- 
tician and physicist, has published in the Philosophical 
zinc tot October, l s ?»'>. p. '-.Ml. a paper in which he . think 

conclusively, that the commonly accepted view of Potential 
Energy cannot be sustained, but that energy invariably remains 
actual' 1 learn from him that he had in ltGT indicated briefly 
this same view 

Tiie remaining case, above adverted to as calling for comment, 
concerns my motive for suppressing a certain in the 

chapter on w Ultimate Scientific Ideas" and substituting another 
passage Before proceeding to state the reasons for this - 
tution. and to disprove the inferences which Professor Birks 
draws from it, 1 may remark that it is usual in literary criti- 
cisms to judge an author by the latest expression of his views. 
It is commonly thought nothing hut fair that if he has made 
an error (I say this hypothetical!}-, for in this case I have no 
error to acknowledge) he should he allowed the benerit of any 
correction he makes. Professor Birks. however, apparently 
thiuks that, moved hy the high motive of "dbii g vice, 

he is warranted in taking the opposite course—] links, 

indeed, that he would fail of his duty did any regard for 
erous dealing prevent him from making a point against an op- 
ponent of his creed 

But now. sa> ingno more about the ethics of criticism. I 
to the substantial question. In the first place. I have to point 
out that m the passage suppressed I have not said that which 
ssor Birks alleges He represents me as asserting " thai 

at ion is a nee. i 1 1 of the laws of space 71 (p. 22*3 

iave asserted no such thin-;-. He >ays There can be no a 

3ity that every particle should act on every other at all at 
every distance" (p. 222). I have nowhere said or even hinted, 
that there is any such </ priori necessity. The notion "that 
gravitation results by a fatal necessity from the laws y^i space." 
which lie ascribes to me (p. 229) is one which I should repudi- 
ate .is utterly absurd, and one which is not in the remotest way 
implied by anything I have said. What I have said is that 
" Lignt Heat. Gravitation, and all central forces vary inv< 



APPENDIX. 491 

as the squares of the distances, " and that " this law is not simply 
an empirical one, but one deducible mathematically from the 
relations of space. " Now what is here said to be " deducible 
mathematically from the relations of space?" Not a thing, or a 
force, but a law. What is the law here said to be knowable a 
priori? The law of variation of any or every central force. 
And what is alone included in the assertion of this a priori 
law ? Simply this, that given a central force and such is the law 
according to which it will vary. Nothing is alleged respecting 
the existence of any central force. Does Professor Birks con- 
tend that if I say that light proceeding from a centre necessarily 
varies inversely as the square of the distance I thereby say that 
the existence of light itself is known a priori as a result of 
space relations? When I assert that of the heat radiating in all 
directions from a point the quantity falling on a given surface 
necessarily decreases as the square of the distance increases, do 
I thereby assert the necessary existence of the heat which con- 
forms to this law? Why then do I, in asserting that the laic of 
variation of gravity "results by a fatal necessity from the laws 
of space" simultaneously assert " that gravitation results by a fatal 
necessity from the laws of space " ? Professor Birks, however, 
because I assert the first says I assert the second. My proposi- 
tion, "Central forces vary inversely as the squares of the dis- 
tances, " he actually transforms into the proposition, " There is a 
cosmical force which varies inversely as the squares of the dis- 
tances. " And debiting me with the last as identical with the 
first, proceeds, after his manner, to debit me with various re- 
sulting absurdities. 

Having thus shown that the passage in question contains no 
such statement as that which Professor Birks says it contains, 
I go on to show that I have not removed this passage because 
I have abandoned the belief it embodies. Clear proof is at hand. 
If Professor Birks will turn to the "Eeplies to Criticisms," con- 
tained in the third volume of my "Essays: Scientific, Political, 
and Speculative " (pp. 334-337), he will find that I have there 
defended the above proposition against a previous attack ; and 
assigning, as I have done, justification for it, I have shown no 
sign of relinquishing it. Why, then, Professor Birks will ask, 
did I make the change in question? Had his mental attitude 
been other than it is he might readily have divined the reason. 
Knowing, as he seemingly does, that this doctrine which he 
criticises had been already criticised in a similar manner (for 
otherwise he would scarcely have discovered the change I have 
made) , he might have seen clearly enough that the passage was 
suppressed simply to deprive opponents of the opportunity of 
evading the general argument of the chapter by opening a side 
issue on a point not essential to its argument. 

The chapter has for its subject certain incapacities of the hu- 
man mind — a subject, by the way, on which theologians are 
never tired of enlarging when it suits their own purpose, but on 
which an antagonist may not enlarge without exciting their 
anger. Various examples of these incapacities are given to jus- 
tify and enforce the conclusion drawn. Among these was orig- 



492 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

inally included the example in question. Misrepresenting it as 
Professor Birks misrepresents it another writer had before him 
similarly based on his misrepresentation sundry animadversions. 
Though still regarding the statement I had actually mad' 
the one ascribed to me) as valid, I concluded that it would be 
best to remove the stumbling-block out of the way of future 
readers, and therefore decided to replace the illustration by an- 
other. The rest of the chapter remains exactly as it was* and 
its argument is not in the remotest degree affected by xh\> sub- 
stitution. Nevertheless, Professor Birks, wrongly describing the 
nature of the illustration, and wrongly attributing the removal 
of the illustration to change in my belief, also wrongly conveys 
the impression that the doctrine which the illustration contained 
had some vital connection with the general argument of the 
chapter and with the doctrine of the work, and by conveying 
this impression calls forth exultation from religious periodicals. 

Were I to deal with Professor BirkV book page by p 
much larger book than his would be required t<> expose his mis- 
statements, perversions, confusions. The above examples must 
suffice. 1 will add only that in one belief of his I cordially 
with him. At the close of his preface he says: "I think 
thai those who take the pains to read my strictures and compare 
them with the statements of the work to which they area reply 
will find the effort repaid by a clearer apprehension of the top- 
ics in debate." And I venture to join with this the expi 
of my belief that if readers follow Professor Birks' tacit b 
tion "a clearer apprehension of the topics in debate" will nc: 
result from acceptance of his criticisms. 



SUBJECT-INDEX. 



(For this Index the Author is indebted to F. Howard Collins, Esq., 
of Edgbaston, Birmingham.) 



" A priori truth, " denned, 149. 
Absolute, the : Mansel on con- 
ception of, 32-35, 63-66, 73- 

82; also Hamilton, 61-63, 

73-82. 
Adaptation, an instance of 

equilibration, 422. 
Albumen, number of atoms in, 

347. 
Alimentary canal, evolution of, 

326-28. 
Amalgamation, the same as 

integration, 480. 
America, Central, effects of 

subsidence, 370. 
Animals, see Biology. 
Annealing, molecular action 

of, 246. 
Annulosa, longitudinal and 

transverse integration in, 

264. 
Appearance and phenomenon, 

misleading associations of, 

131, 132, 488. 
Army, evolution of an, 332. 
Arnold, M. , on the formula of 

evolution, 476. 
Arts, the : integration shown 

by, 273-6 ; also heterogeneity, 

295-9; definiteness, 318-19; 

and multiplied effects, 384. 
Assyria, artistic development 

in, 295-9. 

Astacus fluviatilis, transverse 
and longitudinal integration 
in, 265. 

Astronomy ; various concep- 



tions of solar motion, 86; 
persistence of force exem- 
plified by planetary motion, 
157 ; transformation and 
equivalence of forces, 171-3 ; 
the laws of motion, 192-4 ; 
rhythm of motion, 216-18 ; 
sidereal and solar integra- 
tion, 260, 278; increased 
definiteness of evolving 
solar system, 307 ; greater 
definiteness of prevision in, 
317 ; redistributions of mo- 
tion in evolving solar sys- 
tem, 324; instability of the 
homogeneous illustrated by 
stellar distribution and color, 
340-2; by the nebular hy- 
pothesis, 342-4 ; by planetary 
orbits, 344 ; the multiplica- 
tion of effects, 366-7 ; segre- 
gation, 393 ; independent, or 
perfect moving equilibrium, 
410; Equilibrium mobile, 411, 
412 ; calculations to disprove 
the nebular hypothesis, 413, 
414 ; equilibration illustrated, 
by nebular genesis, 413; by 
the planetary motions, 413- 
15 ; and by solar heat diffu- 
sion, 415-17; terrestrial dis- 
integration, 444 ; universal 
evolution and dissolution, 
445-52; Sir J. Herschel on 
stellar concentration, 448 ; 
gravitation of magellanic 
clouds, 448. 
Atheism unthinkable, 26. 

495 



496 



SUBJECT-IXDEX. 



Babinet, J., on nebular hy- 
pothesis, 414. 

Baer, K. E. von, the formula 
of, 284. 

Ball and string, perceptible 
and latent activity shown bv, 
154. 

Beckett, Sir E. , Origin of the 
Laics of Nature. 47 :j. 

Bees, the sex cf, 373. 

Beliefs : usually founded on 
fact, 3, 4 ; the common 
groundwork of opposed, 3-8 ; 
(see also Religion.) 

Biology : relativity of knowl- 
edge and the nature of life, 
68-72; definition of life 7": 
transformation and equiva- 
lence of forces, 17(>-7!» ; laws 
of motion, 195-8 ; rhythm 
of motion, 221-4; universal 
presence of integration and 
disintegration, 24i> ; amount 
of contained motion in 
animals and plants, 358-7 ; 
and their mutual inter- 
dependence. 262-7 ; hetero- 
geneity of evolving organ- 
isms, 281-4, 287 ; Von Baer's 
formula, 284 ; increasing 
definiteness of mammalian 
development, 909-12; has in- 
creasing definitenesa char- 
acterized evolving Bora and 
fauna'/. 312-13; redistribu- 
tions of motion of evolving 
functions, 895-8 : instability 
of the homogeneous, 347-458; 
multiplication of elfects. 
371-7 : probable effects of 
upheavals in East Indian 
Archipelago. 373-6 ; segrega- 
tion. 396-9; equilibration. 
100-3: dissolution. 440-2. 

Bird, wounded. apologU 
5J>, 378, 

Birks, T. R., on First Princi- 
ple*. 486-92. 

Blood, mental effects of cere- 
bral supply, 182, 

Body : distinguishable from 
space. 158, 189. 

Bones : integration in ossify- 



ing, 263 : heterogeneity in 
various races, 287 ; increased 
defmiteness, 311 ; segregation 
in ossifying, 396-8. 

Boscovich, R. J., theorv of 
matter, 43-o, 49. 

Botany : transformation and 
equivalence of forces. 176-9 ; 
laws of motion. 196-9 ; con- 
tained motion. 253-7 ; mu- 
tual interdependence of ani- 
mals and plants. 262 
heterogeneity of evolving 
plant.-. 281-4; has increas- 
ing definiteness character- 
ized evolving flora?, 312-14; 
instability of the homoge- 
neous. 347-53; effect* 
upheavals in East Indian 
Archipelago, 373-6; plant 

bion Bhoi 
chieal segregation, 399-401. 

Brain : causes influencing ac- 
tion of. 182; integration of 
growth. 262. 

Brewster, Sir D.. on the nebu- 
lar hypothesis, 414. 

Bronze! eff< ubstitution 

Bullets, projection of. 164. 
Burney. Dr. C. . on musical 
development. 300. 

Candle : chemical explanation 
of burning, not philosophi- 
cal, 833-4 : effects on ig- 
niting. 364. 

Cannon, rhythm consequent 
upon discharge, 214. 

Caoutchouc, introduction in 
England of. I 

Cause, the First : infinite and 
absolute. Ifansel on, 

: relativity of knowl- 
and inconceivabili 
is unknowahl 

Cause and effect, popular mis- 
conceptions of. 147. 

Centipedes, uu integrated and 
homogeneous mot 

Change? universality of. ! 

Chemistry: transformation of 
chemical action into other 



SUBJECT-INDEX. 



497 



modes of force, 170-1 ; heat 
as facilitating change, 247 ; 
stability of elements and 
compounds, 248-9 ; increas- 
ing definiteness of, 318 ; in- 
stability of the homogeneous, 
338, 345-7 ; segregation of 
analysis and crystallization, 
390; dissolution, 442-4. 

Cilia, homogeneous and in- 
definite movements of, 328. 

Classification : a progressive 
integration, 273 ; considered 
psychologically with segre- 
gation, 399-401. 

Coherence, (see Integration) . 

Coleridge, S. T. , verbal "de- 
synonymization, " 354-5. 

Colloids, instability of, 249. 

Comte, A. : co-ordination of 
knowledge, 108 ; on the neb- 
ular hypothesis, 414. 

Concentration, (see Integra- 
tion) . 

Conception : the actual and 
symbolic compared, 21-4 ; 
the preliminary and com- 
plex, 257. 

Consciousness (see Psychology) . 

Conservation of energy, objec- 
tions to the term, 158. 

Conservatism : advantages of a 
theological, 98-101 ; con- 
trasted with reform, 432. 

Contradictories and correla- 
tives, Hamilton on, 75-7. 

Creation, an inconceivable 
hypothesis, 26-30. 

Croll, J. , on potential energy, 
490. 

Crystalloids, stability of, 249. 

Crystals : simple evolution il- 
lustrated by, 250 ; influences 
affecting segregation, 391 ; 
conform to law of dissolu- 
tion, 442. 

Dancing: rhythm of, 225; 
originated with poetry and 
music, 299-302. 

Darwin, C. : date of publica- 
tion of Origin of Species, v ; 
"natural selection" and mul- 
32 



tiplication of effects, 376 ; 
divergence of character, 399. 

Death : are we progressing to 
omnipresent? 433; its re- 
lation to dissolution, 440-2. 

Decomposition, an increase in 
indefinite heterogeneity, 304 
-7. 

Definiteness, a characteristic 
of evolution : the evidence 
from astronomy, 307, 317 ; 
geology, 307, 308-9; meteo- 
rology, 309 ; embryology, 309 
-12 ; biology with botany, 
312-13 ; sociology, 313-15 ; 
philology, 315 ; mathematics, 
316; mechanics, 317, 318; 
chemistry, 318 ; physiology, 

318 ; the arts, 318 ; literature, 

319 ; is a secondary phenom- 
enon of evolution, 320. 

Definition, difficulties attend- 
ing, 113. 

Disease : the rhythm of, 222 ; an 
increase in indefinite hete- 
rogeneity, 304^7 ; hereditary 
transmission of, 352 ; exem- 
plifies multiplication of ef- 
fects, 355. 

Dissolution : definition of, 241 
-2, 440-1 ; interdependent 
with evolution, 436; law 
supported from sociology, 
437-40; biology, 440-2; ge- 
ology and chemistry, 441-4 ; 
astronomy, 444 ; considered 
universally with evolution, 
445-52, 463. 

Divine Right, substituted for 
belief in divine origin, 4. 

Division of labor, social : an 
increase in heterogeneity, 
291-3 ; illustrates instability 
of the homogeneous, 358 ; 
multiplication of effects, 380- 
2 ; and motion along line of 
least resistance, 403. 

Dress, progressive heteroge- 
neity of, 479. 

Earth, the, conceptions only 
symbolic, 20 ; (see also Geol- 
ogy.) 



498 



SUBJECT-INDEX. 



Earthquakes : exemplify laws 
of motion, 196; periodicity 
of, 220 ; a geologist's not a 
philosophical explanation, 
28:3-4 ; an increase in in- 
definite heterogeneity, 306. 

Effects, multiplication of : evi- 
dence from astronomy, 366- 
8; heat, 368; geology, 
71, 374^6; meteorology, 369, 
371; em bry o 1 ogy . 37 2-4 ; 
botany and zoology, 374-<; ; 
philology, 376; psychology, 
377-tf ; sociology, 980-4 ; co- 
rollary from persistence of 
force, 384-6; final summarv, 
461. 

Ego and non-ego. 128-30. 
Egypt, artistic development 
in, 295-9. 

Electricity : transformation in- 
to other modes of force, 169, 
171 ; rhythm of the current, 
211. 
Elie de Beaumont. L. . the 

earth's irregularity. 174. 
Embryology: connection be- 
tween vital and physical 
forces, 178; exemplifies pro- 
gressive Integration, 263-6; 
increase in heterogeneity of 
all organisms. 281-4 : detinite- 
ness oi mammalian develop- 
ment, 909-18 : instability of 
the homogeneous, 347-58 ; 
multiplication of effect 
-4; sex dependent on inci- 
dent forces. 873 ; Kirkman's 
criticism. 474. 
Emotions, (so Psycholog 
Energy: "actual" and '•poten- 
tial." 154, 157, 159; the au- 
thor assumed to hold doc- 
trine of potential, 489. 
Engine, (see Mechani 
Entozoa, development oi 
Equilibration : four orders of, 
410; law supported from as- 
tronomy. -4 1 : > — 1 7 : geology. 
417-19; biology and physi- 
ology, 419-28; psychology, 
423-7 ; sociology. 427-33 ; 



and persistence of force, 
43:3-6 ; summary, 462. 

Equilibrium, unstable, defined, 
337. 

Equilibrium mobile, instances 
of, 409, 411. 

Error, definition of, 71. 

Ethnology ; evolution of man- 
kind, an increase in hetero- 
geneity, 288; the savage and 
the European compar- 
segregation of physical and 
psychical conditions. 401—5. 

Europe, national integration 
in, 267, 

Evolution: superior to the 
word involution. 243 
integration of matter and 
4iasipation of motion. 242, 
Bimple and compound, 
242-5, 249-52, 277 < with dis- 
solution the total his!' 
existence, 258; characterized 
by i iative 

* nature of the definition of, 
s change from an in- 
coherent homogeneity to a 
rent heterogeneity, 
in detinr. 
secondary phenomenon, 
820; a change from an in- 
definite, incoherent, homo- 
geneity, B0; tinal 
definition, stenoa 
of force underlies phenomena 

8, 450-3 : resolutioj - 
company ing redistributions 
of matter and motion, 
aid rendered by multiplica- 
tion of ef 6 : which 
is deducible from p< 
of force. 886 : aid 
by segregation, re- 
lation to law of equilibra- 
tion, 407-18; can end only in 
the greatest perfection 
m u t u a 1 1 y interdependent 
with dissolution, 436 ; consid- 
ered universally with die 
tion. 445-52, 463 . the final sum- 
mary. 467-9; universality of. 
459-60; justified by unifica- 
tion of developing knowl- 



SUBJECT-INDEX. 



499 



edge, 465-6 ; the formula 
criticised by Tait, 471-7; 
Kirkman, 473-7 ; M. Arnold, 
476 ; North American Review, 
476 ; T. E. Cliffe Leslie, 477- 
83 ; M. Guthrie, 484-6 ; and 
Birks, 186-92 ; traits associ- 
ated in the definition must 
be considered as a whole, 
478 ; is dependent on con- 
ditions, 481, 483. 

Existence, the cognition of, 
53-5. 

Explanation, limitation of, 
57-61. 

Eye, development of the, 353. 



Faculty, capacity and desire 
usually associated, 380. 

Fashion: rhythm of, 228; 
progressive heterogeneity of 
dress, 479. 

Fibrine, number of atoms in, 
347. 

Figures, mental development 
and, 146. 

Fiji, belief in ruler's unlim- 
ited power, 3. 

First Cause, (see Cause, the 
First) . 

Flint implements, lack of 
precision and definiteness, 
318. 

Food, equilibration of quan- 
tity to force expended, 420- 
22. 

Force : incomprehensibility of, 
49-51 ; underlies time, space, 
matter, and motion, 141 ; the 
intrinsic and extrinsic forms 
of, 158-60 ; persistence of re- 
lations among various forms 
of, 164; the various forms 
qualitatively and quantita- 
tively correlated, 166-71 ; 
resolutions accompanying re- 
distributions of matter and 
motion, 336 ; heterogeneous 
effect of action on homoge- 
neous aggregate, 359 ; and 
the multiplied effects, 362-6 ; 
Tait's definitions of, 472. 



Force, persistence of, (see Per- 
sistence) . 

Forces : of attraction and re- 
pulsion symbols, not real- 
ities, 189-90 ; persistence 
of force underlies parallelo- 
gram of, 208 ; persistence of 
relations among, a philo- 
sophical truth, 231. 

Forces, the transformation and 
equivalence of : shown in 
astronomy, 171-3 ; geology, 
173-6; biology, 176-8; psy- 
chology and physiology, 178 
-85 ; sociology, 185-7 ; corol- 
lary from persistence of 
force, 187 ; a philosophical 
truth, 232. 

Generalities, when unsug- 
gestive, 473-7. 

Geology : the transformation 
and equivalence of forces, 
173-6 ; laws of motion, 194- 
6 ; rhythm of aqueous and ig- 
neous action, 218-21 ; changes 
undergone by species, 223 ; 
segregation of silica in por- 
celain clay, 247; terrestrial 
integration, 260-2 ; and het- 
erogeneity, 279-81 ; the rec- 
ord consistent with evolu- 
tion from simple to complex, 
284-7 ; indefinite heteroge- 
neity of earthquakes, 308 ; 
increased definiteness infer- 
able from terrestrial struc- 
ture, 308-9 ; molar motion 
originating in molecular, 
322 ; redistributions of mo- 
tion from earth's evolution, 
325 ; heterogeneity of trap 
rock, 339 ; physical effects of 
instability of the homoge- 
neous, 345 ; also chemical, 
346-8 ; multiplied effects of 
diminishing terrestrial heat, 
367 ; and of aqueous and at- 
mospheric agencies, 368-71 ;. 
probable effects of upheavals 
in East Indian archipelago, 
373-6 ; segregation of aque- 
ous and igneous action, 394- 



500 



SUBJECT- IXDEX. 



6 ; equilibration illustrated, ! 
417-20 ; also law of dissolu- ' 
tion, 442-4 ; the earth's dis- 
integration, 444. 

Glass, molecular effect of an- 
nealing, 246. 

Government : authority and 
functions of, 3-8 ; evolution 
of, marked by increasing het- 
erogeneity, 2b9-91 ; also in- 
tegration, heterogeneity and 
definiteness, 333 ; and by 
equilibration, 431-2. 

Granite, segregation of. 

Gravity : incomprehensibility 
of, 50, 87; shows "latent" 
and "perceptible" activity. 
165; terrestrial effects of, 17:5 
-6; effect on vascular 
tern, 198, 

Grove. Sir W. R.. Tin 
relation of the Physical 
Forces, 170. 

Growth: Laws of motion exem- 
plified, 196-200; unii 
presence of, 888; integration 
of, 240; shows molecular 
becoming molar motion 

Guthrie. M. On Mr 
Formula of Evolution. 

Hamilton. Sir W. R, : the 
philosophers agreeing in rel- 
ativity of knowled 
the absolute and inlini; 
3. 73-82; correlatives, 75-7; 
trustworthiness of conscious- 
ness. 117. 

Harvests, correlation of vital 
and physical forces. 185-7. 

Heart, the : spiral form of, 197; 
mental influences on, 201 ; 
increasing definitenesE 
development. 311. 

Heat : of air-breathing ani- 
mals. 110: transformation 
into other modes of- force. 
167-9. 171 ; Joule's mechani- 
cal equivalent. 191 ; terres- 
trial effects of solar. 173-6; 
a cause of condensation 
or diffusion. 238. 230 ; molec- 
ular effects, 240; chemical 



stability, 248-9; simple and 
compound evolution illus- 
trated, 249-52 ; amount pos- 
sessed by organisms, 252. 
353-7 ; instability of the 
homogeneous, 338 : multi- 
plied effects of the ten 
decrease, 345-8, 307 ; action 
on simple and complex com- 
binations, 346 ; action of. on 
sphere. 360; aids segregation 
in granite. 395 ; equilibra- 
tion shown by solar, 415-17: 
necessary for organic and 
inorganic dissolution, 440. 
4-42. 444. 

Helmholtz, H. : on solar heat 
diffusion, 4l»'»; tern 
motion and the tidal wave, 
thermal equivate 
rth'B motion. 444. 

Heredity, the instability of the 
homogeneous, .".51-3. 

hel, Sir J. F. W. : a 
rotating etherial medium, 
415: the sun> rays the ul- 
timate source of every mo- 
tion. 41* ; stellar concentra- 
tion 

Heterogeneity of matter: its 
increase during evolution 
shown by astronomy 
meteorology, 281 ; gi 
879-83; biology with em 
bryology and botany. 
paleontology, 884 
ogr, 387-98 : ethn 
philology, 98(8-5 : the arts 
and literature. 296-302. 

Heterogeneity of motion, (see 
Motion). 

Hieroglyphics, the develop- 
ment of. 204. 

Hinton. J., on direction of 
uric growth, I 

History, definition of com- 
plete. 285-7. 

Homogeneous, instability of 
the : 337-40 : evidence from 
mechanics. 888; a>tronomv. 
340-5: geoloj 

chemistry. : - 5-8; me- 

teorology. 347 . biology with 



SUBJECT-INDEX. 



501 



embryology and botany, 347 
-53 ; psychology, 353-6 ; 
philology, 354 ; sociology, 
356-9 ; corollary from per- 
sistence of force, 359-62 ; re- 
lation to segregation, 389 ; 
summary, 460. 
Huxley, Prof. T. H. : on per- 
sistence of force, 158 ; Per- 
sistent Types, 285 ; osseous 
segregation, 397. 

Ideas : and impressions, 119- 
131, 142 ; advantages of pre- 
liminary, 257. 

Impulsiveness, influences mod- 
ifying, 379. 

India : domestic and political 
fixity in, 314 ; segregation of 
physical conditions in, 402. 

Induction, necessary to verify 
deduction, 259. 

Infinite, the : Mansel on con- 
ception of, 32-36, 63-6, 73- 
8 ; also Hamilton, 61-3, 73-8. 

Insanity, correlation of the 
mental and physical forces, 
183. 

Insects, transformation of 
physical and vital force ex- 
emplified by, 178. 

Integration of matter : and dis- 
integration, 238 ; the pri- 
mary aspect of evolution, 
supported by astronomy, 260 ; 
geology, 260-2 ; biology, with 
embryology and botany, 262- 
6; sociology, 266-9; phil- 
ology, 269-73 ; science and 
meteorology, 272 ; industrial 
and aesthetic arts, 273-6. 

Integration of motion, {see 
Motion) . 

Involution and evolution, the 
terms, 242. 

Iron, molecular rearrangement 
in, 246. 

Japan, effect of European civ- 
ilization in, 438. 

Joule, J. P., mechanical 
equivalent of heat, 171. 



Kant, Im., space and time 
forms of the intellect, 41. 

Kirkman, T. P., on the for- 
mula of evolution, 473-7. 

Knowledge : thought tran- 
scended by, 13 ; resume 
showing limitations, 55 ; rela- 
tivity of, 69-72 ; definition 
of complete, 235-7 ; unifica- 
tion of developing, 465-6. 

Language, {see Philology). 

Laplace, P. S. , on nebulous 
ring development, 343, 393.' 

Latham, R. G., on inflectional 
language, 271. 

Laughter, laws of motion ex- 
emplified by, 202. 

Law : of continuity, 43, 48 ; 
uniformity of, 166 ; the au- 
thor's belief in universality 
of, 284 ; increase in definite- 
ness of evolving statutes, 
314 ; developing systems, and 
the formula of evolution, 

. 482-4. 

Leibnitz, G. W., theory of 
matter, 43. 

Leslie, T. E. CI iff e, on the 
formula of evolution, 477-84. 

Liberty : general establishment 
of, 5 ; equilibration of, 432. 

Life : and relativity of knowl- 
edge, 69-72; definition of, 
70. 

Light : transformed into other 
modes of force, 170 ; com- 
pound rhythm of interfer- 
ence, 214 ; like mode of pro- 
duction with sound, 273 ; 
segregation exemplified, 392. 

Literature : integration of, 
275 ; heterogeneity, 302 ; in- 
creasing truth of representa- 
tion, 319 ; multiplied effects 
of, 384. 

Liver, development of, 311. 

Logic, definition of " a priori" 
and "necessary" truths, 149. 

Magnetism : transformation in- 
to other modes of force, 169, 
171 ; illustrates laws of mo- 



502 



SUBJECT-INDEX. 



tion. 191 ; rhythm of vari- 
ations, 218 ; consequent on 
added motion, 246 ; segrega- 
tive power, 388 ; equilibra- 
tion and the solar- spot cvcle, 
419. 

Majorities, usually in error, 3. 

Manifestations, the vivid and 
faint, 119-31, 142. 

Manners and Fashion, essav 
on, 290. 

Mansel, H. L. : on the first 
cause, the absolute, and the 
infinite. 83-4, B&-6, 3 
conceptions of rational the- 
ology, 34; consciousni 
self, 54; attributes being as- 
serted Of the absolute. 91. 

Marriages, equilibration to 

means of subsistence, 427. 
MarsupicUia, integration of 

generative system iii. 966. 

Materialism aud evolution, 
467-7<». 

Mathematics : figures and men- 
tal development, 1 4 ♦ » : in- 
crease in definiteness. 316. 

Matter; divisibility. 42; in- 
comprehensibility, 42- 
lidity, 42 ; theories o! 
covieli. 44-5, 49; Leibnitz. 
44; and Newton. 44-*"). 49; 
connection with force, j^-."")" . 
consciousness of, 188: inde- 
structibility. 14&-5, 148; cre- 
ation and annihilation, un- 
thinkable. 147-s ; and space, 
190; indestructibility ot\ a 
philosophical truth. 281, 884; 
molecular motion and re- 
arrangement of parts. 24.V8 ; 
contained motion in organic, 
252-3, 853-7 ; effect of uni- 
form force on uniform. 
362-6. 

Maxwell, J. Clerk, on Thom- 
son and Taits Treatise on 
Natural Philosophy, 472. 

Measurement, unable to prove 
persistence of force. 100-2. 

Mechanics : progressive inte- 
gration of machinery, 274 ; 



increase in indefiniten- 
317, 318; instability of the 
homogeneous illustrated. 33^> ; 
multiplied effects of locomo- 
tive engine, 382; dependent 
moving equilibrium shown 
by steam engine. 410. 

Metaphysics : sense of illusion 
after reading, 131 ; antago- 
nism resulting from word 
real. 132. 

Meteorology ; laws of motion 
exemplified, 194-6 ; 
rhythm of motion, 2: 
effect of heat on clouds 
visibility and audibil; 
objects preceding rain 
climatic effects of terrestrial 
irregularity, 2*1 ; definite- 
ness of phenomena oi 
molar, originating in molec- 
ular motion. 322; redistri- 
butions of motion caused by 
earth's evolution. 335; in- 
stability of the homogeneous, 

multipl 
solar action. 369; probable 
effee :.tral American 

subsides siting 

effect of climate. 401. 

Micros) a great exactness 
of. 

Mill. J. S.. on limit to indus- 
trial 

integration of 
■ rative system in. 

Morbid grow tlis, an increase 
in indefinite heteroireneitv, 
904-7. 

Motion : incomprehensibility 
of. 46-9; relativity. 4tf ; 
changing to rest. 4* : con- 
ception derived from experi- 
ences of force. 139: continu- 
ity not self-evident, r 
Newton's first law. 151, 472; 
"latent" and "perceptible. " 
151-8, 153-6; of celestial 
bodies and pendulum, 1" 
continuity known in terms of 
force. 1M\ : and im 
persistence, 1S7 ; transformed 
into heat, electricity, etc.. 




SUBJECT-INDEX. 



503 



166-71 ; along line of least 
resistance, 191-2 ■ general 
laws of direction, 192 • laws 
supported by astronomy, 192- 
4 ; meteorology, 194-6 ; geol- 
ogy, 194-6 ; biology and bot- 
any, 196-9; psychology, 199 
-203 ; sociology, 203-8 ; spiral 
direction, 197 ; persistence of 
force underlies laws of direc- 
tion, 208-11 ; universal 
rhythm of, 212-16 ; illustrated 
from astronomy, 216-18 ; 
magnetism, 218 ; meteorol- 
ogy, 218-20; geology, 218- 
21 ; biology with physiology 
and palaeontology, 221-4, 326- 
8 ; psychology with the arts, 
224-6, 298-302,425 ; sociology, 
226-8, 432; corollary from 
persistence of force, 228-30 ; 
final summary, 454 ; continu- 
ity of, a philosophical truth, 
231 ; also law of direction, 
232 ; facility of an aggregate 
to undergo rearrangement, 
243-5 ; through space, and 
effects of incident forces, 
243-5 ; amount in organic 
matter, 252-7 ; integration, 
heterogeneity, and distinct- 
ness of its evolution, 321-4 ; 
shown by geology, 322 ; me- 
teorology, 322, 325 ; astron- 
omy, 324; biology with 
physiology, 326-8 ; psychol- 
ogy, 328-32 ; philology, 329- 
31; sociology, 332; finally 
results in cessation, 407-9 ; 
molar, changing to molec- 
ular, and its relation to 
universal evolution and dis- 
solution, 445-51 ; final sum- 
mary of the laws of 
direction, 454. 

Mountains : rhythm in rain 
caused by, 219 ; altitude and 
thickness of the earth's 
crust, 261, 281, 367. 

Movement, (see Motion) . 

Multiplication of effects (see 
Effects) . 

Muscle : transformation and 



equivalence of its action to 
the sensations causing it, 
179-81 ; contraction caused 
by interrupted nerve dis- 
charge, 224 ; equilibration of 
expenditure to nutrition, 
421. 
Music : rhythm of, 225 ; and 
progressive integration, 275 ; 
originated with poetry and 
dancing, 299-302. 

Natueal selection : implies 
change along lines of least 
resistance, 198 ; relation to 
multiplication of effects, 376. 

Nature: Thomson and Tait's 
Treatise on Natural Philos- 
ophy, 472 ; " Force, " by Tait, 
472 ; Beckett's Origin of the 
Laws of Nature, 473. 

Nebular hypothesis, (see As- 
tronomy) . 

Nerves, transverse integration 
of, in annulosa and Crus- 
tacea, 264 ; (see also Psychol- 
ogy). 

Newton, Sir I. : theory of mat- 
ter, 43-5, 49 ; on force of 
gravity, 49, 87 ; his first law 
of motion, 151, 472. 

Nitrogen : instability of com- 
pounds, 249 ; amount in an- 
imals and plants, 254. 

North American Review, on 
formula of evolution, 476-7. 

Object and subject, 128-31, 
143. 

Orange and .Earth's crust, 368. 

Organic matter, (see Matter) . 

Origin of Species, The, date of 
publication, v. ; "natural se- 
lection" and multiplication 
of effects, 376. 

Ostrich, osseous segregation in, 
396. 

Owen, Sir R. , on anoplothe- 
rium and paleotherium, 286. 

Pain, varying rhythm of, 226. 
Painting, (see Arts) . 



504 



SUBJECT-INDEX. 



Palaeontology : rhythm of mo- 
tion shown by, 223 ; its 
record consistent with evolu- 
tion, 284-6. 

Pantheism, inconceivability 
of, 26. 

Pendulum : " latent'' and " per- 
ceptible" activity, 151-3 ; al- 
teration of rate by locality, 
323. 

Persistence of force : underlies 
continuity of motion, 107 ; 
transcends demonstration, 
100-3; definition, 163; un- 
derlies uniformity of law, 
166 : and transformation and 
equivalence of forces, 187; 
and laws of motion. 208-11 ; 
and rhythm of motion 
30; a philosophical and uni- 
versal t ruth. 231 : underlies 
phenomena of evolution, 
335; and instability of the 
homogeneous, 85JMJ2; and 
multiplication of effects, 
6 : and segregation, 404- 
6 : and law of equilibration, 
432-6 ; summary, showing it 
to be the ultimate truth, 
453; and evolution to result 
from. 460-3. 

Phenomenon and appearance: 
their misleading asf 
tions, LSI ; misinterpreted by 
Birks. 488, 

Philology ; Language and the 
dispersion of mankind. 11 ; 
errors of verbal misinterpre- 
tation. 13i-.">: integration, 
shown by agglutination of 
language, 261-73; by fewer 
number of syllables. 270; by 
increasing coherence. 271 ; 
and greater complexity of 
sentenees. 272 : incoherence 
of Chinese. 271 ; Latham on 
inflectional languages, 271 ; 
completeness of English lan- 
guage. 293 ; increase in het- 
erogeneity of written and 
spoken language. 292-5 : de- 
velopment of writing. 297 ; 
integration, heterogeneity. 



and definiteness of evolving 
speech, 315. 329-32; hetero- 
geneity, " desynonymization 
of words, 355 : establishes 
racial community, 377 ; un- 
suggestiveness of abstract 
word-. 473-7 ; Leslie on lan- 
guage and law of evolution, 

Philosophers, and relativity of 

knowledge. 57. 
Philosophy : hypothesis of first 
can- Hamilton on the 

lute and infinite, 61-3, 
.': also Mans. I 
(i. 73-82 : varied interpreta- 
tions of, 106-8; completely 
nnilied know ^11*: 

ral and special, 111 : 
must assume intuitions nee- 
rv to thought, 113 : and 
justify them. 114-6 ; alf 
surra trust- 

worthy, 1 1 • "»— 1 ^ ; the | 

- adopted, 131, 142 ; errors 
from verbal misinu 
tation, 131-5; relation to 
><-i< ace, 2 of the 

laws constituting it. 
should set k law oi continuous 
redistribution of 
motion. 235; and unify his- 
tory of exi£ 

formula must comprehend 
evolution and djffusioi 
induction verify 

deduction, 258 ; summa 
its relation t<> evolution and 
dissolution, : " ience 

and religion. 4<"»4 ; and 
elusion, with the doctrines 
re-stated, 4 to 
Phosphorus in the brain 
Physiology : knowing. illus- 
trated by pi :'. 59 ; 
transformation and emiiva- 
lenee of forces, 1 J 
rhythm of motion, 221 ; in- 
creasing definrtenesE 
integration of alimentary 
canal. 326-6; eorrelati 
organs to functions. 41 



SUBJECT-INDEX. 



505 



Physiology, Transcendental, 
and Origin of Species, dates 
of publication, v., vi. 

Piano, thought and concept of, 
80. 

Pleasure, varying rhythm of, 
226. 

Poetry ; rhythm of, 225 ; orig- 
inated with music and danc- 
ing, 299-302. 

Political economy, rhythm in 
the processes of, 226-8. 

Population : equilibration of, 
427, 430 ; dissolution shown 
by decrease, 439. 

Pressure, hypothesis of an uni- 
versal, 189-91. 

Principles of Biology, general 
aim and scope, xiv. 

Principles of Morality, general 
aim and scope, xvii. 

Principles of Psychology, gen- 
eral aim and scope, xv. 

Principles of Sociology, gen- 
eral aim and scope xv. 

Printing, the development of, 
297. 

Progress, its Law and Cause, 
and Origin of Species : dates 
of publication, v. , 284. 

Protein, characteristics of, 
252-4. 

Protestantism and Catholicism, 
97. 

Protozoa: extreme indefinite- 
ness, 312 ; and lack of differ- 
entiated parts, 348. 

Psychology : knowledge tran- 
scended by thought, 12 ; act- 
ual and symbolic concep- 
tions, 21-4 ; Mansel on the 
absolute and infinite, 32-6, 
64-6, 73-82 ; consciousness 
only conceivable as a rela- 
tion, — Mansel, 33 ; duration 
of consciousness inconceiv- 
able, 51-3 ; also its substance, 
53-6 ; relativity of cogni- 
tions, 57-61, 112-14; Hamil- 
ton on the absolute and infi- 
nite, 61-3, 73-82; likeness 
implied by complete act of 
consciousness, 66-8 ; the defi- 



nite and indefinite forms of 
consciousness, 73-7, 79 ; the 
belief in the actuality be- 
hind appearances, 78-82 ; for- 
mation of a thought shown 
by concept of piano, 80 ; phi- 
losophy must assume con- 
sciousness trustworthy, 116- 
8 ; the two classes of mani- 
festations, 119-31 ; relation 
the universal form of 
thought, 135 ; experiences of 
force underlie modes of con- 
sciousness, 141 ; recognition 
of " necessary truths, " 145-7 ; 
the conception of force, 160 ; 
correlation and equivalence 
of physical and mental forces, 
178-85 ; the laws of motion 
exemplified, 199-203 ; also 
rhythm of motion, 224-6, 
299-302, 425; the integra- 
tion, etc., displayed by 
evolving phenomena of, 328- 
31 ; instability of the homo- 
geneous exemplified, 352-6 ; 
also multiplication of effects, 
377-80 ; persistence of force 
underlies assertion of dis- 
similarity, 385 ; segregation 
of developing nerve struc- 
ture, 399-401 ; and of men's 
affinities, 401-3 ; equilibra- 
tion shown by moral and 
nervous adaptations, 423-7 ; 
rhythm exemplified by, 425 ; 
mental defects from study- 
ing one group of sciences, 
477. 
Pythagoras, philosophy de- 
fined by, 106. 

Railways ; rhythm of trains, 
213 ; integration exemplified 
by clearing house, 268 ; mul- 
tiplied effects of, 382. 

Real, definition of, 132-5. 

Reform, contrasted with con- 
servatism, 432. 

Religion : relation to science, 
8-10 ; universality, and in- 
dependent evolution of, 10- 

, 13 ; antagonism shown to 



506 



SUBJECT-IXDEX. 



science, 13-16 ; the subject 
matter transcends experi- 
ence, 13 ; the fundamental 
verity of its varied forms, 
13, 102; the discovery of 
which would aid its devel- 
opment, 16-19 ; can only 
coalesce with science in 
some abstract truth, 18 ; the 
various creeds defined, 36 ; 
the underlying mystery, ab- 
solute, 36-9 ; summary rec- 
onciling it with science, 82; 
its gradual purification, 83-6 ; 
instances of its irreligion, 85 ; 
the purification effected by 
science. 65-8; a nee 
correlative to Bcience, 88-91 ; 
the ultimate cause unknow- 
able 91-5 ; and of which no 
attributes should be ass 
91 ; its approximation to the 
truth dependent on contem- 
porary mental development, 
&8-10J ; its imperfections 
relative, !' s -i"'2; advantages 
of conservatism in, 98-101 . 
toleration needful in deal- 
ing with its beliefs, 101-4 ; 
rhythm displayed by, 881 ; 
heterogeneity shown by it> 
evolution. 289-91 ; religious 
character of early art 
the poetry, music, and danc- 
ing, of its ancient festivals, 
899; summary of its relation 
to philosophy and Bcience, 
4(M ; and conclusion with 
doctrines re-stated, 467-70. 

Respiration, explained to illus- 
trate knowing, 59. 

Rest, changing to motion, un- 
thinkable 

Rhizopods, without limiting 
membrane. 848. 

Rhythm, (see Motion). 

Rivers, lateral undulations of. 

Roads follow line of least re- 
sistance. 805, 

Rulers, varied interpretations 
of their origin and power. 
3-8. 



Salutations, the heterogeneity 
of their evolution. 890. 

Sand, rhythm shown by ridg- 
ing of.' 8i5. 

Scaler instability of the homo- 
geneous exemplified by, 33 s . 

Science ■ general justification, 
13-6 ; a higher development 
of common knowledge. 11 ; 
is prevision. 15; de* : 
superstition, So ; instances of 
its being unscientific, *7 ; is 
partially unified knowledge, 
ins- 11. 406; rhythm of its 
vari ad philos- 

ophy. 831-5 ; it- i 
integration, 878-3; mutual 
interdependence of its divi- 
sion 

geneity. I definite- 

plifies 
multiplication of t 

tinal summary of its 
relation to philosophy and 
religion, 4»">1 ; and conclu- 
sion with the doctrim 
stated, 467-70 ; mental dis- 
cipline of. 477: 
Religion). 

Scuplture, (see Arte 

gation : the varied modes 
( .f action < I illus- 

trated from magnetism 
chemistry, 392 . light, 
astronomy, 

_y with i 

4t'l-:; ; m 
4(»1 . with ethnol- 

and anthropology, 4"l-3 ; 
final sum- 
mary. 461. 
Self, its cognition forbidden 

by nature of thought, 
Self -creation an inconceivable 

hypothi 
Self -existence, an inconceiv- 
able hypothesis, 84-48, 
ami the embryo, 304. 
Ship: relativity of motion. 46; 

rhythm of motion. 812. 
Shops, integration displayed 
by, 4S0. 



S UBJECT- INDEX. 



507 



Small-pox, multiplied effects 
of, 372. 

Sociology : transformation and 
equivalence of the social, 
vital, and physical forces, 
184-7 ; laws of motion illus- 
trated by a society's growth, 
203-5 ; by localization of in- 
dustries, 204; by barter, 
etc. , 204-6 ; and by com- 
merce, 206-8 ; exemplifies 
rhythm of motion, 226-8, 
432 ; progressive integration 
of societies, 266-9 ; the in- 
crease in heterogeneity of 
civilization, 287-92 ; and in 
the definiteness of an evolv- 
ing society, 313-15 ; increas- 
ing definiteness of, 318 ; inte- 
gration, heterogeneity, and 
definiteness of social evolu- 
tion, 332 ; the instability of 
the homogeneous, 356-9 ; 
multiplication of effects, 379 
-84 ; segregation, 401-4 ; 
equilibration, 427-32 ; law of 
dissolution conformed to by 
an evolving society, 437-40. 

Sound and light, their like 
modes of production, 273. 

Space : without limit, incon- 
ceivable, 12 ; also its non- 
existence and creation, 28 ; 
wholly incomprehensible, 39 
-42 ; its inconceivability an 
argument for relativity of 
knowledge, 78 ; experiences 
of force underlie conscious- 
ness of, 135-8 ; how distin- 
guishable from body, 158, 
189. 

Species : rhythm in increase 
and decrease, 222 ; palseon- 
tological evidence, 223; are 
they becoming more defi- 
nitely marked ? 313; instabil- 
ity of the homogeneous, 352 ; 
also segregation, 398; and 
equilibration, 423. 

Sphere, action of radiant heat 
on, 360. 

Spiritualism and evolution, 
467-70. 



Sponges, general indefiniteness 
of, 312. 

Statue, intrinsic and extrinsic 
absurdity exemplified by. 
475. 

Stephenson, G. , on solar rays, 
418. 

Stewart, B., and P. G. Tait, 
The Unseen Universe, 471. 

Subject and object, 128-31. 

Substance, {see Matter) . 

Sugar, segregation in pre- 
serves, 249. 

Sun, the : varied terrestrial 
effects, 173-6 ; plant-life de- 
pendent on, 176 ; inspiration 
increased by, 180 ; correlation 
of social and physical forces, 
186 ; redistribution of motion 
effected by, 322 ; its reserve 
of force, 415-7. 

Supply and demand, 428-30. 

Tait, Prof. P. G., The Unseen 
Universe, 471 ; on the formula 
of evolution, 471-7 ; lecture 
on Force, 472. 

Tape worm, development of, 
373. 

Temperature, (see Heat) . 

Tension, the hypothesis of an 
universal, 189-91. 

Theism, hypothesis inconceiv- 
able, 27-30. 

Theology, Mansel on funda- 
mental conceptions of ra- 
tional, 34 ; (see also Reli- 
gion) . 

Theories, the basis common to 
all, 37. 

Tide, Helmholtz on terrestrial 
effects of, 418. 

Time : incomprehensibility of, 
39-42 ; relativity of knowl- 
edge shown by, 78 ; con- 
sciousness of, arises from 
experiences of force, 135-8. 

Top, equilibration of spinning, 
409. 

Trains, (see Railways) . 

Transcendental Physiology, and 
Origin of Species : their dates 
of publication, v ; chapter 



rm 



SUBJECT-INDEX. 



on " instability of the homo- 
geneous" a development of, 
337. 

Truth: definition of, 71, 115; 
a " necessary, " 145-7 ; " a 
priori" and " necessary, " 149 ; 
words expressing the highly 
abstract unsuggestive. 47:3-7. 

Tuning-fork, persistence of 
force, 228-30. 

Tyndall, Prof. J., on the 
rhythm of motion, 214. 

Universe, the : hypothec 
self-existence, 24-0 : of athe- 
ism, 25 ; <>f self-creatioi 
and of creation by external 
agency, 37-30. 

Unknowable, the: 3-104. 1'il j 
the ultimate cause K 90-5 ; 
the two classes of its mani- 
festations, 1 18-81 : sum- 
mary of its relation to the 
knowable. Kit. 

( 'us, , it c iticism <>f. 

471. 

Unstable equilibrium, defi- 
nition of. :;:)7. 

Varnish, effect of drying 
Vascular system ; influenced 
by force of gravity, 198 ; het- 
erogeneity of its evolution. 



326 

327. 



and multiplied effects. 



Velocity, intermediate degrees 
of a changing. 43 

Vertebrata: transverse and 
longitudinal integration of, 
2C4-6; also heterogeneity of 
an, 2>7. 
- ip>. 

Vision deceptive when unveri- 
fied by touch. 131. 136. 

Volcanoes: laws of motion 
illustrated by. 196; rhythm 
of eruptions, 2 l'.t. 

Watch, theological Bimi 

Water: law- of motion shown 
by, l'-io : rhythm caused in 
opposing objects by, 212. 
215; organic redistributions 
affected by, . 
tive power o4 

Weighing and j>ersi>tence of 
force, 160-2. 

Weight, popular misconcep- 
tion- of. 1 17. 

Whew til. Dr. W.. on i; 

ing defmiteness of science, 

Wind ive action of, 

i B0. 
Words and abstract truths, 
472 : 90 PhiloL . 

Writii. 



H 152 82 







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